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In late 20th-century Texas, during decades of rapid economic growth and abrupt
social transformation, traditional state institutions and other features of a less affluent
Southern past persisted side by side with the modern and newly developed. Criminal
justice, in Texas as in other states, became a realm that was fiercely contested politically
and in the courts. Sentencing and corrections, in particular, bore the brunt of changes
promoted by the frequently conflicting forces of federal grant aid to states and federal
judicial intervention. In the case of Texas, comprehensive reforms ordered by federal
vi
courts became a crucial, if limited, impetus for change that challenged the resistance of
the political establishment. The courts typically sought to compel state institutions to
meet standards of service provision set by professional experts and certifying
organizations. The lead role played by federal courts—rather than Texas professionals
themselves and their statewide organizations—in advocating for reforms indicates that in
a state political environment marked by a tendency toward concentrated power, and with
few independent, politically insulated institutions of their own, Texas doctors, lawyers,
academics, and other professionals had few active roles to play. As examples of court-
ordered reform, the cases of prison medical care and juvenile confinement both display
the chronic abasement of professional standards by state institutions, the limits of
effective judicial intervention over time, and the long-term cyclical patterns of state
politics. Other episodes of attempted reform—the use of federal grant funds originally
intended to upgrade criminal justice agencies, and a succession of initiatives to change
the criminal sentencing code—demonstrate the prevalence of political pressures over
state-supported professional expertise. The particular importance of physicians—and the
absence of state medical organizations—in promoting the revival of a modernized death
penalty is emphasized by a comparison with England, where doctors asserted a
professional interest in criminal justice policies and preempted the medicalization of
capital punishment. Ultimately the fate of each of these initiatives in the realm of
sentencing and correction reflects the pressures tending against the creation and
maintenance of independent professional authority in Texas.
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“But This Is Texas”: Crime and Punishment, Sunbelt Politics,
and the Theory and History of Professions
“The causes of crime, the reach of crime, the reality of crime—all these are
national in scale and scope,” historian Lawrence Friedman has observed. “Criminal
justice, on the other hand, is as local as local gets.”1 Friedman’s truism about scale and
scope reflects the impact of the 1960s, when crime—specifically predatory crime, or
“crime in the streets”—became a nationwide preoccupation and a national political issue.
With the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Congress and the
President began a policy of using federal aid to “improve and strengthen” the far-flung,
deeply local institutions of law enforcement and criminal justice. Since then, billions of
dollars in federal grants, mostly channeled through state-level planning councils, have
flowed to local and state police departments, prosecutors, courts, and prison systems.
At the same time, other federal policies have sought to promote equity in criminal
justice and to protect constitutional rights. Starting with the Warren Court’s criminal
procedure rulings in the 1960s—against which the Safe Streets legislation, in its final
form, represented a backlash—the era of congressional and executive-branch initiatives
has coincided with far-reaching intervention by federal courts. Litigation over prisons
and jails has been the leading example, having been pursued in most jurisdictions
1 Lawrence M. Friedman, Crime and Punishment in American History (New York: Basic Books, 1993), p.
461.
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nationwide and having transformed correctional practices in all of them.2 Activists for
prisoners’ rights and the judges who heard their cases developed a new body of law that
changed not only prison conditions but a host of related criminal-justice policies and
practices. Sentencing and corrections, in particular, bore the brunt of changes promoted
by the frequently conflicting forces of grant aid and court orders.
These changes in criminal justice constitute a new, problematic frontier for
historical inquiry. While formal policy analysis has sought to isolate the impact of
particular initiatives and evaluate their effectiveness in terms of their stated goals,
interpretations of historical significance attempt to fulfill a broader mandate. Still, the
complexities of criminal justice, with its nonsystematic arrangement of interrelated but
autonomous agencies and functions, present considerable challenges to a coherent
narrative. Perhaps the most important factor in identifying a manageable research focus
in this field is the distinct pattern of decentralization. While law enforcement has
remained largely (although far from entirely) a responsibility of local institutions, other
criminal justice functions, such as the creation of criminal statutes and the administration
of prisons, involve state-level policies and agencies. Federal grant formulas and planning
directives have applied chiefly to states, and most (though not all) formal policy analysis
has evaluated state-level planning and program administration. Mainly for these reasons,
the task of assessing federal intervention in criminal justice lends itself to a single-state
case study. This approach should gain in richness more than it gives up in claims to
representativeness. Also, by allowing for thorough treatment of the context of ongoing
2 For the full list of jurisdictions, see the ACLU National Prison Project’s Status Report, January 1995, pp.
1-2.
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processes of change in a single locale, it can portray the impact of federal policy in an
appropriate perspective—relating it to other factors, weighing its relative significance,
and appreciating its limits.
In contemporary Texas, as in the past, controversies about crime and punishment
reflect—and reinforce—the state’s peculiar reputation. Violent crime itself, as the object
of daily fear and guilty fascination, has pervaded the public discourse, and influenced not
just familiar social arrangements (like electoral politics, or real estate development, or
public school curricula) but the construction over time of the most basic and enduring
social distinctions (race, gender, class). Criminal sentencing and corrections—the object
of this study—are ostensibly among the means by which society responds directly to the
crime problem, but as it contributes its share to the social construction of the problem, its
agents and institutions function in ways that reflect their own histories. In the Texas
system, as the following chapters will show, much of the history is about conflict among
decentralized local authorities (county sheriffs, city police, and locally elected state
district attorneys and judges) and central state institutions (specialized law enforcement
agencies, the appeals courts, and the prison, parole, and probation systems).
Nevertheless, in particular cases, the separately spinning cogs and gears can seem to
mesh all too well. In Tulia in 1999, dozens of black residents (almost half of the adult
black men in the small West Texas town) were fingered by a single undercover officer,
and rounded up in a single raid—and then quickly tried and convicted by juries, or
induced to plead guilty to felony drug-trafficking charges, and sentenced to lengthy
prison terms, with their fates resting on procedurally constrained appeals before a
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generally hostile state court. “Anyplace else, you might have a chance of getting some
things undone, or at least getting another look at the cases,” said a defense lawyer. “But
this is Texas.”3
Tulia serves to represent not just the surface of the larger system, but some of its
complexity as well. In the spotlight of national coverage, the episode appeared as a
demonstration of racist fears and obsessions maintaining a tight grip on small-town Texas
justice. But while the raids and subsequent railroading of defendants reenacted grim
patterns of persecution from previous decades, they were also made possible by recent
institutional developments—specifically the setting up of drug enforcement “task forces”
by police, sheriffs, and district attorneys in particular locales, with funding provided by a
federal grant program (passed through the state governor’s office) and by the task forces’
own cash and asset seizures. Likewise, the stoking of public anxieties over drug crime, in
political campaign rhetoric but also in executive policymaking at the state level, was an
updated, technologically advanced version of an old phenomenon—the top-down
mobilization of targeted sources of voting support, via coded racial symbols—reflecting a
long-awaited shift in statewide partisan politics and an intensified competition for
particular voting blocs.
Other factors in play ran counter to the prevailing policies and politics of state
officials. Legal challenges which eventually brought the retrial and vindication of the
Tulia defendants reflected the occasional intervention of pro bono attorneys in selected
3 Nate Blakeslee’s insightful reporting and analysis, in his Texas Observer articles and in Tulia: Race,
Cocaine, and Corruption in a Small Texas Town (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), have established the
leading account of the widely publicized case. Also see Jeannie Kever, “Out of Hiding,” Houston
Chronicle, 6/2/02.
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cases at the appeal stage, and the occasional willingness of federal (or, for the Tulia
defendants, state) appeals courts to rule against existing state policies. Like Texas
criminal justice more generally, the Tulia episode reflected both tradition and
modernization. The recent history of institution-building and political-coalition-forming
tended to reinforce a social order rooted in the more distant past—but would not always
guarantee its prevalence.
Tradition and modernization together preoccupied Texas society at the same time,
during decades of disorienting change. Early in the 20th century, oil production and the
birth of an energy industry began an economic shift away from the common dependence
on cash crops that had confounded the southern states. Boom times during and after
World War II were stimulated further by massive federal investments in military bases,
aerospace, the “petrochemical corridor,” and other defense-related industries.
Industrialization, in-migration, and metropolitan area growth came late to Texas but with
abrupt force, creating an unsettled society in cities and suburbs with shallow local roots.
The impact on some of the state’s longstanding social conditions was mixed but
undoubtedly significant: urban and suburban development patterns reinforced separation
by class and race, but at the same time, widespread public resistance to the elimination of
traditional forms of racial discrimination was significantly diluted. As sections of the
state and segments of its population grew less isolated from other places in other states,
the picking and choosing of symbols of Texas memory subtly signaled a break in the
thread of actual tradition.4
4 Randolph B. Campbell observes: “When modern Texans in cities such as Houston put on their boots and
Stetsons and head for the rodeo or hearken back to the days of movie westerns that portrayed their state as a
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The boom accelerated during the 1970s and early ‘80s, as the energy-based
economy ran counter to the national economic cycle and attracted businesses, capital, and
population from other regions. Having recently existed as an economic colony of distant
regions blessed with investment capital, Texas now appeared at the center of the Sunbelt,
a term coined to refer to the shift of economic resources and power toward the region of
continued vitality. This later period arguably saw a lagging cultural shift finally occur—
most visibly on the metropolitan lifestyle frontier (where liquor was now for sale by the
drink, and Texas Monthly and D Magazine offered serious feature journalism, while their
advertisers reshaped the consumption standards of upscale subscribers). Again, the
implications were mixed: the space for public debate was widened, but the distance
between the perspectives of Texans across class and other divides—urban-suburban-
rural, Anglo-Black-Hispanic, inside or outside the criminal justice system—was not
vastly narrowed. The tensions that accompanied growth were clearly aggravated by the
hard times that trailed the cyclical contraction of the energy and real estate sectors.
In the political environment fostered by economic and social development, from
World War II on, concentration of power within elite circles was a constant (if not always
prevalent) tendency. The most influential historical narrative of mid-20th-century Texas
politics describes a near-monopoly of power maintained at the statewide level by “the
Establishment”—“a loosely knit plutocracy comprised mostly of Anglo businessmen,
land of cowboys, rustlers, and gunfighters, they are drawing on a collective memory that, although it has a
basis in fact, is not the essence of Texas. The cold history of being southern is not as pleasing as the warm
memory of being western.” “History and Collective Memory in Texas: The Entangled Stories of the Lone
Star State,” in Gregg Cantrell and Elizabeth Hayes Turner, eds., Lone Star Pasts: Memory and History in
Texas (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 2007), p. 279.
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oilmen, bankers, and lawyers.”5 According to this view, corporate leaders, who in
previous years had been “forced to share the Texas political limelight . . . with reform
movements and self-seeking politicians,” succeeded after World War II in controlling the
state Democratic Party and the outcomes of gubernatorial races and legislative sessions.
They imposed a fixed set of policies (a regressive tax structure weighted toward
consumption and retail sales, franchise fees in place of business income taxes, low
expenditures for state services, tight restrictions on labor organizing) that served their
narrow interests, while upholding others (“states’ rights,” resistance to desegregation,
outlawing the Communist Party, firing liberal university professors) that reflected the
fears and prejudices common to their class. Continuously maintained though it was, this
degree of control was never fully secure, and it faced some vigorous challenges from
liberal candidates for statewide office. Also, while consensus might prevail on broad
policy essentials among politically influential circles, struggling and bargaining between
representatives of conflicting economic interests could prove intense. The individual
governors who received establishment backing were capable of varying degrees of
leadership in their own right, and the Legislature itself was an erratic, unruly, unreliable
body of amateur lawmakers who overrepresented the rural sections and who, for all their
conservatism, tended to resist central direction from any particular source. In
Establishment-run Texas, the carrying of legislation and guarding of priorities shared
within elite circles was an endlessly recurring biennial challenge for the state’s top
lobbyists.
5 George Norris Green, The Establishment in Texas Politics: The Primitive Years, 1938-1957 (Norman:
Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1979), p. 17.
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However effective the “loose plutocracy” actually was in dominating state
politics, by the 1970s the machinery was becoming obsolete. During a period of
diffusion of power, the future direction of Texas politics was up for grabs. The extension
of voting rights, the redrawing of voting districts under federal court orders, the
discrediting of the state’s most powerful elected politicians in a banking scandal, and the
various demographic and cultural shifts under way all undermined the existing system of
top-down management of a pliable electorate. The opening up of tightly controlled
political structures was illustrated most dramatically in Dallas, where the Citizens’
Charter Association—the longtime vehicle for the virtually unchallenged dominance of
local politics by a network of bank chairmen and other business leaders—simply
vanished from the local scene. At the same time, the corresponding institution at the state
level—the Texas Democratic Party—slipped out of the grasp of the old conservative
establishment and came increasingly under the influence of its long-suffering liberal
wing. As both liberal Democrats and pioneering Republicans had long foreseen, the
tipping balance among Democrats created a new, competitive two-party system in state
politics. With Democratic Party allegiance woven tightly into the fabric of political life
throughout areas of the state that resisted rapid change, party leaders calculated that they
could maintain a class-based majority coalition that included newly mobilized voters
(largely minority) and inherited constituents (largely rural conservatives). But instead
Republicans, long confined largely to upscale precincts in urban centers, targeted and
gradually captured the mass of white conservative voters, and ultimately (with a final,
corporate-funded push arranged by Tom DeLay) won control of the Legislature and all
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statewide offices. With one-party dominance reestablished at the state level, the
concentration of power was once again a fact of Texas political life.
The characteristic features of Texas society and politics in recent decades—rapid
economic development jump-started by federal policy, broad demographic and cultural
shifts, the tendency toward concentration of political power within elite circles, and the
reconcentration of power as a function of partisan realignment—also characterize
neighboring states, to varying extents, and serve as (extreme) examples of broader
regional patterns. Together with its Sunbelt neighbors, Texas also retained traditional
state institutions and other features of its less affluent Southern past, side by side with the
modern and newly developed. The improvement of state services lagged behind
population and economic growth (and growing needs) because of the insulated political
structure and its fixed policies. While the opening up of political processes eventually
created opportunities to challenge longstanding policies, the more direct route was often
through litigation—as federal courts increasingly served to adjudicate claims which
political systems would not yet accommodate. Criminal justice in many states became a
realm reshaped by litigation, court orders, and settlement agreements. Like other
Southern states, Texas had retained the plantation farms and many other customs and
practices of its premodern penal heritage. Like five other Southern states (and only three
non-Southern), Texas would ultimately face a comprehensive federal court order
involving the totality of conditions in its prison system.6 Comprehensive court-ordered
6 The other states were Alabama, Arkansas, Mississippi, South Carolina, Tennessee, and (outside the s
South) Alaska, Delaware, New Mexico, and Rhode Island. Statistics compiled by Malcolm M. Feeley and
Edward L. Rubin, Judicial Policy Making and the Modern State: How the Courts Reformed America’s
Prisons (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998), p. 41.
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reforms ultimately became one more distinguishing feature of regional criminal justice,
and (in the case of Texas) a crucial, if limited, impetus for modernization that countered
the resistance of the political establishment.
Federal court intervention typically sought to compel state institutions to meet
standards of service provision set by professional experts and certifying organizations.
While judges sought authoritative guidance for their mandates, reform-minded state
administrators also saw the pursuit of certification as a way of defining their own tasks
and legitimizing their institutions. Texas prisons and the state juvenile confinement
system were both ordered by the court to attain professional accreditation and to meet
other detailed standards reflecting the state of the art in relevant fields of expertise. The
key issue for district and appellate judges—with far-reaching significance for state
institutions—was whether the intensive provision of treatment services to individuals in
state custody, according to professional standards of care, could be construed as a
minimum standard that the state could be required to provide.
Why was it left to an activist federal judge, rather than state professional
organizations themselves, to try to make state institutions meet professional standards?
In raising this question, the litigated reform effort opens up a broader complex of
unsettled questions about professional expertise, professionals themselves, and their
relationships to state institutions and political authority. The question of physician
participation in the death penalty raises the same set of issues, perhaps even more acutely.
The sociological and historical literature on professions offers a range of understandings
of the expert and his social role. According to functionalist theory, professional
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occupations distinguish themselves and legitimize their authority through such means as
peer review, scientific expertise, and higher values. In this view a profession, as one
synthesizing scholar helpfully puts it, is “an occupation that regulates itself through
systematic, required training and collegial discipline; that has a base in technical,
specialized knowledge, and that has a service rather than profit orientation, enshrined in
its code of ethics.”7 Inevitably such claims, rather than describing reality, promote the
shared interests of professionals—authority, autonomy, prestige, social privilege, material
compensation. Also inevitably, group self-interests and political expediency can be
expected to conflict with the upholding of professional values across a range of possible
situations and contexts.
Over time the literature of professions has increasingly emphasized the waning of
independent professional authority in contemporary society and the subjection of
expertise to formerly subordinate forces. The phenomenon of the American medical
profession—its unique attainment of sovereignty over health care in society, and its
almost equally spectacular fall from its pedestal—has long preoccupied leading scholars
and shaped their analyses of professional activity as maximizing group self-interest. The
more recent prevalence of market forces over physician discretion in health care is seen
as a partial consequence of the routine compromising of stated professional values by
self-interested, market-oriented practitioners. Historians have drawn broadly congruent
conclusions from particular case studies. Brian Balogh’s study of the delegation of broad
policy authority over promotion of nuclear power to scientific experts on the Atomic
7 Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine (New York: Basic Books, 1982), p. 15,
identifying themes in the prior work of Talcott Parsons, Ernest Greenwood, and Morris L. Cogan.
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Energy Commission emphasizes the ultimate failure of the experts to contain their
internal disputes and to maintain their external standing. In a very different context,
Kenneth Lipartito and Todd Pratt’s authorized history of the Houston law firm of Baker
& Botts portrays the influence of the powerful corporate law firm over the developing
institutions of the Texas legal profession—and the firm’s deep identification with the
technical needs and broader interests of its corporate clients. Lipartito has subsequently
crafted a broad, synthetic account of American professions during the 20th century which
portrays subordination as the norm. “The years between 1950 and 1970 were the
exceptional ones,” he argues. “In those stable decades, professional practitioners could
pretend to be above the competitive fray and free from the taint of commerce.”8
To answer the question about Texas professionals and their distant relationship to
criminal justice, it is necessary to hypothesize beyond the existing arguments about
professionals in recent history. Whether or not Lipartito’s case study of Baker & Botts
serves well as a model for his generalizations about the 20th century, it may well help to
explain the orientation and behavior of other leading professional entities and
organizations in the same place. The firm’s full commitment to expertise in established
and emerging areas of corporate law made unquestionable sense as a business strategy,
but in the context of conceivable alternatives it amounted to a revealing choice about
priorities. Essentially, the most powerful law firms in the state could not afford to
jeopardize their client relationships by presuming to wield their power independently. In
8 Kenneth J. Lipartito and Paul J. Miranti, Jr., “The Professions,” in Stanley I. Kutler, ed., Encyclopedia of
the United States in the Twentieth Century (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1996), Vol. 3, p. 1428.
Also see Lipartito and Miranti, “Professions and Organizations in Twentieth-Century America,” Social
Science Quarterly, Vol. 79, No. 2 (June 1998), pp. 301-320.
13
booming cities ruled by small circles of businessmen, and in a state long governed by a
“loose plutocracy” of corporate chairmen, professional power basically derived from
patronage, service, and proximity to the center where actual power was concentrated.
My hypothesis is that in the long-delayed reform of criminal justice in Texas,
leading doctors, lawyers, academics, and other professionals had few independent roles to
play. The state lacked meaningful competition among alternative centers of political
power (such as labor), and professional groups lacked politically insulated institutions
(such as universities, or Ford-sized private endowments) to serve as power bases in state
politics. Attending to their own immediate interests required Texas professionals to serve
independently powerful patrons rather than challenging them. Broad social changes and
the partisan reshuffling of state politics ultimately reinforced the limits on independent
professional influence. Potential support for a broader range of policy alternatives was
preempted. Organized support for legislative criminal justice reforms rarely carried
significant weight in the absence of imminent crises. Reconciling Texas criminal justice
institutions with modern standards of treatment and care was thus left up to the federal
judiciary, working with national professional organizations and experts typically brought
in from out of the state.
The lack of active support by local professionals and their statewide organizations
was particularly damaging to the prospects for criminal justice reform over time. This
was largely because the existing operations of the justice system already required the
provision of services by members of leading professions. Beyond the obvious roles of
prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges, court cases increasingly required expert
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witnesses, and both adult and juvenile correctional systems required medical and
casework services as well as custodial staff. Improving these services, as well as other
conditions of confinement, required not only the existence of professional standards, but
also the legal and political power to impose—and enforce—standards of any kind. Even
as long as court orders were upheld, enforcement was always a problem. For corrections
systems newly required to provide professional services, or for other areas of state
criminal justice policy, arrangements for oversight and analysis indicated the degree of
independence that professionals would demand and that officials would tolerate. In a
sense, the tasks of inspection, oversight, and evaluation of criminal justice reflected core
responsibilities of independent professionals. The extent to which they actually perform
this function may be a fair index of their independence and relative standing in a broader
context.
Each of the case studies contained in the following chapters considers the issues
of federal intervention and professional expertise, and their impact on policy outcomes in
the realm of sentencing and corrections. Several of the chapters follow reform efforts
driven by litigation in federal court—meaning mostly the U.S. Court for the Eastern
District, under Judge William Wayne Justice. In separate landmark cases that continued
for years, Judge Justice ordered far-reaching reforms in both adult prisons and “state
schools” housing juvenile delinquents. My examination of the comprehensive prison
reform case focuses on one key issue of professional service provision—medical care for
Texas prisoners. The ingrown, primitive customs of care offer an outrageous example of
official neglect and the abasement of professional standards. While the court’s remedial
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orders could address the worst conditions, I argue that its failure to force the state to limit
the prison population ultimately confounded its intentions. The takeover of prison health
care by state medical schools, without independent oversight, reflected the institutional
priorities and political power of the academic medical establishment and raised barriers to
the visibility of care that had been taken down nearly a generation before.
Another ruling by Judge Justice (six years before the ruling on prison reform) was
aimed at transforming the juvenile justice system. To a greater degree than the prison
farms and units for adults, the reform schools were always ostensibly intended to provide
rehabilitation as well as confinement, and over time the state created a façade of
professionalism to conceal the actual conditions of imprisonment. The case in Judge
Justice’s court exposed these conditions, and his ruling sought to force the system to
abandon its facilities and reorient itself according to what were then considered advanced
concepts among professionals in the field. These instructions were voided when the
appeals court reversed Judge Justice’s ruling and remanded the case to the court for
retrial. While the case did ultimately yield a settlement which included a period of
evaluation and oversight by outside experts, the failure over time to limit the flow of
youths into the system overwhelmed the attempted reforms and forced an expansion of
the system, together with various symbols and rituals of regimentation. Once again a
façade of professionalism settled over the state system (until new shocking revelations in
the spring of 2007 confirmed the long-term cyclical pattern).
The story of nonjudicial federal intervention in state criminal justice contains
another case of unintended consequences, while shedding light on the use of criminal
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justice politics by state governors to advance personal and partisan interests. Federal
grants for state and local criminal justice were originally envisioned as a means of
elevating the skills and professional status of law enforcement personnel (as part of the
Johnson White House’s too-little, too-late effort to cope with crime in the streets). In
reality, the transformation of the actual program into a block grant allowed state
governors to practice a new form of criminal justice patronage politics. But in the hands
of a clever, ambitious executive, the money could be put to more meaningful use. My
chapter shows how federal grant funds helped fuel a popular antidrug crusade and
mobilized an influential new public constituency for draconian drug laws.
The fate of successive sentencing reform initiatives in the Texas Legislature
reflects both the cultivation of actual professional expertise—data collection, analysis,
and projection of prison population trends—at the state level, and the failure of experts to
make more than a modest impact on legislative outcomes. The state penal code enacted
in 1973 reflected progressive intentions among leaders of the legal profession, but the
fight over enactment also displayed the intraprofessional divisions that disabled the State
Bar as a force for political change. Years later, dire problems of prison population
management forced state leaders to set up a staff of data analysts and, ultimately, a full-
blown special commission charged with recommending comprehensive sentencing
reforms. Both initiatives raised the possibility of bringing credible professional expertise
to bear on the legislative management of criminal justice as a matter of course. But in the
end, the difficulties of sustaining such a role were reconfirmed.
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The last chapter addresses the sorest subject in Texas criminal justice. The
revival of the death penalty came accompanied—and to some degree further
legitimized—by rituals of medical procedure (execution by lethal injection) and
sentencing criteria that included psychiatric diagnosis. This latest innovation—together
with its passive acceptance by organized medicine—proves well suited to a direct
comparison across international boundaries. In England, many of the same developments
that later characterized capital punishment in Texas were anticipated and debated. What
stood in the way of recommendations which might have helped sustain the death penalty
was the British Medical Association, which objected both to the rules determining the
criminal responsibility of defendants and to proposed procedures for execution by lethal
injection. The comparison raises new questions about the social standing and perceived
jurisdictional responsibilities of leading professions under political pressure. In places
such as England, doctors asserted a professional interest in criminal justice policies and
preempted the medicalization of capital punishment.
But this was Texas, where no such responsibilities prevailed. The theme of
regionally distinct patterns of professional formation and evolution forges a new link
between overlapping genres of regional history—the history of Texas, the Sunbelt, and
the broader history of the South, with its richly varied themes of regional
distinctiveness—and the literature on professions and their development. As for the state
itself, my inquiry into changes in criminal justice seeks to shed new light on its recent
history and to relate it to a broader context. Ultimately the fate of each of the
initiatives—federal grant funding, reform of adult prisons and juvenile institutions, and
18
the state criminal justice policy analysis staff—reflected the pressures tending against the
creation and maintenance of independent professional authority in Texas.
19
Chapter 1
Wards of the State: The Politics of Texas Prison Medicine
The history of prison medicine reflects both the evolution of the medical
profession and the strange career of prison reform. In some ways prison medicine, like
prisons generally, has resisted the reforming efforts of litigants for more than a
generation. Early on in these efforts, primitive conditions of care in many state systems
offered clear opportunities to inmates, advocates and federal judges seeking to establish
new Eighth Amendment standards. In Alabama, Judge Frank Johnson’s ruling in a
medical-care suit paved the way for further interventions by asserting federal court
oversight over the entire state prison system and ordering relief to a whole class of
prisoner-plaintiffs.1 Cases in other states cited medical care among other conditions
which together required comprehensive injunctions.2
Prodded by court orders and guided by the development of formal standards, state
and local governments vastly increased their spending on inmate health care from pre-
litigation levels, but the quality of the care being provided has still been bitterly
contested. In the 1990s, the resort to managed care offered by private contractors
renewed debates over whether inmates were being deprived of adequate or competent
1 Newman v. Alabama, 349 F. Supp. 278a (M.D. Ala. 1972). See Larry W. Yackle, Reform and Regret:
The Story of Federal Judicial Involvement in the Alabama Prison System (New York: Oxford Univ. Press,
1989), chapter 2, especially pp. 30-41.
2 Early examples include the Arkansas and Mississippi suits. See J. Smith Henley’s ruling in Holt v. Sarver
(Holt II) 309 F. Supp. 362, 365 (E. D. Ark. 1970), and Judge William C. Keady’s opinion in Gates v.
Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972). Claims of inadequate provision or lack of access to medical
care were part of all the totality-of-conditions claims.
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care.3 In California, where litigation continues to this day, a federal judge in October
2005 actually took the administration of prison health care out of the hands of the state
corrections department and placed it with a court-appointed receiver.4 The persistence of
the issue reflects the tendency of penal reform to chase a receding horizon.
The same tendency could be attributed to the advance of medicine itself, given the
similarly stubborn divergence between ever more costly investments in new technologies
of care and the actual state of people’s health. To the extent that the reform movement
reduced the legal isolation of inmates from the free world, it exposed them more to forces
broadly affecting free-world society, including the inflation of health-care costs and the
rise of managed care as a means of cost control. But as outside forces shaped the
development of medical care within prisons, this same development proved to have an
impact of its own beyond prison walls. The flow of funds into new systems of inmate
care supported the emergence of correctional health care as a field, a new specialty within
medicine and allied professions, with its own professional organizations (such as the
National Commission on Correctional Health Care) offering accreditation to correctional
institutions and promoting new career opportunities for doctors, nurses, technicians, and
others. To a medical profession with declining power over patient care in an
3 A vivid recent example was provided by Paul von Zielbauer’s New York Times series titled “Harsh
Medicine,” which investigated the cost-trimming practices of industry-leading contractor Prison Health
Services, Inc., and their impact on the New York City jail system and on many of the company’s other
clients. See “As Health Care in Jails Goes Private, 10 Days Can Be a Harsh Sentence,” NYT, 2/27/05, and
“In City’s Jails, Missed Signals Open Way to Season of Suicides,” NYT, 2/28/05. Von Zielbauer also
followed Prison Health Services to Alabama and found some of the same types of abuses. See “One
Doctor’s Diagnosis,” NYT, 8/1/05.
4 See Plata v. Davis, No. C-01-1351 TEH, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43796 (N.D. Calif. 2005), Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law Re Appointment of Receiver.
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environment dominated by cost concerns, the expansion of prison populations with
constitutional protections offered a significant growth opportunity.
The peculiar case of prison health care in Texas reflects at once the state’s
characteristically Southern penal heritage, its own distinctive pattern of response to
pressures for change, and, not least, the position of the organized medical profession as
an increasingly interested party. By the early 1970s, the state of medical care (among
other conditions) within Texas prisons had become virtually invisible to the outside
world, shielded not (as in other Southern states) by rustic traditions but by an
administration bent on controlling what it viewed as model institutions. Over many years
of maneuvering over Ruiz v. Estelle, the federal case Texas prisons, state officials fiercely
defended their control over all areas of prison management. On medical care, they
persisted through the trial stage in defending the constitutionality of the indefensible. In
responding to the court’s demands for comprehensive reforms, prison administrators
agreed to settle the medical-care issues rather than including them in ongoing appeals, but
in implementing court orders they still tried to pursue modernization on their own terms.
As with his handling of juvenile confinement in Morales v. Turman, Judge
William Wayne Justice tried to use the Ruiz case to reorient the prison system in ways
which would not survive the appeals process. The provisions of his order granting relief
from overcrowding, which the Fifth Circuit overturned, suggest an underlying purpose of
forcing Texas to accept a smaller prison population which could be better served. As
with juvenile confinement, only on a vastly larger scale, the state’s failure to limit the
flow of convicts into the prison system ultimately meant that all other intended effects of
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the litigation were severely compromised. Later decisions to add institutional capacity
left the state obliged to provide expensive (if not necessarily sufficient) medical services
to a vastly increased population. State medical school administrators adeptly used this
situation to promote their professional and institutional interests, securing control over
managed-care provision without any oversight. Some twenty years after the scandalous
state of prison medicine in Texas was brought to public attention, the system was
effectively brought back behind legal barriers, isolated from the free world once again.
Behind the old brick walls guarding the original Texas penitentiary (now called
the “Walls Unit”) in Huntsville, abutting one wing of a 19th-century structure containing
cell blocks, the Huntsville Unit Hospital building stands five stories high, rising well
above the surrounding complex. Built in the early 1930s, the structure reflects an
intermittent concern for inmate welfare on the part of past generations of prison
managers, political leaders, and reform advocates—a heritage rarely invoked by the
Texas Department of Corrections by the 1960s and 1970s, as it promoted its own image
as a force for modernization and Texas-style progress.5 But during the years of the Texas
5 Paul M. Lucko recaptures the aspirations and initiatives of a forgotten generation of reformers—as well as
their lack of sufficient power to uproot the prison farm system—in “A Missed Opportunity: Texas Prison
Reform during the Dan Moody Administration, 1927-1931,” Southwestern Historical Quarterly 96 (July
1992), pp. 27-52. In their history of recent Texas prison litigation, Steve J. Martin and Sheldon Ekland-
Olson devote a chapter to background on the earlier history of the prison system, attributing the hospital to
the improving initiatives of prison manager Lee Simmons. See Texas Prisons: The Walls Came Tumbling
Down (Austin: Texas Monthly Press, 1987), p. 12, and also Simmons, Assignment Huntsville: The
Memoirs of a Texas Prison Official (Austin: Univ. of Texas Press, 1957). (Lucko however documents
Simmons’ determination to exercise managerial, paternalistic authority, over the objections of prison
reform advocates. See “Counteracting Reform: Lee Simmons and the Texas Prison System, 1930-1935,”
East Texas Historical Journal, Vol. 30, No. 2 (1992), pp. 19-29.) Unfortunately, as of 2007 the leading
scholarly histories of the Texas prison system, both of which also credit the efforts of reformers while
demonstrating their limits, end their coverage with the abolition of convict lease. See Lucko, Prison
Farms, Walls, and Society: Punishment and Politics in Texas, 1848-1910 (Ph.D. dissertation, The
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prison lawsuit, the hospital came to symbolize something else. By then obsolescent and
dilapidated, the building conspicuously embodied the state of the medical care being
provided in its wards and in the prison system generally. The extraordinary efforts
required to get its hospital functions closed down reflect the ways in which Texas prison
managers confronted a changing legal and social environment. The traditional provision
of medical care was integral, if not necessarily indispensable, to the “control model” of
Texas prison governance. Reform of medical care, like other changes, required the
demise of the old regime and a transition to new prison leadership.
The “control model” involved an emphasis on orderliness, intensive
regimentation, and charismatic authority that successive Texas prison system directors
adapted and refined. The original model was Joe Ragen’s “authoritarian regime” at
Stateville, Illinois, which served to advertise the strengths (and ultimately the failings) of
personalized leadership.6 Ragen maintained order at Stateville through a system of
patriarchal dominance that tolerated no challenges and required that the separation of
prison from outside society be rigorously maintained. Marched in silent lines, subjected
to unrelenting regulation of their behavior and movements, prisoners (supposedly) reaped
the benefits of a secure environment and the various progressive programs that it allowed.
As director of the Texas Department of Corrections from 1962 to 1972, George Beto, a
close friend and admirer of Ragen, consciously adapted basic principles from the
University of Texas at Austin, 1999), and Robert Reps Parkinson, The Birth of the Texas Prison Empire,
1865-1915 (Ph.D. dissertation, Yale University, 2001). As an example of boosterism and the selective use
of institutional history to promote the then-current regime, see Texas Department of Corrections: 30 Years
of Progress (Huntsville, 1977).
6 See Joseph E. Ragen and Charles Finston, Inside the World’s Toughest Prison (Springfield, Ill.: C.C.
Thomas, 1962). As a classic work, James B. Jacobs’ Stateville: The Penitentiary in Mass Society (Univ. of
Chicago Press, 1977) remains indispensable to an understanding of prison regime types, and processes of
change, in Illinois and elsewhere.
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Stateville penitentiary to the prison farms.7 Beto’s predecessor, O. B. Ellis, had
renovated a rundown, discredited system, managed farm operations efficiently, obtained
funds for new housing and industries, and rebuilt the system’s public standing. Beto built
upon Ellis’ achievements largely through the force of the persona he cultivated.
“Walking George” strode unannounced through cellblocks and fields, remembering
inmates by name and commanding their deference, as well as that of prison staff. A
strong subculture among guards, emphasizing hierarchical loyalty and bolstered by
Beto’s example, passed on customary methods of intimidating inmates into submission.8
Orderliness, cleanliness, and a low level of reported violence made Beto’s prisons
the object of nostalgia in later years, even among well-informed observers.9 But the
regimes of Ellis and Beto, like the efforts of their predecessors, were limited and shaped
by fundamental characteristics of the Texas system: long prison sentences, large state
landholdings, low state appropriations, very low ratios of guards to prisoners, and the
widespread public assumption that the prison should support itself. Under these
circumstances, the actual control of inmates had long been exercised in large part by
other inmates. “Building tenders” (originally a term for janitors), favored with official
7 The Beto-Ragen relationship is usefully illuminated in David M. Horton and George R. Nielsen, Walking
George: The Life of George John Beto and the Rise of the Modern Texas Prison System (Denton: Univ. of
North Texas Press, 2005). All published sources on Beto’s leadership credit Ragen’s influence. Martin
and Ekland-Olson go so far as to say that Beto’s administration “was but a replication of Ragen’s
Stateville,” likening the Texas building-tender system to Ragen’s use of problem-case inmates as trusties.
The comparison seems not to acknowledge the fundamental differences between a Northern penitentiary
like Stateville and the sprawling array of Southern-style prison plantations which mostly comprised Beto’s
domain in Texas.
8 An invaluable analysis of the guards’ subculture is provided in chapter 3 of Ben Crouch and James W.
Marquart, An Appeal to Justice: Litigated Reform of Texas Prisons (Austin: University of Texas Press,
1989).
9 Dick J. Reavis issued a prominent call for a return to old-style penal ways in “How They Ruined Our
Prisons,” Texas Monthly, May 1985. A more serious and influential—yet almost equally uncritical—
defense of Beto’s regime is contained in John J. DiIulio, Jr., Governing Prisons: A Comparative Study of
Correctional Management (New York: The Free Press, 1987).
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responsibilities as trusties, functioned unofficially as cellblock bosses according to
traditions that went back for decades.10 Ellis and Beto both tacitly accepted the custom,
relying upon building tenders for information about other inmates, and allowing their turf
claims as part of the overall scheme of order maintenance at low cost to the state. Behind
the façade of order, under strict but supposedly secure conditions, individual prisoners
were often actually at the mercy of elite fellow prisoners.
Especially given the secret of its success, the regime of control demanded that the
prison be kept isolated from the world outside. Part of the task was political, a matter of
protecting the system from the interference or control of other parties. For Ellis and
Beto, the main purpose of political networking and of promoting their own reputations as
managers was to maintain their autonomy as decision-makers. This was sometimes put
in traditionally Progressive terms of keeping party politics and patronage out of prison
business. In claiming to be reformers as well as hard-nosed managers, the TDC directors
seem to have sought to preempt any revival of the organized reform efforts of previous
decades.11 Another part of the task, however, was to preempt legal penetration of the
10 Given the state’s determination to hide its actual workings, the building-tender system has
understandably received limited scholarly attention. In chapter 4 of An Appeal to Justice, Crouch and
Marquart provide a careful description. Ethan Blue’s comparative study of the experiences of Texas and
California inmates finds painfully vivid evidence of the sexualized violence that permeated what was
ostensibly a system of order maintenance. See “Hard Time in the New Deal: Racial Formation and the
Cultures of Punishment in Texas and California in the 1930s” (Ph.D. dissertation, The University of Texas
at Austin, 2004), chapter 4.
11 Progressive clubwomen, academics, ministers, and other civic leaders had organized in the 1920s in
groups such as the Texas Committee on Prisons and Prison Labor. See Lucko, “A Missed Opportunity.”
As late as 1948 the Texas State Council of Methodist Women rallied church members to press the state
prison board to adopt reforms (which included the appointment of Ellis), according to Martin and Ekland-
Olson, Texas Prisons, pp. 18-19. The fading out of early 20th-century Progressive politics in Texas, and the
political reorientation of postwar civic elites, could use more direct attention, although the literature on
Texas politics and Southern progressivism suggests plenty of likely factors (such as the New Deal shift of
reformist energy to centralized national policymaking, anti-New Deal backlash, oil money, racial politics,
and broad demographic change spurred in part by federal funds).
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prison system arising from the inmates’ own efforts. Again following Ragen’s example,
Beto banned the possession of legal materials (including attorneys’ correspondence),
censored all mail to and from inmates, and made sure that inmates who made legal claims
against the prison suffered retaliation. But in the legal climate of the late 1960s and early
1970s, these restrictions actually came to invite challenges that they were intended to
prevent. The writ-writers’ circle that included Fred Cruz, Guadalupe Guajardo, Jr., and
David Ruiz, who filed habeas corpus writs and lawsuits challenging the conditions of
their confinement, was separated from the general population and made to perform extra
field labor (becoming known as the “eight-hoe squad”). Issues of medical care—poor
quality, lack of access—accounted for a large part of the rising flow of complaints and
petitions.12
Neglect of medical care may not follow from the theory of the control model, but,
like the persistence of the building-tender system and other traditions, it demonstrates
how Beto’s self-proclaimed model system was actually a creature of its own peculiar
institutions. Like other Southern penal farm systems, Texas prisons carried on conditions
of labor that dated back to the heyday of convict lease, which the substitution of state for
private management had done little to transform. Amid clouds of lint in a TDC textile
mill, one inmate worker quoted in a late-1970s magazine article summed up the
experience of prison labor by whispering: “Slavery, man. Human slavery. You write
that down. That’s all you need to write, because that puts it all in one word.”13 As long
12 Judge Justice later explained that he and his clerks separated the prisoner complaints they received into
four main categories: brutality, lack of medical care, overcrowding, and summary discipline. See William
Wayne Justice, “The Origins of Ruiz v. Estelle,” Stanford Law Review, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Nov. 1990).
13 Quoted in Kevin Krajick, “Profile: Texas,” Corrections Magazine, Vol. 4, No. 1 (March 1978).
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as the voices of inmates remained largely suppressed by traditional and modern means of
control, the provision of benefits like medical care would depend only upon the needs of
the system’s managers for maximum security and labor productivity. Keeping inmates
under tight control and prisons isolated from the outside world reduced the incentives for
TDC to invest in improvements which would have been more visibly in demand under a
less constrained regime.
While inmate complaints began to illuminate the actual conditions of medical
care, it took the beginning of formal investigations in the mid-1970s to make visible the
overall state of the system. In an exceptional case of progressive initiative on the part of
leaders of both chambers, the Texas Legislature in 1973 appointed a joint study
committee on prison reform. With inmate lawsuits attracting growing publicity and
stimulating public concerns about TDC, the Legislature charged the committee with
investigating the prisons as well as proposing changes.
John Albach, a young attorney and criminal-justice researcher, was the staff
member who drafted the committee’s working report on medical services. Albach went
to great lengths to couch unsparing observations in constructive ways. He generously
granted that the health care system at TDC aspired to offer treatment comparable to what
the free world offered, and that it intended to provide all the necessary staffing and
facilities. But “one need only talk to the medical staff at TDC to learn that the existing
health care system falls far short of the intended system. In fact, everyone we have talked
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to agrees that the present level of medical care in TDC is inadequate. Only TDC’s
official statements contend that the system is adequate.”14
Some inmates requiring major medical care were treated at John Sealy Hospital in
Galveston by the University of Texas Medical Branch, under an arrangement with the
medical school going back to the 1920s. But most inmates were hospitalized at the
Huntsville Unit Hospital, which Albach reviewed in detail. Despite the degree of
dissatisfaction on the part of TDC medical staff that Albach acknowledges, his
description of the hospital conveys a sense of a place whose residents have grown used to
conditions that would shock visitors from outside. “This building is old, poorly
maintained, unsafe, and unhealthful,” he reported. “The hospital is in no way adequately
equipped to meet the medical needs of 17,000 TDC inmates. The hospital is considerably
below any minimum certification standards.”15
Albach’s report included the findings of an evaluation by Texas Hospital
Association staff which TDC itself commissioned, apparently after the facility lost an
accreditation from the agency that it had somehow maintained. For the THA evaluators
and Albach’s own staffers, the flouting of safety standards seemed especially flagrant.
Obsolete design was part of the problem: the building had exactly one exit—the front
door—and its upper floors were reached by a narrow stairwell and a single elevator. But
no emergency evacuation plans even existed. The elevator often broke down and was
locked at night anyway. “When a security guard was asked what would happen if a fire
14 “Medical Services Working Paper,” p. 10, Records of the Joint Committee on Prison Reform, unmarked
folder, Box 1980/20-31, Archives and Information Services Division, Texas State Library and Archives
Commission.
15 “Medical Services Working Paper,” p. 12.
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occurred, he answered, ‘It would be a disaster.’”16 The building was crisscrossed by
ungrounded electrical equipment cords and had no plans for safe storage of dangerous
materials. Less dire but still significant hazards were created by visibly shoddy
housekeeping, aging fixtures and cracking floors, unsanitary kitchen and bathroom
conditions, and overcrowded patient wards with insufficient bathroom facilities.
For all the obvious problems of the physical plant, the personnel and staffing
issues were arguably worse for patients and more emblematic of the character of the
system. As of the drafting of Albach’s report in mid-1974, Dr. Ralph Gray was the only
full-time physician employed by TDC. His duties consisted merely of the following:
(1 ) director of all of TDC’s medical services, (2) chief physician for the “Walls”
hospital, (3) examining physician for all inmates entering TDC at the Diagnostic
unit (this requires that Dr. Gray go to the Diagnostic unit five afternoons each
week), (4) physician making rounds and having primary responsibility for inmates
at the Wynne and Ellis units, and (5) physician on-call to examine inmates within
northern units who have died.17
Other prisons (“units” in TDC lexicon) were scheduled to be visited once a week by
physicians with private practices who worked for TDC part time. Earlier that year, Dr.
Gray had had three full-time physicians on his staff, but they had all quit because TDC
could not pay them sufficient salaries. “At its present level of staffing,” Albach
concluded, “TDC falls tragically below minimum prerequisites.” Applying guidelines
from the American Correctional Association’s Manual of Correctional Standards,
Albach figured that TDC required no fewer than twenty full-time physicians.
16 “Medical Services Working Paper,” p. 14.
17 “Medical Services Working Paper,” p. 20.
30
Most of the treatment of inmates was provided by medical assistants, a majority
of whom had been trained in the military as medical corpsmen.18 Medical assistants
staffed the unit infirmaries, held sick call at each of the units, and decided whether
inmates should receive a particular treatment, should be referred to a physician, or were
simply malingering. (Albach noted that a leading complaint among inmate petitions was
denial of care by medical assistants who refused to believe that an inmate was sick.) No
formal training was provided for medical assistants, who were expected, like the guards,
to learn on the job after being hired. In the absence of physicians, Albach made clear that
medical assistants were being used to carry out tasks well beyond their qualifications.
If the medical assistants performed most of the doctoring, all of the other
functions—orderlies, nurses, technicians, clerical staff—were actually filled by inmates.
The language of Albach’s report suggests that he unexpectedly came to the realization
that the Huntsville Unit Hospital was not what it seemed on the outside—that it was a
facility run on inmate labor. He was familiar with secondhand accounts of the extent of
the inmates’ responsibilities, but skeptical:
When we first visited the “Walls” hospital, we were dubious of the claims made
by inmates in their letters that inmates served as “doctors.” These inmate
“doctors” are not licensed physicians who have found themselves in prison, but
rather inmates who have learned certain medical techniques by seeing and
doing.19
Albach’s description of what he witnessed for himself conveys a sense of the surreal. He
observed the routine performance of a range of skilled tasks by inmates whose only
18 “Medical Services Working Paper,” p. 24.
19 “Medical Services Working Paper,” p. 25.
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qualifications were their own experience. Prisoners acted as X-ray and lab technicians,
and “their work product, from all accounts, appears to be good,” but they were left to do
the work without training or supervision.20 All nursing care in the prisons was provided
by inmate nurses, who also received no training other than watching each other work. In
addition to the professional functions of registered and licensed vocational nurses, inmate
nurses provided emergency medical treatment at night, when the hospital was left in their
charge.
Albach then reported that the tales of inmate “doctors” were all too well rooted in
actual practice:
Most disturbing is the fact that inmates at TDC perform surgery on other inmates.
On one visit to the “Walls” hospital, we went into the operating room and
watched an inmate perform minor surgery on another inmate, after another inmate
had given the patient an anesthetic. This procedure involved giving a local
anesthetic, making an incision, removing a steel suture, and then sewing up the
incision. All of this procedure was performed by inmates without a physician
being present. After observing the operation, we asked a TDC physician about
the use of inmates as surgeons. The doctor praised the skill of these inmate
surgeons. We were told that most simple surgery in the hospital was performed
by inmates without a doctor being present in the operating room. . . . The TDC
doctor informed us that inmates requiring minor surgery were told that it could be
done by an inmate “surgeon” promptly or that they would be put on the list to be
attended by a real doctor weeks or months later.21
The most complicated surgery performed by the inmate surgeons, according to the TDC
doctor, was repair of Achilles tendons (a prison specialty, reflecting a tradition of self-
mutilation among inmates seeking to avoid field work). In such cases, a doctor might be
available to assist. Albach consulted a private surgeon who “stated that he would not
20 “Medical Services Working Paper,” p. 26.
21 “Medical Services Working Paper,” pp. 26-27.
32
even attempt such surgery himself, but would refer it to a specialist.”22 The work of the
inmate surgeons appeared to Albach to be highly valued by the prisoners themselves.
The discovery of the role shed some light on the hierarchy of an inmate society in which
experienced hospital workers commanded special prestige. Many inmates, Albach
observed, “point to inmate medical personnel who have reputations as skilled and
knowledgeable persons as examples that inmates can be productive. However, some
inmates do express sincere doubts as to the medical competency of these untrained
inmates.”23
In cases such as Albach’s exposure of the state of medicine at the Huntsville Unit
Hospital, the institutional conditions and practices that he evaluated with reference to
recently drafted professional standards seemed a very plausible proxy for a more essential
concern, which was the effectiveness of treatment in terms of outcomes. The two
issues—compliance with standards and the actual quality of treatment—would never be
the same, however, and in this sense Albach’s report illustrates a dilemma of health care
that would persist in later years as prison health care was modernized. Another way of
trying to get at the question of quality of care was to study the outcomes themselves—
especially particular kinds of outcomes such as deaths of patients under care. Inmate
deaths were all the more significant, Albach observed, because of the responses they
elicited. The legislative committee on prison reform had “received many allegations of
deaths as a result of inadequate medical care from both inmates and employees.
Unfortunately, the Joint Committee staff does not have the competence or relevant data to
22 “Medical Services Working Paper,” p. 27.
23 “Medical Services Working Paper,” p. 27.
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properly check these allegations.” The absence of autopsy reports (which TDC was not
authorized to pay for) or other official information on the causes of deaths smacked of
secretiveness, fostering rumors which invariably swept through the inmate population.
Albach could only conclude that rules for postmortem inquiries should be developed and
that “the apparent invisibility of non-routine deaths in prison needs to be corrected.”24
One particular letter to the legislative committee staff vividly suggests the effect
of patient deaths on fellow inmates. Darral R. Lovett was an inmate at the Walls Unit
who Albach met during a visit to the Huntsville Unit Hospital, and who evidently felt
compelled to send details to the committee of cases he had mentioned in the meeting.
His letter describes the deaths of four hospital patients. One was treated at the hospital
for pneumonia, and was returned to his unit despite a lack of improvement: “The story
goes that he was transferred back to the Wynne farm before his x-ray report had been
read. He was back within a week with two full lungs. He died a short time later.”
Another inmate, Roy Wright, suffered and died from what was listed as a pulmonary
embolism but was given no pain medication. He was, however, transferred to an
isolation cell because of his loud complaints. “We civilized people provide better for our
household pets,” Lovett observed. “But Wright wasn’t a pet, he was a convict.” One
other inmate, Charles Boyd, a building tender, died of a fatal dose of Demerol
administered after gall bladder surgery while his vital signs were weak:
Charlie died of incompetence. I didn’t mourn his death because of the misery
other convicts had suffered because of him. He had [a] right to live though. He
was just another frightened human being, making it the best way he knew how.
Even if it was the wrong way, it was the way officials here want it to be.
24 “Medical Services Working Paper,” pp. 41-42.
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I have mixed emotions about this letter. On one hand, I know that I may
suffer for what I’m telling you. On the other, if people don’t tell about the things
going on here, we may never see any change. God knows, we need some.
People here are very reluctant to help the committee and for good reasons.
It isn’t a bad place to do time, if you have got time to do. What they don’t realize
is that it could be them over there in that hospital, very ill, and having to depend
[on] the medical aid available. And not being able to do one goddam thing about
it. We’re wards of the state, and the state really couldn’t care one way or the
other if we live or died. Freaks me out to think I might get sick while I’m here.25
Albach’s working paper and recommendations for improvements formed the basis
for the section of the legislative committee’s formal report, which was published in
December 1974 (shortly before the next Legislature convened). The committee’s curious
treatment of Albach’s revelations suggests its view of the politics surrounding its work.26
Albach’s recommendations regarding inmate labor, that inmates “should not be used in
professional capacities for which they have not received formal training and
certification,” and specifically that “the practice of using inmates as RN’s, surgical
assistants, and surgeons should be ended immediately,” were included in the list of
formal recommendations by the committee. But the narrative section on medical care
omitted any reference to inmate surgeons, observing only that inmates provided “all
nursing capabilities” and held unofficial responsibilities for “administering medication
25 Letter, Darral R. Lovett, TDC #225209, to John Albach, Joint Committee on Prison Reform, April 4,
1974, Records of the Joint Committee on Prison Reform, unmarked folder, Box 1980/20-31, Archives and
Information Services Division, Texas State Library and Archives Commission.
26 Chet Brooks, the respected state senator who had proposed the committee and served as its chair, clearly
hoped to shepherd proposals that would be broadly acceptable to legislators in the 1975 general session, as
did a number of fellow committee members known for their liberalism (including Mickey Leland and
Lloyd Doggett among others). But, as Martin and Ekland-Olson observe, one of the committee members
refused to sign the report and publicly denounced the committee’s citizens advisory panel as “the most
grotesque collection of radical activists ever put together under one roof.” See Texas Prisons, p. 78.
Martin and Ekland-Olson emphasize the committee’s “forceful findings” on medical care but miss the
omission of Albach’s narrative on inmate surgeons.
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and injections.”27 The narrative section and the recommendations did emphasize the
deficiencies of the Huntsville Unit Hospital and the “glaring need for more doctors and
trained medical personnel.”28
If the committee members doubted the political appeal of their recommendations,
the Legislature lived up to their doubts. The burying of prison reform legislation was
generally credited to Beto’s hand-picked successor as director of TDC, W. J. “Jim”
Estelle, who was proving to be an effective advocate and an uncompromising defender of
institutional traditions in his own right. As with juvenile justice reform, the collapse of
legislative efforts left Texas prison reform largely in the hands of federal courts. One
case which was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, Gamble v. Estelle, yielded the
standard that has been invoked and applied ever since in rulings on prison medical care.
J. W. Gamble, an inmate at the Walls Unit, was unloading a truck at the prison textile
mill on November 9, 1973, when he was caught partially in the path of a falling 600-
pound cotton bale and hurt his lower back. His complaint alleged that he was given
nothing but pain pills, and was punished with solitary confinement for refusing to go
back to work, despite his constant pain, “blackouts,” and high blood pressure. The
federal district judge’s dismissal of Gamble’s suit was reversed by the Fifth Appeals
Court, which ruled that Gamble had an actionable claim.29 The appeal brought by the
state of Texas before the Supreme Court, Estelle v. Gamble, elicited the opinion that set
the new standard. Justice Thurgood Marshall, writing the opinion for the majority that
27 Final Report of the Joint Committee on Prison Reform, 63rd Legislature, December 1974, p. 55. The
report also credited medical assistants and inmate nurses with providing “what seems to be adequate
paramedical assistance” while noting that this amounted to no substitute for physicians. See p. 56.
28 Final Report, p. 56.
29 Gamble v. Estelle, 516 F.2d 937 (CA.5 (Tex.) 1975).
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reversed the appeals court, appears to have tried to justify the reversal while still crafting
a robust standard of protection under the Eighth Amendment.30 Marshall argued that
what Gamble had was a tort claim rather than an Eighth Amendment case. But
“deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners” was constitutionally
forbidden and represented valid cause for action.31
TDC would not have to wait to be challenged under the new standard. In 1974,
Judge Justice, who as a known liberal received more than his share of prisoner petitions,
selected and consolidated eight of them—including a rambling set of complaints by
inmate David Ruiz—into a single case. Having presided over traditionally unequal court
contests between semiliterate complainants and the TDC’s attorneys, Justice acted on his
longstanding desire to set up a fair fight. Using his powers to the limit, he selected the
lead counsel for the inmates (prominent prisoners’ rights attorney William Bennett
Turner) and, as in Morales, ordered the U.S. Justice Department to serve as amicus
curiae and investigate the inmates’ complaints. “It was not my business to be an
advocate,” the judge later asserted. “But it was emphatically my business to find an
advocate, because the truth could not have been ascertained without one.”32 Specifically
Judge Justice wanted the truth about four key issues of complaint, one of which was
medical care. (The others were overcrowding, summary discipline, and brutality, the last
of which raised the issue of the building tenders.)
30 Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976). Despite the importance of the “deliberate indifference” standard
for all subsequent litigation on prison medical care, the literature on the formulation of Justice Marshall’s
opinion itself is thin. Melvin Gutterman, “The Prison Jurisprudence of Justice Thurgood Marshall,”
Maryland Law Review, Vol. 56 (1997), provides some commentary at pp. 174-175.
31 Estelle v. Gamble, at p. 104.
32 Justice, “The Origins of Ruiz v. Estelle,” p. 11. My explanation of the origins of the suit is based mainly
on Justice’s account.
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Led by Estelle and joined by the Texas attorney general’s office, TDC fought
back against the court as well as the plaintiffs. What Justice saw as the creation of a level
playing field impressed state officials as an illegitimate attempt to railroad a preconceived
verdict through the court. Assistant Attorney General Ed Idar, Jr., who served as lead
defense counsel, made a point of objecting to Justice’s rulings, routine and otherwise. “I
think he had expected us just to fold over as they did in the Morales case,” Idar explained
later.33 He and the other state’s attorneys appealed the order bringing the Justice
Department into the case, challenged the authority of federal investigators, demanded a
change of venue out of Judge Justice’s district court, and pressed miscellaneous other
matters upon the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. With the appellate judges generally
supporting Justice’s rulings, the state’s efforts mainly had the effect of delaying the
beginning of the trial for several years, until October 1978.
The delay affected the case in several ways. The Estelle v. Gamble ruling was
handed down during the Ruiz preliminaries, creating the “deliberate indifference”
standard which from then on would determine the shape of the case against TDC’s
provision of medical care. At least initially, the state’s attorneys had an interest in
holding out for the possibility of a favorable outcome in the Gamble case, or at least a
restrictive standard which might then bind the Ruiz court. But they appear to have had
another, continuing interest in stretching out the proceedings. TDC and other state
officials appear to have viewed medical care issues as the area where they were most
vulnerable, presumably considering the burden of trying to defend conditions like the
33 Quoted by Frank Kemerer in William Wayne Justice: A Judicial Biography (Austin: University of
Texas Press, 1991), p. 354.
38
ones John Albach had exposed. Having fended off the immediate threat of the joint
legislative committee, TDC had belatedly begun pressing the Legislature for substantial
budget increases for medical care and, in 1976, for a new prison hospital (to be built,
preferably, on the grounds of one of its existing units). The Legislature in 1977 approved
building the new facility at Galveston, where the medical school already provided some
inmate hospital treatment. In his opening arguments at the trial, Idar acknowledged that
prison medical care had been deficient as of 1974, when proceedings in the case had first
begun, but argued that TDC was rapidly improving its services and had already solved
the most significant problems. The state further amplified this point in its post-trial brief,
by which time construction on the Galveston hospital had advanced further: “Within two
years, TDC will have a medical care system that will meet or exceed any professional or
constitutional standard. It will provide better care than that available to most Americans
and will be without peer among prison medical care systems.”34
In one other important sense, however, the delay worked very much against the
state’s interests. State population growth, rising crime rates, and local enforcement and
sentencing patterns all helped launch what would be a drastic and sustained expansion of
the inmate population, beyond what could be accommodated within any of TDC’s
existing facility expansion plans. From 15,000 in 1972 the population rose to 25,000 by
the time of the trial opening.35 The plaintiffs’ original case against the state on grounds
of prison overcrowding was only made more urgent and compelling with every passing
day of continued litigation. The need to accommodate the flow of commitments, which
34 Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F.Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (henceforth Ruiz), Defendant’s Post Trial Brief, p. 79.
35 TDC annual report statistics cited in Martin and Ekland-Olson, Texas Prisons, p. 111.
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would later confound the successors to the old regime of TDC, initially served to
undermine the regime as it fought to preserve its authority.
The trial involved no fewer than 349 called witnesses and consumed almost
exactly a full year, reflecting the multiple issues being dealt with as well as the
complexity of each issue and the stubborn recalcitrance of Idar and the rest of the defense
team. In his opening remarks William Bennett Turner stated that the plaintiffs would use
the authority of experts and other professionals to establish the charge of deliberate
indifference.36 The most comprehensive support for Turner’s charge was provided by the
Justice Department, which by then had been raised to the status of a co-plaintiff.
On the issue of staffing, despite some additions TDC had been able to make in the
years since Albach’s report, the Justice Department’s expert witnesses drew scathing
conclusions. The situation at unit infirmaries, with outmanned medical assistants holding
sick call and making referrals, was merely bad, but staffing at Huntsville Unit Hospital
was “recklessly inadequate.” Dr. Richard Della Penna, visiting the hospital in 1978,
found “four or five full-time physicians that covered not only HVH [Huntsville Unit
Hospital], but handled the Huntsville Unit sick call and referrals from outlying units as
well.”37 With this small group of doctors stretched thin by their various commitments,
inmate patients normally spent days at the hospital without ever seeing one of them.
Medical assistants continued to make most of the actual medical care decisions, as well
as filling many of the skilled nursing functions. After 1974, TDC had attempted to
maintain a staff of up to six registered nurses, but they had all quit, largely because of
36 See the helpful analysis of Turner’s opening statement in Martin and Ekland-Olson, Texas Prisons, pp.
115-117.
37 Ruiz Post-Trial Memorandum, U.S. Department of Justice, Volume 1 (henceforth DOJ), p. 118.
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disputes with the medical assistants arising from the basic problem of the absence of
doctors.38
This left most of the staffing needs, as before, in the hands of inmate nurses, who
continued to outnumber vastly the civilian staff. Many of the inmate nurses “have poor
educational backgrounds and cannot read or write.”39 But they served in most supporting
functions, as technicians, attendants, record clerks, and providers of most of the nursing
care, all without any other than on-the-job training. The Justice Department expert
witnesses saw no cases of inmates actually performing minor surgery, suggesting that
Albach’s reporting had had some effect. But one of the registered nurses who had left the
hospital testified to having watched as an inmate did a finger amputation, and as another
x-rayed and pinned a broken finger (but missed the break).40 Even confined generally to
lesser responsibilities, inmates still routinely failed to carry out medical orders correctly,
gave wrong medications and injections in the wrong sites, wrote down imprecise or
unreadable notes, failed to monitor patients attentively, falsified their charts, and dealt
drugs and took bribes from their patients. As in previous years, inmate nurses remained
alone in charge of the hospital after hours. One professional nurse described arriving on
typical Monday mornings to find bedridden patients with unchanged bandages and caked
feces, their urine bags spilled on the floor.41
As all parties presumably expected, the plaintiffs’ witnesses were unsparing in
their assessment of the hospital facilities. Surveying past reports, the Justice Department
38 See Dr. Gray’s testimony at Ruiz v. Estelle trial transcript, p. 959: “They wanted a doctor over them. We
didn’t have enough doctors.”
39 Ruiz Post-Trial Memorandum (DOJ), Vol. 1, p. 126.
40 John Goforth testimony at Ruiz trial transcript, pp. 48-50.
41 Cited in Ruiz Post-Trial Memorandum (DOJ), Vol. 1, p. 145.
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brief observed that “the list of physical plant deficiencies . . . reads like a slum landlord’s
outstanding work orders.”42 Both the housekeeping and the state of the structure, if
anything, had deteriorated further. A medical expert for the defense actually commented
that he “could not believe that a warden would knowingly allow such filthy conditions to
exist.”43 Basic inadequacies of design and construction—insufficient space for nursing
stations or patient privacy, multiple fire hazards—remained unaddressed. Dr. Della
Penna’s major concern was with the overall effect of these conditions upon the ability
simply to practice medicine:
I think it’s important that professionals taking care of and caring for people who
are sick have an appropriate environment in an appropriate therapeutic setting. . . .
In my experience it’s very, very difficult to act as a professional on a day-to-day
basis in a prison setting or really any setting, anyplace that doesn’t have basic
amenities, doesn’t have basic sanitation, doesn’t have adequate lighting. That’s
inadequate, very depressing and, I think, very demoralizing.44
Other expert witnesses were most concerned about the likely spread of infections in the
crowded, cramped, unsanitary environment. Another visiting doctor cited the mixing of
clean linen and dirty laundry, storage of drugs and bacterial cultures in the same
refrigerators, and nurses changing bandages without washing their hands and using
unsterilized thermometers. The lack of space for isolation wards kept patients with
hepatitis and other infectious risks sharing wards and hallways with others.45
Some of the practices of TDC medical staff impressed the expert witnesses as
clear cases of custodial concerns overriding or interfering with necessary medical care.
42 Ruiz Post-Trial Memorandum (DOJ), Vol. 1, p. 113.
43 Ruiz Post-Trial Memorandum (DOJ), Vol. 1, p. 115.
44 Dr. Richard Della Penna testimony at Ruiz trial transcript, p. 49.
45 Cited in Ruiz Post-Trial Memorandum (DOJ), Vol. 1, pp. 117-118.
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In part this reflected the prevailing, historically rooted philosophy of the prison system;
other parts reflected tendencies toward arbitrary abusiveness. Within the prison units,
inmates with disciplinary records were typically denied permission to attend sick call,
and others were allowed to attend or not at the discretion of the guards. Asthma inhalers
were banned from cellblocks, and other prescribed drugs were routinely withheld.
Inmates who complained were typically punished with solitary confinement or, more
frequently, with field work detail—reflecting the traditional main concern of prison farm
medicine. Medical assistants holding sick call at one unit diagnosed roughly half of their
patients with “trickitis,” or malingering, and used infirmary space as punitive
confinement for inmates who insisted that they needed treatment. Medical assistants
were evaluated and supervised by unit wardens, to whom Dr. Gray and the TDC central
administrative staff normally deferred.46
At Huntsville Unit Hospital, despite the overcrowded wards and severe space
limits, much of the first and second floors was given over to cellblocks for admitted
patients, many of whom were sent there for complaining about their treatment. In the
cellblock sections, patients with emergencies would have to wait while inmate nurses
rounded up cell keys. Arthur Driver, a former medical assistant who had become the
administrator at Huntsville Unit Hospital, was accused by nurses and many inmate
witnesses of threatening and abusing hospital patients. He cut off pain medication for
one paraplegic inmate and transferred him to the cellblock after the patient wrote a letter
46 Descriptions of unit level practices in this paragraph contained in Ruiz Post-Trial Memorandum (DOJ),
pp. 48-68.
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asking to be moved to where he could more easily use the commode.47 He routinely
intervened in patient care, changing their locations and prescribed diets, and told one
nurse to “suture a self-mutilator with the same anesthetic the patient had used when he
cut himself, i.e., none.”48 In 1976, Driver received the Outstanding Employee Award for
all of TDC.
As a medium for conveying the voices and experiences of inmates under care, the
trial was shaped and constrained by the legal judgments of the plaintiffs’ advocates,
whose task was defined by the vague dictate of the “deliberate indifference” standard.
The legal standard itself, in referring to the conduct with which care was administered (or
not), drove the plaintiffs to concentrate on actions, procedures, and circumstances of care
rather than outcomes. The voluminous briefs compiled by the plaintiffs did not include
statistical studies of inmate health or treatment outcomes; anecdotes of outcomes in the
cases of individual patients were typically examined for what they could show about how
treatment had been administered. The basic purpose of the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses
was actually twofold: to report observations, and also to cite the professional standards
which should be used to evaluate the conditions and practices they observed. Dr. Della
Penna, the former director of the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals,
generally compared the hospital’s civilian staffing patterns and treatment practices with
the protocols of his organization: instead of four physicians stretched thin by other
47 Gerald Sullivan testimony at Ruiz trial transcript, pp. 43-50.
48 Descriptions of hospital security practices in this paragraph contained in Ruiz Post-Trial Memorandum
(DOJ), pp. 136-144. Nurse testimony cited at p. 143.
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responsibilities, for instance, he recommended six to eight to serve the only the hospital,
three of whom should have training in emergency medicine and internal medicine.49
The attorneys and witnesses defending TDC’s medical care had little to work
with, in terms of either practices or outcomes, in asserting that it met any qualitative
standard. Their case was solely a defense against deliberate indifference, a charge which
they tried to define as impossible to prove. Throughout the trial they had insisted that
anecdotal evidence could generally be discounted because “there must be an ‘affirmative
link,’ a definite, systemwide practiced or policy that invariably violates the constitutional
rights of inmates, before the plaintiffs can be said to have carried their burden of proof.”50
In the case of medical care, they consequently argued, the plaintiffs’ “selection of
medical ‘horror stories’ failed to prove any systematic pattern or practice inadequate care
or denial of same.”51 Even failure to meet professional standards of care (something the
plaintiffs had endlessly established) was irrelevant because “the evidence did not reflect a
causal relationship between the deviations and any systematic injury to the plaintiff
class.”52 None of the existing associational sets of correctional standards represented
constitutional minimums. Even the work of inmate nurses was constitutionally
unchallengeable as long as they were “acting within their technical skills and so long as a
reasonable level of security is maintained,” standards which TDC itself should be left to
judge.53
49 Ruiz Post-Trial Memorandum (DOJ), Vol. 1, p. 118.
50 Ruiz Defendants’ Post Trial Brief, p. 5.
51 Ruiz Defendants’ Post Trial Brief, pp. 85-86.
52 Ruiz Defendants’ Post Trial Brief, p. 86.
53 Ruiz Defendants’ Post Trial Brief, p. 112.
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Another line of argument for state attorneys was that the charge of deliberate
indifference could be refuted by virtually any pattern of demonstrated concern or
activities aimed at improvement. The state attorneys gamely maintained that “TDC has
always had the critical elements of a constitutionally minimal health care system,” but
they placed more emphasis on TDC’s supposedly self-motivated efforts to improve the
system.54 They acknowledged that “the improvements have taken time” (like the trial
itself, perhaps not coincidentally). But the Galveston hospital under construction was due
to open shortly, a dedicated ward that had been created at John Sealy Hospital in the
meantime to take in additional patients from Huntsville Unit Hospital, and legislative
appropriations had been secured for additional staff in most areas of care.55
Ed Idar later claimed that the attorneys defending the state were certain that Judge
Justice would rule against them on all counts, and that the trial record and arguments they
created were ultimately addressed to the appeals court.56 The judge and his clerks spent
over a year studying the vast trial record and drafting the memorandum opinion, but
when it was finally issued on December 12, 1980, the ruling lived up to its part of the
defendants’ expectations. Justice found for the plaintiffs on five major grounds—
overcrowding, health care, security and supervision, summary discipline, access to
courts—as well as miscellaneous others. On medical care, as the plaintiffs must have
hoped, the judge’s findings followed both the observations of the expert witnesses and
the use of professional standards to evaluate what the witnesses had observed.
54 Ruiz Defendants’ Post Trial Brief, p. 83.
55 Ruiz Defendants’ Post Trial Brief, pp. 92-93.
56 Quoted by Frank Kemerer in William Wayne Justice: A Judicial Biography, p. 365.
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Essentially, the court argued that TDC’s provision of medical care was unconstitutional
mainly because it was unprofessional:
The personnel providing medical care are often unqualified; they are also wholly
insufficient in numbers and deficiently supervised. The meager medical facilities,
inadequately equipped and poorly maintained, do not meet state licensing
requirements. Medical procedures are unsound and faulty at all levels of care.
Initial processing, sick call methods, and transfer practices are all unnecessarily
cumbersome, inefficient, and life-threatening. Proper medical treatment and
practice is often sacrificed to exaggerated concerns about security. . . . Finally,
the entire medical care “system” is marked by an absence of any organizational
structure, plan, or written procedures for the delivery of medical care or for the
instruction, supervision, and review of the personnel putatively providing it.
These factors combine to produce a system that persistently and predictably fails
to provide for the legitimate medical needs of the prison population.57
Significant sections of the opinion text actually echoed the language of the plaintiffs’
expert witnesses and the arguments of the Justice Department brief. The number of
physicians providing care in TDC was, as the Justice Department had put it, “woefully
inadequate.”58
Judge Justice faithfully cited each of the plaintiffs’ findings regarding staffing,
personnel, facilities, and the placement of custodial over medical priorities. The system
had “an acutely grim and unwarranted lack of licensed nurses. . . . TDC’s failure even to
attempt to employ RN’s and LVN’s in its hospital and unit infirmaries vividly
demonstrates its virtual abdication of responsibility for the provision of adequate health
care for its inmates.”59 With medical assistants screening and providing most care, “the
typical inmate’s access to health care is regulated from the outset by persons who would
57 Ruiz Memorandum Opinion (Dec. 12, 1980), pp. 115-116.
58 Ruiz Memorandum Opinion, p. 116, compared with Ruiz Post-Trial Memorandum (DOJ), Chapter II (A)
section 4 (a), titled “The Huntsville Unit Hospital Is Woefully Inadequate.”
59 Ruiz Memorandum Opinion, p. 120.
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be qualified to perform only orderly-type functions at a free-world hospital.”60 Inmates
formed “the backbone of the TDC medical system,” and the use of inmate nurses
“necessarily creates deplorable obstacles to effective treatment of inmate patients.”61 As
for facilities, “it is highly questionable whether TDC’s ‘hospital’ at Huntsville can be
accurately labeled as such,” since its accreditation was long lost.62 Citing both the trial
witnesses and Albach’s report, Judge Justice went over some of the building’s
deficiencies, but was most concerned that it remained a firetrap. Its continued use to
house bedridden patients represented “chilling indifference” on the part of TDC
officials.63 The restrictions on access to medical care at prison units and the use of
confinement at Huntsville Unit Hospital showed that “all aspects of medical care are
compromised by security and disciplinary considerations.”64
If his individual findings largely tracked the testimony and pleadings of the
plaintiffs, Judge Justice offered his own critically important argument about the relation
of medical care to the rest of the suit. To a degree the judge’s original decision to
consolidate the key inmate claims may have failed in part of its purpose, in that the need
to separate the sprawling Ruiz opinion into manageable units of analysis meant that its
key portions were all too easily considered in isolation from each other. Also, the case
against the constitutionality of medical care provision involved its own standard that did
not relate directly to other matters. But in setting forth the case against TDC on one of
the other basic issues, Judge Justice used deliberately broad language: “The
60 Ruiz Memorandum Opinion, pp. 124-125.
61 Ruiz Memorandum Opinion, p. 129.
62 Ruiz Memorandum Opinion, p. 139.
63 Ruiz Memorandum Opinion, p. 140.
64 Ruiz Memorandum Opinion, p. 154.
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overcrowding at TDC exercises a malignant effect on all aspects of inmate life.”65
Solving this issue, Justice indicated, was necessary (if not sufficient) to the solution of all
the others. Overcrowded prisons could not be kept secure; they could not maintain the
other basic functions to which prisoners were entitled; overcrowded prisoners could not
be kept safe or healthy:
Crowded two or three to a cell or in closely packed dormitories, inmates sleep
with the knowledge that they may be molested or assaulted by their fellows at any
time. Their incremental exposure to disease and infection from other inmates in
such narrow confinement cannot be avoided. They must urinate and defecate,
unscreened, in the presence of others. . . .66
The argument was most vividly conveyed by the image of three men packed in a cell, but
it applied with no less force to the prison’s other functions. Texas had never provided
basic services adequately to its prison inmates, but any efforts that it had begun to make
or would make in the future were doomed if the prisons were to be perpetually
overcrowded. Judge Justice’s assessment of prison medicine made it explicitly clear that
care must meet professional standards. For this reason, as well as for others, he made it
equally clear that there would have to be fewer prisoners.
The Ruiz verdict was a landmark, but the harder tasks still lay ahead. The
struggle over implementation—what exactly constituted relief, what ultimately would the
state be required to do—continued to unfold over the next two decades. As in the trial
stage, medical care provision was only one of the subjects of dispute, but its resolution
65 Ruiz Memorandum Opinion, p. 14.
66 Ruiz Memorandum Opinion, p. 14.
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was tied to decisions on other subjects. The shape and extent of relief on overcrowding
affected the future of prison medical care most profoundly.
For its part, the resolution of prison medical care issues had broad implications of
its own, legally and socially. The Ruiz verdict by itself was of limited value in
establishing minimum Eighth Amendment standards for health care, because the legacy
of deliberate indifference to inmates’ health—embodied vividly by the Huntsville Unit
Hospital—was so severe. But how could the circumstances be remedied, practically
speaking, and how could remedies sufficiently ambitious to bring real change also be
made judicially supportable? Ironically, the particular circumstances that made the
verdict easier to reach (and harder to overturn) were the same ones which threatened to
limit its practical effects.
Medical professionalism—specifically professionally defined standards, and the
role of professional organizations in certifying the fulfillment of these standards—was at
the center of the implementation struggle. Overall, certification served the interests of
both plaintiffs and the state at different times; in fact, the state used its commitment to
seek certification as a means of settling most of the plaintiffs’ case on medical care. But
if professional standards were sufficient to meet constitutional standards, were they
necessary? How to resolve this question would have far-reaching consequences. Once
again, Huntsville Unit Hospital was at the center of the dispute. What to do with the
hospital was the one medical-care issue which the state refused to settle with the
plaintiffs, and which was raised in the state’s appeal to the Fifth Circuit. Judge Justice
maintained that prison hospital care must also meet professional standards. He, as well as
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the plaintiffs, faced the tough task of affirming this position while still demonstrating
reasonableness in dealing with the practical and logistical issues that the state was able to
raise. On this issue, as on others, the state basically continued the same battle it had
waged during the trial. The final outcome did not deprive the plaintiffs of relief, but it
narrowed its scope by lowering the necessary standards.
After the trial verdict, the state’s decision to settle most of the medical care issues
was a quick one, reflecting the serious consideration that had been given to settling them
before the verdict. The decision also reflected a readiness to commit to compliance with
professional standards, as a means of resolving the case. Assuming the virtual certainty
of an adverse verdict, TDC officials during 1980 studied the American Correctional
Association’s health care standards and concluded that most of them would ultimately be
met “if TDC continues in the current directions of improving health care services.”67 The
positive conclusion applied to the medical care system as planned, not in its then-current
state. Soon after the verdict was issued, TDC managers contacted the director of the
American Medical Association’s Jails Program and made preparations to apply for AMA
accreditation.68 In late January 1981, TDC’s assistant director for treatment formally
recommended to Estelle that the agency should seek an agreement with the plaintiffs on
the basis of a commitment to “operate a health care system capable of accreditation by
67 Allen D. Sapp, Jr., “Proposed TDC Health Care Services and the American Correctional Association
Standards: A Comparative Analysis,” Working Paper No. 59-07-80, July 1980, Texas Department of
Corrections Treatment Directorate, Operations Research, Planning and Development, in Box 37, Folder 12,
Eduardo Idar, Jr. Papers, Benson Latin American Collection, the University of Texas at Austin Libraries.
68 TDC Inter-Office Communication, Bill Barry to Bob Bozzelli, 1/7/81, describing telephone conversation
with Joseph Rowan, AMA Jail Program director; Inter-Office Communication, 1/8/81, Barry to Bozzelli,
summarizing conversation between Rowan and several TDC officials; and letter, 1/9/81, Rowan to Barry,
with assembled application form, self-survey questionnaire, and other materials attached; all in Box 37,
Folders 12 and 13, Idar Papers.
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the American Medical Association.” According to the proposal, TDC should also agree
that the its new hospital (still under construction at the University of Texas Medical
Branch in Galveston) should maintain accreditation from the leading professional
certifying organization (the Joint Committee on Accreditation of Hospitals), and other
new facilities with plans to be sanctioned by the Texas Hospital Association.69 As state
officials developed their position for negotiations with the plaintiffs, as instructed by
Judge Justice, they agreed early on to try to settle the health care issues on these terms.70
While the negotiations left most issues in the case unresolved, they yielded broad
agreement on upgrading medical care, essentially elaborating on the terms TDC had
developed. The consent decree entered on March 3, 1981 committed the state to apply
for AMA accreditation, to plan for achieving compliance with standards and obtaining
accreditation under the court’s supervision, and to develop new standards, together with
the Texas Hospital Association, to address any “architectural, engineering, or equipment
needs of prison health care facilities” not addressed by the AMA. Other commitments by
the state included seeing that “no nonmedical staff may countermand any medical order
regarding a prisoner’s treatment,” that prisoners in administrative segregation received
“full access to health care,” and that prisoners would not be deprived of prescribed
medications or “denied access to work, recreation, education, or other programs or
opportunities because of health status unless required for medical reasons as determined
by a licensed physician.” The state agreed to file a plan with the court by June 1, 1981
69 TDC Inter-office Communication, Ronald D. Taylor to W. J. Estelle, Jr., 1/21/81, Box 37, Folder 13, Idar
Papers.
70 Paul T. Wrotenbery, budget aide to Gov. Bill Clements, outlined TDC’s emerging negotiating position in
memo, Wrotenbery to Gov. Clements, 2/9/81, Box 37, Folder 22, General Counsel Records, 1979-1983,
William P. Clements, Jr. Papers, Texas A&M University Libraries.
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“which will assure that prisoners receive necessary medical, dental, and psychiatric care
from the moment of their arrival in TDC.”71
Whether state officials ever consciously related these commitments to Huntsville
Unit Hospital is unclear, since, mystifyingly, the consent decree made no mention of the
facility (even though accreditation of the Galveston hospital was specifically included).72
But at some point during the weeks that followed, state officials conveyed their intentions
to Judge Justice. On April 20, in his decree containing remedial orders for aspects of the
case not already settled, the judge made clear that no exceptions to the agreement
contained in the consent decree would be allowed. Huntsville Unit Hospital, he decreed,
must be “downgraded to use as the unit infirmary and shall not be used for care of
prisoners from other units unless, by November 1, 1981, it can be brought into
compliance with the standards of the Texas Hospital Association or the Joint Commission
on Accreditation of Hospitals.” Failing to make HUH compliant, TDC would be required
to arrange with other, accredited facilities to provide care for prisoners. Also, the section
of the decree pertaining generally to inmate trusties (which was mainly intended to
eliminate the broad authority of “building tenders”) prohibited inmate access to any other
inmate’s medical records.73
71 Ruiz v. Estelle, Consent Decree, 3/3/81, copy in Box 28, Folder 6, Idar Papers.
72 How carefully and clearly state officials considered all of the provisions is open to question. William
Bennett Turner later stated that one of the provisions of the decree that was later sharply criticized—regular
food rations for inmates in solitary confinement—was offered, somewhat randomly, by Attorney General
Mark White in a phone call with plaintiffs’ attorneys, in exchange for minor changes in unrelated language.
See Martin and Ekland-Olson, Texas Prisons, pp. 179-180.
73 Ruiz Amended Decree Granting Equitable Relief and Declaratory Judgment, May 1, 1981, sections III
and II (D), in folder “Amended decree. . . ,” Box 2004/016-3, Texas Department of Criminal Justice,
General Counsel’s Office, Ruiz Case Files, Archives and Information Services Division, Texas State
Library and Archives Commission (henceforth Ruiz Case Files). The version dated May 1 contains
typographical corrections of the April 20 version and minor substantive amendments.
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Efforts by state officials to carve out an exception for Huntsville Unit Hospital
presumably followed from objections raised by Dr. Ralph Gray, the prison physician
whose list of official responsibilities had so impressed John Albach during the joint
prison reform committee’s investigation. Some seven years later, Gray was no longer the
only full-time physician employed by TDC, but as assistant director for health services he
was still responsible for supervising the running of the hospital and the provision of other
care throughout the system. Gray had testified as a witness for the state in the trial stage
of the case, in August and September of 1979, and under cross-examination he had
acknowledged that the hospital was outdated and inadequate in many respects.74 But
now, in an affidavit dated April 16, 1981, he made the case for keeping HUH open. The
case actually consisted of two distinct claims. One was that the hospital and its staff had
been significantly upgraded in the short time since the end of the Ruiz trial. Gray could
not seriously maintain that the quality of care being provided was high, or even adequate,
but he could at least seek to demonstrate TDC’s bona fides. He offered a list of sixteen
specialist positions that had been newly added to the staff, and he cited the recent hiring
of two part-time physicians and three dentists, and other technicians, on top of his
existing staff of three full-time and two part-time physicians and various other assistants,
nurses, and technicians. He gave a similarly detailed list of equipment improvements,
which included “a magnatherm shortwave diathermic unit (providing heat therapy to
deeper layers of skin and muscle tissue without risk of burn on outer layers) as part of the
74 Gray’s testimony is cited by Martin and Ekland-Olson, Texas Prisons: The Walls Came Tumbling
Down, at pp. 155-156.
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physical therapy equipment (making TDC possibly the only prison institution in the
country with such a piece of equipment).”75
Notwithstanding the diathermy unit, Gray’s other argument was the main one:
that hospital services for TDC inmates would be made unavailable if HUH was closed.
The hospital contained some 100 to 120 inmates (including some thirty geriatrics, 25
severely handicapped patients, and five to eight tuberculosis ward residents) who could
not be placed elsewhere. Gray explained that the HUH administrator, under his
supervision, had informally surveyed all the “free world” hospitals within range of the
unit prisons clustered around Huntsville, and found that “free-world hospital care as an
alternate [sic] is available on, at best, a very limited basis, and at considerable expense.”76
The hospitals would offer primary care only, accommodating small numbers of inmates
on a space-available basis, with supervision by TDC security staff required at all times
(creating prohibitive costs). The already-existing prison wing at John Sealy Hospital in
Galveston was too small and distant to substitute entirely for HUH. Until the new
building in Galveston was finished, Gray concluded, closing the Huntsville facility could
only result in “the substantial curtailment of medical treatment.”77 Finally, he added, “the
impact of eliminating the use of inmates in handling medical records would be that
medical care would virtually be eliminated.” Inmate clerical staff would eventually be
75 Perhaps more to the point, Gray also noted that a new fire escape had been installed, and the emergency
room and first aid facilities no longer had to share the same space. Affidavit of Ralph Edward Gray,
notarized 5/16/81, in folder “Defendant’s Alternative Hospital Plan, Aug. 17, 1981,” Box 2004/016-51,
Ruiz Case Files.
76 Gray affidavit, 5/16/81, p. 7.
77 Gray affidavit, 5/16/81, p. 10.
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eliminated under TDC’s long-term plans, he maintained, but forcing it to be done
immediately would be “catastrophic.”78
State officials initially tried to use Gray’s affidavit to make an end run around
Judge Justice, inserting its claims into their appeal to the Fifth Circuit for a stay of Judge
Justice’s remedial orders.79 The circuit court judges issued a stay order on June 26, with
crucial consequences for the resolution of the overcrowding issues in the case, and they
seemed sympathetic to TDC’s position on the Huntsville hospital. Their order suggested
that, given Gray’s legitimate concerns, “the equities may favor a stay” of Judge Justice’s
orders as they related to the hospital. But they could not let the defendants get away with
such obvious maneuvering: “The State is entitled to present these facts to the district
court in a motion to modify or a new motion to stay.”80
Along with the stay motion, the state submitted to Judge Justice an “Alternative
Hospital Plan,” containing a slightly expanded version of Gray’s arguments, in lieu of the
compliance plan required by the remedial order.81 The new list of “improvements and/or
changes” since the Ruiz trial cited the same staff additions, new equipment, renovations,
and other improvements as before, with a few late additions. One was that “the medical
records office is now staffed exclusively with staff personnel; all inmates have been
78 Gray affidavit, 5/16/81, p. 12.
79 The motion for a stay was before the appeals court already because the state had preemptively submitted
a stay motion to Judge Justice before his remedial decree was even handed down. Clearly the state wanted
to bring the case before the Fifth Circuit as soon as it possibly could. Justice’s denial of the motion was
released simultaneously with the remedial decree. See Ruiz v. Estelle, Order Denying Stay, undated copy
(but released on 4/20/81), in Box 28, Folder 4, Idar Papers. Idar’s motion to stay is at Box 34, Folder 2,
Idar Papers.
80 Ruiz v. Estelle, 650 F.2d at 562-563.
81 See “Alternative Hospital Plan,” 8/17/81, in “Defendant’s Alternative Hospital Plan, Aug. 17, 1981,”
Box 2004/016-51, Ruiz Case Files. Justice’s remedial order had directed TDC to produce a compliance
plan by August 1.
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removed from the area.”82 The “plan” document also reviewed the unavailing contacts
with area hospitals and the medical services which would be eliminated with the closing
of HUH. The overall arguments, however, were restated and sharpened for Judge
Justice’s benefit. Somewhat audaciously, the maintenance of the facility’s hospital
functions was recast as a professional obligation:
The closure of the Huntsville Unit Hospital would be in direct confict with the
ethical code of the medical profession; the doctors would be placed in the
untenable position of violating their oath as physicians or violating the mandate of
the Court. The effect of closure upon the inmate population would be
immeasurable, causing unnecessary suffering, enforced denial of medical and/or
surgical care, curtailment of elective care or, in the extreme, possible loss of life.83
Specific recent cases were cited of inmates requiring critical care which was provided on
site. The “plan” also cited the annual number of plastic surgery procedures which were
conducted on site, all of which would presumably be lost to inmates. Even after the new
Galveston hospital was open, “the need for the Huntsville Unit Hospital will continue for
the convalescent care” of patients released from Galveston. The conclusion of the
document actually raised the issue of professional standards explicitly, only to argue that
the continued provision of care was more important: “Realizing that JCAH accreditation
is unattainable, the hospital staff remains committed to its obligation of ensuring that all
patients continue to receive the best care that is in their power to provide.84
How valid were Gray’s claims and arguments? With action now required on the
state’s motion to stay, the court needed updated information on conditions at HUH from a
82 Presumably this had few “catastrophic” effects. See “Alternative Hospital Plan,” pp. 9-10.
83 “Alternative Hospital Plan,” p. 19.
84 “Alternative Hospital Plan,” p. 22.
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credible source. One new evaluation was provided by Texas Department of Health
inspectors, who evaluated the facility in June at TDC’s request to determine whether it
would meet Medicare standards. The “Alternative Hospital Plan” itself acknowledged
this inspection, as well as its negative verdict.85 For more, Judge Justice relied on the
contacts of the special master he had appointed, Vincent P. Nathan, an expert in reform
litigation who had accepted the imposing challenge of bringing about TDC’s compliance
with the court’s orders. Nathan selected Dr. Robert L. Cohen, a specialist in internal
medicine who was then serving as associate medical director of health services at the
Rikers Island complex in New York City. Cohen toured the Huntsville facility on August
13 and 14, 1981, conducted interviews, reviewed charts and death records, and submitted
his report five days later.
Compared with what John Albach had witnessed in 1974, Cohen’s report does
show that meaningful efforts had been made to improve hospital care for Texas prison
inmates. But it easily served the court’s purpose of demonstrating that Huntsville Unit
Hospital was still fundamentally a primitive place by modern medical standards, in some
ways only slightly influenced by “free world” practices. The medical staff now included
four full-time physicians (not including Dr. Gray) and two physician’s assistants (plus a
non-licensed physician who ran the paraplegic ward). Cohen observed at length the work
of Lloyd Ashberger, one of the PAs, and reported that he was “impressed with the quality
of Mr. Ashberger’s medical judgment and fund of knowledge.” But he watched with
85 “Operational, structural, and staffing deficiencies preclude compliance with Medicare standards.”
“Alternative Hospital Plan,” pp. 16-17. The Department of Health report was also cited in Robert L.
Cohen’s report (see below), which outlined and endorsed its conclusions.
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mounting unease as Ashberger, on his own, treated an emergency room patient with an
injured leg:
On the basis of his reading of the X-ray, he judged that no fracture had occurred
and explored the wound. He found a deep muscle tear which he sutured, and left
the skin wound uncovered. He countersigned Dr. O’Hare’s signature to the
admission note in the hospital chart. Mr. Ashberger did not call any M.D. for
consultation, nor did he attempt to get any orthopedic consultation. He told me
that he was sure that if an orthopedic surgeon had seen the patient, the patient
would have had an operation. No adequate examination of [the patient’s] knee
was made.86
After witnessing this case, Cohen went on to learn that Ashberger also routinely
“diagnoses and treats complicated stab wounds to the chest.”87 Cohen’s reporting
virtually appealed for help on behalf of the inmate patients. “HUH cannot function as a
major trauma center,” he asserted, “and it is incumbent upon the staff there not to think of
themselves as providing complicated, tertiary care.” Procedures which would not be
undertaken by licensed physicians in other specialties were “clearly beyond the
reasonable responsibilities of an unsupervised physician’s assistant.”88
In the view of an observer from outside, the absence of professionally qualified
staff and the performance of functions by unqualified personnel still determined every
aspect of the hospital’s operations. Unlicensed medical assistants supervised the facility,
including the emergency room, at night. Pills were dispensed by MAs without
pharmaceutical training. Radiological exams and lab work were similarly carried out by
untrained, unsupervised staff. And, like Albach, Cohen gradually reached the realization
86 Robert L. Cohen, “Report and Recommendations Concerning the Status of Huntsville Unit Hospital,” p.
8, found in Box 36, Folder 1, Idar Papers.
87 Cohen, “Report,” p. 9.
88 Cohen, “Report,” p. 9.
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“that the hospital operation at this time is completely dependent upon inmate personnel.”
Inmates served as assistants and technicians throughout the hospital (though not as
surgeons, at least during Cohen’s visits). Cohen watched one inmate worker try (and fail)
to draw arterial blood from an intensive care patient. Inmate nurses were formally
designated as orderlies or nurse’s aides, but in fact they had “primary responsibility for
observing patients” in most areas, at most times: “During the afternoons and evenings
the only way a hospitalized prisoner can get access to medical care is by appealing to the
inmate nurses for help, or to call the MA who is located on the first floor. Clearly,
involving inmates in this screening process sets up a dangerous dynamic, guaranteed to
lead to abuse.”89
The premises still abounded with other conditions and practices which everyday
staff took for granted but which shocked the first-time visitor. Water seeped through the
ceiling cracks in the operating rooms. Nurses washed their hands in mop sinks. A
patient with clear symptoms of tuberculosis was left coughing in the open medical ward
while the staff waited on his lab work. Cohen was even more appalled by his visit to the
dimly lit “cell block” area of the hospital, for patients in medical segregation, where one
inmate with advanced metastatic cancer had been sent for slashing his own arms.
Cohen’s review of mortality cases cited four examples of inmate deaths which clearly
reflected misdiagnosis, neglect, and otherwise deficient care which seemed all too
consistent with his own observations.90 His final recommendations were emphatic and
89 Cohen, “Report,” p. 12. But, consistent (presumably not by sheer coincidence) with the claims in the
“Alternative Hospital Plan,” the medical records coordinator told Cohen that there were no inmates
working in medical records.
90 For Cohen’s observations of the “cell block,” see “Report,” pp. 28-35.
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not exactly ambiguous: HUH must be downgraded to an infirmary, should provide
nursing and 24-hour emergency room coverage by actual nurses and doctors, and should
arrange with area hospitals and the Galveston facility for transfer of patients requiring
surgery or other critical care.91
The persistence of the conditions prevailing in the Huntsville Unit Hospital—
behind the walls, but nevertheless one of the prison facilities most open and best known
to professionals from outside—seems a revealing if not necessarily surprising example of
what some doctors were willing to tolerate, or accommodate. Albach and Cohen were
both willing to attribute decent motives to figures like the beleaguered Dr. Gray, to whom
they could attribute a resigned acceptance of grim circumstances, along with a
commitment to alleviating them as best he could. But arguably deeper, in its way, than
the squalor of the conditions themselves was the willingness of some medical
professionals to contribute actively to their persistence. Gray’s appeal to keep HUH open
might be seen as one example, but also might be mitigated by legitimate concern for
patients with no place to be sent. The circumstances accompanying Cohen’s
appointment, however, offer other examples. After the order appointing Cohen was
entered by the court, TDC was given five days to submit any objections. Ed Idar, still
actively representing TDC, objected both to the procedure and to Cohen himself.
Gratuitously, Idar asserted the defendant’s prerogative to submit alternative nominations
for the position of medical expert for the court.92 The individuals Idar put forward, Drs.
91 For Cohen’s final recommendations see “Report,” pp. 42-43.
92 Ruiz v. Estelle, Opposition to the Appointment of Dr. Cohen and Making Alternative Nominations to the
Court, in Folder “Opposition to the Appointment of Dr. Cohen . . . (Aug. 5, 1981),” Box 2004/016-1, Ruiz
Case Files.
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Vernon Knight and Robert Couch, were both professors at Baylor College of Medicine in
Houston, and both occupied positions of eminence: Knight was the chairman of the
Baylor microbiology department and senior attending physician at Methodist Hospital,
while Couch directed Baylor’s Influenza Research Center. Idar argued that their
availability locally made it unnecessary—and therefore indefensible—“to go nearly 2,000
miles to the East Coast to obtain experts to assist the Court in evaluating and monitoring
the prison hospital unit.”93 Even more compelling, in Idar’s view, was the familiarity
with Texas prisons that came from their longstanding relationships with the system:
Both Drs. Knight and Crouch already have extensive experience in the area
providing medical services in the Texas Prison System in the context of medical
research utilizing prison volunteers from approximately 1967 through 1977. This
research project involved approximately 6,000 inmates. Drs. Knight and Crouch
during this time personally examined and completed health evaluations of
approximately 1,200 inmates. They have also rendered gratuitous medical care to
inmates at several of the TDC institutions over several years. They have had the
opportunity to observer the TDC health care system and everyday operations for a
number of years.94
In Idar’s view, the willingness of two of the state’s leading physicians to act as court
experts was a credit to them and their institution. In light of accounts such as Cohen’s,
their willingness to serve at the defendants’ request, on the basis of their long association
with the prison system (not simply as caregivers but as researchers), seems less morally
outstanding. For Vincent Nathan and Judge Justice, as well as the plaintiffs, TDC’s
relationships with leaders of the Texas medical establishment were undoubtedly part of
the problem, and part of the vital importance of an expert from outside, like Cohen, was
93 “Opposition to the Appointment,” p. 4.
94 “Opposition to the Appointment,” p. 4.
62
precisely his absence of local ties, and his consequent willingness to affirm basic
professional standards without fear or favor. In hearing out explanations for the
orthopedic care provided at HUH by Lloyd Ashburger, the PA, Cohen concluded that the
episode represented “a symptomatic and systemic problem, rather than an individual case
of mistreatment.”95 The same might perhaps explain the apparent unwillingness of
Knight and Couch to advance conclusions such as Cohen’s during their long years of
familiarity with the system, as well as their apparent willingness to serve as expert
witnesses at the system’s request.
In responding to the state’s motion to stay, Judge Justice and the plaintiffs faced a
dilemma. Cohen’s investigation proved that conditions at HUH remained intolerable
(and suggested that they were irredeemable), but Gray’s objections could not be
dismissed (or even addressed by any means available to the court). Most importantly,
despite its own refusal on procedural grounds to consider Gray’s arguments for staying
Justice’s order, the Fifth Circuit had signaled its own probable willingness to issue the
stay, after Justice rejected it, on the strength of those arguments—and ultimately to
overturn the stay order itself.
For the plaintiffs and for Judge Justice, dealing with the stay order as it came back
to the district court appears to have amounted to the crisis of the whole episode. The
importance of the dilemma extended well beyond the hospital itself. Perhaps without
initially intending to do so, the state had managed to separate the question of
constitutional standards from the mechanism of professional standards and had found a
plausible way of claiming to fulfill one without reaching the other. If the plaintiffs and
95 Cohen, “Report,” pp. 8-9.
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the judge ceded ground on the hospital order, it meant losing the identification of
professional standards as constitutionally required. But if they held their ground, they
risked losing all remedial control over the hospital.
In responding to the state’s arguments to Judge Justice regarding the stay, the
plaintiffs’ attorneys made the decision to seek a line of retreat, putting forward a list of
conditions under which they were willing to endorse a stay. 96 Some of the conditions
amounted to restated, somewhat pared-down demands for solutions to some of the
infirmary’s worst and most intractable problems, such as unsanitary conditions and lack
of supervision by qualified medical and nursing staff. But, more importantly, they also
included the de facto downgrading of the hospital by taking away its acute care and
surgical functions (again, unless it could be brought into compliance with Medicare
standards, as cited in the inspections by the Department of Health). This would not meet
the demands in the “Alternative Hospital Plan,” but it went some distance toward meeting
Gray’s stated concerns for the hospital’s most helpless long-term patients.
Justice followed the plaintiffs’ lead. He also saw the need to make a tactical
retreat but was determined not to let the state establish its desired principle. On October
19, he issued a response to the various accumulated stay motions filed by the state,
including the stay of the HUH order (and the “Alternate Hospital Plan”).97 He cited
Cohen’s report (and the conclusions of the Department of Health) as evidence against
96 Ruiz Plaintiffs’ Response to Motion to Stay or Modify Injunction, as cited in Ruiz Order, 10/19/81,
Folder “Order denying defendants’ motion to stay or modify injunction, Oct. 19, 1982” [should read 1981],
Box 2004/016-6, Ruiz Case Files; and as excerpted in Ruiz Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs Conditions
Concerning Huntsville Unit Hospital, in Folder “Defendants’ response. . . ,” Box 2004/016-1, Ruiz Case
Files.
97 Ruiz Order, 10/19/81.
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Gray’s claims, and claimed that “the factual findings based on testimony adduced at trial
will not be vacated on the basis of Dr. Gray’s affidavit.” But while his order might not be
vacated, Justice was willing to modify it. The hospital, he maintained, was demonstrably
unsuitable for provision of acute care, but nevertheless it played “a critical role in the full
provision of health care to inmates, other than those who require acute care. . . . Inmates
who require non-acute care may well be harmed by the downgrading of the Huntsville
Unit Hospital. Certainly, this deprivation was not contemplated in the Amended Decree,
and it will not be visited on the inmates.”98 The invocation of acute care as the critical
function that the hospital was still required to serve, taken straight from the plaintiffs’
conditions, did not truly characterize the claims made by Gray or the conclusions reached
by Cohen, but it offered Justice the compromise he needed. Reluctantly and somewhat
wryly, Justice concluded that “it appears that the interests of the inmates, as well as of
TDC, will be served by issuance of a stay.” But the stay was conditional and subject to
review. Citing and endorsing the plaintiffs’ conditions for supporting the stay, Justice
directed the defendants to respond to each of the conditions, and ordered the parties to
meet yet again and try to settle the matter. “This process should produce a reasonable
solution to the disadvantageous conditions, which will obviate the need to enforce the
health care provisions of the order by further injunctive action.”99
Justice’s order reflected the tactical good sense which generally enabled him to
secure a substantial amount of relief and remediation, in the face of state resistance, and
in the face of a largely unsympathetic appeals court. By granting the stay, on his own
98 Ruiz Order, 10/19/81, p. 18.
99 Ruiz Order, 10/19/81, pp. 18-19.
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terms, he preempted the appeals court’s consideration of it. At the same time, he left
himself the option of lifting it, as a possible source of pressure on the defendants to settle.
Without the likelihood of an unconditional stay from the appeals court, the defendants
might still anticipate an overturning of the order itself on appeal, but in the meantime
Justice would require them to negotiate, which might permit the plaintiffs to salvage
some even in the event of an adverse appeals court ruling. And the defendants also had
to weigh the possibility (albeit perhaps a distant one) that Judge Justice’s willingness to
accommodate them might favorably influence the appeals court’s view of his orders.
Whatever the extent of his calculations, Judge Justice seemed to solve the
problem of encouraging the parties to negotiate seriously. It turned out that the
importance to the state of carrying on a full range of hospital functions at HUH was, after
all, not so great. Within days of Justice’s stay order, the state submitted a response to the
plaintiffs’ conditions which addressed them all seriously and accommodated them all to
some degree. The response to the first condition was perhaps the biggest surprise:
“Defendants are willing to agree not to admit to Huntsville Unit Hospital, or retain as
patients in that facility, patients who are, in the opinion of the attending physician,
seriously or critically ill or injured.”100 Instead the hospital would retain the ability to
stabilize such patients until they could be transferred. The intensive care unit would be
shut down. The defendants objected to the condition banning surgeries in the operating
room, but were “willing to agree not to perform non-emergency general surgery such as
100 Ruiz Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs Conditions, p. 2.
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hernia repairs, appendectomies, some hemorrhoidectomies, and gall bladder surgery.”101
The defendants’ responses to three of the other plaintiffs’ conditions—placing terminally
ill patients in non-prison settings, keeping handicapped patients out of isolation, and
maintaining better sanitation—described elaborate and detailed plans already being
pursued. Willingness to negotiate over the hospital allowed TDC officials to pick and
choose the functions they wished to maintain and the improvements they wished to make.
Giving up the burden of acute care turned out to be entirely acceptable.
With the state willing to settle, a formal agreement was soon reached—which
ended one phase of the dispute only to begin another one. Judge Justice, citing his
appreciation for the state’s reasonable response, directed the parties to work out a draft
consent decree and submit it to him jointly.102 Several weeks of meetings produced the
terms of a stipulation that Judge Justice received in late January and approved on
February 15, 1982, officially amending his earlier decree.103 One newly drafted
condition now allowed for emergency medical care at HUH if the local Huntsville
hospital refused to provide treatment (and if transporting the patient to Galveston or
another hospital was inadvisable, in the judgment of the attending physician). The
defendants were charged with using “their best efforts” to finalize an agreement with the
Huntsville hospital which by then was already being worked out (despite Gray’s prior
representations regarding his initial contacts). Otherwise, HUH would be allowed to
101 Ruiz Defendants’ Response to Plaintiffs Conditions, p. 5. The defendants went on to insist that elective
plastic surgery and podiatric procedures should continue to be done on the site, referring to the arguments
from their briefs.
102 Ruiz Order, 11/15/81, Box 2004/016-1, Ruiz Case Files.
103 Ruiz v. Estelle, Stipulation and Order Modifying Decree, 2/15/82, in Folder “Stipulation and order
modifying decree, HUH, 2-15-82,” Box 2004/016-6, Ruiz Case Files.
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remain open, subject to “limitations and conditions” that closely followed the plaintiff’s
suggested conditions and the plans and improvements the state had claimed to be making.
The “stipulation and order modifying decree” settled the arguments between the
parties that the Fifth Circuit had heard in the appeal of Judge Justice’s original order on
HUH, but the court nevertheless handed down its decision on the original, unmodified
decree. The decision was still important not because of its immediate bearing on the case
but because of its treatment of the underlying purpose of Judge Justice’s original order—
the identification of professional standards of medical care for prisoners as constitutional
ones. The appeals court took the trouble to reject explicitly what the plaintiffs and Judge
Justice had conceded largely. The court’s decision on HUH was a small section of its
June 23, 1982 decision on the array of objections and appeals the state had pursued. In
this section, the court cited the “deliberate indifference” standard from Estelle v. Gamble,
noted the inadequacy of the HUH facility as acknowledged by TDC, and then proceeded
to argue that requiring the facility to meet the standards of hospital certification was
absurd:
Although HUH does not meet these standards, the record establishes that no
prison hospital in any other state does. Some Federal Bureau of Prisons hospitals
meet them but others do not. Of the 7,000 private hospitals in the United States,
only 3,000 meet JCAH standards adequately for full accreditation and an
additional 1,000 are on probation or one-year accreditation; the other 3,000 are
not accredited because they do not meet the standards. Literally millions of
persons receiving private medical care are being treated in hospitals that do not
meet the requirements imposed by the district court's decree.104
104 Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d at 1150.
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The comparison of high standards of provision for prisoners with lower standards with
those available to free-world citizens was a staple of the state’s legal and political case
during the appeal, on overcrowding as well as medical care. In its ruling the appeals
court indicated that it bought the argument wholeheartedly. Whatever the place of
professionalism in corrections might be, there was no doubt about what it was not:
“Expert standards are a useful guide but they are not a constitutional measure.” Judge
Justice’s already-moot order was vacated, and the already-settled issue was remanded to
his court with the instruction that any injunctive relief “shall not command the closing of
HUH or restrict its use solely to Huntsville inmates. The order should instead be limited
to requiring that TDC provide the minimum level of hospital care required by the
Constitution.”105
In rejecting expert standards as a constitutional measure, the appeals court
rejected the strategic thrust, if not all the ameliorative effects, of litigated prison reform in
Texas. The court left intact the achievement of Judge Justice and the plaintiffs in
establishing the unconstitutionality of Texas prisons as they found them. But it would
not allow them to use the Ruiz case as a landmark establishing a new, higher standard for
Texas and the rest of the nation as well. State officials had sought to use Gray’s
arguments to keep all final orders and decrees as narrow as possible. But their
willingness to settle suggests that for them, as well as for the judge and the plaintiffs, the
underlying matter of whether professional standards would be identified as constitutional
minimums was the essential one. In this respect, as in others, the victory state officials
claimed to have won in the appeals court was in fact a meaningful one.
105 Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d at 1150.
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Chapter 2
Promoting Innovation: The Politics of Federal Aid to Criminal Justice
“Crime will not wait while we pull it up by the roots,” proclaimed Lyndon
Johnson in March 1965, in a special message to Congress on crime and law enforcement.
“The long-run solution to the view of crime is jobs, education, and hope. This is a goal to
which our country is committed. But we should remember that not all crime is
committed by those who are impoverished or those who are denied equal opportunity. In
any event, we cannot postpone our responsibilities to act against crimes committed
today.”1 Starting in what was still the optimistic springtime of the Great Society,
President Johnson sought to defuse crime as a political issue by acknowledging the
immediacy of the problem, and promising to develop near-term solutions. His crime
initiatives were widely recognized as an effort to defuse a conservative backlash (which
had been signaled, if not fully realized, in the resonance of Barry Goldwater’s crime
rhetoric during the 1964 presidential campaign). But within Johnson’s White House, safe
streets and crime control were also seen as a legitimate cause, and one more social goal
for federal policy to promote. The modest initiatives launched at that time of LBJ’s 1965
message—a small Justice Department grant program for police and other justice
agencies, and a major presidential commission on law enforcement and criminal justice—
1 “Special Message to the Congress on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice,” 3/8/65, Public
Papers of the Presidents: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965 (Washington: GPO, 1965), p. 265.
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led within three years to a more massive commitment of funds, administered by the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration until the agency was closed down in 1982.
By the time of the closing down, LEAA was mostly the object of bleak humor, as
was any lingering memory of the optimistic rhetoric surrounding its origins. The agency
distributed, in total, some $7.5 billion, mostly in block grants to state-level planning
agencies, and it retained the political support of some of its beneficiaries in law
enforcement. The general impression of failure arose from both results (given the
upward spiral, mostly uninterrupted, in overall index crime rates) and process (given the
agency’s reputation as a bureaucratic fiasco, generating endless red tape without
conveying a consistent understanding of its own objectives). Few political leaders
offered serious complaints when the Carter administration abruptly decided to cut the
agency’s funding out of its budget request. Yet one of the few was none other than Bill
Clements, the hard-nosed, bull-headed Republican governor of Texas whose regard for
federal domestic programs typically matched his level of esteem for personal political
opponents. Clements sent a public letter of complaint to President Carter, privately urged
candidate Ronald Reagan to support the program, and continued over the following years
to attack the phase-out as an abandonment of federal obligations. “Those funds had
enabled state and local communities to strengthen their response to crime,” he insisted.
“The abrupt withdrawal of federal support occurred at a critical period in our nation’s
fight against crime.”2
2 See letter, Gov. William P. Clements to President Jimmy Carter, 3/12/80, Box 5, Folder 38; unsigned
memo addressed to Gov. Ronald Reagan (n.d.), Box 32, Folder 24; and quotation taken from Remarks
Prepared for Governor William P. Clements, Jr., National Governor’s Conference, Feb. 22, 1982, Box 41,
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Studies of the strange career of federal aid to law enforcement conducted in the
shadow of the LEAA experience based their unambiguously harsh judgments on the
standards proclaimed by President Johnson and his immediate successors, or by leaders
of the agency itself as they sought to affirm the value of their work.3 Aside from the
unrealistic hope of actually reducing the overall crime rate, LEAA had taken on such
goals as improving the functioning of the criminal justice system and promoting local
innovations in crime-fighting; but critics, citing the inconsistency of these priorities and
the lack of influence of central planners over local agencies, generally agreed that the
agency had accomplished little, even in these terms. But a more distant remove, away
from the evaluative criteria of the agency itself or its contemporary critics, may allow for
new views of its significance. Its impact on professionalization in criminal justice—one
of its early and enduring stated goals—deserves consideration in historical perspective. I
argue that the influence of federal aid on the development of law-enforcement
professions was hamstrung at the outset by conceptual failures, particularly an inability to
relate the state of the art in academic research to the practical tasks of law enforcement.
Without a credible, solid basis in an established science, professionalization in
criminal justice (in any meaningful sense) was easily sacrificed to the priorities of state
and local political leaders. But here, again, instead of sealing a diagnosis of failure, the
Folder 15, all in General Counsel Records, 1979-1983, William P. Clements, Jr. Papers, Texas A&M
University Libraries.
3 See Malcolm M. Feeley and Austin D. Sarat, The Policy Dilemma: Federal Crime Policy and the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1980); Richard S.
Allinson, “LEAA’s Impact on Criminal Justice: A Review of the Literature,” Criminal Justice Abstracts,
Dec. 1979, pp. 608-648; Robert F. Diegelman, “Federal Financial Assistance for Crime Control: Lessons
of the LEAA Experience,” Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, Vol. 73, No. 3 (1982) pp. 994-1011;
and Alan R. Gordan and Norval Morris, “Presidential Commissions and the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration,” in Lynn A. Curtis, ed., American Violence and Public Policy: An Update of the National
Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1985), pp. 117-132.
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prevalence of political influence should be a point of departure for new inquiry. In
Texas, where broad social factors promoted a long-expected but gradual shift in the
overall partisan orientation of the voting public, successive governors sought to use their
control over federal grant funds to build constituencies among local officials in law
enforcement and criminal justice and, ultimately, a broader public. Preston Smith, the
first governor to administer the program, put it to use in a traditional way. But Clements’
aggressive use of the issues around federal grant aid—all the more aggressive after Carter
terminated the aid—shows that the program did, after all, promote innovation in some
forms. Beyond his own immediate electoral priorities, Clements also deployed grant aid
in ways that helped reshape the grass-roots politics of criminal justice and foreshadowed
the revival of federal grant aid for targeted purposes. The eventual establishment of
political supremacy by the Republican Party in Texas was advanced by these initiatives.
The experiences endured by the victims of the Tulia drug sting are among the myriad
smaller consequences.
The origins of federal aid to law enforcement within the Johnson Administration
offer a case study in the role of social science research, not simply upon policy in an
immediate sense, but on the structure of governmental institutions and the consequences
of their flaws. Johnson’s presidential crime commission, his legislative proposals for
federal aid to law enforcement agencies, and the congressional response all led to the
statute—the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968—which set up LEAA
and governed its granting procedures (which were then adjusted repeatedly over the years
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by successive acts of reauthorization). Complaints about the agency generally cited its
unwieldy, complicated structure (originally, instead of a single director, it was led by a
“troika”) and the limited supervisory authority granted in the enabling legislation. In
fact, an explanation of LEAA’s salient features goes back beyond the legislative history,
to the arguments and assumptions about the etiology of crime that structured the choices
perceived by the administration officials who drafted the original proposals. In the
absence of scientific guidance pertaining to crime reduction methods, President
Johnson’s men were left to build an agenda on the principle of professionalization—an
agenda which was inevitably overwhelmed in Congress by a rising tide of partisanship,
conservative reaction, and the opportunistic politics of crime and punishment.
In his policy proposals and in his public rhetoric, Lyndon Johnson set out to
capture the terms of the emerging debate over crime in the streets and to create a
responsible middle-ground position. In his public statements he offered assurances of his
commitment to maintaining local and state responsibility for crime control, and ritual
disavowals of the idea of a national police force, together with bold pronouncements that
put fighting crime, and reducing the fear of crime, high on the list of Great Society
priorities. He would not be satisfied, Johnson proclaimed, with characteristic restraint,
“until every woman and child in this Nation can walk any street, enjoy any park, drive on
any highway, and live in any community at any time of the day or night without fear of
being harmed.”4 But notwithstanding the President’s hyperbole problem, another
recurring theme suggests his sensitivity to the kind of expert knowledge he would
4 “Statement Following the Signing of the Law Enforcement Act,” 9/22/65, Public Papers of the
Presidents, 1965, p. 1013.
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ultimately need in order to deliver the promised solutions. This theme was his
acknowledgement that crime was not only a function of impoverishment or a denial of
opportunity (as he had occasionally suggested while defending his poverty program).5
Some criminals were well off; moreover, most poor people were not criminals. At the
first meeting of his crime commission, in September 1965, Johnson read a list of
questions for the panel to answer, including “why one man breaks the law and another
living in the same circumstances does not.”6
Johnson’s question unwittingly posed one of the fundamental challenges to the
scholarship that guided the crime commission’s work. The commissioners’ assumptions
were largely shaped by the classical strain theory of criminology, as developed by
sociologists such as Robert K. Merton and adapted to the anti-poverty policymaking
community by Lloyd Ohlin and Richard Cloward in their landmark book Delinquency
and Opportunity. With far-reaching policy consequences, Ohlin and Cloward established
as conventional wisdom the explanation of juvenile delinquency as a function of social
setting, and specifically of juveniles’ relative access to legitimate and illegitimate
“structures of opportunity,” depending on how their surrounding community was
organized. Instead of an answer to Johnson’s question, which would enable anticrime
policymakers to focus on some deeper individualized root, the crime commission’s
report, with the help of Ohlin himself, offered an elaboration of the causes of crime in
terms of opportunity theory. For crimes of violence, according to the report of the
5 Johnson sensed that he had erred in his response to Goldwater’s appeals to public fears, when he replied
that his War on Poverty was simultaneously a war on crime. See Michael William Flamm, “Law and
Order”: Street Crime, Civil Disorder, and the Crisis of Liberalism (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia
University, 1998), p. 128.
6 “Remarks to the members of CLEAJ,” 9/8/65, Public Papers of the Presidents, 1965 (Book II), p. 983.
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commission’s task force on assessment of the crime problem (chaired by Ohlin), the
leading age-group of those arrested was the 18-to-20-year-old cohort (followed closely
by the 21-to-24-year-olds), while the 15-to-17-year-olds were the highest for burglaries,
larcenies, and auto thefts.7 The commission report correlated delinquency with urban
slum settings, family dysfunction, and backgrounds of social and economic deprivation.
Consequently, the report cited antipoverty social policy, targeting juveniles through their
surrounding communities, as the most demonstrably plausible approach to the problem of
crime prevention. “In the last analysis, the most promising and so the most important
method of dealing with crime is by preventing it—by ameliorating the conditions of life
that drive people to commit crimes and that undermine the restraining rules and
institutions erected by society against antisocial conduct.”8 Also reinforcing the
preventative importance of organizing a community’s socializing institutions so as to
head off delinquency—as opposed to reinforcing police firepower—was the
commission’s endorsement of labeling theory, which attributed high rates of recidivism
to the “stigmatizing effects of the criminal justice system.”9
Despite their intensive efforts, the ambitions of the crime commission staff were
necessarily constrained by deadlines and by the existing state of the art in relevant fields
of study. Ohlin later recalled that “the most important inputs of social science knowledge
to the Crime Commission were probably (1) the documentation of the harmful
consequences of existing practices and policies and (2) the suggestion of a variety of
7 The President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, The Challenge of Crime
in a Free Society (Washington: GPO, 1967), p. 56.
8 The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, p. 58.
9 The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, pp. 66-67.
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persuasive theories and justifications for pursuing alternative ones.”10 What was lacking,
among other things, were experimental findings that established the preventative effect of
any particular policy alternatives. If this was true in the realm of antipoverty research,
with its rich scholarly tradition, it was all the more so in what was then the much thinner
literature on law enforcement and criminal justice agencies. The commission task forces
that dealt with police, courts, and corrections were occasionally able to relate their
recommendations to the goal of crime prevention—as with the correction task force’s
emphasis on the need for community-based alternative methods to reduce recidivism
(given the pervasiveness of the “labeling” problem). Also, the science and technology
task force dedicated a section of its work to devices which could reduce criminal
opportunities, such as more secure car ignition mechanisms and better street lighting.
But each of these task forces to some degree served pioneering functions, conducting
surveys to collect basic information about the operations of their subject field, and
identifying some of the most pressing research needs.
Given the President’s commitment to finding ways of improving law
enforcement, the findings of the police task force took on special urgency. In this case as
in others, the task force recommendations occasionally pointed toward a possible impact
on crime rates, but no research existed which could prove the relationship. Progress, if it
came, would take trial, error, and time. The task force’s emphasis on ways of improving
police-community relations, while obviously informed by the urban riots and simmering
inner-city tensions of the period, also followed from the undeniable fact that a hostile
10 Lloyd E. Ohlin, “Report on the Preisent’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of
Justice,” in Mirra Komarovsky, ed., Sociology and Public Policy: The Case of Presidential Commissions
(New York: Elsevier, 1975), p. 109.
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public “adversely affects the ability of the police to prevent crime and apprehend
criminals.”11 Also, the report cited speculations about the crime-deterring effect of
officers visibly fulfilling community-service functions, such as traffic patrol, which
arguably had little to do with enforcing the law.12 But in the absence of hard information
on anything police could do to head off crime, the task force concentrated on what its
studies and surveys did offer—which was an array of opportunities to reorganize and
rationalize existing police operations, management, and personnel. As its one
experimental suggestion, the report endorsed the idea of redividing tasks and assigning
personnel so as to allow for “team policing,” in which a discrete unit of officers serving
patrol, investigative, and community-service functions would work a single
neighborhood together under a single supervisor.13 But the other recommendations
mostly aimed at upgrading personnel, through means such as competitive salaries,
higher-education requirements, better training, promotions based on ability, and statewide
commissions on standards. While arguably innovative in a sense, these recommendations
basically amounted to an endorsement of well-weathered notions of professionalization
advanced by generations of police reform advocates.14
As rates of violent crime continued their rapid rise in 1965 and 1966, and as urban
riots and protests tore at the civic fabric, Johnson felt increasingly reliant politically on
the prospect of serious proposals from his crime commission. But over the same period,
the commission members and staff became, if anything, more circumspect about what
11 The President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force Report:
The Police (Washington, GPO, 1967), p. 145.
12 The Challenge of Crime in a Free Society, pp. 97-98.
13 Task Force Report: The Police, p. 53.
14 See Samuel Walker, A Critical History of Police Reform (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1977).
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they could achieve. In early 1966, Nicholas Katzenbach, the U.S. attorney general and
chairman of the commission, having been prompted by his close colleague and crime
commission staff director (and future Harvard Law School dean) James Vorenberg,
complained about a reworked draft of the President’s 1966 crime message. Noting some
new language that had been substituted for the Justice Department’s carefully constructed
rationale for the President’s legislative proposals (which were minor), Katzenbach said
the White House “speaks rather hysterically about crime and treats the eight point plan as
though it, by itself, would provide solutions. But they will not.” Portraying the plan as a
new departure, rather than as part of a consistent strategy, “risks serious questions. Not
only will people ask what we have been doing during the past year, but they will ask the
same question next year when the crime rate goes up again. It makes no sense for the
President annually to engage in an all-out war on crime and annually lose.”15
Vorenberg, the indispensable man who orchestrated the entire staff effort for the
crime commission, was similarly cautious about what the commission could hope to
accomplish. In July 1966, shortly after the Supreme Court handed down its landmark
ruling in Miranda v. Arizona, commission member (and then-president of the American
Bar Association, later Supreme Court Justice) Lewis Powell wrote to Vorenberg to
complain about the ruling and, more importantly, the commission’s failure to take a stand
publicly on the consequences of the Court’s new restrictions on police interrogation.16
Vorenberg, in replying, made it clear that he also disapproved of the Court’s ruling, in
15 Memo, Nicholas deB. Katzenbach to Joseph Califano, 2/25/66, “Joseph A. Califano Jr. Folder 1, 1966,”
Box 15, Papers of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, LBJ Library.
16 Letter, Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to James Vorenberg, 7/6/66, “Justice—National Crime Commission,” Box
11, Papers of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, LBJ Library.
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part because it preempted state legislative efforts to codify civil procedure.17 But he also
cited the sensitivity of the commission’s task of educating the public, managing its
expectations, and carefully selecting its subjects of emphasis. Ultimately, he suggested,
this was because the commission in the short run had so little to offer:
There is no single question to which the Commission staff . . . have devoted more
attention than seeking early and viable remedies. We have some specific ideas
and proposals for short-run measures and are even trying our hand at a separate
chapter combining these, but I do not believe that this will be the major
contribution of our work. While there are far too few able people in this field,
there are some; and the sad fact is that if there were relatively clear and early
answers which would dramatically affect the amount of crime, they would have
been put into effect. In fact, one of the things that has struck me most in my work
in the last two years is what a complex, slow process it is to devise and put into
effect changes which are likely to make a significant impact on crime.18
Even as it elicited Vorenberg’s acknowledgement of skepticism, the Miranda decision
further deepened the President’s political predicament. The ruling proved politically
explosive in an environment in which the Court’s preceding rulings on admissibility of
station-house confessions (the Mallory and Escobedo cases) were already the subject of
growing controversy. The ruling represented the views of Johnson himself no more than
that of the Justice Department, but the Court’s growing ranks of critics generally found
LBJ guilty by association.
Thus by the fall of 1966, as the crime commission settled upon its
recommendations and wrote its reports, the national debate over crime policy was already
17 Letter, James Vorenberg to Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 8/1/66, “Justice—National Crime Commission,” Box
11, Papers of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, LBJ Library. Vorenberg himself had contributed greatly to these
efforts through his work on the American Law Institute’s model code of pre-arraignment procedure. See
Vorenberg and Paul M. Bator, “Arrest, Detention, Interrogation, and the Right to Counsel: Basic Problems
and Possible Legislative Solutions,” Columbia Law Review 66 (1978), pp. 62-78.
18 Letter, James Vorenberg to Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 7/22/66, “Justice—National Crime Commission,” Box
11, Papers of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, LBJ Library.
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degenerating into attacks on the Supreme Court and on liberal permissiveness.
Meanwhile, Katzenbach, Vorenberg, and other officials from the White House and the
Justice Department began the task of turning the crime commission’s recommendations
into the President’s 1967 legislative package. Joseph Califano, Johnson’s chief domestic
policy aide, assigned the Attorney General to chair a special task force and to develop a
detailed outline of legislative proposals. (Shortly afterwards, Katzenbach left the task
force and the Justice Department to serve as under secretary of state, and the new Acting
Attorney General, Ramsey Clark, took over his duties.) The task force report, finished
and submitted in November, set forth a list of proposals led by an operational grant-in-aid
program which would be used by local agencies for “innovations in the operations of
criminal justice,” examples of which included education and training for police, studies
of centralized court administration, and community-based corrections. This was similar,
to the work of the small grant agency Johnson had set up in 1965, though on a much
larger scale. But to promote what it called the “institutionalization of innovations,” the
task force went on to recommend that federal aid be conditioned upon the submission of
program plans by a state criminal justice planning agency with the authority to oversee
the administration of programs by local grant recipients. The federal program would be
administered by a new division-level agency within the Department of Justice.19
The impetus for defining the administration’s program in terms of planning
mechanisms and structures aimed at fostering the generic goal of innovation seems to
have come mainly form Vorenberg, who understood it as the way in which the federal
19 “Proposed Legislation on Federal Support to State and Local Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice
Systems,” folder “Report of the Task Force on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice (Tab
B),” Legislative Background—Safe Streets and Crime Control Act, 1968, Box 1, LBJ Library.
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government could best stimulate reform and professionalization. Califano, attuned to the
White House’s political needs, forced some changes in the plan. Perhaps with the idea of
firming up support from the administration’s urban constituencies, he took out the state
planning agency requirement for grant applicants.20 He also appealed to Vorenberg and
to Charles Haar (an assistant housing secretary, and architect of the administration’s
urban grants programs) to come up with a “Safe Streets and Homes” bill, or a separate
title attached to the task force proposal. Understanding what Califano was getting at,
Haar outlined a series of demonstration grants aimed at such things as new technology for
police departments and new street lighting and alarm systems. “This Act sees crime from
the point of view of the victim, be he central city grandfather or suburban matron,” wrote
Haar in his proposal. “Unless liberalism can show an eagerness to cope with this
problem, it will become a notable victim of crime in the streets.”21 Vorenberg submitted
his own draft, but added mordantly that “we probably know even less about most of the
results that can be expected from the programs which would be included in such a
package than we do about the proposals for planned upgrading of the criminal justice
agencies (about which we know little indeed).” Furthermore, even if it did result in crime
reductions, Vorenberg said, “it seems most unlikely that, even at very high levels of
spending, it would offset the predictable increase in crime in the next five to ten years,
which will result from increases in the 15 to 25 age bracket, racial shifts within that
20 See Meeting Notes, 12/10/66, folder “Gaither’s Notes of Crime Program Meetings,” Legislative
Background—Safe Streets and Crime Control Act, 1968, Box 1, LBJ Library.
21 Memo, Charles M. Haar to Joseph Califano, 12/8/66, folder “1966-67 Task Force on Crime—II,”
Legislative Background—Safe Streets and Crime Control Act, 1968, Box 1, LBJ Library.
82
bracket, and increased urbanization. If the public develops expectations of dramatic and
early change, it will be disappointed.”22
Johnson’s concerns were more immediate. He did not approve a package of
specific demonstration grants, as Haar had suggested, but the final version did reflect
Califano’s efforts to widen its appeal. On February 6, 1967, LBJ submitted his third
special message on crime to Congress, together with a legislative package headlined by a
Safe Streets and Crime Control Act. The act proposed a new program to offer cities and
states grants for planning, program implementation, and research and development, to be
administered (like the existing small program) by the Department of Justice. According
to the department’s official history, under the proposed structure “the Federal
Government would seek to create and guide the allocation of new resources to law
enforcement, consistent with the Nation’s historical conviction that law enforcement
must continue to be primarily a State and local responsibility.”23 The message
emphasized key themes from the crime commission’s report (which was just then being
published): the importance of crime prevention (using examples of technology, and the
need to overcome poverty), the fairness of the criminal justice system, and the desperate
need of the system for “better-trained people.”24 A month later, Ramsey Clark appeared
for the administration before the Criminal Laws Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary
22 Memo, James Vorenberg to Joseph Califano, 12/8/66, folder “1966-67 Task Force on Crime—II,”
Legislative Background—Safe Streets and Crime Control Act, 1968, Box 1, LBJ Library.
23 “Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, Titles I-III,” p. 3, Administrative History of the
Department of Justice, Vol. I, Part 1, Box 1, LBJ Library.
24 “Special Message to the Congress on Crime in America,” 2/6/67, Public Papers of the Presidents, 1967,
pp. 134-145.
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Committee, in the first of a series of hearings in what promised to be a grueling
legislative struggle.
Over the months that followed, the administration lost its key battles in both
chambers of Congress over the shape and contents of its crime bill. In the House of
Representatives, after the bill was reported intact through the Judiciary Committee,
Republican leaders successfully amended it on the floor, taking out the Justice
Department’s granting authority and substituting pure block grants to states, allocated by
population. Using the planning grants, states would create state-level and regional
planning agencies which would then pass on block-grant funds to local applicants based
on comprehensive statewide plans. The administration and its supporters hoped to
reverse this outcome in the Senate, but were outmaneuvered by Judiciary Committee
chairman John McClellan, who added provisions purporting to overturn the Miranda
ruling and expanded police departments’ wiretapping authority, then helped pass the
block grant amendment on the Senate floor. Then, following the assassination of Robert
F. Kennedy, the House passed the revised Senate version intact, leaving the measure to
be signed, reluctantly and quietly, by President Johnson.25 In both chambers, on the
block-grant amendments Republicans voted virtually unanimously in combination with
Southern Democrats to remove the administration’s control over program grants. While
the outcome reflected a perceived level of public fear and anger, it also represented the
resurgent influence of political patterns long entrenched in Congress up until the passage
of civil rights and Great Society bills. The traditional coalition of Republicans and
25 Public Law 90-351 (H.R. 5037), The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 90th
Congress (Washington: GPO), 6/19/68.
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southern Democrats was pulled back together, especially by indignation at the Warren
Court. Also, state governors of both parties almost unanimously demanded their own
discretion over federal funds, and their national organization poured resources into the
congressional struggle.26
Against these institutional forces, the Johnson administration, in its waning days,
offered a proposal which was intended to address the public fear of crime, but in fact
offered little more than the prospect of eventual improvements in the branches of the
criminal justice system, to be supervised by federal officials. The administration’s
legislative agenda overall included other recommendations by the crime commission,
much of it in different pieces of legislation (such as further grants for juvenile
delinquency programs, to be administered by an established office in the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare). But the signature proposal all too obviously reflected a
failure on the part of the commission to meet the needs of the President—to transcend the
prevailing wisdom and to find the near-term answers to questions Johnson had posed at
the beginning.
On the Texas Tech University campus, in the lobby outside the university’s
archival collections, an exhibit in a glass display case commemorates the career of
Preston Smith, the first and only West Texas native to win the state governor’s office.27
26 My sketch of the legislative outcome relies on Barry Mahoney, The Politics of the Safe Streets Act, 1965-
1973 (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1974); Michael William Flamm, “Law and Order”;
journalist Richard Harris’ coverage in the New Yorker, later republished as The Fear of Crime (New York:
Praeger, 1969); Feeley and Sarat, The Policy Dilemma, chapter 2; and the Administrative History of the
Department of Justice.
27 Smith was actually born in Williamson County, outside Austin, in 1912, but was moved with his family
to a farm near Lamesa, south of Lubbock. Reminiscing about the move in later years, he recalled that his
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Forgotten in most of Texas long before his death in 2003, Smith is still revered in
Lubbock; the airport was recently renamed in his honor, and a tall bronze statue of him
stands facing the university administration building (with his back toward the rest of the
campus). Together with artifacts of his career, the display behind glass lists some of his
accomplishments as governor. Near the top of the list is his distribution of federal crime-
fighting funds to local law enforcement and justice agencies throughout Texas.
The distance between the likes of James Vorenberg (or even Ramsey Clark,
himself a Texan) and Preston Smith shows the extent of the consequences of rejecting
federal discretion over grants-in-aid and substituting block grants to states. Many
individual grant recipients would have been the same, in either case; but the underlying
orientation of the program was entirely different. Instead of being vehicles for the
“institutionalization of innovations,” as directed by federal Justice Department staff, the
state planning agencies served as pure reflections of the political forces within states
which had an interest in substantial outside grants for criminal justice. Among these
forces were the governors who appointed the planning committees. As politicians
recognized from the beginning, the flow of funds for criminal justice represented at least
a potential force for promoting political change in its own right.
With Texas still in the early stages of a long-anticipated but stubbornly slow shift
in its overall partisan leanings, sources of outside grant funds under the control of the
family’s packed-up Model T had to be driven in reverse up a steep incline leading onto the high West
Texas prairie. For his own part, Smith as a college student traveled the 100-mile distance between home
and Texas Tech on foot. Interview with Prof. Donald R. Walker, Department of History, Texas Tech
University, July 2004. Also see interview with Preston Smith, 2/6/75, Preston Smith Oral History
Collection, Southwest Collection/Special Collections Library, Texas Tech University; Sam Kinch, Jr. and
Ben Procter, Texas Under a Cloud (Austin: Jenkins, 1972), pp. 52-62, and Charles Deaton, The Year They
Threw the Rascals Out (Austin: Shoal Creek Publishers, 1973), pp. 59-63.
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governor’s office were meaningful political assets. With fear of crime having become a
pervasive public concern, and “law and order” becoming a pervasive political theme,
federal aid to criminal justice became a potentially valuable asset to leaders of both
parties. The different approaches of successive governors largely followed from the
tendencies of particular personalities but also, to a degree, reflected the different
constituencies they represented, or targeted.
As the first governor of Texas to inherit the potential political asset of federal aid
to criminal justice, Preston Smith ultimately established the tradition of seeking the
political dividends. While he realized few significant gains from the effort, this reflected
not so much the irrelevance of the issue so much as the irrelevance of Smith himself, by
then, due to other circumstances. Smith’s ability to win the governorship to begin with is
revealing of the condition of Texas Democratic Party politics in the fading years of the
party’s dominance. By the 1960s the party was irreconcilably split between liberal and
conservative wings. (Lyndon Johnson was able to maneuver into a position of power
over the party, as an intended base for his presidential plans, but since he stood in the
middle without representing either side fully, his control remained precarious.) John B.
Connally, LBJ’s personal (but not ideological) protégé and Smith’s immediate
predecessor as governor, sought to reinforce the dominance of the conservative faction by
building new ties between business interests and an expanding state government.
Effective as he was in managing a modernized spoils system, Connally and his allies
were unable to develop a successor within the party who could win the endorsement of
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Democratic primary voters.28 Smith had won the lieutenant governor’s office on the
strength of solid support in West Texas and an ability to appeal to rural voters statewide,
who still constituted a large share of the party primary electorate. His willingness to
announce his 1968 candidacy for the governorship early on, before Connally’s
withdrawal, gave him a head start on his competitors for conservative support, which he
then consolidated in prevailing over liberal Don Yarborough in the primary runoff.
As Connally’s successor, Smith appeared as a kind of personal and political
throwback. The personal qualities that emerged during his West Texas upbringing—such
as his mastery of a homely kind of gregariousness—deepened his affinity with his
regional and rural supporters while limiting his appeal to others.29 His roots lay in
isolated rural poverty but, as he later recalled, he was inspired to dream of becoming
governor of Texas by reading political newspapers delivered along the postal routes.30 In
28 Connally did hand-pick an intended successor, Dallas businessman Eugene Locke, whose well-funded
media campaign actually managed to make the phrase “Eugene Locke should be governor of Texas” into a
catchy jingle that filled commercial breaks statewide. In later years Smith gleefully enjoyed singing the
tune himself. Other candidates in the race, such as state attorney general John Hill and Uvalde ranching
scion Dolph Briscoe, contended unsuccessfully for the conservative support Smith was able to attract. See
John R. Knaggs, Two-Party Texas: The John Tower Era, 1961-1984 (Austin: Eakin Press, 1986), pp. 118,
125.
Connally’s career is described in his own autobiography (In History’s Shadow: An American
Odyssey, written with Mickey Herskowitz [New York: Hyperion, 1993]) and two other books (Ann Fears
Crawford and Jack Keever, John B. Connally: Portrait in Power [Austin: Jenkins, 1973] and James
Reston, The Lone Star: The Life of John Connally [New York: Harper & Row, 1989]). But the most
useful political interpretation, despite being dated by its preoccupation with Connally’s presumed viability
as a presidential candidate, remains Paul Burka’s “The Truth About John Connally,” Texas Monthly,
November 1979.
29 Reminiscing about covering the Capitol, one newsman said, “Preston was just as common as an old
shoe!” Interview, Glen Castlebury, 1/11/74, Preston Smith Oral History Project, Southwest
Collection/Special Collections Library, Texas Tech University.
30 Specifically Smith was inspired by the Ferguson Forum, the longtime organ of “Farmer Jim” Ferguson,
which maintained a substantial rural following for Jim and “Ma” Ferguson for several decades. Aside from
the heroic example, Smith seems to have taken little of substance from the legacy of “Fergusonism.” See
Lewis L. Gould, Progressives and Prohibitionists: Texas Democrats in the Wilson Era (Austin: Texas
State Historical Association, 1992) and Norman D. Brown, Hood, Bonnet, and Little Brown Jug: Texas
Politics, 1921-1928 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1984).
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Austin, where he represented a West Texas district in the Legislature, his country ways
and high ambitions inspired some amusement, but his particular base of support (along
with his attention to other necessary rituals, such as dedicated campaigning for trade
association endorsements) eventually proved effective in his rise to statewide office.31 In
addition to reflecting the persistence of traditional party constituencies, Smith’s success
exposed the image of modern corporate leadership resting on effective political
management—an image embodied by Connally—as a façade. Connally’s own dim view
of his successor, however, took into account the disconnect between Smith’s capabilities
and the government over which he would preside.32
The early years of federal aid to criminal justice in Texas reflected the narrow
circle of executive-branch policymaking, as well as a lack of central direction aimed at
integrating the workings of the various branches of justice included within the circle.
Upon taking office in early 1969, Smith was all but unaware of the new grant program,
and with a contentious legislative session already under way, he left day-to-day
administration of the program entirely in the hands of his staff and appointees.33 Some of
His early adult life may have reinforced the hard experiences of his youth. Living on a frayed
shoestring, he worked his way through Texas Tech while running a filling station, and, after seizing an
opportunity to set up a movie theater near the college campus, he ultimately established himself as the
owner of a regional cinema chain, which gave him the means to pursue his political dreams. Even as a
statewide politician, he never abandoned, or transcended, the regional homeliness. Interview with Prof.
Donald R. Walker, Department of History, Texas Tech University, July 2004.
31 See interviews with Bo Byers, 8/22/73, and Stuart Long, 5/17/74, Preston Smith Oral History Collection,
Southwest Collection/Special Collections Library, Texas Tech University.
32 According to Paul Burka, Connally “warned his friends not to support Preston Smith for governor, as
some had pledged to do if [he] did not run again; Smith didn’t know how to run the system, he told them;
he would be too lax, there would surely be a scandal. And sure enough, there was.” See Burka, “The Truth
About John Connally.”
33 See interview, Harold Dudley, 6/13/73, Preston Smith Oral History Collection, Southwest
Collection/Special Collections Library, Texas Tech University. Also see James Robert Short, The Texas
Criminal Justice Council: A Chronicle and Analysis (M.A. report, University of Texas at Austin, 1973), p.
52. A careful survey of the CJC meeting minutes from October 1971 to January 1973 shows no incidences
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the necessary preparations for Texas’ participation in the aid program had begun under
Connally, such as the creation of a Criminal Justice Council (CJC) within the governor’s
office, which would recommend program grants (for the governor’s final approval) and
perform the state-level planning functions required by the federal act.34 But, especially
early on, the complex requirements of the grant program placed nearly impossible
demands on the newly organized council and its staff—which also suffered from
administrative problems of its own. The first application for the CJC’s own planning
grants, the CJC’s consideration of individual program grant applications, and the first
statewide plans for allocation of block-grant funds all had to be accomplished within a
few months, under extreme deadline pressure, and without the benefit of a functioning
executive director (since Connally’s initial appointee fell ill and had to resign and be
replaced).35 One result of these early difficulties was that no “comprehensive
planning”—meaning planning based on a perspective of the criminal justice realm as a
integrated whole, and coordinating programs across its different branches and
specialties—took place. Separate planning directors handled the separate branches of the
of Gov. Smith exercising his prerogative to disapprove program grants recommended by the council. See
Box 1989/057-1, Records of the Criminal Justice Division, Office of the Governor, Archives and
Information Services Division, Texas State Library and Archives Commission.
Gov. Smith did issue an executive order in 1971 that reorganized the council’s structure and
membership, but this was at the suggestion of a subcommittee of key council members aimed at facilitating
the handling of the program as available funds expanded and program applications increased. See remarks
by Gov. Smith to the Criminal Justice Council, 10/8/71, Box 564, Folder “Speech Material Prepared for
Gov. Smith,” Texas Criminal Justice Council (1969-1972), Papers of E. Preston Smith, Southwest
Collection/Special Collections Library, Texas Tech University.
34 Michael Vance Powell provides a careful analysis of the structure, composition, and staff functions of the
Criminal Justice Council in The Block Grant for Crime Control in Texas, 1968-1970 (M.A. thesis,
University of Texas at Austin, 1972), pp. 21-30.
35 Leonard Blaylock’s note to Vernon McGee tendering his resignation as CJC director, 5/28/69, is in Box
527, Folder “Criminal Justice Council,” Program Development (Oliver-McKee) Correspondence, E.
Preston Smith Papers, Southwest Collection/Special Collections Library, Texas Tech University.
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criminal justice system (law enforcement, courts, and corrections) independently, and
even the appointment of a new executive director failed to influence their work.36
Without firm leadership, or even guidance, from above, the decision-making
process among CJC staff members, and the council itself, amounted to a struggle among
staff and councilors representing particular interests. Smith’s council-member and staff
appointments reflected a clear assumption that the planning process would represent
institutional interests rather than the views of unaffiliated citizens. Nine of the 21 seats
on the CJC were reserved ex oficio for the heads of the state agencies involved in
criminal justice (such as the Department of Public Safety, the Attorney General’s office,
TDC, the Texas Youth Council, and so on). Two of the three program directors had
recently been employed by agency chiefs who now sat on the council.
The CJC’s funding history for the first three years under Smith, up to the end of
fiscal 1971, reflected the inevitable logrolling and self-dealing among the state and local
agencies who carried some degree of weight on the council. The council’s action grant
list for fiscal 1969-1971 (combined, for the purposes of its press release, with an LEAA
discretionary program involving law enforcement in Dallas) totaled some $25 million.37
The action grant list did not contain its own subtotals by section, but its listed grants
included some $2.1 million for peace officer training and professional college education;
36 See James Robert Short, The Texas Criminal Justice Council, pp. 59-71. Short and Powell also provide
invaluably clear first-hand accounts of the continuing administrative struggles, which included endless
disputes with LEAA regional officials over “special conditions” attached by the agency to its approval of
the state criminal justice plans during the first two years, and the state’s disputes of the regional officials’
criticisms.
37 Letter, Joe Frazier Brown, executive director, Criminal Justice Council, 12/3/71, in Progress of Action
Grant Funding in Texas by the Texas Criminal Justice Council and by the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration in accordance with the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, as amended,
from the Inception of Funding in November 1968 to September 30, 1971 (Austin: Criminal Justice Council,
1971).
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$2.7 million for prosecution, court activities, and law reform; $2.15 million for programs
in corrections, including adult probation services; $650,000 for police-community
relations units; and $3.1 million for facility construction, which included $700,000 for an
academic building for the criminal justice program at Sam Houston State University
(whose president was another of the original ex oficio members of the CJC). 38 Other
relatively large portions of the total budget went toward communications and database
programs that were identified as building blocks of a comprehensive Texas Criminal
Justice Information System. Grants to law enforcement took a predominant share of
funds over the first three years, but as total funding levels grew, courts and corrections
were gaining larger slices of the pie.39 In the first two years the council approved roughly
$250,000 in grants to local governments for riot control equipment, which was mostly
discontinued as a category in the third year.
The overall picture is of an array of state and local agencies carving up the grant
money so as to attend to those leading institutional priorities for which legislated
appropriations were, for whatever reason, not already available. A few of the grants that
council staff and members approved were for programs actually reflecting politically
progressive views about criminal justice, such as an $18,000 contribution to the Texas
State Bar for a project on revision of the state penal code (to be discussed here in another
chapter). The grants for corrections included curriculum development for continuing
38 The funding totals are my compilations of the listed grants within the sections of Progress of Action
Grant Funding (1971).
39 Law enforcement captured 77.7% of the $1.3 million in grant funds provided in fiscal 1969, but was
down to 50.4% of the $19.2 million total in fiscal 1971. Michael Vance Powell, who sat in on the
bargaining among the program directors over the statewide plan for the first half of fiscal 1970, observed
that “it was believed by the executive director and others on the staff that too little money had been spent
on prosecution and court matters during fiscal year 1969.” See Powell, The Block Grant for Crime Control
in Texas, p. 44.
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education and doctoral programs at Sam Houston State, management seminars for TDC
administrators, service improvements and new rehabilitative services in several local
probation departments, and two halfway houses. Approval of these line items supports
the impression that certain state agency leaders (such as Beto and Estelle at TDC)
sympathized to a degree with alternative approaches in their fields, and were never as
resistant to progressive change as many of the old-fashioned legislators who had long
supervised their biennial budgets. But ambitious notions of progress, if they came at all,
could be expected to arrive slowly. Meanwhile, grants for most forward-thinking
programs not directly tied to key institutional priorities amounted to crumbs. The total
funding for halfway houses statewide was $48,435. Assistance to district attorneys’
offices over the three years totaled $1.1 million (including $100,000 for the salary of the
executive director of the statewide prosecutors’ association), but the category for grants
for public defenders included a single grant of $27,214. One grant for $7,371 was the
total effort for recruitment of minority police officers. The statewide plan included
categories for improvement of parole services, and police offices for processing citizens’
complaints, but no grants were made.
With no particular ambition to reshape criminal justice, but with an image to
maintain and a record to defend, Governor Smith used his discretion over distribution of
federal aid in ways that were politically sensible, if not imaginative. He intervened
sparingly in the Criminal Justice Council’s work. He did indicate his own interest in
steering greater funds into drug abuse and narcotics control, and in January 1970 he
ordered the Council to prepare a plan for drug abuse treatments (which was funded to the
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tune of $1.2 million over the following two years). In at least one case he appears to have
intervened to steer a contract toward a campaign supporter.40 But mostly he kept his
distance from the council’s internal workings, and especially from its troubled dealings
with LEAA officials.41 As the program grew larger, Smith’s public schedule increasingly
consisted of appearances announcing the award of individual program grants. Some of
Smith’s own aides took a condescending view generally of his inaction, seeing it as
passivity.42 A more generous view might allow for Smith’s homespun shrewdness. For
the Governor, approving, issuing, and announcing the grant awards was a way of building
up goodwill, especially with the public audience for the press coverage. Making the CJC
and its staff the venue for the inevitable disputes between competing interests in criminal
justice effectively contained the disputes. For the Governor to become embroiled directly
in the carving-up process would have generated grievances and clouded his image as a
benefactor to local criminal justice.
By 1971 he needed all the good public relations he could get. Along with other
leading figures, Smith was implicated in allegations by the SEC in its lawsuit against
Houston financier Frank Sharp, who stood accused of bribing lawmakers by loaning them
money to buy his bank stock and then artificially inflating the share values. Smith was
40 The grant award (for part of the statewide law enforcement communications system) was to a Houston
engineering firm, that had given campaign contributions to Smith. The council staff was known to have
recommended contracting with another firm, but the Governor exercised his power of final approval to
reverse the decision. See George Kuempel, “Smith Backer Wins $250,000 Grant,” Austin American,
4/22/71. The critical coverage appears to reflect the simultaneously unfolding (though unrelated)
Sharpstown scandal. The story does not seem to be part of a frequent pattern of similar revelations.
41 Michael Vance Powell observes that while the council’s funding decisions were always identified as
recommendations, “in practice, however, neither the Governor nor any of his top assistants routinely
reviewed the council’s ‘recommendations,’ and the ‘recommendations’ stood as final decisions.’ See The
Block Grant for Crime Control in Texas, p. 25.
42 For one example see interview, Larry Teaver, 6/6/73, Preston Smith Oral History Project, Southwest
Collection/Special Collections Library, Texas Tech University.
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not indicted, and only three individuals (including the speaker of the Texas House) were
ultimately tried, but practically all of the leading elected officials and other power brokers
in Austin stood convicted by public opinion.43
Convinced of his innocence and seeking vindication, Smith unexpectedly
embarked in late 1971 on a quixotic campaign for reelection to a third term. Faced with a
crowded field of opponents, one of whom (Briscoe) commanded the leading position as
both an outsider and a conservative, Smith pursued a different campaign from his
previous ones, running largely on his record of social programs and emphasizing those
(health care services and criminal justice) for which he had obtained federal grant
funding.44 A substantial (but short-lived) dip in the rate of index crimes in the four
largest Texas cities in the first half of 1971 gave Smith the opportunity to claim credit on
behalf of the aid program. In an introductory letter to the compiled list of action grants
for the first three fiscal years, council executive director Joe Frazier Brown cited the dip
in the crime rate and somewhat rashly tied it to the action grants. “Many such projects
are designed for long-range effect,” Brown acknowledged. “However, some of those
designed for more immediate results, and some early maturing long-range projects,
apparently have had a direct effect on the incidence of crime in Texas.”45 Smith’s
43 Smith had called a special session in 1969 to allow the passage of bank deposit legislation that would
benefit Sharp. He actually then vetoed the legislation after it was pushed through, which was later cited as
a reason why he avoided being indicted, but his record of business dealings with Sharp tied him tightly to
the scandal. Sam Kinch Jr.’s Handbook of Texas entry on the “Sharpstown Stock-Fraud Scandal” neatly
summarizes the affair and its broad short-term effects. The typical sources on this affair are two dusty but
entertaining period pieces of political journalism, Sam Kinch, Jr. and Ben Procter, Texas Under a Cloud
(Austin: Jenkins, 1972) and Charles Deaton, The Year They Threw the Rascals Out (Austin: Shoal Creek
Publishers, 1973).
44 See press release containing Smith’s speech announcing re-election bid, 11/19/71, in Folder “Speech
Material,” Box 564, Preston Smith Papers.
45 Letter, Joe Frazier Brown, supra note 37.
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campaign echoed this claim through the primary election, and the governor used several
local grant announcements as campaign stops.46 At the last scheduled Criminal Justice
Council meeting before primary day, he gave a speech praising the council’s record,
playing up some of its achievements (such as the law enforcement communications
network), citing a few of his own priorities (such as multi-county jail facilities, a priority
for rural counties), and urging his appointed council members to “serve as a two-way
communication link between the state planning agency and the communities you
represent” (which seems a decently subtle appeal for reinforcement of his campaign
theme).47
Smith’s campaign was doomed from the beginning, and in the final results in
April he finished in fourth place with roughly 13% of the vote. As he receded into
obscurity, however, the importance of his handling of criminal justice grants arguably
became more visible, as the display case suggests. His precedents included not simply
the distribution of grants to local beneficiaries but also the creation, in a sense, of a new
politics of criminal justice at the state level. Others would later build in more imaginative
ways upon Preston Smith’s creation.
46 Examples include the “Year End Report” released by the Governor’s Office, December 1971; Smith’s
remarks at the formal opening of a police department building in Port Arthur, 3/25/72, citing construction
grant funding obtained from LEAA, and his remarks to the Eastland County Law Enforcement Association,
3/24/72, surveying the record of program grants, all in Folder “Speech Material,” Box 564, Preston Smith
Papers; and numerous newspaper stories from the primary campaign including “Smith Will Stress Crime
Prevention,” Houston Chronicle, 2/11/72 (describing address to annual crime prevention week luncheon of
the Exchange Club of Houston); “Anti-Crime Program Pushed by Gov. Smith,” Dallas Morning News,
2/11/72 (reporting on Smith’s announcement of LEAA discretionary grants for Dallas); and “Governor
Stresses Crime Drop,” Houston Post, 3/10/72 and Stewart Davis, “Smith Reports Crime Drop,” Dallas
Morning News, 3/14/72 (both reporting on Smith’s March 10 remarks to the Criminal Justice Council
meeting).
47 Remarks of Governor Preston Smith to the Criminal Justice Council, 3/10/72, Folder “Speech Material,”
Box 564, Preston Smith Papers.
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“I don’t want these drug pushers in Texas. I don’t want them peddling their junk
here, and we’re going to put them where they belong—in jail!” Blunt, plain-spoken
Governor Bill Clements, speaking in April 1982 to an awards dinner in Fort Worth,
undoubtedly paused for the cheers.48 During his two terms in office, the first Republican
governor of Texas since Reconstruction was also the first one to make the perennial
theme of fighting crime serve the cause of partisan change and the organization of new
public constituencies. The threat of drugs and “drug pushers” was a constant refrain.
The use of discretionary funds, to back up the calculated plain speaking, was a valuable
tool.
In his willingness to put the prerogatives of incumbency to political use, Clements
actually followed in the footsteps of his predecessors, though perhaps more vigorously.
He inherited what was now the Criminal Justice Division of the governor’s office, still
channeling federal block grants into local program grants across the state. Like his
immediate predecessor, he also invested his political capital in an anticrime legislative
agenda that featured stricter sentences and new powers for law enforcement. But unlike
any of his predecessors, he put the two pieces together—using the grant funds he
controlled not just to fund an agency or implement a program directly, but to actually
build a public campaign (the Texans’ War on Drugs) with both legislative and broader
political goals.
Circumstances ended up testing Clements’ ability to improvise. When the federal
government abruptly terminated its support for law enforcement grants, it threatened the
48 Remarks Prepared for Gov. William P. Clements, Jr., Safety Council of Fort Worth 30th Annual Awards
Dinner, Fort Worth, Texas, April 30, 1982, in Box 41, Folder 14, General Counsel Records, 1979-1983,
William P. Clements, Jr. Papers, Texas A&M University Libraries.
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future flow of discretionary funds to projects such as the continuing war on drugs.
Demonstrating the importance of maintaining the flow, Clements proposed to replace the
lost federal funds with additional state ones and incorporated the proposal into his
anticrime agenda. Less successfully, as his political purposes became clear, he fought to
maintain his own sole discretion over the funds. But his groundbreaking efforts,
reflecting the motives and fixations of a thin slice of the elite public, ultimately validated
the potency of antidrug fervor as a political force. In his later term in office, despite his
greater preoccupation with prison crowding and construction efforts, Clements would
continue to find new ways of using grant funds to wage drug wars and criminal-justice
politics.
Political innovation may not have been expected of someone who prided himself
on his lack of certain political skills, but Clements as governor brought some of the
advantages of an outsider’s perspective. For a Republican to win high office in Texas
was by itself a remarkable (albeit long-awaited) act of innovation. As a novice candidate
and, after 1978, an unexpected governor, Clements cultivated a persona that lent itself all
too well to his crime-fighting themes once he began developing them. His Highland Park
upbringing was not particularly humble, but he nevertheless spent enough time as an oil-
field roughneck to appear convincingly self-made as a drilling-rig magnate.49 As a
member of the Dallas business elite in the 1960s and 1970s, he seems (at least in
retrospect) slightly anachronistic, belonging more to the generation of R. L. Thornton and
49 My interpretation emphasizes different themes, but necessarily relies on Carolyn Barta’s Bill Clements:
Texian to his Toenails (Austin: Eakin Press, 1996), which appears very likely to remain the standard
biography.
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other, similarly rough-hewn (but self-styled) leaders of the Dallas business oligarchy.50
Notwithstanding his lack of experience as a candidate, he calculated that his no-nonsense
manner, as well as his experience and prestige as a businessman and his abundant self-
confidence, would serve him well in elective politics.51 In fact, he and his view of his
own office were indelibly marked by his Dallas background—and specifically the
influence of the distinctive civic culture of the American city in which municipal good-
government reform took its most fiercely insular, oligarchic form. From the 1930s into
the 1970s, the city’s tightly concentrated leadership circle—the Dallas Citizens
Council—was made up only of business leaders, excluding even academics, attorneys,
physicians, and other elite professionals.52 Together with the exclusiveness and the
insularity went a shared preoccupation with exercising police powers and promoting
social controls.53 Clements, who had traveled the world building his offshore rigs, was
50 While portrayals of the long domination of Dallas civic culture by business oligarchs—and the aftermath
of their rule—are commonplace, useful recent treatments are provided by celebrated local chroniclers
Darwin Payne (Big D: Triumphs and Troubles of an American Supercity in the 20th Century, 2nd ed.
[Dallas: Three Forks Press, 2000]) and Jim Schutze (The Accommodation: The Politics of Race in an
American City [Secaucus: Citadel Press, 1986]), academic participant-observers Ruth P. Morgan
(Governance by Decree: The Impact of the Voting Rights Act in Dallas [Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas, 2004]), Royce Hanson (Civic Culture and Urban Change: Governing Dallas [Detroit: Wayne
State Univ. Press, 2003]) and Robert B. Fairbanks (For the City as a Whole : Planning, Politics, and the
Public Interest in Dallas, Texas, 1900-1965 [Columbus: Ohio State Univ. Press, 1998]); and careful
historical treatments by Patricia Evridge Hill (Dallas: The Making of a Modern City [Austin: Univ. of
Texas Press, 1996]) and Michael Phillips (White Metropolis: Race, Ethnicity, and Religion in Dallas,
1841-2001 [Austin: University of Texas Press, 2006]). The classic expression of the traditional, self-
regarding view of Thornton and the other initial leaders of the Dallas Citizens Council is “The Dydamic
Men of Dallas,” Fortune, Feb. 1949, pp. 98-103, 162-166.
51 Barta portrays his decision to run for governor as an illustration of his way of decision-making. See Bill
Clements: Texian, pp. 3-12.
52 See Evridge, Dallas, chapter 5; and Amy Bridges, Morning Glories: Municipal Reform in the Southwest
(Princeton: Ptinceton Univ. Press, 1997).
53 In addition to the works cited above on Dallas politics, see Chandler Davidson, Race and Class in Texas
Politics (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1990), especially chapter 4, on patterns of elite cultural
reproduction and shared systems of belief.
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almost surely less narrow-minded and morbidly suspicious than many of his peers, but
for him, even the elective leadership of Texas was nothing if not top-down.
Clements’ relationship with his immediate predecessor at first suggested a degree
of continuity extending particularly into the criminal-justice policy realm. Dolph
Briscoe, the outgoing governor, who had presided over the preceding six years as a kind
of Tory Democratic Calvin Coolidge, all but formally endorsed the conservative
Republican after being defeated in his own party primary, and the turnover of power in
Austin in January 1979 had some aspects of a legitimate succession.54 Perhaps the most
important degree of continuity was provided by David A. Dean, Briscoe’s general
counsel, who actually stayed on in the position under Clements (until being appointed
Texas secretary of state in 1981). While Dean took on the executive directorship of the
Criminal Justice Division staff, the holder of the position under Briscoe, Robert Flowers,
stayed on as assistant director, along with other longtime staffers (some of whom, like
judiciary program director Willis Whatley, had served under Preston Smith).
The substance of Clements’ anticrime legislative agenda also reflected continuity
in some ways. Initially Clements, like other governors, entered office with a legislative
session already under way and without a well-prepared agenda of his own.55 The
particular contents of the anticrime bills Clements endorsed, and later reworked and
proposed in his own right during the 1981 legislative session, were also largely passed
down from the previous administration. Clements’ own highest priority in the crime
package, a bill authorizing the state police force (the Department of Public Safety) to
54 See Barta, Bill Clements: Texian, pp. 203, 214.
55 Barta, Bill Clements: Texian, pp. 222-230.
100
conduct wiretapping, carried on a longtime stated priority of Briscoe which had been
debated in 1977. Other bills in his package (such as the admissibility of oral confessions
as evidence in criminal trials, and new bail bond reforms) had similar pedigrees.56
Nevertheless, from its beginnings, Clements’ law-and-order initiatives reflected
his own views and served his own purposes, not those of his predecessors. His own first
recorded personal initiative on crime policy, shortly after taking office, was to instruct his
aides to arrange for unused Criminal Justice Division discretionary money to fund “a
tough drug program.”57 This was the birth of the Texans’ War on Drugs (TWOD), a
state-funded campaign which increased the severity of state drug laws but also
represented a landmark in the mobilization of public antidrug sentiment. The campaign
was identified publicly with Ross Perot, who directed the effort at Clements’ request, but
the origins of the effort lay in the governor’s own handwriting.
Days later, on March 7, 1979, the Criminal Justice Division staff submitted to the
Governor a detailed set of war plans. Two different forces would be mobilized for the
coming struggle:
ONE: A Special Drug Strike Force, made up of Texas Rangers, will be
established. . . . It will be commanded by the current Senior Captain, Texas
Ranger Service, and will direct operations of the DPS Narcotics and Intelligence
Services. Its operations will be (a) managed by objectives; (b) constantly
redeploying personnel based upon daily analysis of drug trafficking intelligence;
and (c) coordinating a full utilization of existing local, state, and federal law
enforcement and other personnel.
56 Compare “Synopsis of Law and Order Legislation Passed by 67th Legislature,” Box 32, Folder 17,
General Counsel Papers 1979-1983, Clements Papers, with press coverage of Briscoe legislation. See
Warren Burnett, “Crime bills: Nothing new in an old war,” Texas Observer, 6/17/77, pp. 31-33.
57 See Clements’ handwritten comments on memo, Bob Flowers to Gov. Clements, 1/31/79 (forwarded by
Gov. Clements to David Dean), Box 5, Folder 39, General Counsel Papers 1979-1983, Clements Papers.
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TWO: The Texans War Against Drugs Committee will counsel and advise the
Director of the Strike Force, and recommend and work for legislation necessary to
eliminate drug traffic. The committee, with a staff of three, will organize a citizen
awareness campaign of the drug traffic issues, utilizing a series of local and
statewide television, radio, and newspaper advertisements developing and
featuring modern heroes. Advertisements will feature an inward WATS line for
citizen informants. . . . Committee staff will pass intelligence from that line to the
Strike Force.58
Most of the implementation procedures involved the establishment and operations of the
“Strike Force,” which would target all forms of smuggling and manufacture of illegal
drugs (as well as the diversion of legal ones). As for the citizens’ committee, the report
listed possible several possible projects other than those already cited, such as organizing
a speakers’ bureau to discuss the dangers of drugs (“Speak to everyone who will listen—
civic clubs, churches, television talk shows, influential friends, legislators”), creating
similar programs for churches statewide, and organizing Scouts (“both boys and girls,
with programs on the dangers of drugs, and to establish a reporting system of drug use,
[and] suspicious aircraft”).59
Undoubtedly one thing making the war on drugs so easy to declare was that no
request to the Legislature for military appropriations was required. In accordance with
Clements’ instruction, CJD staff had identified $534,109 in unused funds controlled by
the division, and DPS had some $1.1 million in grant funds budgeted—all of which was
declared to be available. The projected Strike Force budget was $644,000, while
58 “Strategies in the War Against Drugs in Texas,” prepared for Gov. Clements, Criminal Justice Division,
3/7/79, in Box 5, Folder 40, General Counsel Records, 1979-1983, Clements Papers. “Management by
objectives,” as coined by Peter Drucker and as promised by the Strike Force, was a technique Clements was
known to want to bring to state government; Barta asserts that he became impressed with it during his
tenure as deputy secretary of defense. See Bill Clements: Texian, pp. 234-235.
59 “Strategies in the War,” pp. 12-15.
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citizens’ committee operations were estimated at $290,967. The strategy sheet even
indicated that the Legislature could be asked to appropriate money from a separate CJD
planning fund balance if costs ran above what was already available.60 Clearly the
Governor would have his war.
Whatever the extent of its funding and activities, the Strike Force faded from the
documentary record, but the waging of the war among the public became a genuinely
significant undertaking. The public declaration came on April 16 with the issuing of an
executive order creating the Texans’ War Against Drugs citizens’ committee, and
charging it “to assist the Governor and law enforcement agencies in an all-out war against
the drug traffic coming into Texas.”61 Somewhat innocuously, at least by comparison
with the underlying strategy proposal, the executive order directed the citizens’
committee to “study the situation and to make recommendations to the Governor on ways
for the state to more effectively deal with the drug traffic,” which could include
cooperative efforts among agencies and authorities or also “educational projects for
citizens, businesses, local governments, and law enforcement agencies.” The CJD staff
would “serve as the primary staff for the Committee.”
Ross Perot had already participated in the strategy planning, although to what
extent is not clearly conveyed in the documentary record.62 A brief history of TWOD’s
60 “Strategies in the War,” pp. 16-17.
61 State of Texas, Office of the Governor, Executive Order WPC-2, Box 5, Folder 40, General Counsel
Records, 1979-1983, Clements Papers.
62 Clements had also appointed Perot to the CJD Advisory Board. The vision of the citizens’ committee’s
work conveyed in the strategy paper (i.e., training Boy and Girl Scouts statewide to watch for suspicious
aircraft) is at least highly suggestive of Perot’s influence. (Press inquiries during the 1992 presidential
campaign revealed some of the extent of Perot’s enthusiasm for attacking the drug trade using military and
covert assets. He was said to have discussed such ideas as blowing up ships and shooting down planes
suspected of smuggling drugs across the border, and he also offered to buy a Caribbean island for the use of
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achievements drafted within the organization itself (apparently as part of the group’s
application for grant aid from the governor’s office) describes Perot’s actions upon taking
over as chairman, after the committee was formally appointed. Under his direction, the
group as a whole began by studying “every aspect of the drug culture. They studied the
law, penal institutions, medical research, and they talked with nationally known experts
in the field.”63 After several months, Perot directed some committee members to draft
bill proposals, and assigned others to develop suggestions for law enforcement. A third
group, led by “Mr. Perot’s right-hand man Tom Marquez,” focused on public education.
Marquez and his subcommittee “found unbelievable statistics documenting drug use
among our children. He found that approximately one out of every three young people
age 12 to 17 had tried marijuana and that one in six was a regular or current user.”
Marquez also found that “the newest scientific research showed marijuana to be
extremely harmful to minds and bodies, especially for our young people.” Finally,
Marquez discovered a strange and terrifying retail phenomenon:
This subcommittee also learned about “head shops” which were located in almost
every community in Texas. A “head shop” is a place where drug paraphernalia is
sold and instructions given to juveniles and others on how, when, and where to
obtain and use drugs. Tom’s goal came into focus when he discovered that the
magnitude and scope of the problem was largely unknown to middle and upper
income people over thirty. Yet, because of the expense of these illicit drugs,
including marijuana, it is the children of precisely these parents who are most
acutely affected.
federal drug agents. See David Jackson, “Perot drug war record reviewed,” Dallas Morning News,
6/16/92.)
Clements’ fairly detailed but cryptic handwritten notes on the strategy paper, dated 3/14/79,
included the following: “Citizen Committee staff—to whom report? Only to Chairman Perot—citizen
group would have no authority over DPS!”
63 “History of Texans’ War on Drugs,” p. 1, Box 5, Folder 40, General Counsel Records, 1979-1983,
Clements Papers.
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Apparently spurred onward all the more urgently by the upscale demographics of the
youth drug culture, the subcommittee “reported these facts to Ross Perot. They felt time
was critical and strong action was necessary. They felt that children’s lives and futures
were at stake.”64
To save the children of Texas, Perot’s subcommittee launched one more initiative
which would become a pervasive, enduring theme in the experiences of Texas public
school students. The committee applied to the CJD for still more grant funds “to educate
the public on the dangers posed by the abuse of drugs, and to create public support and a
proper climate for the cessation of illegal drug transactions involving juveniles. The
grant was awarded under the name of Drug Abuse Research and Education (DARE)
Foundation, Inc., and an all-out campaign against drug abuse in the State of Texas was
launched.”65 Using the same selection criteria that would later yield a vice-presidential
nominee, Perot assigned the leadership of DARE to Robinson Risner, a retired Air Force
general and Vietnam War POW. As the strategy document had anticipated, the citizens’
committee’s efforts to address the public now proceeded as a kind of paramilitary
psychological warfare campaign:
64 “History of Texans’ War on Drugs,” pp. 3-4.
65 Perot’s DARE Foundation, Inc. was actually different from the organization now known as DARE
America, which developed and promoted the Drug Abuse Resistance Education curriculum for elementary
and secondary school students and police-officer instructors. According to DARE America
(http://www.dare.com), its program, founded by the Los Angeles Police Department in 1983, continues to
be implemented in 75% of the nation’s school districts. Researchers have long disputed the effectiveness
of DARE in reducing youth drug abuse. (For several recent examples see U.S. General Accounting Office,
Youth Illicit Drug Use Prevention: DARE Long-Term Evaluations and Federal Efforts to Identify Effective
Programs, GAO-03-172R, January 15, 2003.) The place of Perot’s high-profile Texas initiative in the
context of antidrug policies nationwide requires a dedicated study, but it seems likely that his work was
known to officials in California, as well as in the Reagan Administration and other states, who were
planning antidrug educational programs.
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Under Risner’s leadership, DARE set out to raise the awareness level of every
citizen in the state of Texas, beginning at the community level. The state was
divided into six regions, with a DARE office in each region—a small staff of four
ran the central office with a youth coordinator and minority coordinator added
later to work the entire state. Presentations were made describing the drug
problem, the social pressures that encourage such behavior, and the social,
psychological, and physiological consequences of drug abuse.66
Perot himself targeted particular groups and organizations to be enlisted in the effort. “At
his own expense,” he staged seminars for the Junior League and the Texas Medical
Association Auxiliary. The statewide Parent-Teacher Association passed a supportive
resolution, and PTA board members “were trained in another two day seminar, along
with the wives of the State legislators, and again at Mr. Perot’s expense.” Local
“community action groups” were then formed across the state, each with “a DARE
coordinator, a Junior League member, a TMAA person, and a PTA representative.”67
Over the following months, other fraternal societies and community organizations joined
the effort, and by 1982, the leaders of Texans’ War on Drugs proudly observed that
leaders in other states were using their campaign as a model.
Coinciding with the broader public education campaign, TWOD’s bill-drafting
efforts led directly to major changes in the state’s drug laws. In this respect, as with
DARE, the self-promoting narrative crafted by TWOD exercised legitimate bragging
rights. Upon its appointment, “the legislative subcommittee, headed by Abner McCall of
the Baylor Law School, went into action by teaming up with Rick Salwen, Ross Perot’s
dynamic corporate lawyer.”68 The proposals that McCall and Salwen drafted were
66 “History of Texans’ War on Drugs,” p. 5.
67 “History of Texans’ War on Drugs,” p. 5.
68 “History of Texans’ War on Drugs,” p. 2.
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intended to facilitate law enforcement initiatives (such as the DPS Strike Force) and
rested on the same premises about interdiction strategy.69 One bill defined “trafficking”
as a new category of criminal violations and raised penalties (including higher minimum
sentences) for possession, as well as delivery, of “commercial quantities” of illegal drugs.
It also broadened the existing controlled substances laws to allow for conspiracy charges
and seizure and forfeiture of contraband.70 Other bills raised penalties for selling illegal
drugs to minors, provided for revocation of licenses for professionals convicted of felony
drug violations, and imposed new record-keeping rules for legal drug prescriptions. One
more bill took aim at the head shops, prohibiting “the possession, sale, or manufacture of
items used or intended to be used to violate the drug laws,” and specifically citing
cocaine spoons, heroin packaging balloons, and “power hitters and bongs.”71 With heavy
lobbying by TWOD and its allied organizations and “community action groups,” the
package of five antidrug bills passed through the Legislature in the 1981 general session.
While the successes of the Texans’ War on Drugs depended on heavy investments
of unpaid toil and sweat by Perot, his lieutenants, and the volunteer groups they targeted,
the program grant money awarded by the Criminal Justice Division remained essential to
the effort.72 Just as the quick identification of available funding sources in the planning
69 As the TWOD official history shows, the organization’s research efforts had determined that Texas was
“a major transshipment point” in the cross-border drug trade, with “approximately fifty aircraft flights”
daily from Mexico into Texas accounting for much of the smuggling. “It was also thought that increased
federal anti-smuggling activities off the coast of Florida would increase the illicit drug trade through Texas.
According to the intelligence data, it was believed that Mexico would increase its production of illegal
drugs as a result of increased efforts in Columbia [sic].” See “History of Texans’ War on Drugs,” p. 2.
70 See bill analysis, H.B. 730, Box 47, Folder 3, Clements Campaign Records.
71 See bill analysis, H.B. 733 (Drug Paraphernalia), Box 47, Folder 3, Clements Campaign Records.
72 As Clements may have hoped, Perot also appears to have taken on a major share of the expenses of the
effort. Risner later claimed that he “put out nearly $2 million out of his own pocket to make sure we were
never slowed down.” See Marty Primeau, “Ross Perot,” Dallas Morning News, 7/6/86.
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of the War on Drugs reflected the campaign’s place among the governor’s priorities, so
did the amount of continuing funding, in comparison to other program grants and the
total amount of criminal justice grants being made. By 1979, the total figure was already
down sharply from its mid-1970s peak, as overall budget constraints and disillusionment
with LEAA took their toll on congressional appropriations for criminal justice grants.73
At the same time, CJD’s flexibility in allocating grant funds was restricted by formulas
for dividing money among geographic regions, and by an accumulation of
congressionally mandated earmarks for juvenile justice, corrections agencies, courts, and
various other programs contained in CJD’s annual plans. Nevertheless, under Clements,
CJD made sure that the War on Drugs would be amply funded—at least at its outset. In
fiscal 1980, the total budget for CJD grants (reflecting both federal funds and state
matching funds) amounted to $23.082 million, with funds appropriated for 1980
estimated at $19.25 million (and the remainder of the budget covered by unspent funds
from the two previous fiscal years). Out of this pared-down budget, drawing upon
federal funds earmarked for juvenile justice programs, TWOD was able to obtain
$584,223 to set up and operate the DARE Foundation, with its six regional offices and
community organizing staff, during the year starting in July 1980. This new commitment
was easily CJD’s largest grant to a private nonprofit agency, exceeding the sums which
73 According to one staff worksheet, the total annual figure for CJD grants (from both federal and state
funding sources) peaked in fiscal 1974 at roughly $35.85 million, but remained at nearly the same level
until fiscal 1977, when the total dropped to $22.2 million. See “CJD Funding History: Crime Control Act
Funds (Part C & E),” Box 36, Folder 7, General Counsel Records, 1979-1983, Clements Papers.
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other politically influential constituent groups had managed to secure on a continuing
basis.74
Aggressive as he was in putting the grant money he controlled to his own
preferred uses, Clements was forced at the same time to deal with unexpected
complications that threatened the continued flow of funds. In March 1980, only three
months after the passage of complicated legislation reauthorizing LEAA, the Carter
Administration revised its budget recommendations and proposed new cuts, which
included LEAA’s entire budget for new programs. Clements, who wrote an irate public
letter to President Carter demanding to have the funding restored, was among the few
nationally prominent public officials to voice serious complaints.75
More importantly, Clements planned a response to the phasing-out of LEAA
which would maintain most of the funds for criminal-justice grants and, not incidentally,
cement an alliance with the local officials who had been receiving most of the grant
money. With all previously approved LEAA money due to run out at the end of fiscal
1981, Clements nevertheless approved the continuation of most existing CJD operations
and program grants through the fiscal year. David Dean, who as general counsel acted as
Clements’ key adviser on criminal justice, also developed a contingency plan to replace
74 Other leading nonprofit groups receiving CJD funding were the Texas District and County Attorneys
Association, which was granted $408,000 for the fiscal year beginning in April 1980; the Texas Police
Association, which was granted $133,218 for statewide police training during the year starting in
November 1979; the Texas Justice of Peace and Constables Association, which received $200,000 for the
year starting in November 1979; and the Texas Center for the Judiciary, which received $364,768 between
January and September 1980. Smaller sums were granted to groups such as the Amarillo Rape Crisis
Prevention Project ($12,478 in calendar 1980) and the Texas Federation of Women’s Clubs ($6,789 for the
year beginning in October 1980). See “CJD Grants to Private Non-Profit Agencies for the Years 1977-
1981,” Box 36, Folder 7, General Counsel Records, 1979-1983, Clements Papers.
75 Letter, Gov. Clements to President Carter, 3/12/80, Box 5, Folder 29, General Counsel Records, 1979-
1983, Clements Papers.
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most of the federal funds with money from state sources. In recommending these steps to
the governor, Dean cited their political importance: “The impact of the plan is to hold
together and in place the nonpartisan coalition of law enforcement and criminal justice
officials throughout Texas that you have created with your vocal and extended efforts in
trying to salvage the LEAA program in Congress and overcoming Carter’s determined
demise [sic] of the program.” The plan would also maintain funding for high-priority
CJD-funded projects—such as the War on Drugs—and would allow for the possibility of
a restoration of LEAA funding under a Reagan administration (which Clements was
urging upon the Republican nominee). And it would also allow for the Legislature to
consider Dean’s contingency plan during the 1981 general session. Dean himself would
seek commitments from constituent groups to endorse the Governor’s efforts to save CJD
funding and to require the candidates they supported to do likewise: “This plan, in effect,
tells the nonpartisan coalition of law enforcement and criminal justice officials
throughout Texas that you created that they are being given a year’s breathing room with
the understanding that their active support is necessary for Texas legislative approval of
the contingency plan or they are just flat out of luck in the future.” 76
Following Dean’s recommendation, Clements proceeded to seek the full political
benefits of the “contingency plan” for CJD funding. The successive acts of Congress
authorizing federal grant aid required 10% state matching funds in most cases, and under
a plan passed in 1972, Texas provided the necessary funds not by legislative
appropriations but through dedicated fees assessed against defendants in local, county,
76 Memo, Dean to Gov. Clements, 7/29/80, Box 36, Folder 6, General Counsel Records, 1979-1983,
Clements Papers.
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and district courts. The “contingency plan” was to replace at least part of the federal
contribution to the pool of funds available to CJD (by then referred to as the Criminal
Justice Planning Fund) by doubling the court fees. In the choice of funding mechanism
and in other respects, Dean carefully sought to maintain the control over grant funds that
had been vested all along in the governor’s office—with the understanding that, without
the whole structure of federal earmarks and without the need for LEAA approval of state
criminal justice plans, the discretionary power of the governor and his CJD would
actually be even greater.77 With the approval of the law enforcement groups whose
support he had been cultivating, Clements added the CJD funding plan to the package of
criminal justice legislation already being prepared for the 1981 legislative session. In
promoting the bill, the governor’s staff drew upon the history of criminal justice grants
going back to the Preston Smith years.78 During the session, the list of witnesses
supporting the bill in committee hearings included leading district attorneys, police
chiefs, the chief justice of the Texas supreme court, and the heads and representatives of
most of the state agencies and organized groups involved in Texas criminal justice.79
For all of the careful preparations overseen by Dean and Clements, and despite
the passage of almost all of their packaged proposals as submitted, the 1981 session was a
mixed success for the Governor. Among the Democratic leaders who still commanded
broad majorities (despite major Republican gains in 1980), the governor’s very success in
77 For the substance of the bill as proposed by the Governor’s office, see bill analysis, “Statutory Authority
to Continue Activities of the Criminal Justice Division and Administration of the Criminal Justice Fund,”
10/30/80, Box 47, Folder 13, Clements Campaign Records.
78 See “Ten Years of Accomplishment: The LEAA Program in Texas,” Box 36, Folder 7, General Counsel
Records, 1979-1983, Clements Papers.
79 See the typed sheet “CJD Bill Witnesses,” Box 36, Folder 6, General Counsel Records, 1979-1983,
Clements Papers.
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putting grant funds to political use provoked a backlash. When the CJD funding bill was
brought before the Texas Senate, early in the session, an amendment was passed giving
each of three elected officials—the lieutenant governor and House speaker, as well as the
governor—the authority to appoint one-third of the members of the Advisory Board that
considered and recommended grant applications. Even final approval of grants, which
under federal statute had always been the sole responsibility of the governor, was now to
be shared with the other two officials, as part of a three-member “Executive Funding
Committee.” These were shrewd strokes that exposed a dilemma that Dean and Clements
were unable to solve: despite their support for the continuation of the grant program, law
enforcement officers and criminal justice officials had no particular stake in Clements’
continued personal control over the program as well. Clements was believed to have
reluctantly accepted the outcome once passage of the amendment was seen as inevitable,
but the issue was reopened when the House passed a version of the bill without the three-
way appointments provision. However, with Senate Democrats accusing Clements on
“welshing” on the deal previously struck, Clements was unable to take advantage of his
House victory and ultimately had to settle for final legislation containing the Senate’s
terms. The outcome forced Clements to share board appointments and final approval
power with Speaker Billy Clayton, a conservative Democrat and occasional ally of the
Governor, and Lieutenant Governor Bill Hobby, a moderate with very different views
and priorities.
An even more serious threat to the Governor’s priorities came from legislators’
interest in passing their own appropriations from the Criminal Justice Planning Fund.
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This interest was not a new development. But as long as the governor’s office exercised
authority over federally granted funds expressly delegated by Congress, office staff could
argue that raids by the Legislature upon the planning fund, or any interference with the
governor’s control over program grants, violated federal statutes and would cause the
state to lose all of the grant money.80 What was exposed to legislative appropriators was
the accumulated unexpended balance in the planning fund, which reflected receipts to the
state from court fees that exceeded the amounts needed to match federal funds (as well as
some unspent grant money). This was the money Clements had drawn upon in order to
launch the War on Drugs. The final appropriations bill approved by the Legislature in
1979 took just over $8 million over the ensuing biennium (meaning $4 million per fiscal
year) out of the planning fund in order to finance six line items, several of which
provided additional funds to entities (such as the Prosecutors’ Coordinating Council and
Sam Houston State University) which were already receiving CJD grants. Most of the
money went toward supplements for district attorney salaries to be provided by the
comptroller’s office.81 Following the recommendations of his staff, and citing the
80 During the 1979 general session of the Legislature, one bill proposed to give the Legislature final
authority over CJD program grants. CJD staff in the governor’s office made the argument that interference
with the governor’s authority would lead to a cutoff of LEAA funds. See “Bill Analysis: Legislative
Control of Federal Funds Act,” and attached Legal Opinion No. 77-5 (Pennsylvania State Legislation,
August 13, 1976), in Box 5, Folder 13, General Counsel Records, 1979-1983, Clements Papers.
81 For an explanation of the line items in the appropriations bill, as well as veto recommendations, see
memo, Willis Whatley to Jim Kaster, 5/31/79, Box 5, Folder 13, General Counsel Records, 1979-1983,
Clements Papers.
Comptroller Bob Bullock opposed the governor’s control over state assistance to prosecutors. In
addition to having sought the funds contained in the 1979 appropriations bill, he also was seen as an ally of
Attorney General White’s efforts to provide assistance to prosecutors via the attorney general’s office. See
memo, Dean to Gov. Clements, 5/13/80 (alleging “a definite relationship between the Attorney General and
the Comptroller to prevent the Prosecuting Attorneys Coordinating Council from providing prosecutorial
assistance and to provide the Attorney General with ammunition to support his prosecutors assistance
project”), Box 19, Folder 15, General Counsel Records, 1979-1983, Clements Papers. Needless to say,
Bullock was also a notorious empire-builder in his own right.
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Clements vetoed most of the line items (and allowed another large line item for the
comptroller’s program to lapse, in the absence of necessary supporting legislation).82
But, as with the composition of the CJD Advisory Board, the removal of the
mandates accompanying federal funds took away constraints on the Legislature. In
drafting the CJD funding bill, Dean carefully maintained continuity in the prescribed
procedures for planning and consideration of grants (although, of course, the state no
longer had to submit its work for LEAA’s approval).83 But given the need to get
legislative approval of new financing for the Criminal Justice Planning Fund using state
sources, there was no practical way of creating a new mechanism to replace the federal
constraints on the Legislature’s access to the money. Inevitably, the entire planning fund
would now be potentially subject to legislative appropriations.
With the united support of statewide law enforcement and criminal justice
agencies (and with the amendment on Advisory Board appointments power), the CJD
funding bill passed through the 67th Legislature. But the success appears to have come
with further costs to the Governor’s own priorities. The final appropriations bill
contained a set of line items financed from the Criminal Justice Planning Fund that bore a
striking resemblance to what had been passed and vetoed two years before: almost $8
million total over two years, more than half of it going to the comptroller for assistance to
prosecutors, and additional sums to the same entities as before (except for a new line item
82 Whatley recommended that the Governor veto those line items for which the Criminal Justice Planning
Fund was the sole source of financing. In two cases (an appropriation to the state Office of Court
Administration, and one for the Commission on Jail Standards) Whatley argued that since “the
appropriation is reflected in the method of financing,” a veto would not be applicable. See memo by
Whatley, supra note 81. For the actual vetoes, see Proclamation by the Governor of the State of Texas
(veto message), 6/14/79, available on the Legislative Reference Library website (http://www.lrl.state.tx.us).
83 See the procedural provisions as detailed in CJD’s bill analysis, supra note 77.
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of $1.37 million over two years to the Department of Public Safety).84 This time,
however, Clements did not veto the line items, even though the same arguments from two
years before would have applied. It appears likely that the same circumstances that
reduced his power over the Advisory Committee also applied to the issue of
appropriations from the planning fund. Support for the CJD funding bill did not
automatically lead to support for the Governor’s maintenance of his own powers.
Constituents who were able to win further funding commitments from the Legislature
were not exactly going to sacrifice their winnings for the greater cause of the Governor’s
discretionary power.
The direct appropriations from the planning fund, together with the reduction in
the flow of funds resulting from the switch to state sources, clearly compromised the
Governor’s ability to continue using CJD funds for his own priorities. The War on Drugs
did not seek a cease-fire, but its planned operations were scaled back. Technically the
public educational campaign was funded by federal juvenile-justice grants which were
not directly affected by the LEAA shutdown, but these grants were themselves subject to
new budget cuts being proposed by the Reagan administration. The leadership of
Texans’ War on Drugs nevertheless submitted an application for $741,703 for the second
year of DARE operations, an increase of 22% over the first year. DARE intended to
support a total of “150-175 community coalitions of parents, teachers, school
administrators, law enforcement officials, ministers, and other concerned citizens” and
84 See memo, Bob Flowers to David Herndon, 10/14/82 (suggesting ways of opposing future direct
appropriations from the planning fund), and Attachment A, “Funds Appropriated to State Agencies from
the Criminal Justice Planning Fund by the 67th Legislature—Biennium 9/1/81 – 8/31/83,” in Box 5, Folder
13, General Counsel Records, 1979-1983, Clements Papers.
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also planned an array of PTA workshops, law-enforcement seminars, and other public
events.85 CJD staff had to meet with Risner to explain the need to cut back the request by
at least $125,600. They explained that available CJD funds were already far below grant
requests: “We received $9,090,801 in requests for state agencies with only $5,668,000 in
available funds for state agency projects. It has been necessary to cut many state agency
projects by 25-50% in order to achieve a budget which is balanced evenly between
police, courts, adult corrections, and juvenile corrections.” Noting the likely cuts in
federal funds for juvenile justice, CJD staffers observed that the need to fund DARE
exclusively from state sources would require cuts in existing operations. Given these
circumstances, the staffers drew a remarkably modest conclusion: “It would be
inadvisable to increase the staff of [the] DARE project, at least until future funding is
more secure.”86 Given its place among the Governor’s priorities, DARE was actually
shielded from the full impact of the fund shortage, but it could not be made immune.
Bob Flowers, who handled the DARE grant application, blamed the funding
problem squarely on the Legislature. In a 1982 memo to David Herndon, Dean’s
successor as Clements’ general counsel, Flowers observed that the practice of
appropriating directly from the planning fund “seriously hampers CJD’s ability to operate
the Criminal Justice Assistance Program by reducing the amount of funds available for
continuation of existing projects as well as development of new, innovative ones.” For
fiscal 1983, all new state agency projects had been eliminated from consideration, and
85 See grant application at Box 5, Folder 3, General Counsel Records, 1979-1983, Clements Papers.
86 Memo, Bob Flowers to David Dean, 9/15/81, Box 5, Folder 26, General Counsel Records, 1979-1983,
Clements Papers.
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continuing projects were approved on a short-term basis.87 As Clements left office after
the 1982 election, the instruments he had used to pursue his own priorities appeared to
have been effectively constrained.
The legacy of his first term was actually more complicated, and more substantial,
than frustrated staffers would have been in a position to recognize. The restrictions on
Clements’ authority over criminal justice funds were actually removed by the Legislature
during Mark White’s term (given the absence of partisan motives dividing White from
his fellow Democrats in the legislative leadership) and were not again restored.
Subsequent initiatives, such as a criminal justice task force launched by the Dallas
mayor’s office (and later elevated to the statewide level during Clements’ second term, in
1987), would continue to draw upon the pool of discretionary funds that Clements had
managed to preserve. As the cause of professionalization of criminal justice receded
farther into the idealistic past, the legacy of discretionary funds would continue to
promote innovative political initiatives and the reshaping of criminal justice politics.




Narrowing the Net: Professional Expertise and
the Politics of Sentencing and Corrections in Texas
In recent decades, as shares of responsibility for criminal sentencing practices in
Texas became dispersed across a daunting array of stakeholders, the problem of reform
grew both more difficult and more urgent. Any comprehensive reform of the sentencing
code required technical expertise both intensive and extensive, and a broad perspective
above and beyond that of individual judges, courtroom advocates, politicians, or laymen.
In large part for this reason, the task had remained unconfronted for decades, while dense
thickets of legislated amendments overgrew the original framework of the penal code
first passed in 1856. “In every area that we have studied,” reported Page Keeton, dean of
the University of Texas School of Law, “we have found conflicting lines of decisions,
irrational overlaps and inconsistencies, and other signs reflecting over one hundred and
ten years of neglect of the Penal Code as a system.”1
The years that followed may have made up for past neglect, but the outcome of
legislative reform efforts was not so much the forging of a rational system as it was a
balancing of political forces under extraordinary circumstances. For Dean Keeton, who
directed a penal code revision committee of the State Bar of Texas in the later 1960s and
early ‘70s, the revision effort reflected the responsibility of legal-professional elites for
1 Address text dated 11/17/67 in Box K28, folder “Texas Criminal Procedure Lecture and Tutorial Institute
speech, speech drafts, and notes, 1967,” W. Page Keeton Papers, Tarlton Law Library, The University of
Texas at Austin.
118
promoting reform as modernization. Achieving this to any extent was a difficult project
in itself. But by the 1980s and early ‘90s, the cause of sentencing reform was essentially
one part of a broader conflict over the balance of discretionary power in Texas criminal
justice, with crucial consequences not only for the shape of sentencing and corrections
policies but for the partisan political evolution of the state.
This struggle was propelled not only by partisan politics but also by other cross
currents, such as federal court intervention, ideological conflict among criminal justice
professionals, and an emerging source of expert knowledge and policy analysis. The
struggle involved not only responses to sharply rising rates of violent crime but also the
overcrowding of state prisons, the litigation of the overcrowding issue in federal court,
and the state’s inability, for more than a decade, to accommodate the inflow of convicted
felons while complying with federal court mandates. Forced to try to manage and resolve
a chronic problem in its critical stages, and forced to acknowledge the unanticipated
consequences of past actions, political leaders relied increasingly on policy analysis and
evaluation by staffers with academic expertise. By the early ‘90s, the apparent necessity
of change in sentencing practices offered a new opportunity for reform proposals
informed by research and formulated by professional staff. Some participants who
advocated alternatives to imprisonment saw sentencing reform as an opportunity to
constrain the tendencies of local prosecutors, judges, and juries toward excessively
punitive decisions. But in passing legislation, the politics of practitioner interest-groups
and partisan constituency-building continued to determine final outcomes.
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In recent decades, in a nation pervaded by both litigation and fear of crime, most
states and cities were forced at some point to deal with overcrowded prisons and jails,
court oversight, and the consequent need for changes in sentencing. Some other states
developed mechanisms for insulating state penal policies from political pressures, or
linking them to the availability of prison space to meet projected demands for
confinement.2 Almost all of these efforts involved the development of new,
comprehensive guidelines for criminal sentences which narrowed the available range of
penalties and, to some degree, replaced the discretion of sentencing authorities (mainly
judges) with the prescriptions of experts and legislators. But in Texas, where guidelines
were resoundingly rejected, unrealistically severe penalty lengths (which inevitably
overstated time to be served) maintained, and the traditional prerogative of jury
sentencing preserved, the limited influence of reform-minded experts (confronted by
established practitioners) was reconfirmed. Insofar as the approved legislation was
informed, and constrained—and thereby legitimized—by formal policy research which
was generally accepted, the process offered some support for a vision of state-supported
expertise as a nonpartisan, agenda-free, “user-friendly” resource, enabling a broad range
of possible legislative outcomes by offering decision-makers the best available
knowledge of the consequences of alternative actions. This narrowed vision of the expert
role effectively abandoned the hope of influencing debate by shaping its terms and
2 See Michael Tonry, Sentencing Matters (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1996), chapter 2, and also
Richard S. Frase, “Sentencing Guidelines in the States: Lessons for State and Federal Reformers,” Federal
Sentencing Reporter, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Nov./Dec. 1993), pp. 123-128, as well as subsequent articles in the
same issue on individual states. Michele Deitch describes the failure to institute such mechanisms in Texas
in her article in the same issue, “Giving Guidelines the Boot: The Texas Experience with Sentencing
Reform,” pp. 138-143.
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parameters, and conceded failure to counter the prevailing trends toward mass
imprisonment, abandonment of alternative sanctions, and the disproportionate impact of
criminal justice on racial minorities. Yet ultimately even this view overestimated the
willingness of partisan political leaders to tolerate a source of potential opposition
supported by state agency funds.
In developing the penal code revision proposal that went before the Texas
Legislature in 1971, Dean Keeton and the State Bar of Texas provided an unusually pure
example of the earnestly civic-minded sponsorship of progressive reform by an organized
profession and its leading academic lights. In responding to the proposal, the Legislature
offered a fairly typical demonstration of the enduring tendencies and rooted principles of
state politics.
In the context of the prevailing currents in criminal sentencing policies nationally,
the initiative by the Texas bar was a careful and deliberately conventional expression of
longstanding reform principles, as expressed in then-current American Bar Association
standards and the American Law Institute’s original 1962 Model Penal Code. Beginning
in 1966, the bar committee on revision of the penal code, chaired by Keeton, embarked
on an exhaustive effort to mediate between accepted modern models and existing Texas
statutes and case law. The work took much longer than expected, Keeton later explained,
in part because of the committee’s consideration of core principles of criminal law, but
largely because of the sheer extent of the duplications, inconsistencies, outright
contradictions, and other mystifying contents of the existing code. Keeton used
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archaisms still on the books to press the case for reform. “Our gambling statutes bristle
with long-forgotten game words such as ‘muggins,’ ‘A.B.C.,’ ‘crack-or-loo,’ and
‘bucketshop,’” he observed in one speech, “and the squabbles and disputes of a frontier
society come to life in the Penal Code’s provisions on animals.”3
As important as it was to clean up the old code, casting the committee’s proposed
changes in terms of modernization and rationalization seems to have been calculated to
influence the public perception of the revisions generally—including those which
actually overrode traditional principles rather than reconciling them, or involved
ideological differences rather than objective corrections. The reclassification of offenses
and punishments (much of which survived the legislative gauntlet) provides one example.
Citing an unmanageable array of overlapping, or arcanely specified, offenses and a
“bewildering variety and combination” of punishments, the committee wrote a
consolidated list of offenses and graded them according to four felony categories (three
degrees, plus capital felony) and three classes of misdemeanors. Minimum and
maximum penalties were then assigned to each of these classifications.4 Keeton
acknowledged before one audience that this new code “effects a general reduction in
penalties” (although not to the extent recommended in the ABA standards, as he took
care to point out).5 He chose not to make the same point in publicizing the code revisions
3 “The Proposed Texas Penal Code,” speech by the Hon. Page Keeton to Governor’s Conference on
Implementation of the American Bar Association Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice, Austin, June
12, 1970, p. 10, in Box K27, folder “Governor’s Conference, 1969-1970,” Keeton Papers.
4 See Texas Penal Code Revision Project, Revised Report on Sentencing, Draft 3 (January 5, 1970),
sections 6.03 through 6.07 (pp. 5-10), and Page Keeton and Seth S. Searcy, “A New Penal Code for
Texas,” Texas Bar Journal, December 1970, pp. 982-985.
5 “Sentencing Under the Proposed Texas Penal Code,” a statement by Dean Page Keeton to Sentencing
Institute, Huntsville, Texas, May 1, 1970, pp. 7-8, in Box K27, folder “Sentencing Institute, 1970,” Keeton
Papers.
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to a broader audience, as in his Texas Bar Journal article. He did emphasize, in the
article as elsewhere, that the revised code required the completion of the minimum
sentence assessed before allowing for parole eligibility, “so that the initial sentencing
authority can ensure a minimum period of incapacitation for serious offenders.”6 He also
cited the inclusion of extended sentencing provisions for third-time felons.7
Arguably even more important than the rewriting of the code, however—although
receiving less emphasis, for seemingly understandable reasons—was the proposal to end
the practice of jury sentencing in noncapital cases. This was a progressive reform that
was contained in the Model Penal Code but had long since been generally adopted
outside the South. Along with only five other states, Texas had retained the ancient
tradition of jury sentencing for all felony charges (although a 1966 amendment to the
existing code allowed the convicted defendant facing sentencing to choose between the
jury and the judge).8 Early in the redrafting process, however, committee members
agreed on the need for change, and in this case (as in others, at least to some extent) the
theme of modernization seems to have invoked in all honesty. “It is true that Texas
judges have, in the past, shown reluctance to discard entirely the insulation of jury
sentencing,” commented the author of the first preliminary draft of the new code.
6 “A New Penal Code for Texas,” p. 990.
7 See “A New Penal Code for Texas,” p. 990; “Sentencing Under the Proposed Texas Penal Code,” p. 8.
8 The other five states, all at least arguably Southern, are Virginia, Kentucky, Arkansas, Missouri, and
Oklahoma. The leading authority on the history and contemporary patterns of jury sentencing, Nancy J.
King, provides a useful discussion of contemporary practices—albeit not in Texas—in “Felony Jury
Sentencing in Practice: A Three-State Study” (co-written with Rosevelt L. Noble), Vanderbilt Law Review
57 (2004) 885-947. On the 1966 amendment allowing the option of judge or jury, see John F. Onion, Jr.,
“Some Major Changes in the Revision of the Code of Criminal Procedure,” (State Bar of Texas, n.d.).
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“However that may be, the time has come for Texas to join the vast majority of
jurisdictions that place this most difficult decision in the hands of the judge.”9
Dean Keeton offered several compelling reasons for the change. Judges could be
expected to make better informed decisions, simply because their trial rulings on
admissible evidence would often serve the purpose of restricting, rather than deepening,
the jury’s knowledge of the defendant. Moreover, Keeton argued that judges, over time,
would “develop sentencing expertise that no jury, sitting once in their collective lifetimes
in a single criminal case, can ever develop.”10 Expert decision-making in sentencing
would improve the justice system broadly. Judges could be required to follow detailed
procedures in rendering their decisions, and the revised code instructed judges to hold a
post-trial sentencing hearing and obtain a pre-sentencing examination and report by a
probation officer after each felony conviction.11 Under current practice, Keeton
observed, “the variety of authorized punishments, combined with the availability of jury
sentencing, frustrate the Legislature’s attempt to create an indeterminate sentencing
system.”12 But the code revision and judicial sentencing decisions would together reduce
the system’s vast disparities and allow the Legislature’s intentions to be fulfilled in
practice.
The lawyerly argument directed at the Legislature betrays a degree of doubt about
the fate of the project. The State Bar had previously developed and sponsored reforms of
the Code of Criminal Procedure (including the option of being sentenced by the judge or
9 “Preliminary Draft: Revision of Texas Penal Code” (Fred Cohen, reporter), May 26, 1967, p. 17.
10 “Sentencing Under the Proposed Texas Penal Code,” p. 9.
11 For hearing procedures and presentence report requirements see Revised Report on Sentencing, Draft 3,
pp. 32-39.
12 “Sentencing Under the Proposed Texas Penal Code,” p. 6.
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jury), which passed during the 1965 legislative session, but the effort had sparked
controversy and bitter resistance by some prosecutors. Keeton’s public statements on the
committee’s work all cited the individual members at length to show that all interested
parties were well represented. What he was up against is illustrated by a curious souvenir
from a member of the state capitol press corps, who sent Keeton a clipping of a news
brief he had written on the ongoing project, together with a supposedly secret “hard line,”
brass-tacks version of the same story as supposedly rewritten by Keeton’s critics. The
inside dope was that the committee was visibly anxious to avoid the fate of its
predecessor, and that despite the inclusion of Harris County (Houston) district attorney
Carol Vance, prosecutors as a group assumed that the committee, like the State Bar itself,
was dominated by the defense bar.13 The inevitable attack was launched late in 1970,
when Henry Wade, the Dallas County district attorney, citing outdated draft sections of
the committee report (and distorting their contents), accused the committee of seeking to
decriminalize drug and sex offenses.14 Keeton sent an angry reply and organized a
campaign of letters supporting the State Bar and its work. Committees in both chambers
of the Legislature held hearings during the 1971 session, but in the end neither committee
acted on the proposal. The success claimed by the prosecutors was undoubtedly aided by
the Legislature’s consuming preoccupation with the Sharpstown banking scandal, in
which most of the leading figures in state politics were in some way embroiled.
After the session Dean Keeton gave up his leadership role, but the State Bar
maintained the penal code revision committee and expanded its membership to include
13 Anonymous note addressed to Keeton, Box K30, folder “Committee correspondence & reports, 1967-
1968,” Keeton Papers.
14 Press release, n.d., Box K26, folder “Penal Code general material 1969-72,” Keeton Papers.
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Wade and other representatives of the district attorneys’ lobby. On the eve of the 1973
legislative session, T. Gilbert Sharpe, Keeton’s successor as chairman, unveiled a revised
proposal. Both prosecutors and members of the defense lawyers’ association had,
according to Sharpe, “rendered valuable assistance in reviewing the prior proposal and
suggesting certain changes therein.”15 The main change was that the existing option of
jury sentencing was maintained, although judges were authorized to set aside convictions
for third-degree (the least serious) felonies and substitute judgments for Class A (the
most serious) misdemeanors. Struggles over other issues, such as reduced drug offense
penalties and the treatment of abortion, were left unresolved over the interim, but the
announcement of the Roe v. Wade verdict, in the opening days of the session, removed
one of the possible roadblocks. With the new proposal maintaining at least qualified
support from each of the interested groups, the Legislature finally enacted a new penal
code, bringing eight years of work to a close.
Penal code revision, as pursued by Dean Keeton—together with the forerunning
struggle to pass the criminal procedural revisions—revealed the waning power of leading
professional groups to advance progressive reforms on the strength of the prestige and
deference they commanded, at least in the face of the emerging politics of crime and
criminal-justice issues. Beginning with its accommodation of the prosecutors’ views on
penal reform, the State Bar made a practice from then on of avoiding possible
confrontations with either of its mutually antagonistic constituent groups. With the views
of University of Texas law professors eliciting the suspicious scrutiny of the institution’s
15 T. Gilbert Sharpe, “A Proposed New Penal Code for Texas,” Texas Bar Journal, December 1972, pp.
111-113.
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own regents, Dean Keeton was forced to spend time and effort defending his own
prestigious institution.16
The eventual reemergence of the sentencing code itself as an object of public
concern—and expert attention—resulted in part from the unanticipated consequences of
long-running political themes involving criminal justice, and the policies they promoted.
As crime rates rose and public fears grew, politicians competed to establish their tough-
on-crime bona fides. Even Governor Dolph Briscoe, mostly content to block tax
increases and remain secluded on his ranch, felt compelled in 1977 to appear in public to
promote a package of “crime bills,” which lengthened selected sentences and set
minimum requirements of calendar-time-served for inmates convicted on aggravated
counts. His successor, Bill Clements, the first Republican governor of Texas since
Reconstruction, aggressively sought to use law and order to build new political alliances.
As new policies added to rising demand for prison space, Jim Estelle and the TDC
leadership began keeping significant numbers of inmates “triple-celled” and struggled to
win increased funds for expansion.
The Ruiz ruling did not preempt Clements’ carefully planned legislative agenda
built around law enforcement and drug penalties, but it negated the intended political
effects of the legislation. For more than a decade, the tide of the prison overcrowding
crisis continued to sweep crosswise over the prevailing currents of law-and-order politics.
Statewide leaders of both parties struggled to steer through these waters. Instead of
16 See the correspondence in Keeton v. Erwin files, Box G138, folders 1-7, Tarlton Law Library, University
of Texas at Austin.
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reaping the rewards of his hard-won credentials as a hard-line crime fighter, Clements
was forced to deal with the mounting consequences: court mandates, prisons closing to
new inmates, policy choices without political benefits. Mark White, who succeeded
Clements, was much less committed to the extension of punitive sanctions as a means of
constituency-building, but he too proved unable to manage the prison capacity crisis
without suffering political damage. One potentially significant initiative of the White
years was the creation of a permanent state agency staff which could apply the tools of
professional analysis to the range of state correctional policies and proposals.
In his second term as governor, from 1987 to 1991, Clements began what would
become a drastic expansion of the Texas prison system. At the same time, however, he
allowed for two developments which had the potential effect of limiting, to some degree,
the growth of imprisonment. One was the increasing role of the staff of criminal justice
policy experts, whose work had the effect of promoting legislative alternatives to the
governor’s own agenda. The other arose from Alberti v. Sheriff¸ a case in federal district
court in which Harris County, originally the defendant in a jail overcrowding suit, and
struggling to meet the terms of longstanding court orders, itself sued to force the state to
take in the large backlog of convicts sentenced to prison but still waiting in the jail. I
argue that it was the second of these developments, more than the first, which held out
the best chance for changing Texas sentencing practices and thereby limiting the extent
of the prison boom. Ultimately, episodes of litigation—specifically the original Ruiz
decision, and the strange-bedfellow politics surrounding the Alberti case—came closest
to pulling the development of the Texas prison system off the course that it ultimately
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took. Outside of the courtroom, professional expertise could not effectively promote the
same opportunities for reform.
Bill Clements came to power in Texas as an outsider to state government, and
viewed corrections accordingly. Upon taking office in 1979, the same governor who
moved aggressively to win the support of local law enforcement displayed none of the
same interest in identifying himself with the TDC leadership. Clements clearly
mistrusted them, although it is not immediately clear how much this reflected wariness
due to the Ruiz trial as it continued, or any sense on his part of the true state of the
prisons, or simply the longstanding ties that TDC directors had cultivated with state
Democratic Party potentates. He made a crucial contribution to prison reform, in the
view of Steve Martin and Sheldon Ekland-Olson, by appointing Republican businessman
Harry Whittington to the Board of Corrections; with no political or financial ties to the
prison system or its managers, Whittington was willing to demand serious, critical
oversight of Estelle’s operations and maneuverings.17 On the other hand, Clements
made his own small but significant contribution to the overcrowding problem by rejecting
a relatively high rate of paroles approved by the parole board, placing his law-and-order
agenda above the needs of the prison system. Clements’ other expression of his initial
views about the prison system came at a greater cost, ultimately, to himself. In June
1979, following a session of the Legislature which passed a budget well beyond his
recommendations, he vetoed $30 million in prison construction funds, among other line
17 See Whittington’s introduction to Martin and Ekland-Olson, Texas Prisons: The Walls Came Tumbling
Down, and pp. 227-232. Much later, in 2005, Whittington gained unwanted fame as Vice President Dick
Cheney’s unlucky hunting partner.
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items.18 With White, as the new attorney general, taking over formal responsibility for
the state’s defense in the Ruiz trial, Clements kept the proceedings at arm’s length.
When the Ruiz decision was finally handed down, however, it touched off a
struggle and a chain of consequences which would ultimately embroil the governor
directly in the prison system’s troubles. While Judge Justice found deficiencies in all the
main aspects of the prisons at issue in the litigation—overcrowding, security staffing
levels, medical care, disciplinary procedures, access to courts, fire safety—overcrowding
was not only a fundamental issue which contributed to the others, but also the least
amenable to being relieved by anything other than a reversal of the state’s most basic
principles of penal confinement. In his December 12, 1980 memorandum opinion in
Ruiz, Judge Justice carefully assembled the trial findings about the state of the
overcrowding problem.
Having set forth the case against TDC on grounds of overcrowding, as well as
medical care and the other main issues, Judge Justice applied the same “totality of
circumstances” argument to the Texas prison system, with its giant facilities holding up
to 4,000 inmates, that he had used six years before in demanding the closure of the
Gatesville and Mountain View training schools in Morales v. Turman. The essential
18 The entire TDC appropriations request for the 1980-81 biennium totaled $351 million, with $131 million
involving construction programs and $83 million for new cell space, compared with $30 million in the
previous budget cycle. See House Study Group Special Legislative Report No. 43, Overcrowding in Texas
Prisons, April 18, 1979, pp. 9-11. Paul T. Wrotenbery, an aide to Clements, later claimed that he had met
with Estelle to discuss budget cuts and Estelle had volunteered the $30 billion, claiming that “TDC could
not expend this money during the biennium” due to changed circumstances since the development of the
original request, and that Estelle “had not, because of the budget process, had an opportunity to get this
amount eliminated from the appropriations bill.” See Memorandum for the Record by Paul T. Wrotenbery,
5/20/82, Box 23, Folder 21, General Counsel Records, 1979-1983, William P. Clements, Jr. Papers, Texas
A&M University Libraries. This was the source of the explanation which Clements himself was forced to
cite frequently during his 1982 and 1986 campaigns.
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argument was that the patterns of abuse were too deeply rooted in the institutions as they
existed, and existing managerial controls over huge facilities were too rudimentary to
deal with the patterns. It followed that attempts to address the system-wide overcrowding
by building more overpopulated institutions must be ruled out. Existing TDC unit
prisons, Justice concluded, “must be broken down into much smaller organizational
entities than those which currently exist, and each new component must have its own
manageable supervisory structure.” And any new units to be built would have to be on a
reduced scale, as well as located sufficiently close to metropolitan areas to allow for the
successful recruitment of professional staff.19
In the wake of the ruling, state leaders had to make fateful decisions on where to
accommodate the court and where to resist—decisions which Judge Justice intended to
force the state to face promptly. Like the detailed memorandum opinion in the Morales
case, the Ruiz opinion did not include provisions for relief, but a brief order
supplementing the memorandum opinion ordered the parties to confer and submit a
proposed remedial decree within sixty days.20 In preparing for conferences with the
plaintiffs and the Justice Department, TDC and other state officials had to revisit and
reconsider their existing agency priorities. Overcrowding, like the deficiencies of
medical care (and unlike the delegation of broad authority to inmate guards), was a
problem that the agency had itself acknowledged and was trying to address on its own,
having appealed for state support it was bound to be explored in the negotiations. But in
19 Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F.Supp. 1265 (S.D. Tex. 1980), Memorandum Opinion, pp. 394-396.
20 Martin and Ekland-Olson view the Ruiz remedial orders as clearly reflecting the lessons Judge Justice
took from his experience with Morales. See Texas Prisons: The Walls Came Tumbling Down, pp. 177-
178.
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contrast to their position on medical care, TDC officials felt unable to move very far
toward the plaintiffs’ demands (as reflected in the judge’s ruling). “Triple-celling,” at
least, was legally indefensible and would have to be ended, but any commitments TDC
made to overcrowding relief would have to be “paid for” in terms of new capacity and,
inevitably, greater numbers of releases. Paul Wrotenbery, the governor’s budget aide,
explained to Clements that TDC was hoping to implement several new “back door”
policies, such as releasing inmates within six months of their scheduled discharge, and a
new work-release program Estelle had proposed which would allow inmates to live at
home under close supervision. Another option was to “attempt to have more convicted
felons awaiting appeal be detained in the local county jails rather than at TDC.”
Wrotenbery added: “Politically, this would be very hard to accomplish.”21
Ultimately on overcrowding, as on most other issues, TDC was unwilling to
concede enough to reach an agreement, and the issue was left out of the consent decree
issued on March 3, 1981 (which included medical care and several minor matters). The
position maintained by the state was that it would agree to end triple-celling in cells with
60 square feet or less by November 15, but beyond that it would make no binding
commitments. The goal would be to raise the ratio of dormitory space to inmates from
current levels by 1984, but if TDC could not comply by then, it could file “a detailed
report of steps they have implemented and what steps are planned and allow the Court to
determine whether additional time should be allowed.”22
21 Memo, Paul T. Wrotenbery to Gov. Clements, 2/9/81, Box 37, Folder 22, General Counsel Records,
1979-1983, Clements Papers.
22 Memo, McCollum to David R. Dean, 3/13/81, in Box 37, Folder 22, General Counsel Records, 1979-
1983, Clements Papers..
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As expected, this was not nearly good enough for Judge Justice, whose April 20
relief decree closely followed the plaintiffs’ proposals and spelled out precisely what the
political leaders of Texas were up against.23 TDC was directed to “employ all measures
within their power to reduce the total population of prisoners . . . as well as the prisoner
population at each prison unit.”24 These measures were to include the removal of
obstacles to grants of good time and parole, expansion of work furlough programs and
community-based facilities, and mandatory review of the records of various types of
prisoners not granted early release. Judge Justice also set a series of caps for the overall
TDC population, with annual reductions in the figure for inmates relative to available
space, with no new admissions to be allowed if the cap was exceeded. He set deadlines
for ending “quadruple-celling” (immediately), triple-celling (by August 1), and then
double-celling in cells with 60 square feet or less (over the following two years). A
similar series of caps and deadlines applied to the population of inmates housed in
dormitory space.25 In another section of the order, Justice issued instructions for new
facilities: no units to contain more than 500 inmates, no units to be built more than fifty
miles from a major metropolitan area (unless TDC could demonstrate that it could recruit
and maintain adequate numbers of professionals), and no double-celling. Existing unit
prisons would have to be subdivided and retrofitted to comply with the restrictions on
23 Ruiz v. Estelle, Amended Decree Granting Equitable Relief and Declaratory Judgment, May 1, 1981.
The version dated May 1 contains typographical corrections of the April 20 version and minor substantive
amendments. In a memo forwarded to Gov. Clements, staffer Johnny R. McCollum gave a synopsis of the
consent decree, reflecting positions agreed upon by the parties, and provided outlines of separate proposed
orders tendered to Judge Justice by the separate parties which contained their positions on the issues still in
dispute, such as overcrowding and population reduction, the closing of Huntsville Unit Hospital, staff
ratios, use of inmates in building service jobs (such as building tenders), and others. See memo, McCollum
to Dean, supra note 22.
24 Ruiz v. Estelle, Amended Decree, May 1, 1981, p. 1.
25 Ruiz v. Estelle, Amended Decree, May 1, 1981, pp. 3-8.
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new ones. Ultimately all prisoners in Texas would be kept in single cells of at least 60
square feet, or in dormitories with at least 60 square feet per inmate.
State leaders never once considered agreeing to these terms. Clements did send
other officials a brief preliminary study, compiled by his own staff, of some of the budget
implications if the overcrowding provisions did have to be implemented.26 But, as with
the Huntsville Unit Hospital and all other issues not resolved in the consent decree, state
officials shared a single-minded determination to reverse the overcrowding relief orders
on appeal. Until the appeal ran its course, virtually everything that was done by state
leaders in response to Ruiz was aimed directly at the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The state’s legal strategy yielded mixed results. It failed in its goal of preserving
the existing regime at TDC and its control over the prisons. This failure had less to do
with the overcrowding issues than with the part of the Ruiz lawsuit that involved TDC’s
historically rooted pattern of staffing, with its reliance on inmates to perform guarding
and other functions. Judge Justice’s ruling had condemned the “building tender” system,
and his relief order had sought to abolish it by eliminating the inmate work assignments
and formal titles that trusties normally held.27 Since the “building tender” system was
formally outlawed, and since TDC staunchly insisted that it did not exist, its continuation
in secret was the Achilles’ heel of the state’s legal defense. Anticipating the state’s
resistance to his orders, Judge Justice had appointed an expert in prison litigation,
Vincent P. Nathan, to serve as a special master of the court, with the power to investigate
26 Memo, Johnny McCollum to David A. Dean, 4/22/81 (with Gov. Clements’ handwritten instructions on
forwarding to Jim Estelle, TDC board members, and other parties), Box 37, Folder 22, General Counsel
Records, 1979-1983, Clements Papers.
27 See Ruiz v. Estelle, 503 F.Supp. 1265, at 1294-1298.
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the prisons and monitor compliance (or the lack thereof). When one of Nathan’s assistant
monitors, David Arnold, reported on the uninterrupted authority and control of building
tenders over cellblocks (including their possession of weapons), TDC and other state
attorneys fiercely attacked the monitor and demanded that Justice dismiss the special
master. (Clements contributed his share to this effort, accusing Nathan of “playing father
confessor to the inmates” and claiming wrongly that the monitors were the subject of a
grand jury investigation.28) The trumped-up charges against the master’s office were
quickly abandoned after Justice began holding hearings on Arnold’s findings and took
testimony from inmate witnesses, and the state was forced to settle with the plaintiffs and
commit explicitly to dismantle the building tender system. With this outcome Estelle lost
much of the credibility and deference that he and his predecessors had long commanded.
By 1984, TDC was under new leadership which was committed to uprooting and
replacing the traditional mechanisms of control and order maintenance.29
All of this was both dramatic and genuinely significant, but it overshadowed a
judicial defeat for the cause of prison reform which was arguably more important in the
long term.30 This was the victory (albeit a partial one) that the state’s defense obtained
28 Martin and Ekland-Olson, Texas Prisons: The Walls Came Tumbling Down, pp. 195-200.
29 Estelle’s final downfall came in 1983 after another monitor’s report cited persistent episodes of beatings
and other illegal use of force by guard staff. The classic inside account of the legal and political battles that
led to the end of the Estelle regime is in Texas Prisons: The Walls Came Tumbling Down, chapters 6 and
7. The standard analysis of the building tender system, in the context of Texas prison traditions and the
guard subculture nurtured by Beto and Estelle, is in Ben M. Crouch and James W. Marquart, An Appeal to
Justice: Litigated Reform of Texas Prisons (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989), chapters 2-5.
30 Martin and Ekland-Olson’s account portrays the appeals court’s opinion as a glass half full, from the
plaintiff’s perspective, emphasizing that its rulings affirmed Judge Justice’s findings of unconstitutionality,
as well as his remedial orders on access to courts and various others. (The court provided a convenient
summary of its rulings at 679 F.2d 1163-1165.) This judgment seems understandable, given that Judge
Justice’s underlying opinion was at stake and that state officials were fiercely determined to see their
original case vindicated, but it reflects the contemporary perspective of engaged observers. My contention,
in light of the ultimate direction of penal policy over the two decades that followed, is that the appeals
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on the overcrowding issues before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals. As state officials
realized, in order to avoid making drastic changes to the basic organization of the prison
system, as well as its individual units, they needed to get both a stay of Justice’s remedial
orders and a reversal of his opinion rulings.31 They were able to get both, at least
partially. Within days of Judge Justice’s decree, Ed Idar, the assistant attorney general
who had been the lead defense counsel during the trial in district court, filed a 108-page
motion in the appeals court that sought a stay of almost every one of Judge Justice’s
remedial orders (as well as the elimination of the mastership).32 The Fifth Circuit
responded by issuing a stay order on June 26, 1981.33 The court applied a test—
likelihood of success on appeal, and plausible claims by either side of “irreparable harm”
resulting from the implementation or staying of orders pending appeal—which worked
against most of Idar’s claims but effectively penalized Justice’s most far-reaching and
ambitious orders (the undoing of which would have been least feasible in case of a
reversal on appeal). The order specifically stayed Justice’s schedule for single-celling of
inmates, as well as his directions regarding prison reorganization, new site selection and
construction requirements, and implementation of work furlough and community
corrections programs.34 (Significantly, however, the stay order did not comment on, or
stay, Justice’s orders pertaining to dormitory space. This maintained the schedule for the
court’s refusal to permit the restructuring and constraining of the prison system looms larger at a greater
distance.
31 Johnny McCollum used this point—that the state could ultimately win on appeal but still lose the war if it
couldn’t obtain a stay—to emphasize the need for legislative appropriations and other measures to cope
with the prospect of actually having to implement the court order—a task which proved too big for one
memo. See memo, McCollum to Dean, 4/22/81, supra note 26.
32 Ruiz v. Estelle, Appellants’ Motion for Stay, Box 34, folder 2, Eduardo Idar, Jr. Papers, Benson Latin
American Collection, the University of Texas at Austin Libraries.
33 Ruiz v. Estelle, 650 F.2d 555, U.S. Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, Unit A.
34 Ruiz v. Estelle, 650 F.2d 555 at 567-575.
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state to reach 40 square feet per prisoner by November 1981 and 60 square feet by a year
later.) The circuit court judges accepted the state’s arguments that Justice’s schedule for
single-celling would effectively preempt the appeal process, and that the restrictions on
new prisons stood in the way of achieving any mitigation of overcrowding. These
arguments received last-minute reinforcement from the Supreme Court’s decision in
Rhodes v. Chapman, handed down on June 15, which reversed a district court ruling on
the unconstitutionality of double-celling at an Ohio state prison.35 In aggressively
seeking to secure rapid, irreversible progress on different issues simultaneously, Judge
Justice turned out to have overreached.
The circuit court’s ruling on the appeal itself finished the work that the stay had
begun, narrowing the scope of relief and limiting the extent of judicially imposed reform.
The ruling came on June 23, 1982, by which time the state’s war against the special
master had played out and the building-tender issues had been settled separately. For
Clements, White, and other top officials, the political stakes involved in the outcome
remained intense and had led to the retainer of Fulbright & Jaworski, the nationally
famous, power-brokering Houston firm, to handle the appeal.36 Aside from the sheer
urge for vindication, the critical task was to secure the reversal of the overcrowding
35 Rhodes, Governor of Ohio, et al. v. Chapman et al., 452 U.S. 337 (1981).
36 The decision to hire Fulbright & Jaworski was formally taken by the Texas Board of Corrections, but
appears to have been worked out between the board and Attorney General Mark White, whose office was
responsible for representing state agencies and had handled the Ruiz defense (under successive attorneys
general) from the beginning. Pike Powers, a partner in the firm and a confidant of White, headed the
litigation for the firm. The decision reflects the intensely competitive, mutually mistrustful maneuvering
among the state officials who were exposed politically to the effects of the litigation. White had good
reason to believe that both TDC officials and Governor Clements had intended for him to bear the blame
for any ultimate failures in the litigation. See memo, Robert E. DeLong, Jr. (TDC general counsel) to W. J.
Estelle (regarding “Requirements for Legal Support in Ruiz Case”), 2/27/81, in Box 23, Folder 31, William
J. Clements, Jr., 1978, 1982, and 1986 Gubernatorial Campaigns, Texas A&M University Libraries
(henceforth Clements Campaign Records).
137
orders that had been stayed. This task was largely accomplished—unsurprisingly, given
the Rhodes ruling and the top legal talent brought to bear.37 “We are left with the
conviction,” the appeals court wrote, “that, without the guidance now provided by
Rhodes v. Chapman, the district court adopted some remedies that are not essential for
the elimination of unconstitutional prison conditions.” Specifically, on overcrowding
remedies, Judge Justice had “failed to consider the cost of the remedial measures ordered
as well as the possibility of achieving constitutional conditions without requiring single-
celling.”38 The single-celling orders were therefore vacated. On dormitory space, the
appeals court sustained the 40-square-foot requirement that had already gone into effect,
but it vacated the next step of requiring 60 square feet by November 1982, reasoning that
the existing rule was what TDC could accommodate without undue cost. And the other
remedial orders—the furlough and early-release mandates, reorganization of prisons,
restrictions on new sites—were dismissed, in every sense. “Palaces may be erected in the
wilderness,” the judges wrote. “Large prisons may be impersonal but they are not
necessarily inhumane. . . . The effect of these remedial measures does not appear to us
sufficient to warrant their economic cost, their intrusion on state decision-making, or the
supervisory burden that their administration would impose on a federal court.”39
Having prevailed on the most essential counts, Clements, White, and the rest of
the state legal team declared victory, with good reason. Nevertheless, even if the hope of
37 See brief of the appellants, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Sept. 25, 1981, Box 2004/016-29,
Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Office of General Counsel, Ruiz Case Files, Archives and
Information Services Division, Texas State Library and Archives Commission. Martin and Ekland-Olson
point out that the arguments on overcrowding take up almost half of the brief. See Texas Prisons: The
Walls Came Tumbling Down, p. 187.
38 Ruiz v. Estelle, 679 F.2d 1115 (CA.5, 1982) (henceforth Ruiz 1982) at 1145.
39 Ruiz 1982 at 1148.
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forcing Texas to remake its prisons along progressive lines was lost—as the plaintiffs had
reason to expect it would be, after Rhodes—there was still hope for some further degree
of relief. The silver lining of the appeals court ruling, for the plaintiffs and Judge Justice,
was that the original district court ruling—that overcrowding, among other conditions
cited by the plaintiffs, violated the prisoners’ Eighth Amendment rights—was affirmed; it
was only the remedies that were overturned. (And not all were overturned, since the
existing 40-square-foot limit on dormitory crowding was left in effect. Judge Justice’s
aggressive scheduling had accomplished at least this much.) Justice was not instructed to
issue a new decree, but plaintiffs were expressly allowed to move for a new hearing
within one year to determine whether unconstitutional conditions still prevailed.40 The
appeals court did not establish a clear standard—in fact, it indicated that no simple
standard existed, given the various relevant factors, including costs—but the gist of the
decision was that TDC would have time to try to work out a solution on its own.
Unfortunately for the litigants, their judges, and the people of Texas, the prison
overcrowding problem exceeded the assumptions of the courtroom, and instead of
solving it on its own, TDC had fallen well behind the curve. On May 10, 1982, with the
circuit court’s decision still pending, the Board of Corrections closed Texas prisons to
new inmates for the first time. The stated reason was that the system was reported to be
out of compliance with the square-footage requirements of existing court orders
40 Ruiz 1982 at 1148.
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(specifically the 40-square-foot requirement for dormitories, which was now in effect, as
was TDC’s commitment not to resume triple-celling).41
For the effects on Texas law and politics of the prison space shortage crisis, a fair
analogy may be the global effects of the energy crisis that had begun a decade before. In
each case, the established patterns of public and private life had come to depend upon
expedient use of a scarce resource, and when the inevitable crisis finally came, it forced
painful choices which would otherwise have been deferred or avoided. The only
available options—expensive development of new resources, more sparing use of what
was still available—challenged widely held assumptions of the public and disrupted the
agendas of its representatives.
One inevitable response was to blame the broader problem on factors involved in
the crisis. The prison litigation obviously did not cause the overcrowding itself, but it
may actually have helped precipitate the crisis in more ways than one (the obvious one
being the relevant court orders). With an election impending, Clements and White
immediately blamed each other for the crisis, and both blamed the Board of Corrections,
but the worsening situation had been no secret to any of them.42 Still, their preoccupation
with winning the court case had required them not only to demonstrate the
unreasonableness of Judge Justice’s orders but also to insist on the effectiveness of their
41 The board also directed Estelle and TDC management to bring the system back into compliance and to
“devise a plan to resume receiving prisoners in a manner to maintain compliance with the Court Order.
Resumption of reduced admissions is anticipated within thirty days.” Given the response to the
announcement, the necessary releases were carried out much more promptly than that. See meeting
minutes, Texas Board of Corrections, 5/10/82, Box 1998/038-26, Minutes and Meeting Files, Records,
Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Archives and Information Services Division, Texas State Library
and Archives Commission.
42 For Clements’ immediate response see letter, Gov. Clements to T. L. Austin, 5/12/82, in Box 38, Folder
2, General Counsel Records, 1979-1983, Clements Papers.
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own measures to address an acknowledged problem—and to view “effectiveness” more
in terms of the effect on the Fifth Circuit than on the underlying problem. During the
regular session of the 1981 Legislature, Clements ordered the housing of 1,500 inmates in
army tents and won passage of a “conditional parole” program allowing for the release of
1,500 more—all of which went toward immediate relief, since more than 3,000 inmates
were then sleeping on floors.43 Clements also obtained an emergency appropriation for
$65 million for new prison construction (aimed at housing 2,800) and signed an amended
version of a work-release program Estelle had advocated.44 In the view of Tony Fabelo,
who would soon take on a critical role as the state’s leading criminal justice policy
analyst, the 1981 measures were “cosmetic in impact because of their ineffectual design,”
which in turn was because of the underlying lack of rigorous or realistic projections of
future prison admissions.45 But they served the state’s case before the appeals court, as
well as the persistent effort, led by Clements, to peel the Justice Department away from
the plaintiffs and settle separately with the department.46 By late October 1981, officials
on the Governor’s staff were aware that new admissions were running above projections,
parole releases were lagging, and construction of new facilities was running behind
43 See memo, Johnny R. McCollum to David A. Dean, 8/6/81 (regarding “Status Report on Alternatives to
Overcrowding at the Texas Department of Corrections), Box 37, Folder 23, General Counsel Records,
1979-1983, Clements Papers.
44 The population figure for the emergency prison appropriation predated the 40-square-foot dormitory
space requirement. McCollum estimated that at 60 square feet per dormitory inmate, the new prisons
would only house 1,440 inmates. Undeniably the litigation hung heavily over all of the state’s plans. See
memo, McCollum to Dean, 8/6/81, Box 37, Folder 23, General Counsel Records, 1979-1983, Clements
Papers.
45 Tony Fabelo, “Making the Obvious Possible: Policy Research and the Building of Coalitions for
Criminal Justice Reforms,” Crime & Delinquency, Vol. 38, No. 3 (July 1992), p. 371.
46 See “Position Statement (Selected Issues Ruiz v. Estelle),” position paper prepared by TDC, 10/15/81,
Box 37, Folder 25, General Counsel Records, 1979-1983, Clements Papers.
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schedule.47 Yet the state continued to insist that it had the situation under control. A
position paper submitted to the Justice Department boldly maintained that “the State of
Texas and TDC have taken action that will provide long range assurance that
overcrowding will not rise to unconstitutional dimensions.”48
When the Board of Corrections closed the entrance gates, the charade could no
longer be maintained.49 With an election showdown looming over the governor’s office,
the effort to win before the appeals court was replaced with an even more intense,
consuming preoccupation with reopening the prisons and keeping them from closing
again before election day. Initially, Clements sent a letter denouncing the board for not
consulting him and “directing” it to reopen the prisons. More productively, he presided
over a feverishly assembled set of new front-end and back-end mechanisms. Working
with the prison and parole agencies, his aides arranged for additional early releases and
expedited reconsideration of past rejected parole applicants.50 After releasing enough
inmates to reopen the gates on May 17, TDC worked out a schedule of controlled
47 Memo, Johnny R. McCollum to David Herndon, 10/27/81 (regarding “Update on Overcrowding in the
Texas Department of Corrections”), Box 37, Folder 23, General Counsel Records, 1979-1983, Clements
Papers. Despite the deteriorating situation McCollum described, the main point of the memo was to
prepare for a meeting between Clements, Estelle, and Board of Corrections members which was to focus on
the negotiations with Reynolds. TDC itself reported entirely consistent findings in “An Analysis of Trends
in TDC Population Growth and Housing,” 3/11/82, attached to letter, W. J. Estelle to David Herndon,
4/13/82, Box 38, Folder 2, General Counsel Records, 1979-1983, Clements Papers.
48 “Position Statement,” supra note 46, p. 17. The paper actually cited litigation in Oklahoma involving
metropolitan jail overcrowding resulting from new admissions restrictions by the state prison system. By
comparison, “TDC does not anticipate burdening Texas counties with an overcrowding problem.” This
was drafted less than seven months before the Board of Corrections closed the Texas system to new
admissions.
49 Whether Clements and others were waiting out the appeals court while actually intending to address
overcrowding any more candidly is unclear, but the likelihood seems dubious, given that the election
showdown with Mark White also lay ahead.
50 See letter, Ruben M. Torres (chairman, Board of Pardons and Paroles) to David Herndon, 5/12/82, and
memo, Herndon to Gov. Clements, 5/13/82, Box 38, Folder 2, General Counsel Records, 1979-1983,
Clements Papers.
142
admissions that set weekly ceilings for inmates from the sixteen counties that represented
70% of the state total.51
Clements also summoned a special session of the Legislature to pass new funds
for prison construction. (The lawmakers agreed to provide $58 million—which promptly
led to further dispute between TDC, which planned for a typical maximum-security unit
prison, and Clements, who was intent on maximizing numbers of new beds and wanted to
build less secure facilities.) He also announced the appointment of a “Blue Ribbon Task
Force” to reconsider corrections policy and recommend a “master plan” to the next
legislative session.52
During the rest of the year, through the fall campaign, the Governor and his aides
nervously monitored the weekly population reports, intent on preempting any more ugly
surprises. In July, the completion of three prisons (funded by the 1981 emergency
appropriation) boosted capacity by nearly 3,000, relieving the immediate crisis and
allowing TDC to set aside the county admissions ceilings.53 But by late August, the
Governor’s general counsel, David Herndon, was already predicting that at prevailing
rates of net admissions, the prisons would be full again by November.54 Days later
Herndon warned that TDC had had to postpone the completion of new prison unit space,
thereby making a new crisis all but certain. He notified Clements that he had discussed
51 David Herndon informed Gov. Clements of the negotiations between TDC and the counties in his memo,
5/20/82 (regarding “Most Recent Numbers on Prison Population, Admissions, and Releases”), Box 38,
Folder 2, General Counsel Records, 1979-1983, Clements Papers.
52 Executive Order WPC-45A, 7/6/82. A draft of the announcement text is in Box 23, Folder 31, Clements
Campaign Records.
53 David Herndon notes that the “controlled admissions” policy was kept in place for two months, in memo,
Herndon to Gov. Clements, 9/23/82, Box 38, Folder 5, General Counsel Records, 1979-1983, Clements
Papers.
54 Memo, David Herndon to Gov. Clements, 8/25/82, Box 38, Folder 5, Clements Papers.
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the situation with the chairman of the parole board and (subtly) had asked for projections
of paroles in coming months, to be updated weekly. If the parole board did not raise its
own numbers, the Governor himself would have to act to speed the flow through the back
door.55 Herndon was ultimately able to get the parole board to give early reconsideration
to rejected parole applicants, which would head off the immediate crisis and allow time
for more new capacity to become available early in the new year.56
Having staked his governorship largely on the politics of law and order, Clements
was himself one of the first victims of the prison capacity crisis he and his predecessors
had helped to create. The task of dealing with a crisis which would not end was passed
on to his successors (which included, in yet another twist, Clements himself). Another
legacy was the report of the blue-ribbon commission, which appeared in December 1982
during the interregnum following White’s election victory.57 Bruce Lipshy, a Dallas
businessman hand-picked by Clements, led a group which seems to have been honestly
selected to represent a broad range of views.58 The commission’s recommendations,
55 Clements replied, in handwriting, on his copy of Herndon’s memo: “We need to discuss in more detail—
we must NOT have a crisis in Oct.!” See Memo, Herndon to Gov. Clements, 9/7/82, Box 38, Folder 5,
General Counsel Records, 1979-1983, Clements Papers.
Interestingly, one of the Plan B options Herndon suggested was to “have us, your parole office,
become more lenient, i.e., grant a larger percentage of the paroles recommended by the Board.” Clements
was intent on forcing the parole board to raise its numbers of recommended paroles but, with the power of
final approval, was unwilling to reduce his own rejection rate. As Herndon observed, getting the parole
board to act on its own was “the best of the presently identified options because it is a change in Board
policy, not your own.”
56 Memo, David Herndon to Gov. Clements, 10/1/82, and letter, Gov. Clements to Members of the Board of
Corrections, 10/4/82, Box 38, Folder 5, General Counsel Records, 1979-1983, Clements Papers.
57 Blue Ribbon Commission for the Comprehensive Review of the Criminal Justice Corrections System,
Preliminary Report to the Governor (Austin: The Commission, 1982).
58 The twenty-four commissioners included Johnny B. Holmes, Jr., Clements’ appointee to replace Carol
Vance as Harris County district attorney; Board of Corrections chairman T. Louis Austin, and influential
legislators Ray Farabee (a moderate), Mike Moncrief (a liberal), and J. E. “Buster” Brown (a conservative
Republican). Holmes, at least, was not part of the broad consensus reflected in the commission report. The
commission papers (contained in Box 1991/063-35, Records, Criminal Justice Division, Office of the
Governor, Texas State Library and Archives) require further study.
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focusing mainly on diversions and alternatives to incarceration, suggest the traumatic
quality of the prison overcrowding crisis as experienced by officials and observers from
both parties. Clements had himself set the tone, and suggested the course, of the
commission’s work in his initial announcement: “In view of the enormous increase in
prison population which has been projected for our state, I have come to the conclusion
that we cannot continue to build and operate our prisons the same way we have been
doing for the past 50 years.”59 A table at the front of the report divided the
recommendations between those with direct and indirect effects on the overcrowding
problem. The former category included expanded work furloughs, extension of good
time grants and parole reviews, and other recommended changes that read like Judge
Justice’s orders.
Beyond adjusting existing policies to make them more lenient, the commission
proposed two far-reaching new policy departures. One was a task force to study
“sentencing guidelines and judicial sentencing.” The rationale cited the persistent,
gaping disparities in criminal sentences in different locales, and the “confusion and
uncertainty” surrounding jury sentencing deliberations.60 The other new policy was state
subsidies for community-based alternative corrections, pending the success of pilot
programs.61 The committee tabled a recommendation for allocation of prison space
based on population, crime incidence, and other formula factors. This proposal was
“predicated on the fact that the state will not gain control of its prison population until a
mechanism is developed to insure some control over the number of inmates it receives.”
59 Draft announcement, supra note 52.
60 Blue Ribbon Commission report, pp. 35-36.
61 Blue Ribbon Commission report, pp. 36-37.
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Regarding the implications of gaining this control, the rationale was admirably forthright:
“If accomplished, for the first time, the rest of the criminal justice system would have to
respond to the space limitations of TDC and adjust their commitments accordingly. They
would also need to develop community-based corrections programs that would handle
their excess offender populations.”62
In broaching the use of prison and jail capacity constraints as leverage against
local sentencing practices, the blue-ribbon commission pointed to a possible way forward
for criminal justice reform in the aftermath of the Fifth Circuit’s defanging of Ruiz. In
failing to give the idea the same endorsement it gave to alternative sanctions in general,
the commission demonstrated the unlikelihood of implementing such a policy—at least
through the political process. But the suggestion, having been made, pointed toward
further battles in which the forms of punishment and the scale of imprisonment in Texas
would yet be decided.
Without clear legislative priorities of his own, Governor Mark White allowed
many criminal justice policies to be driven by other factors, which in some cases actually
included research and expertise. Several far-reaching developments occurred, few of
which flowed from the governor’s own leadership. As the official formerly in charge of
the state’s defense in Ruiz, and a longtime harsh critic of Judge Justice (and an almost
militant death penalty advocate), the former attorney general had maintained plausible
law-and-order credentials of his own, but unlike with Clements, these were bona fides
rather than tools of building a new political coalition. The political task constantly facing
62 Blue Ribbon Commission report, p. 53.
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White was to hold together liberal and traditionally conservative Democratic support, an
unenviable challenge which helped to seal his reputation for cynical maneuvering.
Perhaps because criminal justice politics wedged Texas Democrats farther apart instead
of pulling them together, White shifted his focus to other issues (such as education
reform) and, early on, surrendered the initiative to key legislative leaders (with the
exception of the question of Ruiz compliance). In 1983, with the prison system closing
still reverberating, and with the blue-ribbon commission report released just before the
beginning of the session, the Legislature passed a remarkable array of bills that
maintained the commission’s fixed focus on prison overcrowding and alternative
sanctions. For a highly unusual moment, lawmakers generally perceived the customary
politics of law and order as having contributed to their immediate problems. Emboldened
liberals and cost-cutting conservatives together slashed TDC’s budget request for prison
construction and provided large new sums to expand probation. There was even
consensus support for early-release mechanisms, such as a sharp increase in the formula
for granting good-time credits (from 30 to 45 days per 30 days served), and a procedure
(the Prison Management Act) which gave the governor emergency powers to grant good
time and advance inmates’ parole eligibility when the total inmate population hit 95% of
capacity.63
63 The characterization of the 1983 legislative session and several of its more prominent criminal-justice
bills draws upon the bill summaries in House Study Group, Texas House of Representatives, Issues of the
68th Legislature, Regular Session, 1983 (Austin: The Study Group, 1983) and the House Study Group
Daily Floor Report analyses of S.B. 727 (the Prison Management Act) and S.B. 640 (maximum good time
for inmates), which include the floor votes in both chambers reflecting the absence of broad opposition.
Tony Fabelo’s analysis and interpretation is in “Making the Obvious Possible,” at pp. 373-375.
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Other products of this rare, brief interlude included renewed attention to
sentencing policies and the creation of the Criminal Justice Policy Council staff as an
influential research and analysis unit. The policy council itself was a well-intentioned
experiment aimed at engaging the governor, lieutenant governor, and House speaker
directly in long-term planning, but it almost never actually convened. Still, in order to
fulfill the council’s statutory charge, a small appropriation and a federal grant were used
to create a planning staff.64 The council staff’s first major project was the creation of a
statistical model (the CLASM, or Computerized Legislative Analysis System Model)
which could generate valid projections of the impact of alternative policy proposals.
The Legislature’s creation of a Commission on Sentencing Practices and Policies
followed directly from the blue-ribbon committee’s recommendation of a task force. For
a new policymaking cohort, the work leading to the commission’s 1985 report raised
once again some of the issues Dean Keeton and his penal reform committee had
confronted, such as the significance of sentencing disparities and the question of
maintaining jury sentencing. The commission report also gave lawmakers an early
chance to weigh the option of sentencing guidelines, which were being introduced and
considered in several other states (and would soon be imposed on the federal courts) as a
means of constraining discretion in sentencing. The commissioners were unwilling to
endorse any bold new initiatives, but their reticence came in part from the absence of
available data and their willingness to require supporting analysis of the kind that the
64 See Fabelo, “Making the Obvious Possible,” p. 374.
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policy council staff was now able to offer.65 Fabelo, who joined the council staff early on
and helped develop the CLASM, later touted the staff’s success in steering the sentencing
commission away from proposals to lengthen minimum time-served requirements by
demonstrating their impact on prison crowding.66
Moving on from its work for the sentencing commission, the policy council staff
used its statistical model to project the continued growth of the prison population,
assuming available space (which was not already in fact provided for).67 The staff’s
March 1985 report on the Texas correctional system was in part an effort to call the
attention of policymakers to the severity of their impending problems, and the urgency of
making combined choices from among the options (such as more new prison space,
expanded forms of parole, and other varieties of early release) that the council identified.
The report argued that since additional prison capacity would take at least two
years to develop, front- and back-end population controls (as well as upgrades to existing
facilities) would be needed in the short term to maintain a population cap. But these
controls—diversion at the front end, early release mechanisms at the back—each came
with particular problems, in terms of the workings of the system model but also in terms
65 One example: in declining recommend the development of sentencing guidelines for Texas (and
recommending against mandatory guidelines), the commission report cited “the uncertainty of the results of
statewide sentencing guidelines on the state criminal justice system.” Report, p. 44. Another example: the
commission’s decisions on the question of sentencing disparities—citing the persistence of broad variations
by race and by jurisdiction, while calling for further research—followed closely the conclusions of a study
by the parole board staff. See “Variation in the Sentencing Process: A Preliminary Examination of
Sentencing Disparity in Texas,” presented by Michael Eisenberg, Board of Pardons and Paroles, October
1984, included in the sentencing commission report (Study 1, at p. 111).
66 Criminal Justice Policy Council, The Impact on the Texas Prison Population of Changes in Minimum
Time Served for Parole Eligibility (Austin, 1984), cited in Fabelo, “Making the Obvious Possible,” p. 375.
The council staff’s report containing CLASM-based projections for other, less politically charged
suggestions was included in the sentencing commission’s report (Study 2, at p. 189).
67 Pablo Martinez and Antonio Fabelo, Texas Correctional System: Growth and Policy Alternatives,
CLASM Series of Policy Analyses, Report 060385, March 1985.
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of broader political requirements. The early release mechanisms included parole, which
could allow for refinements in selection criteria, and “mandatory release,” which was the
name for the policy, mandated by the Legislature in 1977, of releasing inmates whose
calendar-time and good-time credits equaled the length of their remaining sentence.
(The report did not address further legislative grants of “good time” credits, presumably
reflecting a sense that this particular measure had been taken to its limit.) The intended
message to policymakers was that they needed to use these programs carefully, in a
controlled manner, with specific numerical targets, and with an awareness of the possible
consequences. The one remaining back-end option, invoking the Prison Management
Act, was arguably a proper last-ditch tool for an emergency, but since it was the least
selective population tool of all, using it continuously would create maximum danger to
the public.68
While it generally emphasized making carefully measured choices rather than
specifically predefined ones, the council staff was willing to go out on at least one limb.
On diversion, the report explicitly recommended “intensive supervision probation with
the establishment of a prison admission quota system for major metropolitan counties.”69
TDC’s “controlled admissions” policy, from the period after the May 1982 closing,
created a precedent for a quota system. But, as the council staff dryly observed, “one of
the critical implementation requirements for the success of this program is to assure the
cooperation of the judiciary and county elected officials.”70
68 The pointed assertion about the Prison Management Act was not part of the extended analysis but was
contained in the executive summary. See Texas Correctional System, pp. v-vi.
69 Texas Correctional System, p. 49.
70 Texas Correctional System, p. 50.
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The staff’s arguments apparently carried weight with the governor and other
legislators, but they could influence policy only so much. White’s response to the
dilemmas of prison population control was to make a point of never invoking the Prison
Management Act. Instead, he managed the problem largely by presiding over high rates
of parole grants and heavy use of mandatory release, based on the newly legislated
formula for granting good time. For White, these methods were important because they
involved no direct approval of early releases on his own part. Tony Fabelo viewed the
problem as having been “expediently handled” rather than confronted and addressed in
the ways he and the other policy council staffers had recommended.71
Expedient though his actions may have been, White appears to have felt
politically trapped by the dilemmas of prison crisis management, as well as the actions of
a prison board still controlled, for a time, by his predecessor’s appointees. Overcrowding
as an issue in litigation still needed to be settled, despite the appeals court’s rejection of
Judge Justice’s relief orders, because the court had sustained Justice’s original findings of
unconstitutionality and had allowed the plaintiffs to seek a new hearing on remedies
within a year of the ruling on the appeal. But no progress had been made on relieving the
existing crowding problems, because policymakers had felt so hard pressed even to keep
up with new admissions. The Clements appointees on the Texas Board of Corrections
concluded that the state had little chance of escaping new remedial orders (which the
71 Citing TDC annual report statistics, Fabelo later noted that total releases in 1986 rose 46% from three
years before, largely because of a 53% increase in mandatory releases (from 2,143 to 3,283 three years
later). Paroles granted were up a mere 39%. “Meanwhile, during this same period, reported index crime
in the state increased by 33%.” Fabelo, “Making the Obvious Possible,” p. 376.
151
appeals court would be much less likely to stay or vacate), and therefore that they should
finally settle the issue with the plaintiffs.72
A large part of the problem, as board members and other officials belatedly
realized, was that the capacity numbers calculated by TDC drastically understated the
actual crowding. Newly selected TDC executive director Ray Procunier, an experienced
prison administrator chosen by the board (over White’s objections) to succeed Estelle,
visited all of TDC’s unit prisons and observed lines of inmates, back from field work,
having to stand outside, nude, waiting for long periods to use the few showers that were
available.73 Working toward a settlement, the board hired Henningston, Durham &
Richardson (HDR), a major private consulting firm, to study TDC facilities, measure the
overcrowding problem, and provide a credible basis for large new appropriations
requests. HDR’s team confirmed that the system was overcrowded by 35%, even by a set
of standards devised by the consultants themselves that fell far short of those
recommended by the American Correctional Association. Dining rooms were serving
72 The view of Harry Whittington, board member and dedicated Estelle opponent, was also that since
perjured testimony by state witnesses had come to light since the appeals court’s ruling, the state could not
afford to have the case brought back before the court and would have to try to settle all remaining
outstanding issues. Whittington was willing to make this point in public. See Frank Klimko, “TDC
witnesses lied during suit, group told,” Houston Chronicle, 7/21/85. He expanded on his charges in a
detailed briefing on prison matters that he gave to Clements during the 1986 gubernatorial campaign. In
this briefing he cited perjury by state witnesses, the firing of six wardens by the Board of Corrections in the
months after September 1983, “when Clements appointees took charge of the Board,” and numerous other
violations and disciplinary cases, all of which made the state’s case unsustainable. See “Remarks of Harry
Whittington to Clements Campaign Executive Committee on Texas Prisons,” 6//7/86, pp. 3-4, in Box 74,
Folder 22, Clements Campaign Records.
73 Steve Martin, who continued under Procunier as TDC general counsel, observed that “Procunier could
very well have become Turner’s most effective witness if he were called to testify at the overcrowding
hearing.” He also claimed that Procunier’s assessment “for the first time provided attorneys for the state
with some concrete idea of the extent of overcrowding in the TDC” [my emphasis]. See Martin and
Ekland-Olson, Texas Prisons, p. 240.
152
meals in shifts starting at 3:00 a.m. for breakfast and ending after 10:00 p.m., which still
left some inmates only ten minutes to eat after receiving their trays.74
In settling the overcrowding issues, the board parted ways with the governor.
Intent on avoiding hearings, which were scheduled to begin in February 1985, the board
was able to win a postponement by citing the consultants’ forthcoming findings, as well
as a new TDC plan for holding several types of inmates (including mentally retarded and
psychiatric cases) in single cells and releasing others who had completed special
educational programs.75 HDR’s report, released in late February, acknowledged the
extent of overcrowding and proposed $500 million in new facility expenditures simply to
achieve compliance with their own “conservative” standards (which remained well below
professional benchmarks) for the existing prison population. On top of that, the report
recommended $369.3 million in new prison construction. The board voted to accept the
findings, but, signaling his opposition to the board’s course of action, White publicly took
issue with the consultants, saying that he would not support “country club prisons.” He
even denounced the cell-allocation plan that had enabled TDC to head off the hearing,
accusing TDC of giving excessively favorable treatment to mentally ill inmates. He also
refused to reappoint Harry Whittington to the Board of Corrections when Whittington’s
term expired during the final settlement negotiations.76
74 Whittington, “Remarks,” pp. 2-3.
75 Whittington, “Remarks,” p. 4.
76 Whittington’s comprehensive briefing to the Clements campaign executive committee emphasizes
White’s emerging opposition to the settlement effort but does not mention White’s statement endorsing the
settlement plan. His apparent assumption—that the stated endorsement was worth little—seems reasonable
enough. Whittington also avoids discussing the circumstances of his own failed effort to win
reappointment. For this see Martin and Ekland-Olson, Texas Prisons, p. 242.
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White’s resistance proved not to be an obstacle to a settlement agreement but was
an ominous indication about his eventual willingness to enforce it. In the short term, the
Board of Corrections and TDC completed a settlement agreement with the plaintiffs, and
the Governor appeared to acquiesce in the outcome. The agreement, signed by the parties
on May 16 and approved by Judge Justice two months later, set a population cap on each
individual unit prison and required a reduction in the total population of units already
existing, to be accomplished in two phases in 1987 and 1989, with a total depopulation of
over 5,000. The state would have to spend some $200 million on two new prisons and
ten trusty camps in order to avoid having to release the set number of inmates. Other
provisions included minimum levels of security staffing, maximum population and
minimum space requirements for newly constructed prisons, various renovations to
physical plant, and annual quotas for clothes and linens per individual inmate.77 The
agreement permitted the continuation of double-celling, but in return required TDC to
construct new recreational yards and extend the time allowed for double-celled prisoners
to remain outside their cells.78 The terms of many of these stipulations followed the
standards and findings in HDR’s report. After the agreement was announced, the
Governor’s office released a statement endorsing its terms. “Now maybe we’ll get back
to the business of running the prisons without continual litigation,” the statement read.79
Days later, the agreement was formally announced at a press conference at which Robert
77 A copy of the settlement agreement is at Folder “Crowding settlement (stipulation), May 1985,” Box
2004/016-61, Ruiz case files. A convenient summary is provided by Crouch and Marquart, An Appeal to
Justice, at pp. 146-147. Also see Martin and Ekland-Olson, Texas Prisons, pp. 242-243..
78 Whittington emphasized this point in his briefing document for Clements, arguing that the failure of
White and his appointees to implement this part of the agreement was especially flagrant. See “Remarks,”
p. 7.
79 Mary C. Bounds, “Texas prison board approves plan to settle suit,” Dallas Morning News, 5/14/85.
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Gunn, the chairman of the Board of Corrections, declared that “the war is over.” White
declined to appear at the press conference, although he reiterated his support for the
settlement at a separate news conference that same day. 80
As White’s appointees asserted control of the Board of Corrections and TDC, the
Governor’s unwillingness to associate himself with the overcrowding settlement
escalated into a refusal to bear the expenses of its terms, which placed the state on a
collision course with Judge Justice. Six months after Chairman Gunn’s declaration,
William Bennett Turner, the longtime lead counsel for the plaintiffs, filed a motion
charging TDC with contempt and citing obvious instances of noncompliance with the
settlement terms. When TDC officials and state attorneys worked out a new settlement
with the plaintiffs to head off the contempt motion, White publicly repudiated it and
forced the board to do likewise, singling out a provision to allow television sets in cells
which had already drawn public criticism.81 As the 1986 campaign rematch between
White and Clements unfolded, Judge Justice held the necessary hearings on the contempt
motion. As one editorial commentator observed, the visible futility of White’s legal
campaign made its political purpose equally apparent—“to talk tough and hope the final
judgment day in court could be postponed until after election day.”82
For all the criticism that White justly reaped for his transparent maneuvering, his
actions reflected both legitimate political considerations and genuine policy dilemmas.
Given the intense partisan animosity that divided the White and Clements camps, it was
80 Mary C. Bounds, “Prison suit accord signed,” Dallas Morning News, 5/17/85.
81 See Raul Reyes et al, “Governor against TV in cells,” Houston Chronicle, 5/16/86, and Jan Rich, “Prison
board votes for another court fight on overcrowding issue,” Houston Chronicle, 6/12/86.
82 Scott Bennett, “White fumbled prison football,” Dallas Morning News, 10/30/86. Martin and Ekland-
Olson echo the prevailing view of White’s political motivations in Texas Prisons, p. 243.
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hardly unreasonable for White to be suspicious of a prison board controlled by his
predecessor’s appointees, and their sudden, belated determination to make unpopular
concessions to the plaintiffs and Judge Justice. Moreover, circumstances and available
policy choices—rising prison commitments, risky early-release options, and a court
settlement that reduced already scarce prison space—presented dilemmas that were
ultimately beyond the Governor’s ability to manage politically. Attacking the federal
court reflected at least an arguable appreciation of the source of his problems. Like his




“Treatment Culture” and its Discontents:
A Policy History of Texas Juvenile Confinement
The history of responses to youth crime in 20th-century America was one of
constant conflict, despite the appearance of a progressive consensus prevailing until
recent decades. The conception of juvenile delinquency as distinct from adult crime, and
the creation of separate institutions of juvenile justice, rested on the principle of the
young offender’s diminished responsibility and the priority of rehabilitation over
punishment. Child-savers of the Progressive era sought to turn around young lives both
through applying new mechanisms—the juvenile court, probation, individualized
treatment—and through adapting already-existing institutions. Old reformatories were
rebranded as training schools and assigned to provide psychiatric care as well as
academic and vocational instruction. But even while Progressive juvenile justice and its
ideals still commanded prestige, a host of other influences shaped the system in practice
and fueled unending struggles over its workings. Given unlimited discretion to act in the
child’s best interests, judges freely expressed their own biases or those of their public
supporters. Probation officers generally were burdened with caseloads that ruled out
meaningful supervision. Institutions tasked with rehabilitation often remained
preoccupied with maintaining secure custody, as well as their own peculiar traditions.
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In keeping with rising public skepticism, historians have viewed the development
of professional care as reflecting the biases, and serving the interests, of increasingly
powerful, authoritative providers.1 But in Texas, among other places, making state
institutions offer care rather than punishment has always been an uncertain errand. The
history of struggle over delinquency in Texas illustrates the limits, as well as the power,
of professionalizing reform prompted by federal court intervention. Having been an
object of fear and a threat held over the head of young offenders for generations, the
network of state reform schools centered in Gatesville was made nationally infamous in
1973 by the case of Morales v. Turman, which revealed patterns of abuse in virtually all
aspects of institutional life. While the reforms initially ordered by the court were set
aside on appeal, the litigation did ultimately yield a settlement which required the
facilities to meet some professional standards. But the case was neither the beginning nor
the end of the battle over the handling of children in state custody. Before, during, and
after the litigation, advocates of therapy for delinquent youths faced a struggle for
influence over state institutions (and, especially most recently, for the protection of what
they had managed to gain).
Recent coverage has brought intensive group therapy for violent juvenile
offenders in Texas to the attention of a general audience.2 Even in punitive Texas, state
administrators responsible for juvenile institutions have long sought to build legitimacy
1 See Anthony Platt, The Child Savers (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1969); Steven L. Schlossman,
Love and the American Delinquent: The Theory and Practice of “Progressive” Juvenile Justice, 1825-
1920 (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1977) ; and John R. Sutton, Stubborn Children: Controlling
Delinquency in the United States, 1640-1981 (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1988).
2 John Hubner, Last Chance in Texas: The Redemption of Criminal Youth (New York: Random House,
2005). Hubner describes group therapy in the Capital Offenders Therapy program at the maximum-
security Giddings facility, and sensitively portrays the individual participants.
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by publicizing their rehabilitative mission. For some years this meant maintaining a
façade of professionalism, even while budget constraints precluded real reforms. After
the Morales ruling, this investment in therapeutic rhetoric, as well as judicial pressure,
enabled reform-minded agency leaders to undertake new programs and make genuine
changes in institutional life. But their efforts to limit the institutionalized population and
force judges and communities to make local placements left the agency politically
exposed when crime rates and commitments spiked in the late 1980s and early ‘90s. By
the turn of the century, the Texas Youth Commission, with its 5,000 wards, and a newly
expanded array of institutions imposing regimentation and other forms of strict discipline,
amounted to an accommodation among advocates of professional treatment, judges
seeking broad authority to punish and incapacitate, and elected political leaders and
organizations capitalizing on punitive sentiments. Under these conditions, “treatment
culture” survived, but one of its defining principles—the preference for the “least
restrictive means” of confinement—has been not merely abandoned but turned on its
head. Both therapeutic and punitive quests for control over individual wards now
compound and intensify each other.
“Texas citizens should take pride in the fact that the state’s training schools now
have and deserve a high rating,” declared Austin MacCormick, one of the nation’s best-
known penal reform advocates, in 1964.3 MacCormick, the longtime director of the New
York-based Osborne Association, was remembered in Texas for having authored a
3 Letter, Austin MacCormick to Robert W. Kneebone, October 1964, excerpted in Annual Report for 1964,
Texas Youth Council, p. 5.
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critical report on the prison system in the 1940s which prompted efforts at reform and
modernization. In later decades, his returns to the state became occasions for publicizing
the progress of Texas prisons under enlightened leadership. Using MacCormick in the
same way, the Texas Youth Council sought to establish its own image as a modern
service agency that had overcome its unsavory past.
For critics of reform, in criminal justice as in other realms, blaming unintended
outcomes on the failure to implement agendas fully seems a lame excuse, betraying an
unwillingness to engage in self-criticism. But the grim conditions of juvenile
confinement in Texas as revealed in the Morales case clearly had little to do with any
actual reforms. Instead, the role of advocates and providers of treatment was largely to
help build and maintain the appearance of a professionally oriented system. They
acquiesced or, like MacCormick, actively participated in decorating the façade, in some
cases seeming to calculate that this would allow at least for gradual progress. In effect,
professionals served as enablers, allowing state leaders to neglect delinquent children,
and training school staff to abuse them, without being held to account. The silver lining
was that the façade of rehabilitative care served to promote the idea of rehabilitation as an
attainable purpose and as the basis for the system’s legitimacy.
The use of progressive labels for harsh practices reflecting local traditions
characterized juvenile justice in Texas from the very beginning of the system. Recent
scholarship revisiting the origins of the juvenile court in Chicago has shown that features
later seen as integral to an original vision of Progressive juvenile justice, such as private
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adjudication hearings, actually developed over time in response to local circumstances.4
Developments in Texas further illustrate the extent of divergences among regions which
were supposedly caught up in the same Progressive currents. The Juvenile Court Act
passed by the Texas Legislature in 1907, which defined delinquency legally and granted
modified procedures to district and county courts acting as juvenile courts, was clearly
intended by its leading advocates as an extension of guardianship, replacing criminal
procedure and criminal liability with adjudication aimed “at the interests of the child and
its reformation.”5 But, as researchers ruefully observed in the 1930s, legislative
tinkerings and state appeals court rulings actually served to reaffirm and extend the older
practice of trying youths as criminals, and sending them to Gatesville as punishment.6
Instead of saving children from prosecution, the delinquency statute and the mechanism
of juvenile court gave judges new tools to use against disorderly youngsters.7 Juvenile
probation, in urban counties that actually funded probation services, similarly served the
4 See David S. Tanenhaus, Juvenile Justice in the Making (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2004), esp.
chapter 2.
5 General Laws of Texas, 1907, excerpted in Luther E. Widen, Juvenile Court Law Enacted by the Thirtieth
Legislature (Austin, 1907), p. 11.
6 The ruling of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in Byrd v. State (1909) upheld an unrepealed 1889
statute which allowed courts to sentence defendants aged sixteen and younger to the reformatory. In this
interpretation, the Juvenile Court Act merely created an additional option for processing juveniles. Later
legislation required transfer of children’s cases to juvenile courts, but apparently “reverted to terms and
procedures strongly suggestive . . . of the criminal law.” See Texas’ Children: The Report of the Texas
Child Welfare Survey (Austin: Bureau of Research in the Social Sciences, University of Texas Publication
No. 3837, Oct. 1, 1938), pp. 184-190 (quote at 190). In Watson v. State (1922), cited in Texas’ Children,
the Court of Criminal Appeals stated that the juvenile court law “was designed not that one should escape
punishment for crime, but to prevent one under seventeen at the time of trial from being sent to the
penitentiary.” Alan Rucker’s recent treatment surveys rulings and prior research without further
accounting for the use of criminal procedure in juvenile courts. See Rucker, “The History of Juvenile
Justice in Texas Prior to 1943,” State Bar Section Report: Juvenile Law, Vol. 7, No. 4 (Dec. 1993), pp. 41-
49.
7 Juvenile court criminal procedure maintained judges’ control over outcomes, much as guardianship courts
did. While criminal procedure included a right to trial by jury, the researchers who assembled Texas’
Children found that nine of every ten children tried in Texas for delinquency in 1933 supposedly waived
this right. See Texas’ Children, p. 212.
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criminal court rather than the juvenile. Probation officers typically acted as prosecution
witnesses, and in Dallas a probation officer even filled the role of prosecuting attorney.8
The prison system’s “House of Correction and Reformatory” founded at
Gatesville in 1889 was renamed a “State Juvenile Training School” in 1911, but like the
juvenile courts it served, its actual operations remained resistant to reform influences and,
if anything, became more deeply so over time. Set up as a prison farm located near a
small, out-of-the-way central Texas county seat, it spared young male offenders from the
penitentiary, but its conditions were primitive and slow to improve. L. J. Tankersly, a
newly appointed assistant superintendent, reported in 1900 that “there were no funds
available for operation, that [his] predecessor had left no records, that the buildings were
in deplorable condition, and that there was no segregation of races as instructed by the
Legislature. Overcrowding was a big problem. There was no room to isolate younger
boys from the older nor the sick from the well, and a number of pneumonia cases were
being treated in hallways.”9 Given minimal appropriations and no facilities for
instruction in trades, Tankersly and other superintendents kept the institution focused on
farm labor, trying to cover expenses while keeping the boys occupied. Supervision was
passed from the prison system to other officials and, in 1920, was assigned to a new State
Board of Control. In its first annual report the board counted no fewer than 822 boys at
Gatesville (compared to 183 inmates in 1900, when Tankersly cited overcrowding).10
8 Texas’ Children, p. 210.
9 Report of L. J. Tankersly, Assistant Superintendent of the House of Correction and Reformatory,
Gatesville, included in Annual Report of the Board of Trustees and Superintendent of the House of
Correction and Reformatory, 1900, cited in Juvenile Delinquency in Texas: Incidence, Laws, and Services,
prepared by the staff of the Texas Legislative Council (Austin, 1954), p. 281.
10 Population figures from August 31, 1920, in First Annual Report of the State Board of Control to the
Governor and the Legislature (Austin, 1921), p. 105.
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While variations in local crime and policing patterns might have contributed to the
increase, the general effect of the delinquency statute and the juvenile court seems all too
clear.
The rising tide of commitments of delinquent boys became an endlessly recurring
source of tension between local courts and Gatesville superintendents. Both felt severe,
chronic budget constraints. Judges in most Texas counties had no probation services and
no detention facilities separate from the county jail, and often felt compelled either to
sentence delinquents to the training school or to leave them in home situations which
seemed even worse. Gatesville superintendents, facing chronic overcrowding and unable
to control intake, appealed for the prevention of delinquency within schools and
communities.11
By the 1920s, the Gatesville school was one of several children’s and other
eleemosynary institutions overseen by the Board of Control. These included a newly
created school for delinquent girls, as well as an orphanage, a home for “dependent and
neglected” children, and previously established schools for blind, deaf, and disabled
youths. The Girls’ Training School was authorized by the Legislature in 1913 aopened
three years later at Gainesville (another fairly isolated location, near the Oklahoma
border). Its first superintendent, Carrie Weaver Smith, M.D., recruited a staff of college-
educated women and envisioned an intensive program of education, training, moral
instruction, and medical care. “A training school should be recognized first as a
11 A good example is Gatesville superintendent A. W. Eddins’ address to a state teachers’ convention in
1914, in which he scolded educators for lax discipline and enforcement of compulsory attendance, lack of
moral instruction, and a dearth of honest manual labor. “Assails Schools for Neglect of Delinquent Boys,”
San Antonio Express, 11/29/1914.
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hospital,” she proclaimed, and in her first report to the Board of Control she explained the
need for acute care (“An average of one third of our girls have venereal infection”) and
long-term treatments such as “occupational therapy, music therapy, hydro-therapy, and
corrective gymnastics.”12 She resigned in 1925 after bitter disputes with board members
over institutional expenses, and her successor immediately began cutting costs per
student as the population swelled.13
The Board of Control itself was a pure example of Southern business
progressivism in state government. Its main object was “the development of more
efficient business methods in the management of the various State institutions and the
realizing of a great saving by competitive buying in large quantities in the open
market.”14 But, cheaper supplies notwithstanding, eleemosynary institutions reaped few
benefits from the board’s direction. In 1932 a comprehensive study of state government
operations by outside consultants observed that the board members had neither “any
actual experience or training for the administration of the institutions” nor sufficient staff
or facilities for the job. Lacking any long-range plan for reducing demand for state
services, their whole policy amounted to “effecting immediate savings in the per capita
12 “Report of Superintendent,” Girls’ Training School, in First Annual Report of the State Board of Control
to the Governor and Legislature of the State of Texas, fiscal year ending August 31, 1920, pp. 121-122.
13 In reporting on the period from 1924 through 1926, the Board of Control cited the Gainesville school as,
until recently, the institution with the most difficult problems: “It appeared almost impossible to harmonize
theory and practice; idealism and results.” Now, the board reported, “we know that some of these problems
during the past two years have been greatly minimized, if not entirely eliminated,” citing an improved
“business side,” better discipline, and better relations with the local community. The new superintendent,
Mrs. Agnes Stephens, briefly described a school program that emphasized vocational training (“The
laundry is one of the most important departments on campus”) almost exclusively. The enrollment was up
from 56 in 1923-24 to an average of 109 in 1925-26. See Third Report of the State Board of Control, pp.
16, 125-127.
14 First Annual Report, p. 8.
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cost of maintenance.”15 The consultants were most critical of the impact of stringent
policy on state mental hospitals, which failed to recruit good doctors and continued to
provide “custodial care at the expense of modern curative measures.”16 The Gatesville
school, in its way, did the same thing. The consultants noted approvingly that the senior
officers at the school were committed in principle to rehabilitation over punishment, and
that recently “corporal punishment has so decreased and the morale of the boys has been
so increased, that, if given their choice between whipping, having their hair cut short, or
having their offenses go on record, they will usually choose the whipping.”17 But despite
such leniency and good intentions, none of the staff had any training with rehabilitative
methods, or any experience outside of the Gatesville school itself. For this reason, and
because of “the urge of the Legislature and the Board of Control that expenses be kept as
low as possible,” the consultants acknowledged that the institution would stay focused on
“productive labor,” although they hoped that “rehabilitative features” could be adopted
where possible.18
As years went by without improvements, the isolated schools became recurring
sources of scandal, which attracted growing attention during the wartime wave of public
concern over delinquency. In August 1941, the Board of Control fired the Gatesville
superintendent, Earl H. Nesbitt, for alleged acts of brutality. Days later, a mass breakout
occurred, with forty-seven boys successfully escaping. A legislative investigating
15 State of Texas Joint Legislative Committee on Organization and Economy, and Griffenhagen and
Associates, The Government of the State of Texas, Part VII—Public Welfare; Eleemosynary Institutions
and Social Service Agencies (Austin, 1932), pp. 2-3. Referred from henceforth as Griffenhagen Report.
16 Griffenhagen Report, p. 2.
17 Griffenhagen Report, p. 250.
18 Griffenhagen Report, p. 250.
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committee found evidence that the boys had been beaten with “bats,” rubber hoses with
handles that had been been banned from the adult prison system. Firing back at press
coverage of the scandal, a local editor accused politicians of using the Gatesville school
as a football, and said that if superintendents were “left alone by self-seeking
investigators and big daily newspapers, they could probably get the job done.”19 Amid
this controversy the board also replaced the Gainesville superintendent, citing grim
conditions there as well: a lack of training programs, no trained social workers or
psychologists, no proper classification of inmates, a diet of peanut butter sandwiches and
water.20 Standing legislative committees on eleemosynary institutions made return visits
to the training schools for the rest of the decade, citing new examples of abuse and
neglect, and the Legislature passed a restriction on corporal punishment (which
Gatesville staff proceeded to disregard).
A spike in delinquency rates actually coincided with a sharp decline in the
Gatesville inmate population, from 767 in August 1940 to 540 in May 1943.21 After the
war, numbers of cases in juvenile courts remained above prewar levels while the training
schools dwindled further. In 1948 the Gatesville figure stood at 366. One reason,
according to a state commission, was that “many judges appear unwilling to commit to
the State School because of the stigma attached to a Gatesville boy.”22 The stigma itself
19 Dallas Morning News, 9/16/41.
20 Dallas Morning News, 11/4/41.
21 Tenth Biennial Report of the Texas State Board of Control, biennium ending August 31, 1940, population
figure cited in report on p. 66, and “Report of Committee on State Eleemosynary and Reformatory
Institutions,” House Journal, 48th Legislature, May 6, 1943, p. 2824. For Texas wartime delinquency rates
see report of study by the Texas Social Welfare Association and Texas Probation Association, cited in
Dallas Morning News, 3/29/43.
22 Texas Training School Code Commission, Child by Child – We Build a Nation: A Youth Development
Program for the State of Texas (Austin, 1949), p. 12.
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was nothing new. But in a time of widespread public fears of youth crime, an institution
that promoted recidivism rather than curing it seems to have been viewed as part of the
problem.
Reprising their role during the past age of Progressive reform, women’s
organizations took up the renewed cause of bringing Texas juvenile justice up to national
standards.23 The Texas League of Women Voters pushed forward a reestablishment of
juvenile courts that changed criminal proceedings to civil and finally endorsed the
principle of guardianship for delinquents.24 Seeking to introduce child-saving practices
long established elsewhere, the legislation included provisions allowing for closed
hearings and informal procedures, broad dispositional authority for judges over
delinquent youths, and the exclusion of juvenile court records from adult court
proceedings. The bill was passed in 1943. Meanwhile, in Dallas, state district judge
Sarah T. Hughes stirred a local controversy over the detention of juveniles alongside
adult offenders in the county jail, and led a successful effort to win funding for a separate
juvenile facility.25
With the reputation of state juvenile institutions now reflecting on the state itself,
the effort to improve their image now began in earnest. Corporate attorney Beauford H.
Jester, whose triumph in the 1946 governor’s race confirmed the political dominance of a
corporate establishment, sought in various ways to show an enlightened approach to state
23 On women’s leadership in Texas Progressivism see Elizabeth York Enstam, Women and the Creation of
Urban Life: Dallas, Texas, 1843-1920 (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 1998).
24 Sarah T. Hughes, one of the advocates for the legislation, describes its provisions and cites the League’s
support in “Handling of Juvenile Delinquents in Texas,” Texas Law Review 38: 2 (1960), pp. 293-295.
25 Darwin Payne, Indomitable Sarah: The Life of Judge Sarah T. Hughes (Dallas: SMU Press, 2004), pp.
114-117.
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needs.26 He got the Legislature to authorize (albeit without funding) a Texas Training
School Code Commission, which was to prepare a report and proposals for the next
legislative session.
The commission followed the path of other investigators and discovered many of
the same defects at the schools: aging structures, barren living conditions, work routines
determined by “the demands of maintenance and production.” While it discovered no
new disciplinary abuses, the commission’s report went beyond its predecessors in citing
the “insoluble problem” of maintaining discipline at a “mass custody” institution, which
threw together different kinds of youths:
It thus forces the entire staff to be first of all guards and it divides the population
inevitably into the watchers and the watched. Life becomes an endless series of
countings, of unlocking and relocking doors, of forming lines to go to classes, to
work, to eat, to play. As always under repression, the human spirit rebels, plots
endlessly to escape. In turn the administration introduces more “discipline” and
this degenerates sooner or later into brutality.27
The commission report also bluntly reported on the inability of the schools to serve basic
functions in the absence of professional staff. The training schools were unable to
classify incoming children because they “lack most of the technically trained personnel—
psychologists, psychiatrists, social workers—essential to make a competent diagnosis.
The salaries offered are simply too meager to secure them.”28 The Gainesville school
continued to treat girls for venereal disease, but that was the only remedial medical
26 George Norris Green’s portrayal of Jester’s governorship notes his support for the Gilmer-Aikin school
bill and cites his “relative moderation” among conservative leaders of the time. See The Establishment in
Texas Politics: The Primitive Years, 1938-1957 (Norman: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1979), chapter 8.
27 Child by Child, p. 22.
28 Child by Child, p. 14.
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treatment offered at any of the schools. Gatesville had only thirteen schoolteachers for its
nearly 400 students. For children being released, neither training schools nor home
communities provided any meaningful parole supervision. Regarding the employees that
the schools did manage to hire, the commission tried to make its point delicately:
In view of the uninviting conditions of employment, the Schools, particularly
Gatesville, have difficulty in filling vacancies. Gatesville recruits its employees
largely from the neighboring community and very often has to employ both
husband and wife. This naturally transforms the institution into a very closely
knit community.29
The commission offered two main recommendations. One was to create a
diagnostic center for youths being sent to the training schools. This facility would screen
out children needing other institutional care (such as the “feeble-minded and psychotic”)
and would also diagnose “the particular personality defects, assets, and needs” of the
training-school-bound students, so that they could also be prescribed an individually
suitable course of treatment. This would require a doctor, a clinical psychologist, a social
worker, “plus competent supervisors and teachers to keep the child occupied and to
observe his behavior,” and a psychiatrist.30
The other recommendation was to create a Youth Development Council to control
the disposition of all individuals committed to the state for delinquency. The
commission’s plan was based on a model Youth Correction Authority Act published in
1940 by the American Law Institute (as well as the commission’s extensive consultations
with the Institute’s staff). The point of the model statute was to give one agency both the
29 Child by Child, p. 25.
30 Child by Child, p. 26.
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responsibility for treating delinquents and the legal authority to control them.31 The
commission’s proposed statute followed the model in giving the state youth council full
discretion to hold, discharge, or conditionally release an individual offender, as long as it
carried out an initial examination (hence the new diagnostic center) and periodic
reexaminations, up to the offender’s 21st birthday. Granting this much authority to the
youth council was potentially controversial, as the commissioners undoubtedly were well
aware; a recent Texas Law Review article supporting the model statute had addressed
several potential legal challenges under the Texas Constitution.32 In its published report
the commission avoided discussing the extent of the council’s discretion, and instead
described the council’s mandate as “coordination of the various programs within the State
into one development program for all of the people of the State,” with the additional duty
of running the training schools.33
Tailoring their proposal to anticipate lines of opposition, the commission and its
supporters succeeded in passing it intact in all but one crucial respect. Setting aside the
model statute, the commission structured the Youth Development Council so as to avoid
creating another state agency. It was to have no budget line of its own. A majority of its
members were ex oficio heads of other state departments and agencies, and for staff it
would mainly draw upon the resources of departments such as Public Welfare. Its role in
local communities would be largely to promote the creation of municipal youth
development councils to work out their own plans and programs. The report assured
31 Tom B. Rhodes, Tom McLeroy, and Robert E. Burns, “Adolescent Delinquency and Youth Correction
Authority Act,” Texas Law Review, Vol. 20, No. 6 (1942), pp. 754-763.
32 Rhodes et al, “Adolescent Delinquency,” pp. 757-763.
33 Child by Child, p. 31.
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readers that the council “in no way takes powers from the courts, or competes with
them,” because judges would remain free to decide whether to commit delinquents to the
state.34 In steering the bill through the Legislature, Governor Jester and his aides
countered charges that the proposed council intruded upon local responsibilities, and
allowed themselves to portray it as virtually cost-free. “The philosophy of this plan is to
mobilize EXISTING resources of the State which can be used in a State-wide youth
development program,” wrote one of the governor’s staffers. “By using field staffs and
State organizations of existing State agencies, it will be possible to provide these services
to children and youth of Texas at minimum cost.”35 Minimizing the cost may have helped
pass the bill at the expense of its intended purposes. The staffer’s note acknowledged
that Jester would seek to include additional budget requests totaling $150,000 in the
eleemosynary appropriations bill. This figure was already only half of what the incoming
Youth Development Council members believed they needed solely to run the diagnostic
clinic. In the end, the council got all of $33,000 for diagnostic services, none of which
could be used for salaries.36
At its beginning, the new council appeared—at least to some—as part of a
genuine process of reform. As their remarks on “mass custody” institutions had
suggested, Walter Kerr and several other council members who had served on the
commission wanted to close Gatesville and replace it with smaller schools in other
34 Child by Child, p. 32.
35 Bill digest attached to memo, William L. McGill to Gov. Beauford Jester, 4/27/49, folder “1949
Correspondence, Youth Development (Apr. thru May), Box 4-14/78, Papers of Gov. Beauford H. Jester,
Archives and Information Services Division, Texas State Library and Archives Commission.
36 First Annual Report of the State Youth Development Council of the Governor, fiscal year ended August
31, 1950, p. 50.
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places.37 But this was only part of the picture, as the minutes of the Youth Development
Council’s meeting on March 15, 1951 indicate:
Rev. Kerr stated that he feels as our work develops, there will be less time spent
in proportion on administrative matters and on the details of handling routine
duties, and more will be spent on education, prevention, and cooperative work in
communities. He thinks we should eventually be in a position to develop and
control public opinion in matters pertaining to youth work.38
Kerr and other council members wanted to use the council’s statewide coordination
mandate to influence juvenile justice within communities. They mapped out a program
in which a statewide director and regional field representatives would survey local
facilities, act as consultants to local judges and community boards on juvenile services,
and provide probation and placement services in areas without local services.39 Then, in
1953, the Legislature omitted the community service program from the council’s
appropriations bill. The same fate befell the council’s effort to carry out their
underfunded diagnostic-center mandate. Unable to pay for a building, the council
arranged a “mobile clinic,” consisting of a clinical psychologist and two other trained
specialists, which carried out diagnostic tests on children at the request of judges, mostly
in communities without probation or other services.40 The diagnostic-services funds were
cut off in 1951. “The result,” according to a 1954 legislative staff report, “is that there is
no control over intake at the institutions, and with few exceptions, they receive every
37 Also see First Annual Report, p. 39.
38 Minutes, State Youth Development Council, 3/15/51, Texas Youth Commission Records, TSLA.
39 See First Annual Report, pp. 2-11, Second Annual Report of the State Youth Development Council to the
Governor, fiscal year ended August 31, 1951, p. 5; and Juvenile Delinquency in Texas, pp. 336-338.
40 See First Annual Report, pp. 49-60; Third Annual Report of the State Youth Development Council to the
Governor, fiscal year ended August 31, 1952, pp. 39-46; and Juvenile Delinquency in Texas, pp. 339-341.
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child committed to the council. Actually, the old admission practices have changed very
little except for the technicality of the old commitment papers’ specifying the council
instead of the training school.”41
The council remained caught in its original dilemma, as implied in its creation by
the Legislature. It could not spare resources or attention for the cause of reforming
institutional practices, or reshaping the practices of local juvenile courts, while at the
same time managing its immediate responsibilities for the institutions. Despite Rev.
Kerr’s hopes, the “routine duties” of keeping the training schools running actually
amounted to a major challenge, given the circumstances at Gatesville which the
commission report had fairly candidly disclosed. Beyond the isolation, the rundown
facilities and even the excessive size of the population, the key problem with the
Gatesville school, in the council’s view, was its lack of student classification and
facilities for keeping students separated into groups (except for the segregation of black
students). Daily life at the school, as the council reported, remained dominated by the
children being thrown together en masse: “All the boys eat in one large, barn-like mess
hall and all must eat with a spoon because a few cannot be trusted with knives and
forks.”42 Urged on by its newly hired Gatesville superintendent, the council prepared a
formal request to the 1951 Legislature for funds to split up the school into four separate
units, differentiated by graded levels of security, and all housed in newly built small
cottages. Instead, the Legislature passed appropriations for one large building, intended
as a maximum-security facility, and renovations at Gatesville. Council members argued
41 Juvenile Delinquency in Texas, p. 341.
42 First Annual Report, p. 28.
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with each other over uses for the new building, which opened in 1954 as a reception
center for new arrivals.43 The diagnostic-services budget may have been a casualty of the
building appropriation’s degree of success.
While the Legislature may have been inclined anyway to favor brick and mortar
over newfangled initiatives, another likelihood is that council members themselves
prioritized their facility construction requests because of the instability and danger of the
status quo at their main institution. The most politically damaging issue that Gatesville
posed for any of its supervising agencies was the problem of boys escaping the premises
and allegedly threatening the safety and property of local residents. Individual and group
breakouts were a familiar part of the school routine. The guard staff kept a pack of
hounds—not bloodhounds but “a mixture of greyhound and regular old coon dogs,”
according to one official—to track and chase boys down in the surrounding woods and on
the streets of the town.44 Upon assuming control of the school, the council members
found that “the situation at Gatesville was such that any change of policy or personnel
upset the daily routine to such an extent that an epidemic of runaways usually resulted.”45
Feeling directly exposed to these epidemics, with runaways stealing their cars and coon
hounds jingling across their lawns, Gatesville residents blamed outside authorities for
forcing guards to be overly lenient. With Hispanic and black youths together composing
a substantial majority of boys at the school, racial fears undoubtedly sharpened town
feelings. In 1949 a local grand jury cited a rash of local incidents and declared, “As long
as those who make the rules for the governing of this school fail to recognize that bad
43 Juvenile Delinquency in Texas, p. 296.
44 Bob Bray, “Boys Learn Walls at State School Enclose Own World,” Amarillo Times, 11/2/48.
45 First Annual Report, p. 28.
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boys must be disciplined, it is our opinion that these raids and resulting escapes will
continue.”46 Whether or not their diagnosis was correct, the grand jury’s prediction was
borne out over the years that followed.
If the institutions were to be brought under control, it was obvious that they would
have to be expanded further. As juvenile crime spiraled during the 1950s, commitments
rose rapidly and Gatesville’s population rose past its former levels.47 Anticipating a
crisis, the Youth Development Council actually recommended a reorganization of itself
in 1957 that would set free the heads of other agencies and pare the membership down to
three gubernatorial appointees. After signing the reorganization act, Governor Price
Daniel chose businessmen (Houston bank vice-president Robert Kneebone, Round Rock
car dealer Louis Henna, and, in 1959, Dallas real estate developer W. C. Windsor) who
would be more likely to carry weight with legislators. The renamed Texas Youth
Council made a long-range plan for additional facilities (including the old school and the
facilities built by the Youth Development Council) and, over the course of three
successive biennial budget cycles, obtained the necessary funding. By 1962 the
Gatesville school had become a complex with six separate “schools” for boys grouped by
age and degree of aggressiveness. The largest of these was still the original reformatory
building, now dubbed “Hilltop School,” which housed older boys whose IQ tests placed
them in between students considered mentally retarded (“Terrace School” was reserved
46 “Escapes at Gatesville School Blamed on Board’s New Rules,” Waco Tribune-Herald, 6/12/49.
47 The perception of a building crisis over juvenile crime is reflected in press clippings and in state official
correspondence. For a sign of the preoccupation with the issue among Gov. Price Daniel and his office
staff see typed table, “Houston, Harris County, increase in juvenile crime, 1957 over 1956,” Box 351,
Records of Governor Price Daniel, Texas State Library and Archives Regional Records Center, Liberty,
Texas. By January 1958 the Gatesville population was near 850 and the school was “bulging at the seams.”
See Felton West, “Average Stay of Boys in State School Is Under One Year,” Houston Post, 1/17/58.
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for these cases) and high performers (“Sycamore School”). The average population in
the complex by 1964 had grown to more than 1,600 boys.
The concentration of new facilities on the old Gatesville property was widely
understood as reflecting the Texas Youth Council’s cultivation of friends and supporters.
Bob Salter, the state representative from Gatesville during the 1960s, staunchly backed
TYC and, after losing his seat in 1972, became one of its consulting attorneys. The
council also signed up the brother of the House appropriations committee chairman as a
consulting psychiatrist, and in the late 1960s built new school facilities in Brownwood
and in Giddings, each of which was situated in the district of the House speaker serving
at the time it was approved. The council members’ unanimity was disrupted once, in
1960, when W. C. Windsor refused to sign a cover letter stating that the council had
“utilized all resources at our command” in preventing juvenile delinquency, and instead
issued his own report proposing, among other things, eleven years of compulsory
education (for the purpose of monitoring the activities of boys and girls up to seventeen)
and keeping children in school until 5:00 p.m. Kneebone, Henna, and the council’s
executive director, Dr. James A. Turman, all publicly disowned Windsor’s proposals.
“We’ve made real progress here with a well-established program,” Kneebone said, “and
we’ve done that by cooperating with others. If we go out and try to stir up a controversy,
I’m afraid we’ll hurt the very people we’re trying to help.”48 In 1961 Windsor resigned
from the council.
48 For Windsor’s report see letters, Windsor to Henna, Kneebone, and Turman, 11/6/59 (copies all
together), with attached “Report on Juvenile Delinquency,” Box 422, Gov. Daniel Records, and also
“Dallas Head of Youth Board Launches One-Man Crusade,” Dallas Times Herald, 3/23/60. For the
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Dr. Turman, who bore responsibility for TYC’s program operations, played a
leading political role as well, acting the part of the professional expert while Kneebone
and Henna filled the role of the hardheaded businessmen trustees. A psychologist,
Turman had worked for the Youth Development Council in 1950 as part of the traveling
diagnostic clinic, dealing with local officials throughout the state. He moved up quickly
through other positions, such as supervisor of caseworkers and director of institutions for
the old council, and drafted the bill that created the new TYC.49 As executive director,
Turman constantly faced the prospect that the institutions would be overwhelmed by the
tide of commitments. In addition to the building program, he appealed for a statewide
parole program for juveniles that would ease the pressure on institutions by lowering the
recidivism rate. When a newly released Gatesville student killed a 15-year-old boy in his
front yard in West University Park on Christmas night, 1957, touching off demands for
tougher sanctions, Turman responded that the incident showed the need for better parole
supervision.50 At the same time, he supported proposals to allow juvenile court judges to
transfer 16-year-olds to adult criminal courts to face felony charges.51 In some
circumstances Turman was willing to play up the bad conditions inside the institutions.
In 1959, testifying on TYC’s requests before skeptical legislative budget officials, he
called the situation at Gatesville “an emergency” and acknowledged that the school could
reaction of the other TYC leaders and Kneebone’s quoted response see Jimmy Banks, “Urgency of Needs
Splits Youth Panel,” Dallas Morning News, 3/27/60.
49 Turman gives a thorough career autobiography in his application letter for the TYC executive
directorship. Letter, James A. Turman to Frank M. Wilson (TYC chairman), 8/26/57, folder “Youth
Council, Texas,” Box 494, Gov. Daniel Records.
50 “Yule Killing Blamed on Lack of Parole Officer,” Houston Chronicle, 1/4/58, p. 1.
51 “Move to Make 16-Year-Olds Adults in Felony Cases Is Aired in House,” Houston Chronicle, 3/22/61.
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offer “little more than custodial care.”52 Mostly, however, Turman remained intent on
defending the council’s programs and fending off critics.
Beyond the dangers of overcrowding and abuse, however, security at Gatesville
remained TYC’s most urgent problem. While the idea of dividing up the Gatesville
school had always been aimed at addressing this, the council’s overall plan envisioned
something more ambitious. Their 1959 building appropriation included funds for a new
maximum-security facility, to be built separately from the Gatesville complex. (Despite
Turman’s objections, however, the new facility, called Mountain View, was placed
almost right next to the old complex, along the same road. Given the budget constraints
prevailing at the time, the council did well to get the money approved at all.) For Turman
and the board members, Mountain View was being built none too soon. The council
suffered an especially intense series of embarrassments in July and August 1961, when
116 boys escaped in a single weekend following the firings of a guard and a supervisor,
and then a guard was attacked and killed by a student, touching off a revolt among the
guard staff. Facing a wave of critical news coverage, Turman and his superintendent
insisted that the school was actually under control and that guards should not be allowed
to discipline boys using unsupervised force.53 Gatesville residents and officials again
sent a wave of letters complaining to the governor and demanding an end to restrictions
on guards.54
52 Ken Towery, “Fight Seen on Budget For Youths,” Austin American, 8/30/58, pp. 1, 7.
53 William H. Gardner, “Expert Vetoes Arming Guards at Gatesville,” Houston Post, 8/4/61.
54 For one example see letter, Dick Payne to Gov. Daniel, 8/1/61, and attached response, Gov. Daniel to
Hon. Dick Payne, 8/2/62, in Box 193, Gov. Daniel Records.
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When it finally opened in the fall of 1962, Mountain View School starkly
represented the council’s preoccupation with achieving control over institutional life and
a respite from its critics. It was surrounded by a double chain-link fence topped with
barbed wire, floodlit at night and patrolled by jeep. The school housed, on average, some
300 to 400 “chronic, serious offenders” transferred from the Gatesville complex or sent
directly from the reception center. Its lengths of stays (peaking at an average of 28
months in 1967-68) were far greater than those of the other schools.55 Austin
MacCormick, making his debut as a TYC supporter in 1962, praised the council for
separating out the rough kids, saying it “would afford the other units a welcome relief.”
Even so, he claimed, no one should fear for them:
Mountain View should not be thought of by the public, however, as the Alcatraz
of the Texas juvenile institutional system. Boys will not be sent there as outcasts
but because they can be better controlled for their own good in an institution
which is not wide open, and because their special needs can best be met in a
special institution. The aim and purpose of Mountain View, as of the other units,
will be rehabilitation, not merely punishment.56
MacCormick praised TYC in a series of letters issued at two-year intervals
corresponding to the biennial Texas budget cycle. Beyond helping with the council’s
immediate funding requests, his visits and endorsements boosted the council’s efforts to
portray its programs as modern and up to date, no longer an embarrassment. Part of the
point was to emphasize how far the institutions had come since the bad old days. Each of
MacCormick’s letters noted the physical transformation of the Gatesville campus, “which
55 See Senate Youth Affairs Committee, Services to Youth in Texas: Preliminary Report (Austin: n.p.,
1969), p. 9.
56 Letter, Austin MacCormick to Hon. Robert W. Kneebone, 9/1/62, p. 4, Legislative Reference Library,
Texas Capitol.
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20 years ago reflected no credit on the state,” but had now become “a constellation of
training schools of which Texas can be justifiably proud.”57 Another theme was that
institutional staffing and professional services should be improved just as the buildings
had been, a process which in McCormack’s view was already well advanced by 1964:
“The progress made by the Youth Council in the area of personnel since 1962, while not
as visible to the naked eye as the preceding progress in providing physical facilities, is no
less striking and significant.”58 MacCormick noted in 1967 that “the quantity of
professional personnel is still obviously below the level required,” and two years later he
warned that the salary scale for case workers and counselors was insufficient to attract
those with training and experience.59 But the point of these warnings was that the
Legislature should continue to meet TYC’s rising budget requests. MacCormick was
more urgently concerned with improving post-release supervision, and continuing the
expansion of TYC’s parole system. As soon as the council could staff parole offices
throughout the state, and as soon as its Brownwood and Giddings facilities were open, he
wrote in 1972, he would rank the Texas juvenile system as the nation’s best.60
The council itself, under Turman and the board, continued to press for greater
funding (especially for parole), but with MacCormick’s support it shifted away from
criticizing its own institutional conditions, and instead portrayed the training schools as
world-class based on the care and rehabilitation they offered. The institutions, the
57 Quote from letter, MacCormick to Kneebone, 1/13/67, p. 2, Legislative Reference Library, Texas
Capitol.
58 Letter, MacCormick to Kneebone, October 1964, excerpted in Annual Report for 1964, Texas Youth
Council, p. 6.
59 Letters, MacCormick to Kneebone, 1/13/67, and MacCormick to Kneebone, 1/21/69, Legislative
Reference Library, Texas Capitol.
60 Letter, MacCormick to Kneebone, 3/31/72, p. 10, Legislative Reference Library, Texas Capitol.
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council claimed, “provide each youth with continuous opportunities for successful
individual achievement in living situations that promote his physical, mental, emotional
and moral health.”61 Reception centers—for boys at Gatesville and, after 1970, for girls
at Brownwood—were able and qualified to make good placement decisions:
Considerable professional effort, thought, energy, and money has been expended
in the development of programs of diagnosis, social evaluation, orientation and
classification for these reception centers. While this approach is not without its
limitations, it does provide for continuing analysis and evaluation. Under the
direction of a competent and interested staff, it ensures a dynamic and
individualized program—a solid basis for meaningful and beneficial treatment.62
In the training schools, the “meaningful and beneficial treatment” available to each
youngster largely consisted of education, social work, and medical and psychiatric
treatment as necessary.63 The council’s literature sought to show that “considerable
professional effort” had also gone into these programs. As Austin MacCormick had
noted, after finishing building the Gatesville complex and Mountain View, the TYC did
greatly increase its budgets for services to students (albeit from extremely low levels).
The academic schools at each facility were fully accredited and offered transferable
course credits, and with federal educational grant funds, TYC was obtaining new
classroom equipment and expanding its academic and vocational course offerings. Social
workers at each facility were assigned to help each student “in a one-to-one casework
relationship,” and to coordinate “all activities associated with the treatment of a
61 Annual Report of the Texas Youth Council to the Governor for the Fiscal Year Ending August 31, 1972,
p. 28.
62 Annual Report, 1972, p. 31. Italics in original.
63 There were of course other resources provided, such as recreational activities and chaplains (since TYC
was also charged with providing “religious and spiritual training”). The emphasis here is on those services
having to do with treatment rather than custodianship.
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delinquent child.”64 Medical care, the council claimed, was entirely sufficient: “Every
facility employs the part-time services of a physician and a dentist, the consultant
services of a psychiatrist, and maintains a staff of nurses.” These professionals “have
continuously ensured that the most modern treatment facilities and techniques are
used.”65
Some observers in the Texas press were skeptical of the council’s façade of
professionalism, noting the low salaries and continuing shortages of professionals and
skilled personnel.66 But the cracks in the façade came not so much from the chronically
poor provision of treatment services—a problem unlikely to ignite the public—as from
continued episodes of violence and accusations of brutality, especially behind the fences
and walls of Mountain View.67
The abuse allegations led to the creation of a Texas Senate Youth Affairs
Committee, which was charged with studying not only the use of force and disciplinary
procedures but other aspects of the institutions, including treatment programs and
services. The chairman was Criss Cole, a senator who later became a juvenile court
judge. The committee recommended the closure of the old “Hilltop School.” It reached
mixed conclusions about the “meaningful and beneficial treatment” provided at
Gatesville and Mountain View. The academic programs, it found, had come a long way,
in part because of the federal funds. Casework counseling appeared less effective, with
64 Annual Report, 1972, p. 35.
65 Annual Report, 1972, p. 50.
66 Felton West and Henry Holcomb, who separately covered the TYC beat for their respective Houston
dailies, both periodically undertook in-depth investigations. Holcomb finished a series of articles in 1971
which explicitly called MacCormick’s assurances into question by citing other experts. See “Most fact
finders stress need for changes,” Houston Post, 8/19/71.
67 See “The Gatesville challenge,” Texas Observer, 2/21/69, p. 11.
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high staff turnover, heavy caseloads, masses of paperwork, and limited time spent
actually counseling boys. The committee was most critical of the dilapidated Gatesville
hospital facility and the limited psychiatric care made available, which was provided
entirely by a rotating set of part-time visiting consultants68
The abuse claims remained at the core of the committee’s investigation. Cole’s
committee reviewed incident records and investigated fully a small sampling of charges.
It concluded that the situation at the two boys’ schools was not “one where sadistic and
brutal acts are routine,” but that some of the allegations of use of unauthorized force were
credible, and that there was “a strong climate of suppression, repression, and fear” among
both boys and staff. Guards were poorly paid, worked long hours, and frequent held
second jobs. They also felt badly outnumbered, and they received poor training and
unclear guidance about the practical meaning of use-of-force regulations. Boys were
constantly being intimidated, and yet under the surface of their regulated routine, there
was a subculture of resistance and a pecking order based on defying the rules of the
institution. Some of these issues lent themselves to specific recommendations, but Cole’s
committee found an overall explanation in the language used by the 1949 training school
code commission about the “insoluble problem” of discipline in a “mass-custody
institution.” To repeat this language was to assert that after twenty years,
notwithstanding the new buildings, despite the bold claims, what prevailed was the same
cycle of regimentation, resistance, discipline, and brutality.
As it invoked the language from 1949, Cole’s committee actually shifted the
underlying explanation, consciously or not. The old commission’s indictment of “mass
68 See Services to Youth in Texas, supra note 55.
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custody” had implied that boys who were thrown together in the old building should be
sorted out and kept separated in appropriate groups. While it may have overstated its
diagnostic sophistication, the TYC actually had invested heavily in sorting and separating
the boys. Twenty years later, the Cole committee never raised the issue of different types
of boys being kept together. The problems of the institutions ran deeper than that, it now
seemed.
In retrospect Dr. Turman, especially in his last years at TYC, seems to reflect a
painful ambivalence. Like mental hospitals and other state institutions, training schools
generally became controversial in a period of new social currents and conflicts. Even a
figure like Austin MacCormick became less a source of credibility for the likes of TYC
and more an embattled defender of traditional institutional principles that were now
widely considered retrograde. Facing criticism from outside and the constant threat of
disorder inside the institutions, Turman became at least occasionally paranoid, telling
Kneebone and others (in a letter marked “Confidential”) that one near-riot at Gatesville
was “part of a concerted, nationwide anti-establishment effort to harass, to intimidate, to
frustrate, and if possible, ultimately to destroy existing correctional programs and
systems in the United States.”69 But with a Nixon-era backlash brewing against
challenges to authority, and as always with the firm support of Kneebone and the rest of
the board, Turman retained sources of political support. He rejected most of the Cole
committee’s recommendations, and TYC’s supporters in the Legislature helped make
sure the committee’s proposals were never voted on.
69 Letter, Turman to Kneebone, 10/4/71, George Beto Papers, Newton Gresham Library, Sam Houston
State University, Huntsville, Texas.
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Turman nevertheless seems to have remained a reformer at heart, by his own
lights. At the Brownwood girls’ school, which opened in 1970, a young superintendent,
Ron Jackson, developed rules and practices in conscious opposition to the rigidly
enforced routines at Gatesville, instead emphasizing informality, investing more in
casework counseling, and recruiting volunteers from the surrounding community—all
with Turman’s unreserved support.70 Seeming to let his guard down briefly, Turman told
one reporter that Gatesville had been “my albatross.”71 It seems obvious in retrospect—
and may have been apparent to him by then—that the effort to make the old prison for
juveniles into an institution genuinely devoted to treatment was flawed at its core.
Turman made an effort, working within the limits of what was possible in Texas politics
at the time. (He seems to have ended up, like many others of his generation, identifying
with a system he had originally felt obliged to accommodate.) He struggled for progress
toward professional standards, given low budgets and the legacy of past neglect. His own
legacy, however, amounts to a cautionary tale: a greatly expanded system of
confinement, part still obsolete, part brand new, but either way deficient in providing
treatment, preoccupied with security, tending toward brutality. It was less a process of
professionalization than a struggle to simulate it, which helped to legitimate and
perpetuate much of what lay behind the façade.
In the litigation that forced the reform of the Texas training schools, the
jurisprudence of rights was applied, for a brief time, to serve the cause of treatment and
70 Henry Holcomb, “Girls school has teamwork,” Houston Post, 8/18/71.
71 Henry Holcomb, “Gatesville complex size is a handicap,” Houston Post, 8/17/71.
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professionalization. The crucial legal concept was that of a “right to treatment.” In his
interim and final orders in Morales v. Turman, U.S. district judge William Wayne Justice
found that conditions at the institutions violated the Eighth Amendment ban on “cruel
and unusual punishment.” But he found farther-reaching grounds for court-ordered
reform in a different argument. He observed that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee
of due process required that “any non-trivial governmental abridgment of liberty must be
justified in terms of some permissible governmental goal.” TYC’s governing statute,
charging the council with providing “a program of constructive training aimed at
rehabilitation and reestablishment in society of children adjudged to be delinquent,” was
a permissible goal, but the state was violating juveniles’ right to due process if it failed to
meet its goal but kept them confined anyway.72 After presiding over a trial that revealed
a host of deficiencies and abuses, Judge Justice concluded that further safeguards against
abuses would fail unless the deficiencies were addressed. The “right to treatment”
standard offered him sufficient authority to oversee the rebuilding of TYC from the
ground up, making it genuinely a source of treatment and rehabilitation.
What actually happened then was more complicated. The trial’s revelations did
bring about new leadership and an abrupt shift in TYC policies. Board chairman Forrest
Smith and executive director Ron Jackson, the former Brownwood superintendent,
embraced the idea of reform and the principle of using the least restrictive means
necessary to treat youths. But even as they relied on the fact of Judge Justice’s ruling to
72 Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53 (Eastern District of Texas, 1974), Memorandum Opinion and Order
(henceforth Morales 1974). The 1974 memorandum and order expands on the theory of the right to
treatment Judge Justice first articulated in Morales v. Turman, 364 F. Supp. 166 (Eastern District of Texas,
1973) (henceforth Morales 1973).
186
facilitate funding and clear away obstacles to reform, they nevertheless contested the
ruling itself and worked to reclaim authority from the court. The state’s success in
getting the Morales ruling reversed twice on technical grounds by the appeals court had
the effect of denying the “right to treatment” as grounds for judicial oversight.
The Turman case eventually yielded a settlement agreement in which a panel of
consultants reviewed TYC’s fulfillment of various standards over a four-year period. But
while it fended off Judge Justice on one front, TYC also fought battles on others, most
importantly with juvenile courts over control of community corrections. The two-front
war ultimately left TYC, as well as the federal court, with narrowed opportunities for
reforming the ways Texas children were treated.
The Texas litigation was made possible by Supreme Court rulings that brought
procedural due process to juvenile court hearings, but Judge Justice extended the reach of
the federal judiciary beyond the hearing room. In Kent v. United States (1966) and In re
Gault (1967), the high court registered a loss of confidence that judges were actually
exercising their unchecked discretion in ways that protected children. “Under our
Constitution,” wrote Justice Abe Fortas in the Gault opinion, “the condition of being a
boy does not justify a kangaroo court.”73 Fortas made a list of required protections:
written notice of charges, the right to counsel, the right to cross-examine witnesses, and
the privilege against self-incrimination. Texas was one state where, initially, the Gault
ruling went unenforced. In 1971, fifteen-year-old Alicia Morales was one of dozens of
children in El Paso who was detained and sent to TYC without even a hearing, following
73 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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an “agreed judgment” made by parents and the juvenile judge.74 El Paso attorney Steven
Bercu, with the support of the San Francisco-based Youth Law Center, tracked down
Morales and several other local youths and secured a court order allowing him to
investigate their cases and offer to represent them. When TYC officials at the
Gainesville school refused to let Bercu interview Morales and other girls in private, he
appeared before Judge Justice (who was already known for liberal rulings, and whose
district included Gainesville). Along with an injunction against further interference,
Bercu seized the opportunity to file a class-action suit against the state for holding
juveniles illegally. Judge Justice granted the injunction and other discovery motions as
the case went forward, sending a questionnaire to all inmates in the TYC system and
allowing Bercu and other attorneys to interview them on site.75
The discovery process transformed the case. The due-process issues were settled
when the state agreed in December 1972 to findings of fact conceding the plaintiffs’ case,
and in its next session the Legislature enacted a new Family Code that incorporated Gault
protections. Over 500 children, including Alicia Morales, were freed from TYC on the
basis of one habeas corpus writ that Bercu filed in Texas state court.76 ut by then the
plaintiffs’ attorneys and the court had become preoccupied with what they were learning
about the conditions of confinement. Based on their initial interviews and questionnaire
responses, Bercu and Peter Sandmann of the Youth Law Center amended their pleadings,
accusing TYC of brutality and neglect. Judge Justice ordered the U.S. Justice
74 See Bill Payne, “Hurt, frightened children,” Texas Observer, 2/26/71, p. 9.
75 See Frank R. Kemerer, William Wayne Justice: A Judicial Biography (Austin: University of Texas
Press, 1991), pp. 148-153; and Kenneth Wooden, Weeping in the Playtime of Others: America’s
Incarcerated Children, 2nd ed. (Columbus: Ohio State Univ. Press, 2000), pp. 3-6.
76 Wooden, Weeping in the Playtime of Others, pp. 5-6.
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Department and the nonprofit Mental Health Law Project as amici curiae to help
investigate. He also appointed a team of psychiatrists and social workers to live in the
institutions as participant-observers and report to the court on their findings. By June
1973, when Morales v. Turman went to trial in Judge Justice’s court, the court had
developed extensive knowledge about what went on inside TYC’s institutions.
Drawing mostly upon the testimony of the children themselves, the trial revealed
customs of abuse and an environment of brutality. Guards at each school allowed violent
harassment and meted out their own forms of discipline. A fourteen-year-old Gatesville
inmate described “the peel,” in which guards would beat a boy’s bare back while the boy
held his head between the guard’s legs.77 Attacks and beatings were commonplace at
Mountain View and rampant in its Security Treatment Center. One routine punishment
was “racking,” which in Mountain View lingo meant being lined up against a wall and
punched repeatedly in the stomach. One of the supervisors of correctional officers at the
school, “Chop Chop” Wimberly, preferred instead to beat the boys around their eyes.78
FBI investigators discovered dozens of cases in which boys were subdued with tear gas,
at point-blank range in close quarters, causing severe chemical burns in at least one
case.79 Other punishments must have left hidden scars. At Mountain View, boys who
were considered by the guards to have shown “homosexual tendencies” were sent to live
in one of the two “punk” dormitories (one for Anglo boys, the other for Mexican-
77 Morales 1974, p. 56. Oscar Jackson’s testimony is summarized by Wooden, Weeping in the Playtime of
Others, p. 8.
78 Morales 1974, p. 70.
79 Morales 1974, pp. 48-49. Wilbur Watts’ experience is summarized by Wooden, Weeping in the Playtime
of Others, pp. 14-15.
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American).80 Boys at Mountain View spent weeks at a time in solitary confinement, in
the Security Treatment Center, for small infractions.81 There they would be assigned to a
work detail called “picking.” Howard Ohmart, a consultant who reported to the court on
his visits to the institutions, described the boys in the picking line:
As we approached the work squad the nine coverall-clad figures (with the
“security” emblem emblazoned on the back) were seated on the ground taking the
carefully timed “break.” Elbows on knees, head between hands, they sat staring
at the ground, forbidden to either talk or look at each other. Shortly after our
arrival, one of the two supervising officers gave the work signal and without a
word the group arose, still in line and started swinging their heavy hoes. The hoe
comes high overhead and chops into the earth, in a pointless and completely
unproductive exercise. Three or four swings and the line moves forward in
unison, wordless, and with faces in a fixed, blank expressionless mask. Except
for the occasional furtive and fearful glance, they were like so many
automatons.82
Judge Justice acknowledged that “brutality in the girls’ institutions did not appear to be as
widespread as that in the boys’ at the time this court entered its emergency order.”83 But
he cited several examples of physical abuse by house parents at the Crockett girls’ school
and assignments to solitary confinement for varying reasons and lengths at the other
girls’ schools.84
The abuse revelations lent themselves to an obvious Eighth Amendment case
against TYC, but Judge Justice made them serve a broader case for reform. Ultimately
80 Morales 1974, pp. 51-52.
81 Wooden lists some of the offenses and terms served in the STC. “Perhaps the saddest case was of the
young man who was given 32 days for writing ‘I love you’ to a teacher at the school.” Wooden, Weeping
in the Playtime of Others, p. 12.
82 “State Juvenile Incarceration in Texas: An Assessment,” by Howard Ohmart, consultant, in folder 3-19,
Box 1999/085-13, Morales Case Files, Texas Youth Commission, Archives and Information Services
Division, Texas State Library and Archives Commission (henceforth Morales Case Files).
83 Morales 1974, p. 57.
84 Morales 1974, pp. 73-78.
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he argued that the basic problem with the institutions was their lack of professionalism.
He arrived at this conclusion by using the observations of investigators and expert
consultants and incorporating their assumptions. One visible influence was the report of
Alvin Burstein, a professor of psychology who visited the institutions as one of the expert
consultants. Burstein’s report shows how the visiting experts tended to interpret what
they saw and heard. Leading off his summary of his experiences at the Gatesville,
Mountain View, and Gainesville schools, Burstein noted that they had not been built, and
in a sense had never functioned, as actual schools:
First, there is the overwhelming impression of rigidity, sterility, and anonymity of
the institutional life which is imposed upon these children. The dehumanizing
routine, a clear heritage of the penal ancestry of these units, is psychologically
pathogenic, particularly in the case of children whose psychological maturation
depends upon their capacity to form their personal identities on the basis of close,
individual human interaction. At best in these units, children are treated by the
numbers and for administrative convenience, not as growing psychological
organisms.85
The penal heritage of the institutions, Burstein argued, was perpetuated by the power
relations among the institutional staff:
Second, there is a clear split between the clinically and treatment-oriented
professional staff (largely caseworkers) and the attendant staff. The treatment and
educational activities are obviously grafted artificially onto a dominant base of
basically punitive and restrictive policing structures.86
85 Draft report by Alvin Burstein (unsigned), in folder 7-38, Box 1999/085-28, Morales Case Files.
86 Draft report by Burstein, supra note 85.
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The relative powerlessness of teachers and other care providers was one problem.
Another (albeit related) problem, in Burstein’s view, was that the care providers were
incompetent:
Third, the professional preparation of the case workers, psychologists and social
workers is abysmal. Though many of them boast degrees, their actual knowledge
and skills is [sic] at a very, very primitive level. Despite the fact that they are
working with a high-risk population, they bring extremely limited skills to bear.87
Burstein’s specific criticisms of the activities of the professional staff reflected his overall
view of their abilities. Psychiatric treatment was “heavily psychopharmacologic and
would appear more grossly attuned to a psychotic population, with its heavy reliance on
tranquilizing agents.” There was no group therapy, the diagnostic tests used to assess
individual youths were barely understood, and the time served by youths was “largely
contingent on the number of their previous offenses and on their readiness to accept the
discipline of the institution, rather than their needs.”88
Howard Ohmart was less sweepingly dismissive of the professionals employed by
TYC than Burstein, but he identified the same basic institutional failing—the dominance
of guards over other staff. Ohmart’s report to the court, unlike Burstein’s, was almost
entirely analytical rather than anecdotal—with the exception of his recounting of his own
horrified response to the Mountain View Security Treatment Center and the picking line.
Ohmart actually offered qualified praise for the educational resources at Gatesville and
Mountain View, noting the improvements made with federal grant aid. Also, casework
counseling showed signs of improvement at Mountain View, with lower caseloads than at
87 Draft report by Burstein, supra note 85.
88 Draft report by Burstein, supra note 85.
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Gatesville and a pilot program in group counseling under way. But, Ohmert argued,
overall Mountain View served to show “how the effect of some rather good program
elements . . . can largely be nullified because of the punitive, regimented, and oppressive
posture that characterizes the custodial staff operation.” The effect of this “posture” on
life at the institution was not limited to the picking line:
The generally rigid and regimented tone of Mountain View is expressed in other
ways: in the tight group movement of youths as they go from dorm to classroom
or dining hall; in the absence of talk as they wait in line to be fed; in the
requirement that they take off their shoes as they enter upon the shiny, polished
floor of the dayroom in the dorm; in the neatly and tightly made beds, precisely
aligned in the dormitories, which the boys are restricted from entering until
shower and bed-time; in the fact that all personal belongings are locked away in a
separate room and are made available only upon request to the CO [corrections
officer] and clothing room boy; in the loud, harsh, and authoritarian way in which
the Assistant Superintendent barked questions about the youths appearing before
the Discipline Committee.
Ohmert concluded that Mountain View was “an evil, oppressive and authoritarian
operation,” not by default but by design. The reign of terror by uncontrolled,
unconstrained guards was part of the original scheme and had only been reinforced over
the years. Consequently the school was “physically superior to anything in the Gatesville
complex” and had more teachers and social workers per capita, but was nonetheless
“easily the darkest blot on a generally inadequate institutional system.”89
Citing testimony on some of the most outrageous conditions, the plaintiffs and the
amici curiae together moved for emergency interim relief. On August 31, 1973, only a
few days after the end of the trial, Judge Justice issued a preliminary order granting the
89 Draft report by Ohmert, supra note 82.
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requested relief.90 Like the plaintiffs’ motion, Justice’s preliminary order cited a selected
set of conditions, consisting mainly of brutality, abuse, and neglect at Mountain View,
but also including solitary confinement and “security facilities” for disciplinary cases at
the other schools, as well as interception of mail, restrictions on speaking Spanish,
restrictions on visitation policies, and the absence of screening for prospective TYC
employees. What these conditions had in common was not just the urgency of the case
for immediate relief but also the strength of the legal case for their unconstitutionality.
The most shocking of them were all covered by the Eighth Amendment case against
TYC, which was narrower than the “right to treatment” case but established beyond
doubt by the trial record and obviously less vulnerable to appeal. The order did also
assert the “right to treatment” doctrine in a way that suggests that it applied broadly to the
case: “The commitment of juveniles to institutions under conditions and procedures
much less rigorous than those required for the conviction and imprisonment of an adult
offender gives rise to certain limitations upon the conditions under which the state may
confine the juveniles.”91 But Justice invoked this right directly only against a few
conditions, such as the failure to screen employees, segregation “by untrained
correctional officers” of suspected homosexual boys, family visitation restrictions, and
the failure to provide students with an ombudsman. He was willing to use the right to
treatment where necessary to provide the immediate relief he deemed essential, but
mostly reserved the principle for his final ruling. (He struck down the restrictions on
mail and Spanish-speaking on First Amendment grounds.)
90 Morales 1973.
91 Morales 1973, p. 176.
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As it stood, the interim order amounted to a sweeping attack on the customs of
Mountain View, Gatesville, and the other schools. In place of traditional unwritten rules,
it imposed the kind of meticulous regulations that TYC had never composed for itself:
“The use of physical force of any kind by any TYC personnel on any TYC inmates shall
not be permitted except to the extent reasonably necessary (i) in self-defense, (ii) in
defense of third persons, whether TYC inmates or TYC personnel or others, (iii) in
effecting restraint on TYC inmates in the act of escaping, or (iv) to prevent substantial
destruction of property. . . .”92 Inmates were to be allowed to file reports with their
caseworkers alleging any unjustified use of force against them, and superintendents were
required to investigate and report findings within ten days. In the same spirit, Justice
placed restrictions on solitary and other disciplinary confinement, required open
deliberations and written findings for all assignments to Mountain View, and assigned the
chief caseworker at Mountain View to serve as an ombudsman. Family visits “shall be
permitted (1) for at least two hours a day on at least two separate days between Monday
and Friday, inclusive, except holidays; (2) on Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays between
9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m.”93 The final instruction was that three copies of the order itself
were to be posted in every dormitory facility at all the TYC schools, “in a conspicuous
place, preferably a bulletin board near the entrance of the building.”94
Unanticipated consequences of court rulings are an endlessly recurring theme
among histories of litigated penal reform. In the case of the interim Morales ruling, for
once, the political effects were favorable: instead of spurring resistance, as in so many
92 Morales 1973, p. 177.
93 Morales 1973, p. 180.
94 Morales 1973, p. 182.
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other instances, the ruling led to the final collapse of TYC’s old regime. Turman, who
gave a deposition but was never called to the stand to defend TYC, was demoralized by
the trial testimony, and the interim ruling seems to have served as the last straw.95 Two
weeks after the ruling, rioting students at Mountain View destroyed much of the
industrial shop equipment, and over a hundred inmates broke out of the Gatesville
complex. Some observers saw the disorder as reflecting the frustrations of the staff at the
schools, who were reported to have allowed the rampages to continue unchecked.
Turman blamed the riots on Judge Justice and claimed that the ruling’s legalisms had
created confusion among the custodial staff about the actions they could take.
(Curiously, he also maintained that the same court order had clearly incited the students
to riot.) But in the wake of the trial, TYC’s own credibility was too badly damaged for
Turman to be able to turn the issue against the federal court. Governor Dolph Briscoe
told reporters that guards had failed to act because TYC had misinterpreted the ruling.
Several days later, at the next TYC board meeting, longtime chairman Robert Kneebone
was deposed as chair by his two fellow board members, and immediately resigned from
the board. Moments later, at the same meeting, James Turman offered his own
resignation. Whatever he may have felt about the trial revelations, he defended his
employees to the bitter end. “These people have to have support,” Turman said. “When
it comes to the point where they are maligned and abused and their integrity questioned
by a member of the governing board, then it’s time for me to quit.”96
95 Ron Jackson told Frank Kemerer about the trial’s impact on Turman: “It just kept beating him down. He
felt like people had really let him down.” See William Wayne Justice: A Judicial Biography, pp. 159-160.
96 “2 TYC Officials Resign,” Dallas Morning News, 9/22/73.
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For TYC, the ousting of Kneebone and Turman marked a dramatic and genuine
shift. Both of the remaining board members accepted the idea that Texas juvenile justice
needed reform. Pat Ayres, a San Antonio business owner’s wife and civic board
member, had just been appointed by Governor Briscoe. Forrest Smith, a Mobil Oil
executive, who took over as chair after seconding his own nomination (Ayres having
made the motion), had served for four years on the board and had shifted from outspoken
support to troubled skepticism about TYC operations. After the trial confirmed his worst
fears, Smith became an even more emphatic advocate for progressive reform of juvenile
justice. In part his aggressiveness reflected a conviction, at least initially, that he was
carrying out a mission personally entrusted to him by the governor. Briscoe was a
notoriously reclusive and enigmatic character whose intentions were frequently obscure,
but, in late 1974, as Smith spoke in defense of a proposed master plan written by private
consultants, he recalled being given some very straightforward instructions:
The idea of this report was born in Governor Briscoe’s office, one week after the
riot in Gatesville in September, 1973, when the Governor, [two aides], and I were
talking about the problems of the Texas Youth Council, the court order, and what
ought to be done for youth in the State of Texas. He said he wanted a plan
developed for the future of the state that will give Texas the best youth services
delivery system in the United States. He said, “I want to do whatever is necessary
to do it, spend whatever money is necessary to get the best report available, and
the best plan available. I want input from all concerns.” That is the plan we were
operating under.97
97 Minutes of the Texas Juvenile Corrections Master Plan Advisory Meeting, Dec. 4-5, 1974, p. 10, in
folder “Advisory Council minutes, 1974,” Box 2003/030, Records, Texas Youth Commission. Archives
and Information Services Division, Texas State Library and Archives Commission (henceforth TYC
Records).
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After Turman resigned, Smith and Ayres quickly appointed Ron Jackson as acting
executive director. Still only thirty-three years old, Jackson was unique among TYC’s
senior staff in the depth of his experience—as an orphan, he was himself a product of
state institutional care, and had started out at TYC as a janitor while earning his social
work degree—together with his lack of rigid loyalty to customs and traditional attitudes
among the staff. Instinctively sympathetic to the youngsters themselves, rather than their
jailers, he took over the Brownwood school for girls in 1970 and was the one institutional
superintendent who took advantage of Turman’s loose supervision to try to chart a
progressive course for his school. Immediately upon being elevated, Jackson ordered
dozens of changes in TYC policies and procedures, including in areas such as staff
training, use of force, mail, bilingualism, and visitation which Justice had cited.98
Belatedly but abruptly, TYC had come under reform-minded leadership. But
while the sudden transition was obviously a consequence of the court case, the
relationship of the agency leaders to Judge Justice would remain complicated and largely
antagonistic, as long as the Morales case continued. Perceived needs of legal defense as
well as reformist convictions would continue to drive policy. In early 1974, as Justice
prepared his final opinion, state attorneys moved to reopen the case on the grounds that
TYC had already changed the circumstances at issue, which in part explains the urgency
with which Smith and Jackson were acting. As their efforts would show, their
98 See memo titled “Texas Youth Council Programs of Service, Beginning September 1, 1973,” in folder
titled “Innovative Ideas for Change,” Box 1999/085-66, Morales Case Files. This document lists 47 action
items, including “redefinition of policies of use of force” and, even more broadly, “restatement of TYC
goals as the student centered programs and the focus is to be on the individual student” [sic]. The copy of
the memo contains handwritten markings appearing to indicate Jackson’s assignment of particular action
items to individual aides.
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commitment to reform was genuine, but even they could not or would not concede the
legitimacy of federal court oversight.
Judge Justice widened the gap further with his memorandum opinion and order,
published on August 30, 1974. While much of the opinion was devoted to analysis and
documentation of the same conditions cited in the interim order, the fundamental
difference involved its use of the right to treatment. Instead of citing it sparingly, Judge
Justice now seemed to be testing its farthest reaches as a means of forcing fundamental
changes in youth confinement. In part the contrast between the interim and final rulings
seems to reflect a judgment that the legal foundations of the right to treatment were still
under construction and had only just been reinforced. In its ruling (issued April 26,
1974) in Donaldson v. O’Connor, a case arising from an involuntary confinement in a
Florida mental hospital, the Fifth Circuit argued from its own newly constructed
synthesis of the case law supporting the right to treatment.99 Justice cited at length the
new ruling’s two-part formulation of a due-process test: the government must justify any
abridgment of liberty in terms of a legitimate public goal, and it also “must afford a quid
pro quo,” such as rehabilitative treatment, “to warrant the confinement of citizens in
circumstances in which the conventional limitations of the criminal process are
inapplicable.”100 Armed with this far-reaching principle, Justice gave actual legal force
to the expert witnesses’ assessments of TYC conditions and practices. Using these
evaluations, he cited constitutional deficiencies in initial assessment procedures, the
academic and vocational education programs, the “milieu” of daily institutional life,
99 Donaldson v. O’Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated and remanded June 26, 1975.
100 Morales 1974, p. 72.
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medical and psychiatric care, and the care provided by caseworkers. In all these areas,
Justice ruled, TYC wards were constitutionally entitled to procedures and the level of
care prescribed by professional authorities.
The right to treatment thus required the maintenance of many sets of “minimal
professional standards,” which Judge Justice proceeded to formulate in varying degrees
of detail. Several key examples serve to demonstrate the extent of the judge’s assertion
of authority and the extent—and the limits—of his vision of a professionally validated
system of youth confinement. In the area of assessment and placement of incoming
wards, the judge found that the work of TYC’s classification committee was cursory
and—since the range of placement options was so narrow—virtually meaningless
anyway. In this area Judge Justice himself specified the minimally acceptable
professional—therefore constitutional—procedures. Every incoming child “must have
the benefit of an individual assessment, to serve as the basis for his treatment plan. The
plan should include, inter alia, a family history, a developmental history, a physical
examination, psychological testing, a psychiatric interview, community evaluation, and a
language and educational analysis evaluation.” The judge specified minimum
professional credentials for social workers and psychologists conducting the assessment,
and ruled that “the Weschler individualized intelligence quotient test, rather than the
group Lorge-Thorndike IQ test, must be utilized.”101
In most areas, however, Judge Justice defined the minimally acceptable elements
more broadly and left it to the plaintiffs and TYC to work out the implementation of new
procedures. In setting standards for the almost unmanageably broad realm of daily
101 Morales 1974, pp. 85-89.
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institutional life, the judge actually felt compelled to define the “minimal elements” of
the treatment to which juvenile delinquents had the right. They reflected both a view of
adolescent development typical of the period and an uncompromising view of the state’s
obligations to its wards:
A treatment program must aid the youth in achieving “the tasks of adolescence”
that precede his emergence as an independent adult. These tasks include
establishing sexual identity, developing intellectual and occupational skills,
achieving independence from parental authority, developing a capacity for
genuinely intimate relationships, and, finally, evolving a moral code to govern
future actions. Treatment of an adolescent who has tangled with the law or had
difficulties with his family or school authorities must ensure that the juvenile
receives the ingredients that a normal adolescent needs to grow and develop a
healthy mind and body. Because of his often deprived background, the delinquent
needs a more concentrated dose of these normal factors, together with such
intensive or particularized help as special education, therapy, or physical
rehabilitation that he may need. Unless normal needs are met, no special therapy
modality will work, and the treatment program cannot be deemed an adequate
one.
The essential ingredients of normality for a youth are a sense of self-
respect, warm and understanding adults, a chance to participate in decisions that
affect him, adequate diet and recreation, opportunity for adventure and challenge,
and legitimate outlets for tension, anger, and anxiety. In addition, the
environment must promote the juvenile’s feeling of security from fear of physical
and psychological abuse, and provide well-defined limits within which the
juvenile knows his behavior is acceptable. The juvenile must also understand
what is expected from him and what is hoped for him.102
If Justice seemed to display a tendency to define idealized circumstances as “minimal
elements,” the explanation seems to lie in his continuing reliance on the judgments of
expert professionals, who may have felt ethically constrained from drawing a distinction
between what they aspired to provide and what might be “minimally acceptable” under
some other standard. In any case, Justice’s high benchmark for institutional milieu
102 Morales 1974, p. 93.
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served to highlight the deficiencies of the monotonous, regimented, yet insecure life
made possible at Gatesville and Mountain View. It also supported the judge’s emphasis
on the need for integrated efforts on the part of caseworkers and other staff. It did not,
however, lend itself to a comprehensive set of rules precisely crafted by the court. The
particular constitutional rights relating to the daily milieu, as Justice defined them,
remained fairly broad. They included “adequate case work services” by trained social
workers, “a physical plant designed to maximize the child’s security, privacy, and
dignity,” freedom from “unnecessary confinement” and from “unnecessary or arbitrary
invasions of privacy,” and “an environment that permits the juvenile to express—either
verbally or non-verbally—the emotions, such as anger, affection, or unhappiness, that he
may feel, unless the expression is harmful or disruptive.”103 These rights reflected
Justice’s standard of adequate treatment but also that of the least restrictive alternative
among available treatment options, which rested on a separate legal basis.104 The judge
directed the plaintiffs and TYC to work out a plan to secure these rights.
The adequacy of casework and other child care services was itself one more issue
that required attention at length in the ruling, and in dealing with it Judge Justice revealed
the scope of the change he envisioned. The judge made some prescriptions that were
predictable responses to the conditions described by Burstein and Ohmart: social
workers, house parents, and all other child care staff should have adequate professional
credentials, expertise, and training; family involvement in therapy should be promoted
rather than discouraged; and case workers and other types of staffers should coordinate
103 Morales 1974, pp. 100-101.
104 See Morales 1974, p. 125, for a discussion of the right to the least restrictive alternative as it relates to
the requirement to provide treatment in non-institutional settings.
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their efforts rather than working independently or at cross purposes. More significant in
its intended implications was Justice’s view of minimally adequate staff numbers and
caseloads. Child care workers, he stated, “must be employed in numbers that are
consistent with individual attention to every juvenile,” and caseworkers “must be
employed in numbers adequate to provide personalized care to every juvenile, as well as
to furnish competent supervision for all staff members who have contact with juveniles.”
The hardest cases would receive even greater professional attention:
Each juvenile has the right to the implementation of a cohesive treatment strategy
that has been professionally designed to suit his individual needs and achieve his
rehabilitation and return to the community. In this connection, it is essential that
those juveniles who are most emotionally disturbed or who manifest the most
pronounced anti-social attitudes and behavior be the recipients of intensive
treatment. For this purpose, the ratio of psychiatrists, psychologists, caseworkers,
and attendant personnel to the juveniles to be accorded intensive treatment must
be greatly enhanced.105
Again Judge Justice directed the parties to negotiate a plan for the provision of services
that met his stated standards. But by this point the recurring instruction, and the
ostensible presumption that a drastic increase in the intensiveness of treatment could be
one more matter to be worked out between the parties, seems hard for a reader to take
fully seriously. Judge Justice was not nudging TYC to make adjustments. He was trying
to force it to transform itself completely.
In his discussion of the extent of necessary treatment for individual youngsters,
Justice revealingly cited the trial testimony of Jerome Miller. Miller was one of the most
potentially controversial choices of expert witnesses by the plaintiffs in the trial phase.
105 Morales 1974, p. 121.
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By then the former head of the Massachusetts Department of Youth Services, he had
touched off bitter controversy by shutting down the state training schools and moving
almost all the young offenders into small non-secure residential programs within
communities.106 Judge Justice actually had invited Miller personally to come to Texas
and had toured the Mountain View school (and the TYC school for girls at Crockett)
along with him prior to the trial.107 In his long memorandum order and opinion Justice
used Miller’s testimony only a few times, but still managed to imply that
deinstitutionalization in some measure would be an inevitable part of any effort to
implement his order. He cited Miller’s own account of what he had accomplished in
Massachusetts to show that meeting his standards for individualized care was perfectly
feasible:
In the process, the directors of the [Massachusetts] agency discovered that far
fewer children than expected actually required institutional care. Since the
transfer of the vast majority of institutionalized juveniles to less confining
programs freed large amounts of funds, those few juveniles who remain in
intensive care institutions have been “surrounded” by staff. In fact, Dr. Miller
estimated that the staff-inmate ratio at the institutions that remain in
Massachusetts is one to one or higher.108
In his next to last section, as if staging the climax of a long drama, Judge Justice turned
his focus to the Gatesville and Mountain View schools themselves, whose failings had by
now been so thoroughly exposed. Citing observations by both Miller (who had struggled
106 See Rob Wilson, “The Legacy of Jerome Miller,” Corrections Magazine, Sept. 1978, pp. 12-17, for a
brief overview of Miller’s tenure. The Massachusetts General Court Joint Committee on Post Audit and
Oversight issued a harsh condemnation of Miller’s management of deinstitutionalization, reflecting the
general controversy in the state. See “Management Audit of the Department of Youth Services,” April
1974. Miller’s own version of events and response to his critics is contained in Last One Over the Wall:
The Massachusetts Experiment in Closing Reform Schools (Columbus: Ohio State Univ. Press, 1991).
107 See Kemerer, William Wayne Justice, pp. 156-158.
108 Morales 1974, p. 120.
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to reform Massachusetts institutions before closing them) and Ohmart on the
impossibility of uprooting institutional culture, Justice found that the two schools were
“places where the delivery of effective rehabilitative treatment is impossible, and that
they must not be utilized any longer than is absolutely necessary as facilities for
delinquent juveniles.”109 The facilities themselves were both inherently cruel and
unalterably inimical to effective treatment. “No reforms or alterations can rescue these
institutions from their historical excesses.”110 Trying to craft a nuanced position, Justice
denied that “the institutionalization of a juvenile is unconstitutional per se,” but argued
that large, rural institutions serving masses of students and located beyond the reach of
accessible professional services were bound to fail to meet the constitutional standards he
had set forth at such length. In the end he made clear that he expected nothing less than
for Texas to follow the path Massachusetts had traveled:
In summary, Gatesville and Mountain View must be abandoned as quickly as
possible. The court will consider the consensus of parties as to how soon this may
be accomplished. Within a reasonable period . . . the defendants must cease to
institutionalize any juveniles except those who are found by a responsible
professional assessment to be unsuited for any less restrictive, alternative form of
rehabilitative treatment. Additionally, the defendants must within the same period
create or discover a system of community-based treatment alternatives adequate
to serve the needs of those juveniles for whom the institution is not appropriate.
Those juveniles for whom close institutional confinement is necessary must
actually be treated. . . . In particular, those few juveniles for whom close
confinement is appropriate must be surrounded by a staff trained to meet their
special needs, in a virtually one-to-one ratio.111
109 Morales 1974, p. 122.
110 Morales 1974, p. 123.
111 Morales 1974, pp. 126-127.
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Even for advocates of reform within TYC, forced deinstitutionalization by federal
court order was no gift—or at least not one that they could acknowledge. Both Smith and
Jackson denounced the opinion, albeit for significantly different reasons. Smith voiced
the kind of opposition to judicial micromanagement that might be expected from whoever
occupied his position as board chairman. “It is the TYC’s responsibility to set the policy
of the agency and not the court’s,” Smith said. “We have a much better chance of
achieving our goals and obtaining mandatory support of communities and the legislature
if plans are those of the agency, and not those mandated by the court.”112 He made it
clear that his disagreement with Judge Justice was not over the desirability of particular
reforms but simply over the authority and oversight of the court.113 Jackson, however,
was publicly critical of the substance of the ruling. In a statement to the press he accused
Justice of refusing to take TYC’s newly launched reforms into account and cited attacks
on Jerome Miller’s record in Massachusetts. He later made clear that he viewed the
demands of plaintiffs and the court itself as unrealistic.114 More importantly, having only
recently been focused on creating a progressive institution, he was unpersuaded of the
urgency of full deinstitutionalization. “I am not in favor of closing any institution at this
point,” he stated. “We have determined that although they should not be the sole form of
112 Smith quoted by Nadeane Walker, “TYC can meet its goals on its own, Smith says,” Dallas Times
Herald, 9/12/74. Also see citations in Michael J. Churgin, “Mandated Change in Texas: The Federal
District Court and the Legislature,” in Joel F. Handler and Julie Zatz, eds., Neither Angels Nor Thieves:
Studies in the Deinstitutionalization of Status Offenders (Washington: National Academy Press, 1982), pp.
885-886.
113 Smith later told Kemerer that Justice’s ruling “coincided with what I felt ought to be done.” See
William Wayne Justice, p. 170.
114 Describing his meetings with the plaintiffs’ counsel as directed in the court order, and recalling the
plaintiffs’ opening proposal, Jackson told Kemerer, “It was really a wild plan, calling for the immediate
closure of Gatesville and Mountain view, the scaling down of other institutions, the placement of kids in
foster care programs that were not in existence across the state—proposals that we didn’t feel comfortable
with.” See William Wayne Justice, p. 168. In fact, the parts of this “wild plan” were basically what Smith
himself was trying to facilitate.
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treatment for the juvenile offender, institutions are a necessary form of treatment for
many.”115 After meeting with TYC officials, the Texas attorney general’s office
announced it was appealing the ruling. Resistance to direction by the federal court would
continue to drive the council’s policy.
The decision by Smith in particular to support the state’s appeal, and keep fending
off Judge Justice, may have been all but automatic at the time, but in retrospect it appears
fateful. Smith later recalled that he “used the court order as an impetus for change in the
juvenile justice system statewide.”116 He nevertheless fought the court’s assertion of
authority over his own domain, and his opposition also seems likely to have been a means
of maintaining his own bona fides in a state political climate which was always generally
hostile to federal intervention. Overall, Smith’s apparent strategy—taking advantage of
federal court pressure to push for reform while using the same court as a political foil—
seems flawed in its basic conception, even if it accounted for political realities that
escaped Judge Justice’s notice. Jackson’s approach seems less conflicted, but only
because he lacked a commitment to the radical transformation envisioned by Justice and
Smith.
The basic problem for juvenile justice reformers in Texas, and for the aspirations
they generally shared, was that they could not find ways to work together, or at least to
support each other’s efforts. The necessity of doing so, for their own purposes, seems to
have gone unrecognized, perhaps in part because deinstitutionalization appeared to be
occurring on its own, driven by factors beyond TYC’s own control. The average daily
115 Jackson quoted in Mark Villanueva, “Youth Council To Appeal Ruling,” Daily Texan, Sept. 6, 1974.
116 Kemerer, William Wayne Justice, p. 170.
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population of TYC training schools, which had remained slightly over 2,000 for over a
decade, dropped by half, to a total of 994, from 1973 to 1974. Suddenly the Gatesville
complex, which had long housed the majority of inmates in the system, contained no
more than some six hundred youths. As for Mountain View, TYC staff had virtually
ceased making commitments to the facility, whose daily average over the two years went
from 311 to 70 inmates.117 For the system, the leading factor in the sudden decline was
the newly mandated exclusion of “status offenders” (whose minor offenses, such as
truancy, running away, or underage drinking, followed from their status as juveniles), as
the revised Family Code enacted in 1973 came into force. At the same time, years of bad
publicity about TYC, climaxing in the Morales trial and rulings, had evidently come to
outweigh the normal inclination of local juvenile judges to expel problem youths from
local communities. But neither of these factors would persist for long, or offer more than
a respite from population pressures.118
Smith’s own campaign for juvenile justice reform was ambitious and appears to
have been carefully conceived, but it ultimately proved quixotic. Asserting responsibility
not simply for the training schools but for bringing about the shift from institutional
confinement to community-based care, he aggressively sought to initiate the process
under TYC’s management. He and Pat Ayres together maintained a majority of the
three-member TYC board (which was expanded to six members in 1975), although they
were opposed by Don Workman, another recent Briscoe appointee to the board and a
117 Average daily population figures listed in Texas Youth Council Annual Report for 1974, p. 67.
118 In the 1975 session of the Legislature, the new code was amended to allow once again for the
confinement of status offenders, or CHINs (children in need of supervision) under certain restrictions,
which were loosened further in 1977. See Churgin, “Mandated Change in Texas,” pp. 880-881.
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highly conservative West Texas banker. Over Workman’s staunch objections, Smith and
Ayres passed a formal budget request to the upcoming 1975 Legislature that contained,
on top of existing operations, $30 million in new funds for TYC to grant to community
programs.119 The request for funds was obviously ambitious, but Smith had done some
work to prepare the way for it. As his self-described conversation with Governor Briscoe
indicates, he had used the governor’s endorsement early on to try to obtain a planning
document that would guide reform efforts and give them legitimacy and prestige. After
this conversation, the details of which Smith was presumably willing to share generously,
he was able to obtain planning funds from the governor’s office and hired outside
consultants to draft a new master plan for statewide juvenile corrections. In addition to
showing TYC how it could manage the reassignment of responsibilities for juvenile
services to local agencies, the master planning process was intended to mobilize support
for the task and the appropriations that it would require. Before being formally presented
to TYC the master plan itself was to be considered and endorsed by a blue-ribbon
advisory council.
Insofar as it was designed to yield solid support for Smith’s budget request, the
master planning process ended up running off its rails, which suggests the difficulty of
the political maneuvering that Smith was attempting to manage. At first the process
seems to have gone as he intended. An initial draft of the master plan was reviewed by
the advisory committee in September 1974. According to one report, this version of the
plan would, “as Justice ordered, phase down TYC’s institutional program and initiate a
wide variety of community-based services. TYC would become a provider of services
119 Minutes, TYC board meeting, 12/4/74, Box 1998/213-1, TYC Records.
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rather than a builder of institutions, a concept favored by Chairman Forrest Smith.”120 In
fact, the consultants envisioned TYC as both direct provider and grant-maker for
community services. Instead of closing down the training schools entirely, TYC would
continue to operate them as facilities serving new specialized-care functions, and it would
also maintain a corps of “youth development agents” working directly with troubled teens
to preempt delinquency. But “perhaps the major innovation” would be the grant
program, with which TYC would enable counties to develop their own residential and
non-residential programs for young offenders.121
For all his determination to maintain TYC’s leadership of the march toward
community-based corrections, Smith appears to have remained sensitive to the need to
empower local officials and providers to take the initiative in developing community
programs for themselves, both for the sake of the programs themselves and for purposes
of maintaining their support for deinstitutionalization. He, as much as anyone, seems to
have been blindsided by the final draft of the master plan, as submitted to the advisory
council and debated in early December. The consultants appear to have been advised by
Smith and other council members to emphasize local responsibilities for organizing youth
services, but their final plan left the redesigned TYC, with its “youth development
agents,” with much of the task of working with youngsters and providing skills
training.122 Robert Carkhuff, the lead consultant, took a dim view of “communities that
have not been delivering services” and said that turning over responsibilities to them
120 Sara Lee Tiede, “TYC urges shift from confinement to rehabilitation,” Dallas Times Herald, 9/29/74.
121 Tiede, “TYC urges shift.” Also see Mike Ullmann and Vicki Vaughn, “Youth Council Views
Delinquent Care Plan,” Daily Texan, 9/30/74.
122 See State of Texas Juvenile Corrections Master Plan, prepared by Carkhuff Associates, 11/25/74.
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“would be giving them more of what they are not now doing.” He told the advisory
committee that his firm had been “trying to design an effective program, not just a
practical, politically viable program.”123 It proved not to be a very practical or politically
viable message to offer to the advisory council, whose members, one by one, all spoke
against and vented no small amount of frustration. Smith, sitting in on the meeting along
with many others, voiced his own misgivings about Carkhuff’s approach and tried to
reassure the advisory council that TYC would endorse no plan that did not meet with
their consensus approval. He urged the council to pass a motion endorsing the
amendment of the master plan so that state funds would be used for grants to local and
regional authorities rather than direct care programs. (Workman, who opposed
deinstitutionalization, then complained that Smith was trying to “coerce” the advisory
committee.) Smith’s motion passed, and was duly sent back to him in the advisory
committee’s report to TYC, but the impact was clearly not what he had hoped for. Press
coverage of the advisory council meeting were devoted almost entirely to the council
members’ complaints about Carkhuff’s plan.124
Even with a more ringing endorsement by an advisory council of influential
supporters, Smith’s ambitious program would have faced a lengthy gauntlet in the
Legislature. As it turned out, it went down to a quick defeat before the Legislative
Budget Board, the first high hurdle in the biennial appropriations process. The LBB’s
recommended budget for TYC did not zero out the figure for community services, but cut
123 Minutes of the Texas Juvenile Corrections Master Plan Advisory Meeting, Dec. 4-5, 1974, p. 33, in
folder “Advisory Council minutes, 1974,” Box 2003/030, TYC Records.
124 See Sara Lee Tiede, “Youth Council master plan attacked by entire citizens advisory group,” Dallas
Times Herald, 12/5/74.
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it from $30 million to $9 million. Perhaps even more woundingly, the Executive Budget
Board, which prepared the governor’s own proposals, put the figure at just $3 million,
signaling all too clearly the extent of Briscoe’s continued support for Smith’s work. At
the TYC board meeting in Feburary 1975, Smith bitterly acknowledged the political
implications:
This recommendation was a victory to those who have opposed the Texas Youth
Council moving into new areas of interest. Because of criticism alluding to not
building support and good programs properly and spending too much too soon,
these recommendations have been made. . . . This should be considered defeat. I
am saddened and disturbed because of this. It looks as if they were totally
ignorant of the fact that TYC is up against the gun in the Court; clearly the
Federal Court is moving us toward community-based programs. . . . The
Governor’s staff turned us down because they don’t have confidence that we
could do this and spend money wisely. That seems that this agency [sic] can’t be
managed as far as they are concerned. TYC cannot reach where it needs to go
with this budget, possibly with the LBB, but I doubt it. The minimum would be
around $15,000,000 or $16,000,000 in community based efforts to make the kind
of impact the State of Texas needs.125
Smith had trouble accepting the outcome, even as he recognized it. How could it only
amount to this, when the theme of moving from institutions to community-based care had
gained such broad acceptance? Everyone knew about the Court ruling, which was being
appealed but still hung over TYC’s head. Smith had made his own policy intentions, and
those of his board majority, clear all along. “The editorials are ten to one in favor of the
new direction of TYC. The Advisory Council is in favor of the new direction. . . . Who
is not getting the word? Where have we failed to communicate?” Perhaps they could
still prevail, notwithstanding the budget board recommendations: “Our next course of
action is to do what we can to tell our story to the Legislature. Ron, that is your job. You
125 Minutes, TYC board meeting, 2/5/75, p. 18, Box 1998/213-2, TYC Records.
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are there daily. I will consider this to be a failure if this is all we get.”126 But Jackson
had no intention of being made into a scapegoat. Neither he nor his staff, he insisted,
were creating the problem. “We are going to work as hard as we can to sell this program.
I hope that there is not any doubt about this.” But, he argued, $9 million was still a
substantial sum, on top of other appropriations for parole services and the TYC central
office. “I feel that this is good support. I hope it is not considered a failure on our part if
TYC doesn’t receive its request.”127 Ultimately, due to the work of Jackson and his staff
and with the help of legislators sympathetic to the idea of reform, TYC was able to
salvage a $9 million appropriation for community services.
The final passage of the line item was an important but mixed outcome. The
Legislature did not reject the whole idea of continued reform, but it would not give a
single state agency the money and power to force a transformation of youth corrections.
Instead, it would give TYC a small amount of money to use to promote reform gradually.
Smith himself, together with the more ambitious goals with which he had identified
himself, was most clearly the victim, and the outcome fully exposed his lack of higher
connections and influence. “When I lost the support of the governor, I also lost the
support of Ron Jackson,” he later recalled. “I became chairman in name only.”128 With
his six-year term expiring in 1975, Smith waged an unsuccessful battle to persuade
Briscoe to reappoint him to the board. Instead, the governor picked W. M. Shamburger,
the conservative pastor of the First Baptist Church in Tyler, a prominent critic of Smith’s
126 Minutes, TYC board meeting, 2/5/75, p. 20.
127 Minutes, TYC board meeting, 2/5/75, p. 35.
128 Kemerer, William Wayne Justice, p. 170.
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efforts.129 The immediate impact of this appointment was actually very modest because
even a more conservative board had little power to turn back the clock, as long as it
remained likely to have to comply with Judge Justice’s orders. But after the departure of
the strongest advocate of deinstitutionalization ever to lead the TYC board, the
possibilities for reform remained permanently narrowed.
In the aftermath of the Morales trial and Judge Justice’s rulings, at the point of
broadest general acceptance of the prospect of deinstitutionalization, the basic conflict
between institutional administrators (or at least those committed to providing care and
treatment) and local juvenile judges was temporarily obscured. As long as judges were
unwilling (or, for some offenders in newly restricted categories, unable) to condemn
youths to the horrors of Gatesville, or as long as they at least shared the perception that
shifting placements to programs within the community represented social progress, then
they could be expected to accept—and perhaps support—plans such as Smith’s which
would offer access to new program funds. TYC’s role as the source of state funds seems
not to have posed a necessary problem as long as the judges and the TYC board shared
the same broad priorities, and as long as TYC’s role involved approving grant-in-aid
proposals by local authorities and providers (as Smith himself had intended) rather than
providing services directly. But Jackson, and other advocates of reform more “moderate”
than Smith, seem not to have fully appreciated that if the network of state institutions was
maintained, and if local alternatives to institutional commitment were not developed soon
129 Smith organized a campaign of supportive letters from his statewide network of allies and friends,
including none other than W. A. Criswell, the pastor of First Baptist Church in Dallas. But Briscoe also
received letters from Gatesville residents and others who opposed the idea of broad deinstitutionalization,
including Workman and Shamburger himself. See folder “Youth Council, Texas (appointments),” Box
172, Dolph Briscoe Papers, Center for American History, The University of Texas at Austin.
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enough and on a sufficient scale, population pressures would inevitably resurface.
Eventually this would become all too clear, and Jackson, who had insisted on the
continuing need for institutional care, would struggle to keep the institutional population
low. The failure to achieve deinstitutionalization with the judges’ support, while it lasted,
implied the likelihood of reinstitutionalization in the long term.
Judge Justice’s ruling promised to preempt this likelihood, if its terms could be
enforced. Yet, to the detriment of his own reform goals, Smith’s most effective course of
action as TYC chair was his legal response to the main Morales ruling. The appeal that
he authorized ultimately yielded a reversal ruling by the Fifth Circuit in July 1976.130
The appellate judges avoided considering the conditions Justice had painstakingly
documented and focused narrowly on the technical issue of whether the Morales case had
been subject to a law requiring the constitutionality of state statutes to be decided by a
three-judge district court panel. The Texas state lawyers had argued this issue during the
trial, and in his memorandum opinion Judge Justice explained at length that the unwritten
rules, unrecorded policies, and prevailing institutional conditions of TYC did not follow
from any particular statute and thus were not subject to the three-judge rule.131 But the
5th Appeals Court judges contended that “despite the fact that many of these programs
and policies have not been reduced to writing or otherwise formalized,” the plaintiffs had
nevertheless “launched an exhaustive attack on a set of practices and policies which,
taken as a whole, constitute Texas' statewide program for dealing with juvenile
130 Morales v. Turman, 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976) (henceforth Morales 1976).
131 Morales 1974, Section III, “Necessity for a Three-Judge Court.”
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delinquents.”132 Moreover, they argued, the far-reaching, detailed requirements Justice
sought to impose were “precisely [the] type of thoroughgoing disruption of a state's
autonomous implementation of its own legislative and administrative policies that
warrants the added deliberation and procedural protection provided by the three-judge
court statute.”133 On these grounds, the court reversed the whole decision and remanded
the case.
The Fifth Circuit’s own argument proved vulnerable to further appeal. But, by
one means or another, TYC and the state attorneys were increasingly determined to bring
the case back before the district court. The problem for the plaintiffs, and for Judge
Justice, was that the case law pertaining to the “right to treatment” had developed,
subsequently to the 1974 Morales ruling, in a way which made it much less likely that it
could support the weight that the judge had placed on it if the case was to be retried.
Most critically, the Supreme Court had actually reversed the Fifth Circuit’s decision in
Donaldson v. O’Connor, which had played such a vital role in Justice’s opinion.134
Trying to save the original ruling, the Morales plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court,
which in March 1977 reversed the Fifth Circuit’s ruling, basically affirmed Justice’s
argument, and remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit.135
132 Morales 1976, pp. 21-22.
133 Morales 1976, p. 25.
134 See O’Connor v. Donaldson, 95 S.Ct. 2486 (1975). Justice Potter Stewart’s majority opinion actually
did not deny the right to treatment as developed in the Fifth Circuit’s opinion, but argued that the case
actually involved constitutionally impermissible involuntary confinement, regardless of whether treatment
was provided. Only in a concurring opinion by Chief Justice Warren Burger, writing for himself, did the
Court confront whether the right to treatment was valid. Burger’s attack on the principle must have
counted for less than the simple fact that the Fifth Circuit’s ruling was no longer in effect.
135 Morales v. Turman, 97 S.Ct. 1189 (1977).
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But this time, the appellate judges proved receptive to the other main part of
TYC’s legal strategy: the reforms that Smith and Jackson had set in motion, and which
Jackson had by then pursued further, as detailed at length in the supplemental brief filed
by the defendants. The circuit judge suggested that Justice might have erred in failing to
grant TYC’s request to present additional evidence prior to issuing the 1974 ruling. But,
after three more years, “those considerations which should have led to a reopening of the
record in 1974 in the District Court have grown stronger with the additional passage of
time. All of the arguments for permitting the state to show a change in circumstances
continue to apply with greater force today.”136 What gave the arguments greater force
was not just the passage of time, but also TYC’s own claimed accomplishments since
1973, as cited by the circuit judge:
Significant changes have allegedly taken place in the TYC's treatment of youths.
Noninstitutional settings for the care of juveniles has been emphasized to the
extent that the declining institutional population has resulted in the state's closing
three of the facilities at Gatesville and transferring the Mountain View facility, a
major focus in the initial trial, to the Texas Department of Corrections. For those
students who are still institutionalized new programs have been developed. For
example, for those youths whose evaluation indicates the need for developing
self-reliance TYC operates a therapeutic wilderness camp that includes both
survival skills and academic instruction. For all juveniles in its care TYC is
developing a treatment program that will develop living, learning and working
skills. New staff members, often members of minority groups, have been hired to
help implement these programs.137
Of course all these claims remained “allegations,” and whether they were true and
reflected a transformation of institutional life that addressed all constitutional issues was
(ostensibly) not for the circuit court to determine. But they were enough to require a
136 Morales v. Turman, 562 F.2d 993 (1977), p. 996.
137 Morales v. Turman, 562 F.2d 993 (1977), pp. 997-998.
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reopening of the case: “They do indicate a new atmosphere within TYC which makes
such conduct unlikely and suggest that further inquiry into the current conditions of these
institutions should be made.”138 Finally, having set forth the rationale for remanding the
case, the circuit judge noted the “difficulties” with the theory of the right to treatment and
pronounced it “doubtful.” Any remaining violations being committed by TYC must
come under the Eighth Amendment standard.139
Through the appeals process, the state succeeded in transforming the nature of the
Morales case and its significance. The case was now narrowed to Eighth Amendment
issues, allowing for the consideration of many aspects of institutional life but setting
aside the question of treatment itself—let alone the high standards of treatment Judge
Justice had sought to specify, and the consequent restrictions upon institutionalization
itself. Along with Smith’s departure from the TYC board, the final remand of the case by
the Fifth Circuit marked the passing of the opportunity for deinstitutionalization of youth
justice in Texas. Even so, the case remained before Judge Justice’s district court, and the
judge remained committed to seeing it resolved. New discovery and other preparations
for retrial were conducted, but with the judge’s encouragement the plaintiffs and TYC
began working out the details of a settlement. These results of the appellate litigation
seem a victory most of all for Jackson, always an advocate of reforming but maintaining
institutional care. The appellate judges had neatly removed the district court’s pressure
for broader change while retaining its pressure for the kinds of reforms Jackson himself
sought—the amelioration and improvement of institutional life. As the appeals court
138 Morales v. Turman, 562 F.2d 993 (1977), p. 998.
139 Morales v. Turman, 562 F.2d 993 (1977), p. 999.
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ruling showed, Jackson could persuasively cite legal justifications for pursuing the kinds
of reforms he wished to institute anyway. With the court’s discretion now scaled back,
he was able to make the litigation serve his own limited purposes—for a limited time. In
his own way Jackson himself seems to have believed in a right to treatment for youths,
but not one which would leave control over care in the hands of a federal court.
An increasingly critical part of Jackson’s strategy was the program of support for
community services that TYC developed, beginning with the $9 million biennial
appropriation it was able to obtain in 1975. As Jackson’s cool response to Smith’s
frustration has indicated, he was willing to accept the paring back of the original budget
request that reflected Smith’s hopes. But Jackson was nevertheless no opponent of
community-based services and alternatives to institutional placement per se. He
routinely affirmed the idea that TYC should support a full range (or “spectrum”) of
services for troubled youth, institutional and otherwise.140 For Jackson, as well as the
TYC board members, TYC’s support for community alternatives in fact began to play a
crucial role, as commitments by juvenile judges began to rebound from their Morales-
period lows.141 From the very beginning of TYC’s Community Assistance Program, as
staff members developed funding criteria and procedures, the program sought to facilitate
community placements not simply for their own sake, but as a way of reducing the flow
of new commitments—a power which TYC and the training schools had always lacked in
140 See Jackson quotes in “Texas: A State that Bucks the Trend,” Corrections Magazine, September 1978,
pp. 23-28.
141 Dr. Stan Pinder reported in September 1976 that “the reputations of our institutional treatment programs
have also improved and the Youth Council is now seeing a consistent 20% increase in commitments which
has been underway for 27 months.” See “Final Report of 1976 Community Assistance Program,” TYC
files, George J. Beto Papers, Thomasson Room, Newton Gresham Library, Sam Houston State University.
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the past.142 Instead of simply allocating program funds to regions or local governments
based on population, TYC developed a funding formula that weighed the rate of
commitments by county authorities to TYC over the preceding ten years, and also the
number of new commitments made in the course of a year by a county above or below a
“base commitment rate.”143 The purpose was to try to direct available funds to counties
that both needed the assistance and were successfully using it to divert offenders. The
board even added a requirement that grantees answer the question “By how many will
implementation of this grant reduce commitments to the Texas Youth Council you’re
your area, as compared with last year’s commitment rate?”144
Perhaps inevitably, TYC’s effort to tailor community assistance to its own needs
stirred an uproar among juvenile judges—including some who had supported TYC’s
funding request before the Legislature—and county probation officers. With a relatively
limited amount of grant funds available to offer, TYC appears to have cost itself more in
terms of influence by invading the perceived prerogatives of local judiciaries than it
gained by providing the funds. One county judge, notifying TYC of his county’s
withdrawal from the assistance program, complained that the system “penalizes those
counties who have previously instigated good services and rewards those counties who
142 See remarks of Dr. Stan Pinder, Director of Community Services, in minutes, TYC board meeting, June
24, 1975, pp. 16-18, Box 1998/213-1, Records, Texas Youth Commission. Archives and Information
Services Division, Texas State Library and Archives Commission. Pinder is quoted as explaining that the
program he was charged with developing would have as its purpose “to assist local communities in the
reduction and prevention of juvenile delinquency,” which (at least according to the minutes transcript)
would be accomplished by contracting with local public and private service providers, “diverting youth
from the juvenile justice system, and reducing commitments to TYC.”
143 See Texas Youth Council Annual Report for 1975. Also explanation in letter, Stan Pinder to Hon.
Leonard J. Giblin, Jr., 7/13/76, pp. 4-5, TYC files, George J. Beto Papers, Thomasson Room, Newton
Gresham Library, Sam Houston State University.
144 Minutes, TYC board meeting, Nov. 20, 1975, p. 6.
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have not accepted their responsibility,” and also that it “puts a quota on the Judge as to
the number and type of decisions that he may make, which is completely adverse to the
inherent powers of the Court to perform its function.”145 A reply letter written by Stan
Pinder, the TYC staffer who devised and administered the Community Assistance
Program, complained that “several Chief Juvenile Probation Officers in the state have
made criticisms of TYC so vocally to so many individuals and organizations about
everything TYC has ever done or is attempting to do at this time.”146 Pinder insisted that
other county officials appreciated TYC’s support, but clearly few if any of them could be
expected to support TYC’s control over state funding over time. Governor Briscoe
registered his own responsiveness to TYC’s critics by refusing to release a portion of the
appropriated funds for community assistance for a period of months, claiming that the
effectiveness of the experimental program had yet to be demonstrated, and effectively
forcing TYC to cut back many of its planned grants during its first year of operation.147
All this controversy bought TYC a very small number of diversions, at least in the first
year. TYC was able to make small grants to sixteen county probation departments and
several local private juvenile facilities. At the end of fiscal 1976, Pindar compared
commitment rates from counties before and after the grant disbursements and estimated
that the community assistance had diverted a total of some 37 commitments.148
145 Letter, Leonard J. Giblin, Jr. (county judge, Jefferson County), to Ron Jackson, 7/2/76, TYC files,
George J. Beto Papers, Thomasson Room, Newton Gresham Library, Sam Houston State University.
146 Letter, Stan Pinder to Hon. Leonard J. Giblin, Jr., 7/13/76, p. 8, TYC files, George J. Beto Papers,
Thomasson Room, Newton Gresham Library, Sam Houston State University.
147 For an explanation of Briscoe’s attempted impoundment of appropriated funds, see Molly Ivins,
“Briscoe and the TYC funds,” Texas Observer, 3/12/76, pp. 1, 3, and Randy Fitzgerald, “About those TYC
funds,” Texas Observer, 7/2/76, p. 7. Pindar noted the exact impact on TYC grant disbursements in “Final
Report of 1976 Community Assistance Program,” p. 3.
148 “Final Report of 1976 Community Assistance Program,” attached table.
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Jackson and the TYC board appear to have hoped that by successfully
administering a community assistance program over time, they could build enough
credibility that larger appropriations would follow in the future.149 But, somewhat like
Smith’s previous effort to take advantage of Justice’s ruling while opposing it, TYC’s
strategy of building up a grant program under its control while alienating many of its
intended beneficiaries seems to have been doomed by its own flawed conception. If
Smith could not win a larger appropriation when TYC had the support of most local
juvenile justice officials, then the agency was presumably unlikely to prevail in the future
over the objections of its former allies. By 1978, as proposals circulated for restructuring
of state funding for juvenile justice and probation assistance, juvenile judges and
probation officers had organized to demand their own dedicated source of state grant
funding separate from TYC’s control.150 In the ensuing legislative session Jackson
worked with one of his most powerful allies, Lieutenant Governor Bill Hobby, who
refused to allow a vote on the juvenile judges’ bill in the closing hours of the session.
The judges, including the reform-minded former senator Criss Cole, were further
outraged, and during the following interim period between general sessions TYC appears
to have given up the fight.151 In 1981, the Legislature quietly passed the creation of a
149 Shortly before being forced off the board, Forrest Smith actually stated this view on behalf of the
council as a whole, defending the council’s efforts against objections from a local judge: “Mr. Smith
explained that the Texas Youth Council recognizes that the Community Assistance allocation is a small
amount and cannot possibly meet all the needs in the communities. However, if TYC demonstrates that
these funds can be utilized effectively, it is hoped that the Legislature will allocate more funds during the
next biennium.” Minutes, TYC board meeting, August 26, 1975, p. 4.
150 See Report to the Senate of the 66th Legislature by the Interim Subcommittee on Juvenile Crime,
1/17/79.
151 See letter, Criss Cole to William P. Hobby, 6/1/79, in folder “Juvenile Probation Commission,” Box
1991/068-30, Records of William Pettus Hobby, Jr., Texas Office of the Lieutenant Governor, Archives
and Information Services Division, Texas State Library and Archives Commission.
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Texas Juvenile Probation Commission, to which TYC’s Community Assistance Program
was transferred in full.
Jackson, working with general counsel Neil Nichols and with the TYC board, was
considerably more successful in his handling of the Morales case as it finally concluded.
Charles Sandmann, the longtime plaintiffs’ counsel, later said he had concluded that,
given the narrowing of the case, “the institutions had improved enough that we could not
win another lawsuit.”152 For his part, Jackson was sympathetic to virtually all of the
original goals of the plaintiffs that did not involve deinstitutionalization or the loss of
TYC’s authority over its institutions. In the settlement negotiations, TYC largely
accommodated the plaintiffs’ demands for detailed standards for many of the issues
contained in the original litigation, such as classification, employee training, regulation of
use of force and other disciplinary measures, and even the provision of educational
programs and treatment services. The sticking point for the state was the way in which
its compliance with the agreement’s terms would be enforced. On this question Judge
Justice was actually more insistent than the plaintiffs’ attorneys themselves. When
Sandmann and TYC officials completed their negotiations in early 1983 and submitted
the draft settlement for the court’s approval, Justice actually rejected it, on the grounds
that the enforcement provisions were too weak.153 Viewing Sandmann as overly inclined
to accommodate TYC on this point, he actually forced the plaintiffs’ attorneys to raise
their monitoring demands by threatening to appoint an additional independent counsel to
152 Kemerer, William Wayne Justice, p. 175.
153 See initial proposed settlement agreement, 3/3/83, and Kemerer, William Wayne Justice, p. 175.
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represent the plaintiff class.154 Unwilling to leave enforcement of a contractual
agreement in the hands of a state court, he also rejected a revised agreement that included
an expert panel of monitors, on the grounds that the panel was insufficiently funded.
“This is very important litigation,” he told both parties, “and I don’t propose to see it go
down the drain.”155 Jackson, as he later acknowledged, was indeed seeking to limit the
extent to which enforcement arrangements would restrict TYC’s freedom of action, but in
the end he could live with some monitoring.156 The version of the settlement that Justice
finally approved on April 16, 1984, which brought an end to the litigation of the Morales
case, provided sufficient funds for an expert panel to monitor and report on TYC’s
compliance for four years.157
At the time, the end of the litigation was cited by all parties as a major
accomplishment. For Ron Jackson and for TYC, freeing the agency from the mandate of
the federal court was an accomplishment that stood in sharp contrast to the failed
resistance and continuing struggles of the Texas Department of Corrections, then still
mired in the Ruiz case. Justice also expressed satisfaction at the final resolution of the
case, and how far TYC had come in the years since the trial.158 Despite the reversal of
his 1974 ruling, the ruling was widely hailed and cited as a catalyst for progressive court-
154 Kemerer offers a particularly lucid and revealing explanation of how Justice forced the strengthening of
the plaintiffs’ position, and the monitoring provisions of the settlement he finally approved, in William
Wayne Justice, pp. 175-179.
155 Kemerer, William Wayne Justice, p. 175.
156 Kemerer records Jackson’s acknowledgement of the logic underlying Justice’s objections: “It was, I
think, the money issue. They couldn’t adequately monitor the settlement agreement. And that was our
strategy. We didn’t want them monitoring. And he caught it immediately.” William Wayne Justice, p.
177.
157 Morales v. Turman, Second Amended Settlement Agreement, and Order Approving Second Amended
Settlement Agreement, 4/16/84.
158 Justice formally acknowledged that “conditions have so much improved within the Texas Youth
Commission that substantial injunctive relief is no longer a likely result of a trial on the merits.” See Order
Approving Second Amended Settlement Agreement.
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induced change.159 His satisfaction with the monitoring arrangements, for which the
plaintiffs engaged a team of expert academics in juvenile development, appears as one
more sign of his commitment to professional authority as a source of legal standards
which could effectively secure people’s rights. But by comparison with the standard-
setting that the right to treatment had allowed him to pursue, it was a cramped vision of
reform that he now embraced, reflecting a professional consensus that was itself
chastened by countervailing legal and political currents.
Most critically for TYC, victory in limiting and ending judicial oversight, together
with loss of leverage over local jurisdictions and community placements, left all of
Jackson’s other priorities—most of all the maintenance of limits on institutional capacity,
so that the quality and intensiveness of institutional services could be maintained—fully
at the mercy of local authorities and whatever broader factors would impact their
commitment rates. By the early 1990s, when rising juvenile crime rates helped drive a
dramatic rise in commitments, TYC was unable to prevent overcrowding, unable to
maintain the minimum lengths of stay that its educational and rehabilitative curricula
required, and unable to retain its own credibility as an agency advocating care over
punishment. Its forced embrace of expanded institutional capacity and a return to harsh
discipline as a theme of daily life were seen as reflections of a more punitive public
climate, but they also reflected the weaknesses and failures of professionally guided,
judicially induced reform.
159 Kemerer cites the use of Justice’s ruling as a basis for standards written by national juvenile correctional
professional organizations at William Wayne Justice, p. 181.
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Chapter 5
To Do No Harm: Medicine and the Death Penalty in England and Texas
The “medicalization” of the death penalty, by the 1990s and early 2000s, was
both a well-developed part of ongoing practice and a leading theme of the perennial
debate surrounding the practice. Spurred by legislative debates and continuing litigation
over the use of legal injection, advocates of abolition brought greater publicity to the
extent of physician participation in the carrying out of executions and the acquiescence in
this degree of involvement by the medical profession more generally.1 Physicians and
medical ethicists contributed their own reflections on this issue, sometimes noting the
failure of the profession as a whole to constrain effectively its individual members.2
State medical associations and the AMA all proscribed the involvement of doctors in
putting condemned prisoners to death, but in almost all cases the rules were intended
1 See American College of Physicians et al, Breach of Trust: Physician Participation in Executions in the
United States (published March 1994); Robert G. Truog and Troyen N. Brennan, “Participation of
Physicians in Capital Punishment,” New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 329, No. 18 (Oct. 28, 1993),
pp. 1346-1350; Amnesty International, Lethal Injection: The Medical Technology of Execution (published
Jan. 1998); and Human Rights Watch, So Long As They Die: Lethal Injections in the United States, Vol.
18, No. 1(G) (April 2006).
2 Key recent examples include Atul Gawande, “When Law and Ethics Collide—Why Physicians
Participate in Executions,” New England Journal of Medicine, Vol. 354, No. 12 (3/23/06), pp. 1221-1229;
and Peter A. Clark, “Physician Participation in Executions: Care Giver or Executioner?” Journal of Law,
Medicine, and Ethics, spring 2006), pp. 95-104. The debate within medicine, which had continued to brew
since the introduction of lethal injection, was stimulated further by questions newly raised regarding the
specific procedures employed. See Leonidas G. Koniaris et al, “Inadequate anaesthesia in lethal injection
for execution,” The Lancet, Vol. 365 (4/16/05), pp. 1412-1414, and the related editorial in the same issue,
“Medical collusion in the death penalty: an American atrocity,” p. 1361.
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mainly to protect the associations themselves from being linked to the practice, rather
than to ensure that no doctors were involved.3
Critics of medicalized execution protocols implied that the development
compromised medical ethics in disturbing new ways, linking it to a broader narrative of
professional decline. In fact, the history of the death penalty in modern Western
civilization was always connected to the history of medicine in various ways, and the fate
of capital punishment in the 20th century was no exception to the rule. While
contemporary medical techniques for determining criminal responsibility and executing
condemned criminals might be new in their particular details, in a larger sense they are
neither unprecedented nor unanticipated within the medical, legal, and political realms.
The same kinds of advances in professional knowledge, and the same kinds of
professional organizations, could serve to promote capital punishment in one historical
context and to help abolish it in another.
While the identification of Texas as the death penalty capital of America usually
rests on its disproportionately large share of executions carried out, the claim also has a
strong historical basis. The state was the first to perform a lethal injection, and it
developed methods and protocols which others would also employ (including the use of
the hospital gurney and other mimicry of medical procedures). Less heavily publicized
(although still notorious, and perhaps equally important) was the state’s pioneering use of
psychiatric testimony in sentencing convicted defendants to the gurney. In part because
3 Some years after lethal executions had been initiated, a new round of state and national medical-
professional resolutions and legal cases were provoked by new laws in several states, including Illinois and
California, which sought to ensure the precise carrying out of execution procedures by mandating doctor
inclusion. See So Long As They Die, pp. 39-42.
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the controversies and news coverage surrounding these practices are so familiar—part of
the background noise of life in Texas, even for the vast uninvolved majority of the
public—a comparative historical perspective may prove helpful in gauging their
significance. In the case of England, many of the same developments that characterized
capital punishment in Texas were at least anticipated and discussed, but ultimately
history took a very different path. I argue that the comparison bears out the critical role
of medicalization in determining the fate of capital punishment—and that the historical
divergence between the cases studied reflects a divergence between medical professions
in their social and political contexts.
I.
In Albion, known for its fatal tree and “Bloody Code,” the abolition of capital
punishment was the work of many generations. The rise of commerce and industry,
agricultural enclosure, and related social unrest coincided with a chaotic proliferation of
capital-offense statutes—and a rising crimson tide of dispatched offenders. Then, as
middle-class reformers gained parliamentary influence, capital crimes were pared back
and the ritual of hangings in public was ended (although whether the accompanying
cultural shift was toward humanitarianism or sentimental hypocrisy remains in dispute).4
But by blunting the momentum for abolition, these limitations helped sustain the
4 See V. A. Gatrell’s argument in The Hanging Tree: Execution and the English People, 1770-1868
(Oxford Univ. Press, 1994).
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practice.5 After the 1860s, death by hanging remained the prescribed penalty for murder
for very nearly a full century.
At a distance, with the passing of decades since the last legal executions were
carried out, and with the death penalty now banned by the European Convention of
Human Rights, abolition in 20th-century Britain may now be half-remembered as a
necessary response to social transformation and shifting values. But any closer look at
the political battles over abolition shows otherwise—that the outcome was anything but
inevitable. “It is quite possible,” in the view of one magazine writer, “that, had there not
been a resurgence of abolitionism following the Second World War, Britain would have
gone down the same path as the United States,” with capital punishment perpetuated once
again by being modified and brought up to date.6
The critical moment, in this view, came in the wake of a parliamentary initiative
that ended in defeat for the abolitionist cause—and threatened to bring the reinforcement,
rather than the abolition, of capital punishment in Britain. In 1948, with Clement Attlee’s
Labour government committed to passage of a comprehensive criminal-justice reform
bill, party backbenchers unexpectedly succeeded in attaching an abolition amendment—
only to have the amended bill resoundingly rejected by the House of Lords, with the
apparent support of the general public. Ultimately all the insurgents had to show for their
efforts was the creation of a royal commission to study possible reforms in sentencing
5 See the discussion of the Royal Commission report of 1866 in Leon Radzinowicz and Roger G. Hood,
The Emergence of Penal Policy in Victorian and Edwardian England (New York: Oxford Univ. Press,
1986), chapter 20, especially pp. 661-671 and 685-688.
6 See Tom Phillips, “The Abolition of Capital Punishment in Britain: The End of the Rope, Part 1,”
Contemporary Review, Vol. 272, No. 1585 (1998), pp. 57-63. Phillips’ one observation about the Royal
Commission on Capital Punishment that reported in 1953 was that it “concluded hanging was no deterrent
but failed to recommend abolition” (p. 62), which seems a fair example of the abolitionist perspective on
the commission’s work.
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and procedures (not to include abolition itself). Instead of confirming the obsolescence
of the Bloody Code’s remnants, this outcome demonstrated what one historian calls “the
enduring political, judicial, and public resistance to the reforming ethos.”7 What finally
undermined this resistance was a trio of dubious capital cases—occurring, almost
unbelievably, in rapid succession—which sapped the credibility of the justice system and
highlighted the irreversible consequences of its failings.8
Compared with these controversies and with the acts of legislation that followed
them, the work of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment of 1949-1953 has often
been viewed as having played a secondary role (at most) in promoting change. With the
terms of its appointment ruling out consideration of abolition as a policy alternative, it
had no opportunity to register any direct support for the cause, and ultimately few of its
necessarily limited recommendations were ever adopted. What such assessments
overlook is the potential significance of the commission as a force for perpetuating the
death penalty, instead of the opposite. Along with their mandate, the commissioners
were given the opportunity to propose the kinds of modernizing changes that might well
have sent Britain down the American path in following years. In fact, the
commissioners’ refusal to endorse such changes was itself a historic defeat for the death
penalty in Britain—and a crucial victory for the cause of abolition, made all the more
significant by the commission’s lack of positive identification with the cause.
7 Victor Bailey, “The Shadow of the Gallows: The Death Penalty and the British Labour Government,
1945-51,” Law and History Review, Vol. 18, No. 2 (2000) p. 349.
8 A convenient summary of the successive Bentley-Craig, Evans-Christie, and Ruth Ellis cases and their
impact on public discussion of capital punishment is provided by Brian P. Block and John Hostettler,
Hanging in the Balance: A History of the Abolition of Capital Punishment in Britain (Winchester:
Waterside, 1997), chapters 17-19.
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The royal commission’s conclusions were not preordained. They depended
heavily on the recommendations and testimony provided by a host of witnesses over two
years of hearings. On the key practical questions relating to the reform and
modernization of the death penalty—how to reconcile the definition of criminal
responsibility with the views of modern psychology and psychiatry, and how to reconcile
the method of execution with modern standards of humane treatment—those representing
the medical profession had a critical role to play. I argue that the leaders of the
profession—most importantly the representatives of the British Medical Association—
acted so as to foreclose the possibility that a modernized, medically sanctioned death
penalty would emerge from the commission’s work. The BMA never endorsed the
abolitionists’ cause—and, as with the commission itself, avoiding being identified with
the cause was necessary for the maintenance of its standing and influence. But it
maintained longstanding objections to the existing legal definition of responsibility
(insisting instead on a definition which, while accommodating the views of experts on
mental disease and deficiency, posed insoluble political dilemmas of its own). And it
steadfastly refused to endorse or facilitate execution by lethal injection, leaving the
commission without an alternative to hanging that it could recommend. The leading
medical men in Britain had no interest in allowing their profession to be seen as agitating
against capital punishment—but neither would they tacitly support the practice, at a time
when it required this support. Ultimately Britain followed the European path of
abolition, rather than the American path of modernized capital punishment, for reasons
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large and small. The large ones included the position of the British medical
establishment and the influence that it wielded.
The objections of British medical men to the common law’s test of criminal
responsibility were part of a longstanding critique of the prevailing legal standard of
mental guilt (or mens rea)—a critique which accompanied the gradual development of
psychiatry as a medical discipline and followed from its core assumptions. The standard
came from the controversy that followed the acquittal, on grounds of insanity, of political
assassin Daniel M’Naghten in 1843. Replying to questions from the House of Lords, a
panel of judges concluded that juries, when necessary, should be instructed
that, to establish a defense on the ground of insanity, it must be clearly proved
that, at the time of the committing of the act, the party accused was labouring
under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature
and quality of the act he was doing, or, if he did know it, that he did not know he
was doing what was wrong.
The fateful adoption of the M’Naghten Rules by both English and almost all American
state courts reflected jurists’ satisfaction with narrow formal limits on jurors’ discretion.
Psychiatrists and psychologists were dissatisfied from the beginning. Their objection, in
essence, was that the reference exclusively to cognitive failures meant that the rules
applied strictly only to some mentally diseased defendants and excluded others who were
equally unable to control their actions.9 The definition of responsibility solely in terms of
9 The Royal Commission report itself provided a scholarly historical survey of the origins of the
M’Naghten Rules and the longstanding objections of medical men. See Royal Commission on Capital
Punishment (1949-1953), Report (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1953) (hereafter Royal Commission
report), specifically Appendix 8(d) (pp. 397-406).
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knowledge, leaving out all other mental conditions affecting the ability to act (or not act),
ran counter to the very construction of mental malfunction in medical terms—as a form
of disease affecting the mind as a whole.10 Strict application of the M’Naghten Rules
meant that expert medical witnesses found their testimony limited to the state of a
defendant’s knowledge, regardless of their overall diagnosis of the defendant’s mental
state. While judges viewed the limitation of the scope of psychiatric testimony as
necessary to keep medical men from dominating trial outcomes, the medical men saw the
rules as a rejection of the value of their professional expertise—all the more so as the
state of their art developed over time while the rules stood unchanged.
The British Medical Association’s longstanding sponsorship of the psychiatric
critique of M’Naghten was both a bid for influence over criminal justice, on behalf of the
medical profession, and a typical assertion of the BMA’s own status as representative of
the profession at large. The BMA’s leaders normally exercised a certain prerogative to
speak on behalf of the profession and “medical practitioners” generally. In fact, a class
divide separated the emerging mass of general practitioners, whose own organization
grew into the BMA itself, from elite specialists and consultants, who retained their
affiliations with traditional orders (the ancient and prestigious Royal Colleges). But the
GPs’ growing numbers and success in organizing their own ranks enabled them,
beginning in the middle of the 19th century, to win substantial control over the whole
profession and the course of its development. The long war over extending national
health insurance, culminating in the Labour Government’s introduction of the National
10 The Royal Commission report cites the eminent Victorian legal scholar Sir James Fitzjames Stephen as
the leading exponent among jurists of the view of M’Naghten which the report attributes generally to
medical men. See Royal Commission report, p. 80, and Appendix 8(d), pp. 399-401.
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Health Service, illustrated the BMA’s sense of its own prerogatives and the limits of its
actual influence. Like its American counterpart—but with less success—the BMA
fiercely opposed publicly funded provision of health care, and mobilized doctors to join
in defense of the “doctor-patient relationship” and other purported values of the
profession. In 1947-48, its efforts failed, in large part because Health Minister Aneurin
Bevan broke down the opposition by exploiting the old intraprofessional divide. But
even in defeat, the BMA retained both a formal role and considerable influence as the
GPs’ representative in advising and bargaining with the Ministry of Health, inspiring
later commentary on a health service functioning less for its patients than for its
professionals.11
As with the campaigns against national health insurance, the BMA’s longstanding
opposition to M’Naghten invoked the values of medicine while asserting its professional
prerogative. The association first took this stand before a study panel (the Committee on
Insanity and Crime, chaired by Lord Atkin) appointed in 1922, in the wake of a legal
controversy over a murder conviction followed by a medical reprieve. Both the BMA
and the psychiatrists’ own group (the Medico-Psychological Association) came before
the committee to criticize the M’Naghten Rules and propose alternatives. The BMA’s
11 Key secondary sources on the BMA and its role in the politics of health care include Peter W. J. Bartrip,
Themselves Writ Large: The British Medical Association, 1832-1966 (London: BMJ, 1996), especially
chapter 10 (pp. 248-266), and Harry Eckstein, Pressure Group Politics: The Case of the British Medical
Association (Stanford Univ. Press, 1960), which contrasts the BMA’s seemingly high-profile failures with
“a much more impressive record of not-so-public successes, greatest of all on minor matters, points of
‘detail,’ but impressive also in the case of ‘principles’” (p. 96). In Health, Happiness, and Security: The
Creation of the National Health Service, Frank Honigsbaum also offers a revisionist argument about the
institutional politics of national health legislation but reaffirms the basic understanding of the undermining
of the BMA’s position by Bevan’s collaboration with Lord Moran, then president of the Royal College of
Physicians, at pp. 148-150. Asa Briggs reviews Lord Moran’s role in A History of the Royal College of
Physicians of London, Volume 4 (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2005), pp. 1296-1310.
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memorandum recommended that the rules should also exclude actions in which mental
disease or deficiency kept a person “from controlling his own conduct.” The existing
formula as amended, according to the BMA Council, “might be accepted by the Medical
Profession as a fair definition of responsibility for crime.”12 (Rather than trying to amend
the rules, the Medico-Psychological Association concluded that they should simply be
abrogated, and “the responsibility of a prisoner should be left as a question of fact to be
determined by the jury on the merits of the particular case.”)13 Ultimately the Atkin
Committee basically adopted the BMA’s position—recommending that defendants not be
held responsible “when the act is committed under an impulse which the prisoner was by
mental disease in substance deprived of any power to resist.”14
The BMA’s contributions to the Atkin Committee’s work forged a fateful
connection with the debate over capital punishment itself—although the BMA avoided
being drawn directly into this larger debate. Despite the Atkin Committee’s work, or
perhaps because its conclusions were unexpected, its report was set aside by the
government upon its submission. But abolitionists took note of the medical-legal divide
over the insanity defense. In 1929, Labour Party leaders under pressure from their
abolitionist members appointed a House of Commons Select Committee on Capital
Punishment. Reflecting the closely balanced forces in the Labour-led chamber, the
committee narrowly approved a report which mainly addressed the question of abolition
and recommended a five-year moratorium on executions. But it also identified
12 The Report of the Committee on Insanity and Crime of 1923 is quoted in Royal Commission report,
Appendix 8(d), para. 16, p. 404.
13 Royal Commission report, para. 16, p. 404.
14 Royal Commission report, p. 405.
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conditions for any further use of the death penalty—one of which was “bringing the
M’Naghten Rules up to date, so as to give the fullest scope to general medical
considerations and to extend in some way the area of criminal irresponsibility.”15 The
select committee did not call medical men to testify, but instead invoked the gist of the
BMA’s recommendations to the Atkins Committee—as well as the accompanying
implication that rejection of the law’s rules of criminal responsibility was intrinsic to
modern medicine.
The BMA remained similarly detached from the battle in Parliament over
abolition in 1948. The “Medical Profession,” like other established institutions—
including the leadership of the Labour Party itself—had no interest in being identified
with abolitionists or spending its political capital on their cause. Surveys indicated that
the death penalty retained longstanding majority support among the British public, and
advocates of abolition had traditionally acted as dissenters from an established consensus,
among society at large or within their own institutions. Supporters of abolition included
a few contrarian nobles and bishops, a subgroup of middle-class reformers who
specialized in criminal justice, and a more substantial number of Labour politicians and
constituents who expressed class grievances, sympathy with reform views, or both. By
the late 1940s there were two respected but small organizations that advocated for the
cause: the Howard League for Penal Reform (which, through its research and lobbying,
served as the standard-bearer of progressivism in criminal justice, while maintaining
close ties with the Home Office) and the National Council for the Abolition of the Death
15 The Report of the Committee on Insanity and Crime of 1923 is quoted in Royal Commission on Capital
Punishment (1949-1953), Minutes of Evidence (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1949-1951) (hereafter
Royal Commission minutes), 8/4/49, para. 94, p. 13.
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Penalty (which existed more as a one-person operation than as an actual council, and
ultimately folded itself into the Howard League).16 Staunch opponents included the
leaders of the Conservative Party, the entire judicial establishment, and the Church of
England.17 The questions debated among these forces in Parliament—whether capital
punishment was morally acceptable, whether it affirmed or denied the sanctity of human
life, whether it served to deter murder—were mostly outside of medicine’s realm.
The issues of dispute changed with the appointment of the Royal Commission on
Capital Punishment. As approved by Attlee and the rest of the cabinet, the commission’s
assigned topics included “whether liability under the criminal law in Great Britain to
suffer capital punishment for murder should be limited or modified, and if so, to what
extent and by what means.” The question of abolition itself had actually been included in
the commission’s terms of reference as first proposed to the cabinet, but had been
removed at the cabinet’s insistence.18 What remained in the terms of reference was
generally understood as a reference to the idea of creating degrees of murder, which had
never existed in English law. But in a broader sense, taking abolition off the table
necessarily implied that the commission was to serve an anti-abolitionist function—
finding ways of adjusting and improving existing practices so that the death penalty itself
could be made most widely acceptable.19 In keeping with this broad purpose, Attlee later
16 Gordon Rose describes the work and illustrates the perspective of the Howard League in The Struggle for
Penal Reform (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1961).
17 See Harry Potter, Hanging in Judgment: Religion and the Death Penalty in England from the Bloody
Code to Abolition (London: SCM Press, 1993), especially pp. 142-166 (including chapter 14, “Godly
Butchery,” on the Church of England’s longstanding reliance on the symbolic power of the execution
ritual).
18 Bailey states this finding from primary sources in “The Shadow of the Gallows,” at p. 345.
19 Characterizations of the unenthusiastic response of abolition supporters (who were not aware of the
commission’s appointment until the public announcement) implies that they merely expected the
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asked the panel to consider “methods of execution” as well.20 Attlee and his fellow
cabinet members also obviously wanted a thorough inquiry that would be sure to
continue until after the next general election. The chosen members of the panel, chaired
by veteran civil servant Sir Ernest Gowers, represented varied specialties and were
apparently chosen for their lack of known commitment to either side of the abolition
debate.21 As it turned out, the commission held hearings for two years, followed by
research travel, and did not release its report until 1953.
The terms of reference directed the commission back to the old unsettled
argument over criminal responsibility—as well as the broader question of how the
medical profession could help serve the commission’s task of proposing a new, improved
death penalty. Shortly after its appointment, the commission formally invited the BMA
to submit evidence. During the months leading up to the BMA’s appearance before the
commission, the association’s Council found itself having to consider not only its
longstanding position on M’Naghten but also how it would field other likely questions.
At the Council’s formal meeting on January 18, 1950, it became clear what exactly that
meant:
The chairman of the Committee [on Capital Punishment] stated that possibly the
Royal Commission might contemplate recommending intravenous injection as a
method of execution if it were assured that the medical profession would not
object to the prison medical officer being required to give a preliminary injection
commission to be unhelpful to their cause. I maintain that the commission actually had the opportunity to
do far-reaching harm to the cause, which may be more apparent in retrospect (and in comparison with the
United States). Bailey interprets the terms of reference to imply “some new method of classifying murders
by degrees, which the Lords had ridiculed, the Opposition in the Commons had opposed, and the
abolitionists disliked.” See “The Shadow of the Gallows,” p. 345.
20 See the beginning of Chapter 13, “Methods of Execution,” at Royal Commission report, para. 700, p.
246.
21 James B. Christoph, Capital Punishment and British Politics (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1962), p. 79.
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of a narcotic drug for the purpose of facilitating the lethal injection by a non-
medical examiner.
The committee chairman went on to report that the committee “had considered this
possibility” and concluded that while the prison medical officer’s actions “must remain a
matter for his professional discretion,” nevertheless “in no circumstances could the
profession approve of the medical officer being under instructions to carry out an
injection as a preliminary to the execution procedure.”22
The Council endorsed this position, while also voting its approval of the
memorandum drafted by the capital punishment committee and the list of witnesses to
testify before the commission. One other piece of information reported to the Council by
the committee reflects the association’s continuing concern over its representation of the
profession as a whole. The psychiatrists’ organization (now, with its crown charter, titled
the Royal Medico-Psychological Association) had also been asked to address the
commission and, like the BMA, was expected to discuss the M’Naghten Rules in light of
its past statements to the Atkin Committee. A representative of the RMPA had explained
the psychiatrists’ views to the BMA committee, much to the committee members’
dismay:
The Committee had hoped that the BMA and the RMPA, which have given
conflicting evidence in the past on the revision of the M’Naghten Rules, would be
able to speak with one voice on the present occasion. It regrets to report that the
views expressed in its memorandum cannot be reconciled with those of the
RMPA.23
22 Minutes of the BMA Council, 1949-1950, p. 6, in British Medical Association Collection (SA/BMA),
Box 268, Wellcome Library, London (hereafter BMA Collection).
23 Minutes of the BMA Council, 1949-1950, Appendix I, p. 14, in BMA Collection, Box 268.
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Before the medical men appeared, the Royal Committee held thirteen full days of
hearings over five months, starting with the Home Office and continuing through the
organizations representing law enforcement, the prison services, and the judiciary—all
emphatic supporters of the death penalty, all tending to echo the positions which had
prevailed in the recent parliamentary debate. Especially with eminent legal witnesses, the
commissioners devoted much attention to the question of degrees, the “constructive
malice” doctrine, and other issues and possible modifications in the law of murder. But
the panel also drew out witnesses’ views on the M’Naghten Rules and the question of
alternative execution methods. Virtually none of the early witnesses acknowledged any
misgivings about hangings. But on the law of criminal responsibility, things were
slightly more complicated. Only a few were now willing to insist that the M’Naghten
Rules precisely identified an appropriate strict standard of responsibility. But most still
supported the rules as they stood, arguing that a loose interpretation of them was now
customary and that judges and juries exercised their discretion to stretch them when
appropriate. In large part, the defense of the status quo had pivoted away from the rules
themselves and now rested on how they were applied. “Most of these witnesses,”
according to the final report, “recognized the imperfections of the Rules, but argued that
the formula worked well enough in practice and that it was impossible to devise a better
one which a jury would be able to understand and apply—or at least that no one had ever
succeeded yet in doing so.”24
24 Royal Commission report, para. 244, p. 86.
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The BMA submitted its memorandum in January 1950 and gave evidence before
the Royal Commission on February 3. The memorandum offered a reworked statement
of the BMA’s position on M’Naghten and tried to relate it to the new state of the debate
and the kinds of arguments the commission had been hearing. According to the
memorandum, the BMA acknowledged the necessary difference between insanity, as
defined by medicine, and irresponsibility, as defined by law. Thus “instead of criticizing
the M’Naghten Rules as embodying a conception of insanity which is obsolete, it prefers
to criticize them as embodying a conception of irresponsibility which, in the light of
modern psychological knowledge, must be regarded as incomplete.”25
The memorandum cited two arguments being used to defend the M’Naghten
Rules in practice—that judges had leeway to apply them loosely, and that another
safeguard existed in the form of the post-verdict review that the Home Secretary was
required by statute to conduct. In the first case, the memorandum noted the likelihood of
starkly conflicting conclusions by different judges on similar cases. As for relying on the
Home Secretary, the memorandum suggested that it reduced the solemn trial to “a grim
farce” and transferred to the executive “a grave responsibility that properly rests with the
court.” Neither argument amounted to a vindication of the rules themselves:
In the first case, the inexactness of the Rules is acknowledged, the claim being
that, by reason of their inexactness, the Judge can extend their application at his
discretion to meet the circumstances of the individual case. The second argument
frankly admits the imperfections of the Rules and claims merely that the resulting
errors are subsequently rectified outside the court.
25 “Memorandum Submitted by the Council of the British Medical Association,” para. 9, in Royal
Commission minutes, 2/3/50 (hereafter BMA memorandum).
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Either way, the BMA insisted that the defense of the rules in practice ultimately served to
show their insufficiency on their own terms—as a statement of the conditions of legal
irresponsibility.26
The BMA’s own recommendations followed from its own restated analysis of the
essential flaw in the M’Naghten Rules—that their definition of irresponsibility was
“incomplete.” To show how incomplete they were, the memorandum cited an appeals
court ruling that a defendant’s awareness of the illegality of an action made it impossible
to claim that he “did not know he was doing what was wrong,” as the rules required—
which would mean assigning responsibility even to “an insane person who clearly knew
that his act was punishable by law, but believed that he was called upon by the Deity to
commit the act.”27 But even if a judge avoided this kind of conclusion by fudging the
rules—or interpreting them “loosely”—the basic problem of irresistible impulse (or
inclination) would remain. Acknowledging that the rules did not amount solely to a test
of cognitive faculty—that they accounted for emotional states that interfered with
cognition—the BMA nevertheless reiterated its long-held view that “awareness of the
nature and wrongfulness of the act may co-exist with a state of emotional disorder,
resulting from mental disease, of such a nature that the person so afflicted does not
possess sufficient power to prevent himself from committing the act.” The M’Naghten
Rules “cannot cover such cases unless the meaning of the words is stretched beyond any
reasonable interpretation.”28 As in its statements to the Atkin Committee, the BMA again
proposed language to enable the M’Naghten Rules to cover such cases. This time the
26 BMA memorandum, section II, paras. 7-14, Royal Commission minutes, 2/3/50.
27 BMA memorandum, section II, para. 20, Royal Commission minutes, 2/3/50.
28 BMA memorandum, section II, para. 21, Royal Commission minutes, 2/3/50.
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formulation referred to “a disorder of emotion such that, while appreciating the nature
and quality of the act, he did not possess sufficient power to prevent himself from
committing it.”29
At the same time that it proposed expanding the definition of irresponsibility, the
BMA found it necessary also to endorse the idea of degrees of responsibility, or
“diminished responsibility,” which existed in Scottish but not in English law. According
to the memorandum, “there are mentally abnormal persons charged with murder who
cannot be absolved from all responsibility but whose responsibility should be held to be
so reduced . . . as to make it undesirable that they should suffer the extreme penalty.”30
In their appearance before the commission, the BMA witnesses noted that “diminished
responsibility” was no substitute for expanding the M’Naghten Rules—it could not cover
cases of full irresponsibility due to insanity—but it was necessary to include it “if we are
to be in line with scientific developments.”31 It must have also seemed prudent to offer
reassurances that a medically sanctioned expansion of full irresponsibility would not
open the door too wide.
The memorandum devoted a separate section to alternative execution methods,
which made clear the BMA’s apprehension about the prospect of being pressured to
sanction lethal injection. “No medical practitioner should be asked to take part in
bringing about the death of a convicted murderer,” the document stated. “The
Association would be most strongly opposed to any proposal to introduce, in place of
judicial hanging, a method of execution which would require the services of a medical
29 BMA memorandum, section II, para. 25, Royal Commission minutes, 2/3/50.
30 BMA memorandum, section II, para. 23, Royal Commission minutes, 2/3/50.
31 Examination of Witnesses, para. 4008, Royal Commission minutes, 2/3/50.
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practitioner, either in carrying out the actual process of killing or in instructing others in
the technique of the process.”32 Based on its study of previous testimony before the
commission, and its own discussion with a prison medical officer, “the Association
considers that hanging is probably as speedy and certain as any other method that could
be adopted.”33 Intravenous injection of a narcotic drug would be “a speedy and merciful
procedure”—except that “the practical difficulties encountered in many cases when
injection into a vein is attempted are such as to render the method quite unsuitable for the
purpose of execution.”34 Other injection methods (subcutaneous or intramuscular)
“would not bring about sudden death or instantaneous loss of consciousness.”35 The
memorandum went so far as to suggest gas as perhaps “the best alternative to the present
procedure,” albeit “one which has highly unpleasant historical associations.”36
The memorandum included a brief passage indicating the position reached by the
BMA Council on possible requirements placed on prison medical officers. It stated
merely that the association had considered the question “of the administration of
sedatives to condemned persons before execution” and had concluded “that this is a
matter which is best left to the discretion and the humanity of the prison medical
officer.”37 Exploration of this question in detail was clearly not a discussion the medical
men looked forward to having.
32 BMA memorandum, section II, para. 27, Royal Commission minutes, 2/3/50.
33 BMA memorandum, section II, para. 28, Royal Commission minutes, 2/3/50.
34 BMA memorandum, section II, para. 29, Royal Commission minutes, 2/3/50.
35 BMA memorandum, section II, para. 29, Royal Commission minutes, 2/3/50.
36 BMA memorandum, section II, para. 31, Royal Commission minutes, 2/3/50.
37 BMA memorandum, section II, para. 32, Royal Commission minutes, 2/3/50.
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As carefully developed in the memorandum, the BMA’s position sought to affirm
the profession’s authority within its realm of expertise, without extending its claims
beyond this realm. The same task belonged to the BMA’s chosen representatives before
the Royal Commission, which typically approached expert witnesses as a politely
skeptical lay audience. Much of the hearing, as with the BMA’s examination of other
witnesses, amounted to elaboration of the professionals’ views and the presentation of
supporting evidence. The commission members did little to challenge the doctors’
descriptions of mental disorders that affected the ability to act, or not act, regardless of
knowledge of the significance of the action, and the lack of provision for such cases
under the M’Naghten Rules.38 The BMA’s suggested amendment of the rules also
elicited little debate (perhaps because that the witnesses made it clear that the BMA did
not consider that its role was to insist on any particular language). “Diminished
responsibility” actually proved more troublesome, because the concept cut more than one
way—if it kept partially irresponsible defendants from being fully shielded by an
expanded definition of irresponsibility, then it would also be used to try to defend those
who deserved to be held fully responsible. Chairman Gowers told the medical witnesses
that he considered the doctrine “dangerous,” because it might be “interpreted too
leniently by emotional members of the jury” and with too great variations among
judges.39
Methods of execution also brought a brief but revealing confrontation between the
claims of the BMA witnesses and the apparent inclinations of the commissioners.
38 Examination of Witnesses, paras. 3945-3953, Royal Commission minutes, 2/3/50.
39 Examination of Witnesses, para. 3934, Royal Commission minutes, 2/3/50.
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Gowers asked the witnesses to explain the “practical difficulties” of lethal injection. Was
it “merely a technical difficulty of skill”? Dr. R. G. Gordon (who had chaired the BMA’s
capital punishment committee) replied:
Yes. Of course it is easy enough to give an intravenous injection if the patient is
expecting it and willing to co-operate because he knows it is going to do him
good and save him pain; but it would be a very different matter with a criminal
who knew that this was the end, and who probably would not submit to it in the
same way as a patient in hospital would. We feel that if there is not complete
cooperation on the part of the subject it is a matter that would be very difficult to
carry out with any certitude, that is to say, the slightest struggling would mean
that the needle would either slip out of the vein, so that he would not get the
injection, or go through the vein and the injection go into the tissue.40
But why not make the “patient” unconscious first? This was equally unacceptable,
according to Dr. Gordon: “We feel very strongly that it is most undesirable that a doctor
should act under any rule or instruction or regulation whereby he is, so to speak, forced to
give any kind of medication. That is our objection to that on principle.” Prison medical
officers might offer sedatives based on their own judgment, or as an act of compassion,
but not as a responsibility under execution procedures.41 The BMA’s position had clearly
been crafted so as to keep physicians out of actual participation in executions.
The medical men would not be drawn into the process—and neither were they
willing to delegate their role in the process to others. Gowers asked whether a doctor was
necessary for a lethal injection. Dr. T. Rowland Hill (one of the other BMA
representatives) answered:
40 Examination of Witnesses, para. 4039, Royal Commission minutes, 2/3/50.
41 Examination of Witnesses, para. 4040, Royal Commission minutes, 2/3/50. Also see para. 4046.
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An intravenous injection is a highly skilled procedure that would really have to be
done by a doctor. In practice in the hospitals one meets occasionally with an
experienced hospital sister who does intravenous injections, but that is very
exceptional. It must be borne in mind that, although with some people an
intravenous injection would be quite easy, there are quite a number of people with
whom it is technically extremely difficult, and sometimes it is quite impossible.42
One of the commissioners, Dr. Eliot Slater (an eminent psychiatrist, and the only
physician appointed) tried to compare the current procedure for hanging—obviously
requiring great skill, but no medical qualifications—with what the BMA was insisting on.
If doctors would not perform lethal injections, why not train others to do so? Dr.
Gordon’s reply was brief but conclusive: “The Committee felt that that training, having
the object that it has, should not be given by medical men. That was the opinion of the
Committee.”43 The profession would neither sanction participation by its own members
nor facilitate the participation of others.
As they took their stand before the Royal Commission, the leaders of the BMA
knew that the medical profession actually was not united in support of their position. The
evidence given by the Royal Medico-Psychological Association showed the commission
what the BMA Council had already learned—that the gap between the BMA and some of
the leading psychiatrists was deep and wide. At the time of the Atkin Committee the
RMPA had basically shared the BMA’s criticisms of the M’Naghten Rules, but had
suggested abolishing rather than amending them. But now, somehow, even as the RMPA
had grown more dismissive of the rules themselves, its position on criminal responsibility
had swung toward that of the judicial establishment. The RMPA’s representatives told
42 Examination of Witnesses, para. 4042, Royal Commission minutes, 2/3/50.
43 Examination of Witnesses, para. 4048, Royal Commission minutes, 2/3/50.
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the commission that the courts in recent years had stretched the rules to the point of
abandonment—and that “justice is better served as the result.”44 It was best to leave in
place rules which, because of their known obsolescence and inapplicability, effectively
left judges free to issue jury instructions based on their own best judgments. “If you did
get a better substitute,” one of the RMPA witnesses argued, “you might have it very
rigidly interpreted and get a worse position than at present.”45 The existing flexibility, in
the RMPA’s view, actually allowed for the consideration of “diminished responsibility”
and made the BMA’s proposed degrees of guilt unnecessary as well. Pressed by the
commissioners to explain the evolution of their views, the RMPA witnesses suggested
that, as frequent expert witnesses, they preferred not to challenge the judges’ preference
for established rules—especially when they had little to gain from the fight, in terms of
their ability to express their own judgments. “One has certain embarrassments in being
cross-examined, because one never knows what the Judge is going to let one say,” said
one of the witnesses. “But in my experience they let you have pretty wide rope.”46
Given the conflicting evidence and views on criminal responsibility that had been
offered, the Royal Commission members shared perhaps a surprising degree of
consensus—but still they faced divisions of their own. The commissioners generally
agreed that the M’Naghten Rules “could not be considered a theoretically successful
criterion of criminal responsibility” and—despite all the evidence given by judges, other
officials, and the RMPA—they also agreed that the rules “did not in practice exempt
44 “Memorandum Submitted by the Council of the Royal Medico-Psychological Association,” part III
(“The M’Naghten Rules and ‘Guilty but Insane’”), para. 11, in Royal Commission minutes, 5/4/50. Also
see Examination of Witnesses, paras. 6638, 6639, 6656, 6666, and 6667.
45 Examination of Witnesses, para. 6638, Royal Commission minutes, 5/4/50.
46 Examination of Witnesses, para. 6638, Royal Commission minutes, 5/4/50.
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from responsibility all those who ought in principle to be exempted.”47 The fault line was
between those who believed the M’Naghten Rules should be disposed of entirely and
those who insisted that they should be retained in some form. Several of the
commissioners (including Dr. Slater, and the veteran Home Office civil servant Sir
Alexander Maxwell) believed that the tendency of judges and juries to work around the
existing rules weighed against any effort to impose specific rules—so therefore the juries
should be given a broader question (such as whether the defendant’s mental illness
caused a given action) which would fully contain the actual issue at hand. On the far end
of the opposite divide, Leon Radzinowicz (then still rising toward his later eminence as a
criminologist and historian of criminal justice) believed abolition of the rules would do
little to simplify dilemmas for medical witnesses that were rooted in the “complexities of
human personality.” Even trying to amend the rules, he argued, would run into certain
facts of political life:
The great difficulty about extending the Rules was that the medical witnesses who
had appeared before the Commission had not been unanimous in desiring that this
should be done; this difference of opinion within the medical profession showed
how difficult the problem was. Any facile solution must therefore be treated with
suspicion, and since any change would certainly meet very strong opposition, it
ought to be supported by overwhelming arguments.48
Ultimately no position was fully satisfactory—and this may have raised the importance of
pragmatic political considerations. Chairman Gowers himself supported abolition, but he
47 “Minutes of the Seventeenth Meeting,” January 4-5, 1951, pp. 4-5, in Royal Commission on Capital
Punishment: Evidence and Papers, Box HO-301/2, The National Archives, Kew. (Hereafter the minutes of
the Commission’s closed meetings—as distinct from the “Minutes of Evidence” from its public hearings—
are cited as Minutes, Royal Commission.)
48 Minutes, Royal Commission, 1/4-5/51, p. 6.
249
agreed with Radzinowicz that, especially if the Commission itself proved divided and
even if it achieved unanimity, “it was unlikely that such a recommendation would be
accepted and it was doubtful whether such a radical change was consonant with the
normal process of development of English law.”49 He proposed, as a compromise, that
the report should say that while the majority of the commission believed the M’Naghten
Rules should be abolished, “practical considerations had led them unanimously to
recommend a less fundamental change.” The report language eventually followed a
similar formulation.
Despite the compromise that Gowers devised, the commissioners continued to
spar with each other over their disagreements over many months that followed. Maxwell,
Slater, and others continued to assert that the rules should be abolished and that the
commission should recommend doing so. At one point the commissioners voted to
approve this recommendation. But Radzinowicz kept raising possible practical
difficulties following from the abolition of rules—and the political impracticality of the
recommendation. In June 1952, citing a recent appeals court ruling, he said it showed
once again “that the judges would strongly oppose any attempt to abolish the M’Naghten
Rules. Whatever the merits of the case for abolition, the attitude of the judges, in view of
their practical experience, would carry great weight with public opinion and with
Parliament.”50 With several alternative formulations on the table—and the assumption
that any of them might be disregarded just as the existing M’Naghten Rules apparently
were—Gowers again intervened to try to split the differences. The existing draft chapter,
49 Minutes, Royal Commission, 1/4-5/51, p. 6.
50 Minutes, Royal Commission, 6/5/52, p. 1.
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he suggested, should be revised to say “that, if it was thought essential to have some
rules, such and such a proposal appeared least open to objection, but that all (or most)
Members of the Commission considered that it would be better to dispense with rules
altogether.”51 The final text followed directly from this suggestion.
On the question of criminal responsibility, the BMA—as the leading voice
insisting that the flaws in the rules made it necessary to change the rules and practices—
had succeeded (perhaps better than its leaders expected) in setting the bounds of the
debate within the commission. The fact that most of the commissioners actually wanted
to go beyond what the BMA was willing to recommend (abolishing the M’Naghten Rules
rather than amending them) inevitably begs the question of whether the BMA itself might
have gone farther. The cautious tone and substance of its recommendations suggests a
preoccupation with forging a moderate consensus, both within its own ranks and among
other groups of medical professionals (such as the Institute of Psycho-Analysis and the
Institute for the Scientific Treatment of Delinquency, both of which seconded the BMA’s
arguments and recommendations). Still, with the RMPA breaking ranks, the BMA’s
limited ability to offer realistic proposals for drastic change must have been obvious.
And, in fact, Radzinowicz proved correct in anticipating the fate even of the
recommendations that the Royal Commission tailored so carefully before putting
forward. Given the resistance to change within the judicial establishment, the BMA had
little real hope of sweeping aside the formal rules which determined whether convicted
murderers lived or died. What it could do—and did—was to help delegitimze them.
51 Minutes, Royal Commission, 6/5/52, pp. 2-3.
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The more serious challenge to the BMA’s agenda—and the more serious
possibility of modernizing the death penalty—came from the commissioner members’
skeptical response to the association’s position on lethal injection. The commissioners
clearly recognized the position as a calculated effort to head off the development of the
procedure by ruling out physician involvement. Sitting in with the commission in July
1951, Sir Frank Newsam (the top-ranking civil servant at the Home Office, and lead-off
witness at the first formal hearing) told the commission members that he hoped to see a
recommended alternative to hanging, “which he personally regarded as barbarous.”52
One commissioner (Florence Hancock) supported lethal injection “after the condemned
man had been rendered unconscious.” Dr. Slater then said “that the difficulties of this
course had been exaggerated; it would require little training to inject a drug into an
unconscious man.” The commission agreed to seek further guidance on this subject from
an “experienced anaesthetist” and agreed to ask the BMA for a reference. 53
The direction of the commission’s further inquiry could not have been reassuring
to the BMA leaders. A private meeting that October with Dr. Geoffrey Organe (a
prominent anaesthetist) reinforced the commissioners’ sense that there were perfectly
feasible ways to introduce lethal injection—at least as an option. Dr. Slater said that Dr.
Organe’s evidence “showed that intravenous injection would be a painless, humane, and
practicable method of execution, which would give rise to no administrative or
52 Minutes, Royal Commission, 7/5-6/51, p. 8.
53 Minutes, Royal Commission, 7/5-6/51, p. 8.
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psychological difficulties provided that the injection were made an alternative to, and not
simply a substitute for, hanging.”54
A clearer understanding of what was actually being offered to the commission
came when Organe and several other anaesthetists (speaking for themselves, not for their
specialists’ organization) came to give evidence in public two months later. In a
memorandum to the commission, the anaesthetists offered a vision of lethal injection as
an ordinary alternative within a system of capital punishment—but an optional one,
available only under certain conditions. Dr. Organe and his fellow witnesses discussed
alternative drugs with comparative effects (ultimately endorsing a single dose of “a short-
acting barbiturate,” either hexobarbitone or thiopentone). But whichever drugs were
chosen,
intravenous injection requires a fair degree of skill which can be maintained only
by constant practice. Workers in veterinary surgery and in animal laboratories
have the necessary skill. The executioner should have no connection or
association with the medical profession.
Intravenous injection is not possible in all cases.
Intravenous injection would be more difficult in a struggling subject and
the idea is repellent. It should be offered as an alternative, pleasanter method of
executions and should be used only when it has been willingly accepted.55
The commission developed each of these claims at length in the hearing. While the
commission had expected the anaesthetists to show how much more feasible lethal
injection was than the BMA had claimed, the more telling point surely involved the limits
of what anaesthetists themselves would actually do. What made lethal injection perfectly
54 Minutes, Royal Commission, 10/4/51, p. 1.
55 “Statement of the Views of Consulting Anaesthetists: Alternative Methods of Execution,” para. 5, in
Royal Commission minutes (Minutes of Evidence), 12/6/51.
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feasible, they said, was the level of skill at “venepuncture” attained by laboratory
technicians. Neither the anaesthetists present nor any members of their specialty
organization would perform the procedure on condemned prisoners. Perhaps technicians
might also be unwilling but, as Dr. Organe put it, “You cannot tell until you have tried
recruiting them.”56
Moreover, the fact that lethal injection was unsuited for various cases meant that
it would never serve to replace the gallows entirely. At the commission’s insistence, the
anaesthetists offered a lengthy, gruesome set of explanations of the techniques of
venepucture and the difficulties posed by physiology, in some cases, or by uncooperative
patients. “Certain arms,” observed Dr. Alexander Low (president of the Association of
Anaesthetists), “have no visible veins. In other words, you get the rather plump
individuals who have veins, naturally, but they also have a layer of maybe an eighth of an
inch or more of fat over the top of the veins, which makes it quite impossible to see
them.”57 In other cases, veins would shrink, due to cold or anxiety, and anyone looking
for a vein would have to bathe the arm in warm water. Any movement on the part of the
patient would make it impossible to catch the vein with the needle (and not pierce the
other side of the vein). This actually even ruled out the possibility of rendering subjects
unconscious first, because reflex movements would still occur. By the end of the
hearing, it was clear to the commissioners that even doctors who refused to endorse the
BMA’s position were not inclined to offer up lethal injection as an easy option or smooth
over the practical obstacles.
56 Examination of Witnesses, para. 9025, Royal Commission minutes, 12/6/51.
57 Examination of Witnesses, para. 8955, Royal Commission minutes, 12/6/51.
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This evidence did not dictate the committee’s conclusions, but its impact was
decisive nevertheless. Like its skepticism about the BMA’s position, the commission’s
discussions immediately after the anaesthetists’ hearing clearly reflected its own clear
determination to recommend lethal injection—if it had been given a way to do so.
Commissioner Hancock “said that she had been ready to support an alternative to
hanging, but she had been very much discouraged” by the anaesthetists. Another
commissioner, Sir Edward Jones, went so far as to say that “personally, he would prefer
to be hanged and he could not bring himself to support any recommendation in favor of
an injection.” Still others (such as Gowers, and Newsam, once again sitting in) still
hoped for some alternative to recommend because hanging, they believed, was
“barbarous” and must be ended. But the wind had shifted. The commission secretary,
Francis Graham-Harrison, even began coming up with further likely problems, beyond
what the anaesthetists had cited: “It appeared that intravenous injections were difficult if
the patient flinched, and impossible if he struggled. Was he not more likely to flinch
from a lethal injection than from an injection for ordinary medical purposes?” Yet
another concern: “Lethal injection would also differ from all other methods of execution
in one important respect: the executioner would be required to cause the prisoner’s death
by an operation involving direct contact with his body, not indirectly by the mechanical
operation of a switch or lever. This would be most distasteful to many qualified
persons.” Gowers finally interrupted Graham-Harrison and told him to draft a report
chapter on execution methods without stating any conclusions.58 Ultimately the
commission decided to list the pros and cons of lethal injection, while stating that it had
58 For all quotations and paraphrases in this paragraph see Minutes, Royal Commission, 12/6-7/51, pp. 3-4.
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unable to agree on substituting this method for hanging at the present time. It
recommended reconsidering the practicality of the option as techniques evolved further.59
When the full report of the Royal Commission finally was published in 1953—
well after the Labour government that appointed the commission had passed from the
scene—its painstakingly documented chapters and nuanced, ambivalent conclusions
ended up serving functions far different from what had originally been intended. Its
various (mostly small-bore) positive recommendations to Parliament were first ignored,
then dismissed by the Conservative leadership. Instead, the report became more a
symbol of the loosening grip of capital punishment on “respectable” opinion among
governing-class circles. Given its narrow original terms of reference and the distance
separating its members from the likes of the Howard League, what was crucial was the
very fact that the commission did not perform as expected—that it did not find, in the
advanced realms of law, science, and medicine, the solutions to the death penalty’s
problems.
One of the concluding notes struck in the commission report elicited wide
comment, as an example of testing the boundary of the commission’s mandate. On the
question of degrees of murder, the commission had ultimately failed to find criteria for
degrees and instead recommended expanding jury discretion over sentencing, as a way of
allowing for mitigating circumstances. The commission acknowledged that many others
were bound to advance a contrary view:
59 See Minutes, Royal Commission, 2/7/52, p. 2 (specifically comments by Slater and Sir Alexander
Maxwell), and Royal Commission report, Chapter 13, specifically para. 749 (p. 261).
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If this view were to prevail, the conclusion would seem to be inescapable that in
this country a stage has been reached where little more can be done effectively to
limit the liability to suffer the death penalty, and that the issue is now whether
capital punishment should be retained or abolished.60
The implicit necessity of abolishing a practice that one would prefer to be able to
improve (but could not) was the commission’s parting message to its official and public
audiences. Even such a message—perhaps the most powerful support for abolition that a
royal commission could offer, amplified by the high standing and political detachment of
its source—could not move Britain much closer to abolition; other circumstances would
be required and further parliamentary struggles would ensue. But a teleological standard
of assessment fails to account for the real likelihood that the commission could have
reached other conclusions, and spent its prestige on reaffirming the legal foundations of
capital punishment and modernizing its procedures. This outcome was averted by the
leaders of the medical profession—not because they were abolitionists, but because they
would not acquiesce in existing practices or proposed procedures that violated their
professional values. When called upon by the commission to speak on their profession’s
behalf, the leaders of the BMA affirmed these values, despite the divisions among
doctors that actually existed. The outcome reflects both the particular choices made by
key actors in the leadership of the profession (such as Dr. Gordon) and the structural
conditions (the physiology, in a sense) of a political system which made the muffled
voice of medicine speak decisively in the debate.
60 Commission report, para. 611, p. 214.
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II.
In a newspaper profile from 1988, Dr. James P. Grigson, perhaps the most famous
(or notorious) physician in Dallas, reflected with some frustration on the nickname—Dr.
Death—by which he was best known to the rest of the world. “Stop for one second and
think,” he said, “of how many children, men and women are walking around today alive
because we incarcerated or terminated individuals who could be identified as people who
are going to continue to kill.” So, he claimed, “it would be more appropriate, if you were
going to put a tag on me, to put Dr. Life.” The reporter followed the doctor to the
courtroom, where he offered a typical display of his arguably death-dealing—or life-
saving—work as a witness. The description contained in the story was fairly typical of
contemporary efforts to capture the doctor at work:
His tone is always modulated, precise, direct. The word that comes to mind
watching him is “patrician.”
Yet he’s like a favorite uncle, the one who took you fishing when you
were supposedly sick and had to stay home from school. He’s a good ol’ boy
from Texarkana, oldest son of the man who ran the Rock of Ages tombstone
business and the woman who worked for the phone company.
His combination of homespun virtues and unshakable opinions has long
carried great weight with juries in Dallas County and other parts of Texas. His
demeanor on the stand is legendary, his testimony devastating in its withering
straightforwardness.
The classic scene: Turning to face the jury, his back straight and head
still, Grigson says, “(Such and such) is the most severe type of sociopath and
would commit future crimes if returned to society.” It is appropriate for defense
attorneys to blanch at this time.61
With his well-honed performances, Dr. Grigson created a leading role in the
revival of the death penalty in Texas which began in the 1970s and grew into one of the
61 Steve Levin, “The Life of Dr. Death,” Dallas Morning News, 9/19/88.
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world’s most prolific systems of judicially mandated killing. The new system
represented a new phase in the state’s history of capital punishment, which to this day
retains part of the stigma of a vicious past (as did the practice in England, albeit in a
different way). Starting after the Civil War, whites in Texas communities (as in other
Southern states) used both legal hangings and extralegal rituals of violence to overwhelm
Reconstruction governments, enforce a precarious social order, and vent communal fury
against transgressors. Both vigilantism and its (often barely distinguishable) legal
counterpart, as enforced within localities, targeted black men and asserted racial
privilege. Ultimately state leaders felt compelled to try to temper the violence and
preempt the worst outrages. In 1923, a new Texas statute took condemned inmates out of
the hands of county sheriffs and made state prison officials responsible for administering
death by electrocution. Over the next four decades, while the goal of substituting orderly
state killing for lynch law may have been achieved in some degree, the accumulated
statistical record ultimately left the state exposed to a range of possible challenges on
grounds of discrimination, among other constitutional challenges. In 1964, Texas joined
other Southern states and the rest of the nation in a moratorium on executions. The hiatus
ended up lasting for eighteen years, during which the legal landscape of capital
punishment was transformed yet again.62
What emerged by the 1980s was a new set of trial practices, sentencing criteria,
and execution protocols that included the testimony of expert witnesses like Grigson, as
well as other uses of medical expertise and medical symbolism. Grigson and his
62 The standard analytical treatment of the historical background summarized here is provided in James W.
Marquart, Sheldon Ekland-Olson, and Jonathan R. Sorensen, The Rope, the Chair, and the Needle: Capital
Punishment in Texas, 1923-1990 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994), chapters 1-4.
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followers and imitators ultimately made up a cohort of “killer shrinks” who served a
specialized function—diagnosing the “future dangerousness” of capital murder
convicts—that followed from developments in Texas law and the peculiar drafting of the
new capital murder code. Especially during the early years of the revived death penalty
regime, the killer shrinks and their vociferous critics struggled with each other, before
trial juries and appeals court judges, over how far the use of medicine to facilitate capital
punishment could be taken.
The parties to the struggle included local prosecutors, frustrated defense attorneys,
representatives of organized medical professionals at the national level, and various
individual scholars of law and criminal justice. What was completely missing, all
through the period up to the present, was any meaningful participation by the
organizations representing the Texas medical profession. Keeping a fixed focus on
higher priorities, the Texas Medical Association and its affiliated specialty societies
attempted no policing of their own ranks, avoided passing judgment on the use of
medical professionals in various roles, and essentially offered no resistance to the
medicalization of capital punishment. As a result, Texas prosecutors and legislators were
able to use white coats and needles where necessary to legitimize their initiatives and
fend off legal challenges. Instead of giving pause, psychiatric evaluation and lethal
injection gave capital punishment in Texas the go-ahead.
The relationship between medicine and criminal justice followed largely from the
orientation of medicine itself at the state level. In Texas, as much as anywhere, mid-20th-
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century medicine was a sovereign profession. Celebrating the 1953 centennial of the
Texas Medical Association, chronicler Pat Ireland Nixon proclaimed that the
organization “stands out as a towering beacon. From small and uncertain beginnings, it
`has come to be one of the sturdiest of state associations.”63 Dr. Nixon’s was no empty
boast. With its record of success in legislative enactments and its feverish commitment
to the war against national health insurance, the TMA exemplified the American medical
profession’s exercise of political influence in support of guild interests.64
Coinciding with the ascendancy of the sturdy state association in medical politics
was the birth and spectacular growth of Texas medical institutions—military and
veterans’ hospitals, aerospace biomedical research installations, new medical schools,
and specialized care facilities contained in high-rise hospitals in sprawling medical center
complexes—which reflected the postwar boom in federally supported research and
development and the growing funding ability of the state.65 Also at the same time,
however, official neglect, underfunded public services, and rudimentary health care still
prevailed across much of what remained a poor state. As in the rest of the shadow-
crossed Sunbelt—only perhaps most dramatically in Texas—cutting-edge medicine
developed amid unsolved problems of public health and basic health care provision,
reflecting both the longstanding budgeting practices of the state and the particular
priorities of its medical establishment.
63 See introductory remarks in Pat Ireland Nixon, A History of the Texas Medical Association, 1853-1953
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1953).
64 See Florita Indira Sheppard, “The Texas Medical Association: History, Organization, and Influence,”
master’s thesis, Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, The University of Texas at Austin, 1980.
65 See Chester R. Burns, “The Health Sciences,” in Leo Klosterman, Loyd S. Swenson, and Sylvia Rose,
eds., 100 Years of Science and Technology in Texas (Houston: Rice Univ. Press, 1986), and Burns,
“Medicine in Texas: The Historical Literature,” Texas Medicine, Vol. 82 (January 1986).
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In its own way, mental health care followed the general pattern, but its scale,
scope, and pervasiveness gradually forced philanthropic and professional elites to engage
with questions of broad social policy and provision of care. By 1931 the doctors had
managed to secure state funding for a psychopathic hospital on the medical school
campus in Galveston, and after the war a psychiatric research facility was created among
the other specialized hospitals and clinics in the Texas Medical Center. Meanwhile, for
decades, the insane asylums and “state hospitals” were overcrowded warehouses, with
their limited funding being used almost exclusively for custodial functions. (A
“psychopathic hospital” was also set up on the lower floors of the prison hospital at
Huntsville, consisting basically of holding areas and cells with restraints.) Newspaper
exposes, and reports by outside agencies such as the U.S. Public Health Service,
occasionally reminded the Texas public of the conditions inside the institutions.
Eventually organizations such as the Hogg Foundation for Mental Health, which began
its activities by advocating for “mental hygiene” among the public at large, began
emphasizing the public’s responsibility for the institutionalized population.66 During the
1950s, intermittent legislative efforts brought modest results, given the prohibitive
expense of actual treatment provision for a massive institutionalized population.
Comprehensive reform during the 1960s required both the availability of federal funds
and a broad programmatic shift toward deinstitutionalization and outpatient care.67
66 See The Hogg Foundation for Mental Health: The First Three Decades, 1940-1970 (Austin: University
of Texas Press, 1970), pp. 11-22.
67 See K. D. Gaver, “Mental Illness and Mental Retardation: The History of State Care in Texas,” Impact
[bimonthly publication of the Texas Department of Mental Health and Mental Retardation], vol. 5, July-
August 1975, and also Joel Warren Barna, “State Mental Health Services: Change Under Pressure,” in
House Study Group Special Legislative Report (Austin: Texas House of Representatives, 1984), p. 4.
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As the progressive turn in Texas mental health care slowly proceeded, one focus
of reform was in the legal realm. New court procedures transferred new powers to
psychiatrists and gave greater weight to medical expertise—perhaps more even than the
reformers intended. A survey of the institutions by the business-funded Texas Research
League yielded recommendations for changes in the legal structure of the hospital
system, and the state board responsible for the hospitals put up no resistance.68
Supported by a Hogg Foundation grant, a team of University of Texas law professors
drafted a pair of bills—a new Mental Health Code and a set of procedures for
commitment of the criminally insane—which were enacted in 1957. Both reforms sought
to bring standard legal proceedings into accord with up-to-date ideas about mental illness
(as opposed to the traditions and stigmas surrounding “lunacy”) and to force the state to
begin providing treatment instead of mere confinement. In both involuntary civil
commitment hearings and criminal cases, the statutes included new requirements for
medical examination and diagnosis (a written certificate in civil cases, plus testimony by
two physicians in hearings for indefinite commitment, and a requirement of “competent
medical or psychological testimony” for commitment of criminal defendants found
insane).
Advocates for the new mental health code assumed that to protect the rights of
individuals found to be insane—in both civil and criminal cases—it was necessary to
keep the court from excluding relevant medical diagnosis and judgments. New
Gerald Grob chronicles the broad programmatic shift and the significance of federal funding in From
Asylum to Community: Mental Health Policy in Modern America (Princeton Univ. Press, 1991).
68 See Texas Research League, “Legal Structure for the Texas State Hospital System,” (Report no. 13 in a
survey of the Board for Texas Hospitals and Special Schools), and Millard H. Ruud, Interpretation of the
Mental Health Code, 1st ed. (Austin: Hogg Foundation for Mental Health, 1957).
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procedures were supposed to force courts to make use of medical expertise in rendering
their judgments. But what happened in practice was that when physicians were given a
role, they largely took over the decision-making. Emergency procedures allowed judges
to approve a civil commitment for up to ninety days without even having to hold a
hearing, as long as the medical forms were signed and co-signed. To be committed
indefinitely, patients had to have been already held for the temporary period. This was
intended to raise the bar for indefinite commitment, but the effect was to give
unchallengeable authority to the institutional physicians who had been observing the
patient in question for up to ninety days. At the Austin State Hospital in 1966, a
dismayed observer found that indefinite-commitment hearings amounted to quick rubber-
stampings of the hospital psychiatrists’ uncontested decisions.69
The redefinition of criminal responsibility in Texas reflected the same currents of
gradual reform, with advocates and representatives of leading professional groups
perceiving a responsibility to replace obsolete relics of old-time Texas with modern rules
informed by national standards and up-to-date scholarship. The M’Naghten Rules, in
Texas as in England, defined criminal responsibility in terms of the cognition of the
wrongness of an act. During the 1960s the State Bar of Texas took on two Herculean
projects in succession, first proposing a reworking of the code of criminal procedure and
then embarking on a complete redrafting of the penal code. The new code of criminal
procedure adjusted the rules for insanity pleas at various phases of court proceedings, but
69 Fred Cohen, “The Function of the Attorney and the Commitment of the Mentally Ill,” Texas Law Review,
Vol. 44 (1965), pp. 427-431. Cohen points out that anyone eligible for indefinite civil commitment had to
have been previously subjected to temporary commitment—which effectively placed them at the mercy of
the institutional physicians during the later hearing.
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left the M’Naghten Rules in place. The penal code effort, pursued by a committee
chaired by Dean Page Keeton and staffed by the University of Texas law school,
undertook a deeper inquiry into the principles of criminal responsibility and confronted
the question of substantive change.
Dean Keeton’s committee engaged the same debate over the scientific
obsolescence and practical utility of the M’Naghten Rules which had preoccupied the
Royal Commission on Capital Punishment and had long resounded in American courts,
law reviews, and state legislatures. For over a century M’Naghten defined the standard
of criminal responsibility in most U.S. jurisdictions, over the objections of generations of
neurologists, alienists, and their successors in psychiatry and clinical psychology.70 But
unlike the English system, the decentralized American judiciary had allowed several
variations on the rules. In the 1950s, the release of the Royal Commission’s final report
had nearly coincided with the landmark D.C. Circuit Court ruling by Judge David
Bazelon in Durham v. United States, which held a defendant not responsible “if his
unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental defect.”71 Legal observers in
Texas, as elsewhere, took note of the alternatives to M’Naghten raised by the Royal
Commission and the Durham court. But the failings in practice of Judge Bazelon’s
carefully crafted test—psychiatrists offering diagnoses and theories of illness as
conclusive claims about irresponsibility, judges and juries deferring to these claims—
kept alive the debate over whether the M’Naghten test remained preferable to any up-to-
70 A voluminous legal scholarly literature now records the prevalence of the M’Naghten test and the
existing variations among states, including those few which sought to incorporate an “irresistible impulse”
test. One particularly helpful and well-crafted historical case study is Charles E. Rosenberg, The Trial of
the Assassin Guiteau: Psychiatry and Law in the Gilded Age (Univ. of Chicago Press, 1968).
71 214 F.2d 862 (1954).
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date alternative.72 The American Law Institute’s influential Model Penal Code tried to
supersede M’Naghten while identifying the key issues more precisely: a defendant
would not be held responsible for his conduct “if at the time of such conduct as a result of
mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality
(wrongfulness) of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of the
law.”73
Keeton ensured a full hearing before the committee of the case for replacing
M’Naghten by assigning the matter to Fred Cohen, one of the young professors whose
presence on the law school faculty was undoubtedly viewed by others as an example of
the dean’s weakness for liberal firebrands. Cohen had stated his strong support for the
American Law Institute’s effort: “An authoritatively and clearly stated rule that identifies
major impairments of cognition, volition, and emotion has the advantages of placing
controls on prosecutorial and judicial arbitrariness, bringing criminal responsibility into
line with respected psychiatric authority, and providing the jury or judge with sensible
guidelines.”74
The stage was set for a showdown—at least within the committee—over whether
the M’Naghten Rules should remain in Texas law. Cohen drafted a new penal code
chapter on criminal responsibility that included the Model Penal Code’s formula, as well
as procedures for insanity pleas, claims of mental incompetence to be tried, and
psychiatric examinations and commitments to be ordered by the court. On March 15,
72 For a sympathetic discussion of Bazelon’s thinking see William Wayne Justice, “Is the Law’s Treatment
of the Insane Sane?” (Louis Faillace Lecture Series, Univ. of Texas at Houston Medical School, 2002)
73 Section 4.01 (1), Model Penal Code (Philadelphia: American Law Institute, 1985 reprint).
74 Fred Cohen, “Reflections on the Revision of the Texas Penal Code,” Texas Law Review 45 (1967) 429
(footnote 56).
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1968, the full committee met to consider the draft, section by section, starting with the
new formula. Carol Vance, the Harris County (Houston) district attorney, spoke up for
most of his fellow prosecutors and law-enforcement officials, according to the meeting
minutes: “Most people who committed crimes had some kind of mental defect, and at the
same time this was no reason they should be excused.” The law, Vance argued, “should
encourage people to be responsible.” Also, Vance voiced a continuing suspicion of
psychiatric experts and their excuse-making diagnoses: “In his interpretation of this
definition, a person that was just ‘down right mean’ could show a history of a violent
temper and might come under this definition.” The one psychiatrist sitting in as a guest,
Dr. Robert Glen, took particular exception to Vance’s last argument, and complained
about the archaic constraints that M’Naghten placed on expert testimony. Cohen politely
acknowledged that Vance had raised the key issue (perhaps anticipating the outcome). In
the end the committee members (not including Glen) voted, eight to four, to approve the
formula in Cohen’s draft. The new penal code itself, with its multiple chapters and
various separately controversial provisions, went before the Legislature in 1971 and was
finally enacted—with several modifications but with Cohen’s chapter on criminal
responsibility left intact—in 1973.75
Like the mental health code, the redefinition of criminal responsibility in Texas
was an achievement for medicine—both a victory for the principles of diagnosis and
treatment over prior traditions that predated medical advances, and an extension of
psychiatric influence over court case outcomes—for which medicine itself could claim
75 For the Feb. 9, 1968 meeting, see Stare Bar of Texas, Committee on Revision of the Penal Code,
“Summary of Minutes” [concerning Chapter 4, Responsibility] (March 15, 1968), Tarlton Law Library,
University of Texas at Austin.
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little credit. Change came due to the efforts of leaders of the legal profession, along with
various individual advocates (and sympathetic sources of grant funding). Aside from
individual participants such as Dr. Glen, the professional organizations of Texas
medicine—unlike the BMA, and the RMPA—had no stated position on the M’Naghten
Rules or how medicine should inform the determination of criminal responsibility. The
TMA did not completely ignore changes in criminal law that affected its members and
patients—its monthly publication, Texas Medicine, periodically ran articles tracking and
explaining legal developments—but it never included these changes among its legislative
priorities.76 It was leaders of other professions (and a few individual doctors) who
identified progressive reform with medical standards of diagnosis and treatment, and
sought to require authoritative guidance from doctors in reaching difficult but necessary
judgments in criminal justice—all while the medical profession itself tended separately to
its own interests.
Uninvolved as it was in reforms which were intended to use medical expertise to
protect defendants, organized medicine maintained the same distance as the Legislature
fulfilled the last precondition—together with the rise of medical influence over criminal
trials—for the use of “killer shrinks” in capital cases. This was the death penalty law
itself—which was passed in the same regular session of the 69th Texas Legislature (in
1973) as the new penal code. Unlike the years-long efforts to modernize legal codes
overseen by the State Bar, the death penalty revival effort ran on a legislative fast track
from the beginning, reflecting the nationwide political backlash against the invalidation
76 See T. C. McCormick, M.D., “Insanity as a defense and the Texas Penal Code of 1974,” Texas Medicine,
Vol. 71 (Sept. 1975), 64-65, and Harold K. Dudley, M.D. et al, “The mentally ill defendant in Texas: a
new perspective,” Texas Medicine, Vol. 72 (Dec. 1976), 68-76.
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of all state death penalty laws by the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1972 ruling in Furman v.
Georgia.77 (Outgoing Governor Preston Smith even summoned a special session of the
Texas Legislature in late 1972, which actually passed a bill in the Senate but not the
House.) In Texas, as in other states, bill drafters studied the confusing array of separate
concurring and dissenting opinions in Furman, and many persuaded themselves that since
two majority justices were mainly concerned with the irregular application of the penalty,
a mandatory death penalty with fewer possible exceptions would be upheld. The original
bill passed by the Texas House of Representatives was deliberately crafted as a
mandatory scheme, with much debate over the types of murders to be included but no
proposals to allow juries to consider mitigating factors in individual cases.78 The Senate,
which debated the House bill, narrowly preferred a scheme with aggravating and
mitigating factors based on the Model Penal Code.79 Even in the Senate, the debate was
dominated by questions of constitutionality rather than actual policy.
What was actually enacted, reflecting the haste and chaos all too typical of the
end of a general session in Austin, lacked even the questionably serious scrutiny given to
the original bills passed separately in the two chambers. The final compromise reached
by the conference committee was a death penalty scheme unique to Texas: a set of three
“issues,” or questions which, if all answered affirmatively by the sentencing jury, would
require the death penalty. The crucial one of the three special issues was—and is—
77 For discussion of the post-Furman backlash see Stuart Banner, The Death Penalty: An American History
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2002), chapter 10, and Herbert Haines, Against Capital
Punishment: The Anti-Death Penalty Movement in America, 1972-1994 (New York: Oxford Univ. Press,
1996), especially pp. 45-47.
78 Eric F. Citron, “Sudden Death: The Legislative History of Future Dangerousness and the Texas Death
Penalty,” Yale Law and Policy Review, Vol. 25, no. 3 (2006), p. 165.
79 Citron, “Sudden Death,” p. 167.
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“whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence
that would constitute a continuing threat to society.”80 The language was worked out by
conferees meeting behind closed doors, in the small hours of the night before the closing
day of the session, and was hurriedly passed in both chambers with minimal floor debate.
Thus, for a law that would determine life or death, no public record of discussion existed
to shed any light on the precise meanings of the terms newly introduced and suddenly
enacted (such as “probability”). Essentially the legislators got the main thing they
needed—a bill passed and signed—and left their own due diligence in the hands of the
courts. This would take years to resolve but, nevertheless, for those whose priority
genuinely was to see the death penalty upheld and resumed, it was ultimately a very
successful outcome.
The enactment of the “future dangerousness” test made prior developments in
mental health law, and the authority accorded to psychiatric testimony, part of the legal
context of the Texas death penalty. While the farcical final days and hours of the
legislative session made the new standard legal, the weight already given to expert
medical predictions of future behavior made it viable in the face of the court challenges
that the new law had to surmount. What made the future even more dangerous for all
Texas capital defendants was the curious combination of power and weakness that now
characterized medical expertise itself. Medical authority in criminal trials was not a
80 The other two original “issues”—whether the defendant’s actions that caused the victim’s death were
“committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the deceased or another
would result,” and whether these actions were “unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the
deceased”—were in practice answered affirmatively in virtually all cases, meaning that only the issue of
future dangerousness distinguished the Texas scheme from a de facto mandatory penalty. See James W.
Marquart, Sheldon Ekland-Olson, and Jonathan R. Sorenson, “Gazing Into the Crystal Ball: Can Jurors
Accurately Predict Dangerousness in Capital Cases?” Law and Society Review, Vol. 23, No. 3 (1989), pp.
449-468.
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priority for leaders of the medical profession. This authority was augmented not because
doctors and psychiatrists organized to seek and win it, but mainly because others had
fought the battle to confer it upon them. Consequently, there was no previously worked-
out set of ideas prevailing among psychiatrist-witnesses, or among doctors generally,
about how their augmented powers should be exercised, and no professional structures in
place that were prepared to enforce any such standards. The way was open for individual
practitioners, carrying the weight accorded to the medical profession but unconstrained
by professional standards or discipline, to provide de facto certification of “future
dangerousness” and effectively make Texas death penalties a matter of prosecutorial
discretion.
Dr. James Grigson, together with the Dallas County district attorney’s office, took
up the task. Formerly a psychiatry professor at Southwestern Medical School, Grigson
and his students had been drawn into the handling of mental health cases in the Dallas
courts by participating in a federally funded research program. Unlike his academic
colleagues and most of his fellow practitioners, Grigson liked dealing with criminal
defendants and sought out more courthouse work. Eventually he made a full-time job of
it, examining criminal defendants and testifying at hearings on their competence and
sanity (under the rules of the Mental Health Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure).
As judges increasingly responded to encouragement from higher courts to verify the
competence of defendants as a matter of course, Grigson became more and more familiar
with the routines of examination and testimony. He was at the right place at the right
time in 1973, as the new death penalty law went into effect. According to one local
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reporter, the DA’s office hatched the idea of establishing a defendant’s future
dangerousness by using testimony from the same psychiatrist who had already examined
the defendant for competence.81 Henry Wade, the longtime Dallas County district
attorney and the dominant figure in local criminal justice, was notorious for pitting his
assistant DAs against each other and advancing them according to their conviction rates.
The DA and the ambitious young prosecutors in his office needed new ways of winning
under the new sentencing rules. As fate would have it, the doctor already at work in the
courthouse offered a perfect combination of experience, skills as a courtroom witness,
speed and volume of diagnostic judgments—and commitment to the same outcomes that
the prosecutors were seeking.
As Wade’s chief prosecutor Doug Mulder and other assistant DAs started using
their new weapon repeatedly in capital cases, their questions and Grigson’s answers took
on the routine quality of the courtroom terms and procedures applied by experienced
practitioners. In these exchanges, however, the doctor was making the exact same
deliberately crafted claims about the individual nature and certain future actions of one
convicted defendant after another. The Ernest Smith case became the one which brought
this modus operandi before federal appeals courts and a broader audience.82 Smith and
an accomplice had together robbed a grocery store and killed the cashier. After Smith
was arrested and indicted but before his trial convened, the trial judge, R. T. Scales, asked
81 See Jim Atkinson, “Witness for the Prosecution,” D Magazine, June 1980.
82 My reconstruction of the handling of the Ernest Smith case and his trial draws upon the court record as
reconstructed and summarized in the defense and amici curiae briefs in Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454
(1981); Atkinson, “Witness for the Prosecution”; and George E. Dix, “The Death Penalty,
‘Dangerousness,’ Psychiatric Testimony, and Professional Ethics,” American Journal of Criminal Law,
Vol. 5, No. 2 (May 1977), pp. 151-214.
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Grigson to conduct the usual competence exam. On February 18, 1974, Grigson met
with Smith and (as he later testified) spent some ninety minutes carrying out a “complete
psychiatric evaluation.” He sent a letter back to Judge Scales affirming that Smith was
“aware of the difference between right and wrong and is able to aid an attorney in his
defense.” Having been found competent to stand trial, Smith was then tried and quickly
convicted of capital murder.
Under the new death penalty law, Smith now faced the penalty phase of the trial,
in which the jury would hear evidence and decide on the three special issues, including
his future dangerousness. Ernest Smith was a 26-year-old black man who had served
three years in the Army and fought in Vietnam, but had been unable for some years to
keep a steady job. To John Simmons, Smith’s defense attorney, the convicted defendant
stood a reasonable chance in the penalty phase: his accomplice had actually fired the
fatal shot, and—more importantly—he lacked a record as a violent criminal (having been
convicted only once, for marijuana possession). Mulder began by resting the
prosecution’s case, “subject to reopening,” and Simmons called three witnesses: Smith’s
stepmother, his aunt, and the dealer who sold him his gun (which had misfired and was
defective).
Mulder then reopened his case and summoned a single witness—Dr. Grigson.
The doctor’s name had not been included on a list of prosecution witnesses that had been
given to the court, and Simmons was unprepared for his appearance. Judge Scales
overruled the defense counsel’s objections, and Grigson began his testimony by citing his
professional credentials and his past examinations of between seven and eight thousand
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criminal defendants. Affirming that he had carried out the pretrial competence exam, he
outlined his standard procedure. Based on this exam, Mulder asked, what was the
doctor’s diagnosis? Grigson explained that Smith had “a sociopathic personality
disorder”:
It is not an illness or a sickness, it’s simply a descriptive term . . . . Primarily
[sociopaths] are individuals that do not have a conscience that most of us develop
at an early age. They have no type—say guilt feelings, remorse feelings. When
they, say, do wrong, they are very much aware of the difference between right and
wrong. . . . Also, they have a tendency to be able to manipulate people. Since
they don’t operate on the same type value system [sic] with regard to, say, a
conscience, they are able to very freely manipulate people without, say,
considering, “Well, I shouldn’t do that.” It’s “I can do that and get away with it.”
As the testimony proceeded, Mulder led Grigson through a sequence of questions and
answers designed to leave the jury only one option. Were sociopaths truth tellers? “Oh,
no, sir,” Grigson replied. “Only if it serves their purpose. They will tell the truth if it
serves their purpose. If it’s harmful, whatever distortion of the truth is necessary is what
they will use.” After the doctor stated that there were varying degrees of sociopathic
disorder, Mulder asked what kind of sociopath Smith was. “Well, he would have to be
way down to the severe end—at the very end.” What was the doctor’s prognosis for
Smith? “Oh, he will continue his previous behavior—that which he has done in the past.
He will again do it in the future.” Could Smith ever break the pattern? “No. This is not
what you would consider a stage. This is a way of life. . . . It’s only something he will
continue.”
Having identified Smith as a “sociopath,” Grigson drew upon his own definition
of the alleged condition to assert the specific, lethal circumstances that the sentencing
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scheme required. “Mr. Smith does not have any regard for another human being’s life,
regardless of who it may be. This is what makes him such a very severe sociopath. He
has complete disregard for another human being’s life.” Mulder asked the doctor what
could be done for someone with this condition. “We don’t have anything in medicine or
psychiatry that in any way modifies or changes this behavior. We don’t have it. There is
no treatment, no medicine. Nothing that’s going to change this behavior.” So, the
prosecutor asked, what was Grigson’s opinion about the possibility of Smith’s future
dangerousness? “Certainly Mr. Smith is going to go ahead and commit other similar or
same criminal acts if given the opportunity to do so.”
Carefully calculated as his direct testimony was, Grigson’s improvised responses
to cross-examination could reinforce his claims even more effectively—although, in the
Smith case, being a surprise witness obviously helped. Not having had the chance to
investigate Grigson, Simmons nevertheless tried to expose the doctor as a “hatchet man”
making baseless, exaggerated claims—but, bleak as things were for his client, Simmons
actually made them worse. Exactly what, he asked, had made Grigson so perfectly
certain that Smith was a sociopath, in the course of a ninety-minute examination?
Grigson had an answer. In describing his crime to the doctor, Smith had recalled that
after his accomplice fired the fatal shot, he himself had “walked around over this man
who had been shot—didn’t look to see if he had a pistol in his belt or in his coat. . . .”
Simmons tried to interrupt, but Judge Scales let Grigson finish his answer:
Didn’t check to see if he had a gun nor did he check to see if the man was alive or
dead. Didn’t call an ambulance, but simply found the gun further up underneath
the counter and took the gun and the money. This is a very—sort of cold-blooded
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disregard for another human being’s life. I think that his telling me this story and
not saying, you know, “Man, I would do anything to have that man back alive. I
wish I hadn’t just stepped over the body.” Or, you know, “I wish I had checked to
see if he was all right” would indicate a concern, guilt or remorse. But I didn’t
get any of this.
The jury deliberated for a few hours over the special issues and answered yes to all three
questions. Smith was sentenced to die in the Texas electric chair.
In the course of the appeals process, the record of Grigson’s testimony made the
Smith case into a cause célèbre within the legal profession and shaped the debate over
Texas capital sentencing within the courtroom and beyond. The overall effect of the
testimony was polarizing: from the perspective of defense attorneys and some critically
minded journalists, it exposed a pattern of obviously manipulative tactics and clear abuse
of professional medical authority, but at the same time it was apparent that what outraged
the defense bar was all but lost on jurors themselves (and those segments of the public
that Dallas County jurors represented). The spectacle of quackery carrying the day in the
courtroom did ultimately provoke a response by mental health professionals, but the
ensuing battle made plain the disunity of the medical profession and the limited influence
of mental health specialists over legal opinions on a matter of their own expertise. Just as
Grigson used his mantle of professional expertise and authority to ensure that convicted
murderers got death sentences, so did his critics base their counterattack on the actual
state of the art in psychiatric diagnosis and the credibility of those representing the
psychiatric profession as a whole. The key argument (made as much by legal advocates
as by mental health practitioners) was that claims of certain prediction of future
dangerousness had no grounding in medical knowledge. As it made its way to the U.S.
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Supreme Court, the Smith case became a vehicle for the confrontation between Grigson’s
critics and his supporters. What worked to the advantage, in a sense, of the latter was that
the very egregiousness of Mulder’s handling of the Smith case created several alternative
grounds for reversal on appeal. Discreditable as the prosecution’s actions were, this did
not ensure that Grigson’s predictions themselves or the predictability of “future
dangerousness” would be discredited.
The automatic review of the Smith case by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
actually did raise specific criticisms of Grigson’s predictions, but these criticisms were
withdrawn from the court record under curious circumstances.83 In Smith v. State,
Simmons raised a dozen various points of appeal, including the use of Grigson as a
surprise witness. The majority of the three appeals-court judges quickly dismissed each
point, treating the contentions about Grigson as no more serious than the others. The
majority opinion treated Grigson’s claims not as arguments by a prosecution witness but
as findings by the court’s own expert: “His [Smith’s] entire conduct was calculated and
remorseless, and the jury was justified in finding that this appellant will always constitute
a continuing threat to society.” Even the way in which the prosecution introduced
Grigson as a witness was perfectly fine because, the judges claimed, the doctor was being
summoned in rebuttal (since Mulder had initially rested, then reopened his case.) “Since
Dr. Grigson had examined appellant prior to trial, his appearance as a witness in rebuttal
did not surprise appellant.”84
83 Smith v. State, 540 S.W. 2d 693 (1976).
84 In his scathing commentary, Dix drew attention to the majority’s use of Grigson’s assertions as
information rather than advocacy. The characterization of Smith as “remorseless” showed that the judges
“clearly relied upon” the doctor’s testimony. “There was no suggestion in the majority opinion that Dr.
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But one of the three judges, John Wendell Odom, saw it differently. In his
dissenting opinion, Odom specifically challenged both the majority’s unquestioning
reliance on Grigson’s testimony and the testimony itself. He drew attention to the way in
which Grigson’s damning characterization of Smith followed from the doctor’s own
definition of sociopathy instead of anything Smith himself had actually said: “Never
once did he [Grigson] give any basis other than this: that appellant had no sense of guilt
or remorse with respect to the commission of the offense for which he was on trial. . . .
The expert testimony went far afield of any demonstrated logical connection to the results
of appellant’s examination by the psychiatrist.” This by itself undermined Grigson’s
insistence on Smith’s future dangerousness, but Odom went on to indicate that his main
objection was to the use of psychiatric testimony itself to establish the certainty of future
behavior. In one of his key passages, he indicated that Grigson himself was not really at
issue: “Dr. Grigson’s qualifications as a psychiatrist may be fine, but I find no testimony
which qualifies him as an expert in predicting the future.” The problem was that “such
future-telling testimony” was by itself “admissible under no theory of law and prejudicial
beyond belief.” Thus, Odom concluded, “I am unable to find that much of the testimony
offered was from this side of the twilight zone. The introduction of such highly
prejudicial psychiatric speculations deprived appellant of a fair trial at the punishment
stage.”85
Grigson’s testimony was subject to doubt, that any other mental health professional might have arrived at
other conclusions, or that the testimony may have left the jury with anything other than a complete and
accurate picture of the present state of the diagnostic and predictive art.” See “The Death Penalty,” p. 162.
85 For the quoted excerpts from the text of Judge Odom’s dissent (which was withdrawn before the final
publication of the court ruling in the Southwestern Reporter) see Dix, “The Death Penalty,” pp. 161-166.
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Even Odom’s dissent would soon disappear from the record, as the U.S. Supreme
Court made clear its prevailing view of the role of psychiatric testimony, with specific
reference to the Smith case. After the state appeals court ruled but before its ruling was
published, the high court issued a landmark set of rulings and opinions on the new
capital-sentencing procedures enacted in several states after Furman. One was the case
of Jerry Lane Jurek, whose conviction and sentencing in February 1974 were the first
under the new Texas death-penalty statute (and, as of then, the only other death sentence
yet upheld by the Texas appeals courts). In Jurek v. Texas, the defense had pressed
different Eighth Amendment claims against the Texas statute, arguing that the special
issues failed to resolve the “arbitrary and capricious” aspects of death sentencing which
three members of the Furman majority had cited.86 The prosecution’s case for Jurek’s
future dangerousness had not included any psychiatric testimony, but the defense
nevertheless criticized the dangerousness standard (as well as the other special-issue
questions) as an insufficient safeguard against “capriciousness and discrimination.”87
This opened the way for the Supreme Court majority, in upholding the Texas statute, to
affirm the dangerousness standard as well. “It is, of course, not easy to predict future
behavior,” wrote the authors of the majority opinion. “The fact that such a determination
is difficult, however, does not mean that it cannot be made.” The opinion cited examples
of routine decisions about future dangerousness by judges setting bail, sentencing
authorities in general, and parole boards. The task facing juries weighing a death
86 Jurek v. Texas, U.S.S.C. No. 75-5394, Consolidated Reply Brief for Petitioners.
87 Jurek v. Texas reply brief, p. 51.
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sentence was “thus basically no different from the task performed countless times each
day throughout the American system of criminal justice.”88
The affirmation of “future dangerousness” was by itself significant, but the Jurek
majority actually went farther. For the majority justices, the critical issue in Jurek and in
cases involving other states was whether new post-Furman procedures would “allow the
sentencing authority to consider mitigating circumstances”—and, in the case of Texas,
whether the special-issue questions “allow consideration of particularized mitigating
factors.”89 With no other examples yet available of how the Texas statute was applied, in
practice, all the way through the state courts, the justices examined the Smith case as
described in the Texas appeals court’s ruling. In a passage which in retrospect seems
almost like a cruel joke, the justices took at face value the Texas court majority’s
representations about Smith that followed directly from Grigson’s testimony—and then
went on to assert that the appeals court’s citation of Grigson’s claims (“the conclusion of
a psychiatrist that [Smith] had a sociopathic personality and that his patterns of conduct
would be the same in the future”) actually served to demonstrate that the court
accommodated potentially mitigating factors rather than excluding them. Thus the
constitutionality of the Texas death-penalty statute rested, in significant part, on the
notion that taking Grigson’s testimony into account amounted to a safeguard for the
defense. Odom’s objections to Grigson’s conclusions—and to his fellow judges’
unquestioning citation of them—went completely unacknowledged. Judge Odom got the
88 Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) at 274-275.
89 Jurek v. Texas, 271-272.
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message. Twelve days after the Jurek ruling, as the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
dealt with Smith’s motion for rehearing, he withdrew his dissenting opinion.
The Jurek decision not only upheld the Texas death penalty but clearly indicated
the willingness of a majority of the Supreme Court to accept psychiatric predictions of
future dangerousness like Grigson’s. Others remained determined to force judges—and
ultimately the high court—to confront the reality of Grigson’s methods and actions.
After the withdrawal of Odom’s dissent in Smith v. State, the most heated response in the
ensuing commentary came from George E. Dix, a professor at the University of Texas
law school. Stating the obvious after recounting Grigson’s testimony at Smith’s trial, Dix
noted that the doctor’s testimony “was—consciously or otherwise—influenced by a
strongly-held view as to how the penalty issue should be resolved.”90 For Dix, whose
scholarship at the time focused largely on both the death penalty and the role of
psychiatry in civil and criminal cases, the Smith case displayed “a total and unobscured
abdication by both state and federal courts of the responsibility for assuring that
imposition of the death penalty based upon predictive testimony by mental health
professionals bear some relationship to accuracy, reliability, or rationality.”91
Dix’s law review article on the Smith case was important not merely for its
condemnation of Grigson and the courts’ endorsement of Grigson’s testimony, but also
because it confronted a crucial factor—the absence of constraints on a rogue practitioner
representing himself in court cases as the voice of psychiatric expertise. The resolution
90 Dix, “The Death Penalty,” p. 172.
91 Dix, “The Death Penalty,” p. 167.
281
of the case amounted to a failure of professionalism—an inability or unwillingness to
uphold actual standards, even as professional authority was being invoked:
Mental health professionals who testify in Texas death penalty proceedings do so
under circumstances in which there can be no reliance upon the legal profession
or the courts to assure adequate scrutiny of the testimony. There is no assurance
that defense counsel will point out the lack of support for propositions advanced
by prosecution witnesses or contrary positions held by other mental health
professionals. If the jury accepts the expert testimony, the state appellate court
will give the matter nothing resembling adequate scrutiny. And the United States
Supreme Court appears to be totally unreceptive to indications that the
assumptions upon which the constitutionality of the entire procedure rests are
simply inaccurate.92
One arguable implication of Dix’s argument was that the failure of the courts to perform
a gatekeeping function reflected the psychiatric profession’s own failure to assert its
standards effectively, even as its practitioners gathered ever more influence over legal
outcomes. As the background history of the evolution of mental health law demonstrates,
the failure was not just that of mental health professionals themselves, but also of legal
advocates and others who actually drove the extension of medical and psychiatric
authority over the legal realm because they viewed it as a progressive reform. Since
psychiatrists had not organized themselves to demand this grant of authority so as to
carry out any particular set of practices, the effect—in Dallas County, and increasingly
elsewhere in Texas—was to empower not the profession itself but individual practitioners
and opportunistic prosecutors.93
In discussing Smith, Dix chose to emphasize the past failure of courts and the
legal profession, rather than the psychiatric profession itself, to impose standards for
92 Dix, “The Death Penalty,” pp. 168-169.
93 See John Bloom, “Killers and Shrinks,” Texas Monthly, July 1978, pp. 64, 66, 68.
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court testimony. But in any event, he went on to argue that the psychiatric profession
should take on the burden. Mental-health providers themselves should, “in recognition of
the apparent fact that any limitations upon such testimony must be self-imposed,
formulate their own standards for professionally-acceptable testimony as to the
dangerousness of a person.”94 Dix offered a set of proposals which applied to psychiatric
testimony broadly—including the civil-commitment cases which had laid the
groundwork for the extension of psychiatrists’ influence in court more generally. But the
main purpose was clearly to constrain the likes of Grigson by forcing courts and
witnesses to place greater weight on mainstream arguments within the discipline about
what kinds of judgments could be ventured. To qualify as an expert witness, Dix argued,
“a mental health professional should demonstrate reasonable acquaintance with the
developing literature on prediction and behavior.”95 Witness testimony would be
constrained by guidelines governing the examination and diagnosis of a defendant (such
as “an exhaustive history,” and “a complete and consistent diagnostic framework, with
broad professional support”), and assertions about dangerousness should avoid drawing
conclusions about matters of law and should be framed as comparisons with rates of
probability among members of particular groups (rather than estimates of an individual’s
percentage likelihood to commit violent acts). Effectively Dix was using the Smith case
as a vehicle to try to extend the influence of then-recent work by the American
Psychiatric Association’s Task Force on Clinical Aspects of the Violent Individual,
94 Dix, “The Death Penalty,” p. 169.
95 Dix, “The Death Penalty,” p. 175.
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which had drafted a report in 1974 summing up the state of the art within the discipline
and emphasizing the limits of predictive knowledge.
As the Smith case proceeded through the federal appeals courts, it became a test
case whose outcome was understood as critical to the future of the Texas death penalty.
Dix’s article fed a debate over psychiatric testimony—and Grigson’s practices—between
the contending parties in the ongoing case and, to a degree, before the broader public as
well.96 But while the ultimate resolution addressed some of the injustices done to Smith
himself by the prosecutors at his trial, its broader significance for psychiatric testimony in
capital cases was fairly modest. Despite Dix’s framing of the significance of the case, the
appeals process never yielded a decision about the legitimacy of Grigson’s judgments
about Smith. Instead, with Smith’s defense team fulfilling its obligation to put forward
all potentially mitigating arguments, the courts overturned Smith’s conviction because of
the use of the competency exam to elicit what was in effect self-condemning testimony
by Smith and the use of Grigson as a surprise witness.
The federal district court’s handling of Smith’s appeal ensured that the case would
remain focused on the circumstances surrounding Grigson’s testimony rather than the
substance of the testimony itself. Four days before Smith’s scheduled execution, in April
1977, U.S. district court judge Robert W. Porter issued a stay and agreed to consider
Smith’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioning the judge to dismiss Smith’s
petition, the Texas attorney general’s office referred to Grigson as “an eminently
qualified psychiatrist,” described Grigson’s work as “merely a physician’s examination
of the health of the defendant,” and argued that testimony presented at the punishment
96 See Bloom, “Killers and Shrinks.”
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phase could not, technically, be self-incriminating: “It is difficult to perceive a violation
of Fifth Amendment rights when such testimony is only to the evaluation of mental
condition and is admitted only after a finding of guilt.”97 In refusing to acknowledge the
way in which Mulder had played fast and loose with the introduction of Grigson’s
testimony, the state appears to have encouraged Judge Porter to examine the defense’s
claims more closely. Porter requested and obtained affidavits from Simmons, Smith’s
other trial counsel, and Judge Scales which effectively established that Grigson was in
fact a surprise witness—the prosecution never listed Grigson as a potential witness, and
the trial judge had never formally notified the defense of Grigson’s examination of their
client, even after the fact. Porter’s ruling was essentially based on this finding. “I do not
believe,” he wrote, “that psychiatric testimony should be excluded per se from the
guilt/innocence trial and/or circumscribed in the punishment stage as some legal scholars
have suggested.” Instead he held “only that when the state introduces psychiatric
testimony on dangerousness at the punishment phase of a capital trial, the defense must
have a fair opportunity to cross examine that testimony and rebut it with expert testimony
on behalf of the defendant.”98
Propelled in part by Dix’s arguments, the American Psychiatric Association
involved itself in the case as it continued through the appeals courts, arguing for a
broader ruling against the use of psychiatric testimony but also affirming the more
limited grounds on which the district court had overturned Smith’s sentence. Smith’s
appellate lawyers and supporters together succeeded in keeping the district court’s
97 See Smith v. Estelle (445 F.Supp. 647), Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss and Answer.
98 Smith v. Estelle, 445 F.Supp. 647, at 657.
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decision from being overturned, but they failed to win the broader ruling. For the Fifth
Circuit, whose ruling in September 1979 affirmed Judge Porter’s conclusions, the
prosecution’s “irresponsible conduct” actually had the ironic effect of protecting
Grigson’s testimony itself from being the object of an appellate court ruling, because it
was possible to conclude that the prosecution’s conduct had preempted an effective cross-
examination at the original trial.99 The APA, which had appeared as amicus curiae
before the Fifth Circuit, did so as well before the Supreme Court and offered a much-
reworked version of the argument against the admissibility of Grigson’s testimony per se.
By this stage of the case, the argument had been refined so as to target not psychiatric
predictions of dangerousness generally but specifically long-term ones: “In Texas, the
inquiry focuses on the defendant’s lifetime, not on a discrete time period where
psychiatric expertise might be more relevant.”100 The Supreme Court did not bite. The
high court’s ruling acknowledged that “some in the psychiatric community” held the
view about long-term predictions contained in the APA brief, but went on to affirm the
previous rulings on the previously cited Fifth and Sixth Amendment grounds.101
The high court, it turned out, would never defer to the American Psychiatric
Association as the authoritative voice of psychiatric expertise, or concede that an
individual practitioner’s prediction of future dangerousness should be kept out of court.
With Smith having yielded new Miranda-like rules for psychiatric examination of murder
defendants, the test case on the core issue became that of Thomas Barefoot, who was
convicted in November 1978 of murdering a police officer in Bell County (north of
99 Smith v. Estelle, 602 F.2d 694 (1979).
100 Estelle v. Smith (451 U.S. 454), Amici Brief of the American Psychiatric Association.
101 Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
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Austin) and sentenced to death after Grigson and one other psychiatrist testified that he
was a sociopath. In addition to the familiar psychiatric diagnosis, there was a new
procedure for reaching it. Prosecutors had adapted to the appeals of the Smith verdict
and the surrounding controversy by avoiding direct examination entirely; instead,
Grigson now drew his damning conclusions on the basis of detailed hypothetical
questions posed by prosecutors which included the facts of the case established in the
guilt-or-innocence phase of the trial. For Grigson and the prosecutors, this proved to be
the solution to the legal problem. The federal district and appeals courts rejected
Barefoot’s appeals, but the defense managed to obtain a stay and brought the case before
the Supreme Court. The APA’s amicus brief essentially repeated its argument in the
Smith case about long-term predictions of dangerousness, stating that their unreliability
“is now an established fact within the profession.”102 Adapting the argument to the
developing literature on the subject, the brief cited a prominent new study by John
Monahan (a psychologist and legal scholar) which concluded that psychologists’ long-
term predictions were borne out in roughly one of every three cases. Supporting the
fallback argument presented by Barefoot’s defense, the APA brief went on to argue that
the Court “at a minimum” should recognize the absurdity of drawing certain diagnostic
conclusions about Barefoot on the basis of a hypothetical question, and should require
diagnostic testimony to be based on an actual examination.
The majority of justices would have none of any of this. Writing for himself and
five others, Justice Byron White not only defended the use of predictive testimony but
explicitly attacked the APA’s claim to speak for its profession. “The amicus does not
102 Barefoot v. Estelle (463 U.S. 880), Amici Brief of the American Psychiatric Association.
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suggest that there are not other views held by members of the Association or of the
profession generally,” White pointed out. “Indeed, as this case and others indicate, there
are those doctors who are quite willing to testify at the sentencing hearing, who think,
and will say, that they know what they are talking about, and who expressly disagree with
the Association’s point of view.” Having implicitly accorded Grigson and the APA the
same degree of credibility, White argued that whether either of them deserved greater
weight was the jury’s to decide:
Neither petitioner nor the Association suggests that psychiatrists are always
wrong with respect to future dangerousness, only most of the time. Yet the
submission is that this category of testimony should be excised entirely from all
trials. We are unconvinced, however, at least as of now, that the adversary
process cannot be trusted to sort out the reliable from the unreliable evidence and
opinion about future dangerousness, particularly when the convicted felon has the
opportunity to present his side of the case. 103
After the administration of lethal injection to Charlie Brooks in December 1982,
the execution of Texas capital-murder convicts identified as dangerous was resumed at a
gradually increasing rate. The Barefoot decision did not by itself loosen the floodgates,
but it did clear the way for the execution of those whose dangerousness had been
established by psychiatric testimony. (Both Dallas County prosecutors and DA’s in rural
counties continued using Grigson to testify in cases where convicts lacked lengthy
criminal records. Curiously, Harris County prosecutors elected early on to avoid the use
of psychiatric testimony in capital cases, and accumulated a body of practices and case
law in which medical expertise did not play a significant role.) Grigson himself
continued to ply his trade as an expert witness, issuing his predictable but well-crafted
103 Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, at 900-901.
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diagnoses, well into the 1990s. Dangerousness claims made by psychiatrists remained a
feature of the landscape of Texas capital case law, up to the present day.104
Ultimately Dix’s article, originally intended to motivate the psychiatric specialty
to police itself, served as a historical artifact documenting the failures and weakness of
organized psychiatry at a crucial early stage in the history of its relationship with courts
and the criminal sentencing process. And while the national organization of psychiatrists
at least acted, belatedly, the medical profession as a whole remained silent. Far from
being drawn into the controversy over the role of medical authority in ensuing death
sentences, the Texas Medical Association kept its distance from the fray, as always. In
parrying the lunging efforts of defense attorneys to establish his disrepute within the
medical profession, Grigson himself confidently portrayed the APA not only as less
credible than himself, given his own vast experience, but as culturally alien to the
jurors—“a bunch of liberals who think queers are normal.”105 In the absence of censure
by the TMA, or any similarly familiar group of peers, Grigson continued to represent
professional authority itself—rather than its defiance—posing before juries as the
profession’s one truly accessible representative. Deprived of an effective appeal to
responsible professional authority, defense attorneys and experts appalled by Grigson’s
methods were forced to construct their own body of knowledge, over time, showing the
low incidence of reoffense among convicts who had been labeled conclusively as
dangerous, and establishing the lack of factual support for assertions which arguably
104 See Deadly Speculation: Misleading Texas Juries with False Predictions of Future Dangerousness
(Houston: Texas Defender Service, 2003).
105 Trial transcript, Fuller v. State (CCA No. 71,046), cited at A State of Denial: Texas Justice and the
Death Penalty (Houston: Texas Defender Service, 2000), p. 30.
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should have been dismissed as farfetched to begin with.106 For the medical profession in
Texas, the failure to counter or constrain Dr. Death was an act of omission as significant
as it was silent.
106 See Marquart, Ekland-Olsen, and Sorenson, “Gazing Into the Crystal Ball,” and Deadly Speculation,
chapter 3, pp. 21-35.
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Conclusion
The Pendulum Swings: Politics and Professionalism in Texas
Criminal Justice to the Present
During years of change which drastically altered the landscape and society of
Texas , criminal justice, like other objects of public policy, reflected the conflicting
currents of professional expertise and political partisanship. Throughout the period of the
case studies in the preceding chapters, what distinguished Texas from various other states
and jurisdictions (while undoubtedly linking it to others) was the balance between
professional influence and other established centers of political power. Leading Texas
professions historically were far from powerless—both the Texas Medical Association
and the State Bar had long defended their interests in state politics and wielded their
influence through agencies of state government. But they lacked independent influence
over broad areas of policy which involved their members but lay outside their self-
defined jurisdictions. Over time pressure arose—mainly through litigation in federal
courts—for new practices more in keeping with the standards defined by national
professional organizations. As the case studies show, a reorganized partisan political
establishment still tended to prevail in the Texas legal and political environment.
What the following years suggested was that partisan victories were not
necessarily secure or lasting ones, and that the complex environment—inhospitable
though it might be to professionally sponsored reform—also defied control over time by
partisan political machinery. As in Washington with the Bush presidency, in Texas the
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later years of the Rick Perry governorship were blighted by the arrival of some of the
long-term consequences of past partisan maneuverings for short-term advantages. In the
criminal justice realm, the key issues before the 80th Legislature—prison crowding, the
need for sound statistics and projections, and the crisis that unexpectedly engulfed the
Texas Youth Commission—reflected the disastrous practical effects of management
subordinated to partisan political priorities. In each area of criminal justice discussed in
these chapters, signs of a pendulum swinging back (at least slightly) testified to the
degree of openness that actually existed in Texas politics and the visible, meaningful
agency of a wide range of actors. Given the diversity of participants and stakeholders in
Texas criminal justice, and the pervasiveness of political struggles involving citizen
groups, professional experts, and more established centers of power, a range of policy
issues and research questions remains to be explored.
After 2003, the response of state lawmakers to the reemerging problem of prison
crowding remained shadowed by Governor Perry’s item veto of the Criminal Justice
Policy Council budget, and his de facto firing of director Tony Fabelo, after the regular
session of the 78th Legislature. The move against Fabelo shocked participants on all sides
of the divide on criminal-justice legislation—district attorneys, defense lawyers, and
legislative committee chairmen alike—demonstrating, in a sense, the marginalization of
the Governor from a consensus among stakeholders on the value of reliable statistical
information and professionally impartial analysis.1 Speculation over Perry’s motives was
fed by the cursory explanations offered by the governor’s office (citing “fiscal
1 Polly Ross Hughes, “Fund veto of agency troubling,” Houston Chronicle, 6/26/03. See especially quoted
comments by Williamson County DA John Bradley (aptly cited in the piece as “one of the state’s most
conservative prosecutors”) and Harris County DA Chuck Rosenthal.
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management” and claiming that other agencies could take on the council’s work).2 One
widely accepted explanation was that Fabelo’s unwillingness to bend numbers had placed
him in conflict with Perry’s then-chief of staff Mike Toomey, a once-and-future lobbyist
for private prison operators and a fierce advocate for their interests.3
Later. as officials in the governor’s office and TDCJ began organizing proposals
for new prison construction once again, it became clear that the CJPC’s projections and
other statistical reporting had been less a good-government nuisance than a practical
political necessity. The Legislative Budget Board set up a Criminal Justice Data Analysis
Team that performed some of the CJPC’s former tasks (i.e. five-year correctional
population projections under existing mandates) but not others (recommending policy
options to meet lawmakers’ stated policy goals). In late 2006, the Sunset Commission’s
staff report on criminal justice agencies (due for their 12-year reauthorization) cited the
lack of any existing entity “to provide comprehensive and ongoing analysis of the
criminal justice system to determine its effectiveness and help plan for its future.”4 The
commission staff recommended creating anew oversight committee with legislative
members that would take on the CJPC’s work (which would expressly include a mandate
to “determine long-range needs of the criminal justice system and recommend policy
2 Proclamation by the Governor of the State of Texas (line-item veto announcement), 6/22/03, Office of the
Governor. Also see statement by spokesman Gene Acuna in Hughes article, Houston Chronicle, 6/26/03.
3 See Lucius Lomax, “Who Fired Tony Fabelo?” Austin Chronicle, 4/30/04, and Jake Bernstein, “They
Shot More than a Messenger,” Texas Observer, 2/18/05. In 2007, Perry’s controversial executive order
mandating that sixth-grade girls be vaccinated against human papillomavirus (HPV) was linked to
Toomey’s representation of vaccine manufacturer Merck. The Governor’s power (or aspirations to power)
over particular matters of policy, combined with his detachment from concerned parties, arguably fostered
cronyism as a dominant tendency.
4 Sunset Advisory Commission, Staff Report (October 2006), p. 20.
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priorities for the system”).5 Early in the general session of the 80th Legislature, in
January 2007, the chairmen of the House and Senate criminal-justice committees invited
Fabelo himself (now a nationally sought-after consultant) back for an extensive briefing
on alternatives to new prison capacity.6 Perry’s response was to release an executive
order creating a new “Texas Criminal Justice Statistical Analysis Center”—within the
office of the governor, and with his main criminal-justice advisor as director.7 The
implicit concession was clear, but the tug-of-war over control over authoritative expertise
in state criminal-justice policymaking would continue.
The front-page scandal of the spring 2007 legislative session—the exposure of
sexual abuse and administrative cover-ups at the Texas Youth Commission—reflected on
both the basic direction of the agency after the 1995 “reforms” and the place of youth
corrections in Texas society and government over the decades.8 The renewed fixation on
TYC and its problems suggested an unending cyclical pattern of reform, neglect, and
outrage. Even a few of the particulars recalled the Legislature’s actions in 1969—the
appointment of a special commission to investigate abuse allegations, the secretiveness
and defensiveness of longtime agency officials, the involvement of Texas Rangers
5 Sunset Advisory Commission, Staff Report (October 2006), p. 24.
6 See Fabelo, “Justice Reinvestment: A Framework to Improve Effectiveness of Justice Policies in Texas,”
Justice Center, The Council of State Governments, 2007. The hearing was widely reported in state daily
newspapers.
7 “Perry Orders Creation of Criminal Justice Analysis Center,” 1/29/07, Office of the Governor.
8 The seamy details of serial sexual exploitation of youths by the principal and assistant superintendent at
the West Texas State School at Pyote are carefully surveyed by Nate Blakeslee in “Hidden in Plain Sight,”
Texas Observer, 2/23/07. Blakeslee also follows the paper trail of reporting within TYC, cites conclusions
of one internal review which were crafted to avoid implicating senior central office staff, and cites the
failure of TYC itself or the Pyote district attorney to press legal action against the two men, in spite of
voluminous evidence (some of it collected in interviews with Pyote youths by Ranger Brian Burzynski.
Subsequent hearings and newspaper reports brought out more damning details about sins of omission and
commission by the central office—including the fact that a key internal report was later redacted before
being publicly released. See Mike Ward, “TYC report was altered,” Austin American-Statesman, 3/2/07.
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(although the revelations of 2007 were even more incendiary and detailed in documentary
evidence which ruled out any continuing defense of the commission or its senior staff).
While the proposals to be developed by the legislative joint committee on TYC were still
being developed midway through the general session, what was already clear was that the
the agency’s official claims about its own operations stood exposed once again as a
façade, the work of administrators conscious of their inability to serve well the mass of
student inmates, given budget constraints, but inured to a political culture of self-
protection and promotion, and more than willing to make themselves useful. This time
the façade had been developed, with the collaboration of executive director Steve
Robinson and his fellow administrators, as part of a process of gubernatorial image-
making and polishing, all in preparation for a presidential campaign. The constructed
narrative represented the conversion of TYC institutions, by Governor George W. Bush
and his loyal agency heads, from an unsafe, out-of-control liberal experiment gone wrong
into a model of orderly, disciplined tough love. The commission staff managed to keep
funding for several specialized treatment programs—including the Capital Offenders
Program, which John Hubner’s book had endorsed so powerfully, on the eve of the
scandal—but the overall result was to bring institutional conditions back toward the days
of Gatesville, with an expanded population of youths sent away specifically to be
subjected to harsh discipline, and an underfunded agency that sought to be seen as doing
just that. The signs in the spring of 2007 (such as Perry’s appointment of his personal
aide and veteran fixer, Jay Kimbrough, as a “special master”) were not uniformly
promising, but the elimination of the appointed commissioners and senior TYC staff at
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least suggested that the system’s workings and working assumptions would finally be
given serious scrutiny once again.
In the realm of prison health care, professionals did dominate—but the dominance
had everything to do with the aggressive promotion of vested institutional interests and
nothing to do with the ethical or other substantive values of the professions themselves,
the defense of which, as so often in Texas, was left up to various outsiders. The
University of Texas and Texas Tech medical school heads had captured the prison
medical system and divided it between their own institutions in 1994 (prior to the arrival
of private managed-care profiteers). The institutions continued to defend their
advantages under the legislatively sanctioned arrangement, but periodic reviews drew
repeated attention to some of its more unseemly aspects. Judge Justice’s effort to defend
the 1992 “Final Settlement” in Ruiz v. Estelle (which maintained court oversight of health
care and several other issues) inevitably failed to overturn the Prison Litigation Reform
Act and failed to keep the defendants from terminating the case—but the court’s
discovery, testimony, and Judge Justice’s March 1999 memorandum opinion (which the
Fifth Circuit completely overruled) did leave a record of specified deficiencies.9
Investigative reporters Bill Bishop and Mike Ward of the Austin American-Statesman
soon took up the court record and plaintiffs’ witnesses as the point of departure for their
examination of inmate health care. Their four-part series “Sick in Secret” ran in the
9 See Ruiz v. Estelle (37 F.Supp. 2d 855), at 893-903, and 906-907. On medical care Judge Justice ruled—
after setting forth in full detail the findings of the plaintiffs’ expert medical witnesses—that the findings
failed to reach the necessary constitutionally-violative standard of “a systematic pattern of intentional
indifference to known medical needs” as recently defined by the Supreme Court. In detailing the findings
so fully in the text of the opinion Judge Justice clearly intended both to publicize them and to discredit the
Supreme Court’s newly articulated, virtually unattainable standard.
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newspaper in December 2001, bringing the managed-care system for inmates out of the
realm of state audit reports and federal court records and into the public spotlight.10 Their
coverage emphasized both identifiable patterns of compromised care and, perhaps more
disturbingly, the medical schools’ preoccupation with restricting information and
avoiding accountability for compromised care. The quality of care was generally
conceded to be outstanding at the TDCJ Hospital on the medical school campus in
Galveston, but the unit clinics staffed by pharmacists and other paramedics were
different. They contained many of the same kinds of practices—cursory examinations,
prescription drugs made available irregularly or not at all, doctors’ orders routinely
disregarded—that the original litigation had found.
The core of the problem, however, was that no outside entity had any power of
inspection or oversight. This was how the medical schools had drafted the enabling
legislation, and this was the way they wanted it. The Correctional Managed Health Care
Committee, created by the Legislature as the state agency formally responsible for
contracting with the providers, was made up of representatives of the providers
themselves (two seats for UTMB and two for Texas Tech—plus three gubernatorial
appointees added in 1998 following a state audit recommendation). In 1999, the
Legislature even took away TDCJ’s review of the care being provided in its units by the
medical schools. All review functions would be carried out within the university systems
themselves, with the information developed kept away from the rest of the world.11
10 In particular see Ward and Bishop, “’Deadly inadequacies plague inmate wards,” 12/16/01, and “Inmates
pay price for others’ inattention,” 12/19/01.
11 For further statements identifying and criticizing the conflict of interest see Office of the State Auditor,
“An Audit Report on Managed Care at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice” (January 1998), pp. 7-8.
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Despite the bad publicity, the medical schools have stuck to their desired
arrangement. The American-Statesman series embarrassed the medical school and
university leadership and prompted Mark Yudof, then-chancellor of the University of
Texas System, to promise families of inmates that an independent review would be
carried out.12 Instead, the CMHCC ultimately contracted with the Texas Medical
Foundation, the review and disciplinary organization which had been set up by Texas
doctors as a condition of tort reform legislation. The TMF report, released in January
2005, was a lengthy compendium of statistical information furnished by the medical
schools, which included numerous minor recommendations but no broad generalizations.
Both the House Committee on Corrections and the Sunset Commission addressed the
problems of information and oversight in their reports preceding the 80th Legislature.
The Sunset staff argued that “the lack of information about correctional health care
fosters a perception of secrecy that clouds public confidence in the system,” and proposed
a statute specifying extensive data on offender health care to be reported (including
quality assurance statistics and aggregate statistics on deaths and disease prevalence).13
Whether consciously or not, the Sunset staff’s references to secrecy as a problem to be
overcome appeared to mistake the bug for the feature.
Would the modest swing back toward the values of independent professionalism
in Texas criminal justice be sustained? Could it be detected in any other areas of criminal
justice, or social policy? The selection of case studies in the preceding chapters and the
exclusive focus on sentencing and corrections matters, perhaps questionably, meant that a
12 See Mike Ward and Bill Bishop, “UT calls for independent review of prison medical care it provides,”
Austin American-Statesman, 10/12/02.
13 Sunset Advisory Commission, Staff Report (October 2006), pp. 77-82, quote at 80.
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host of other possible relationships and topics were set aside. In particular, questions of
law enforcement, at the state as well as local level, must be part of any more thorough
study of professionals and professionalization in criminal justice. (Police records are
notoriously sparse, at least in 20th-century Texas, but the appearance of solid scholarship
on the Houston Police Department demonstrates some of the possibilities.14) Divisions
within the legal profession (among prosecutors, defense lawyers, judges, and other
advocates) and between rival professions (doctors and trial lawyers, for example) also
remain to be more seriously explored. But these chapters on sentencing and corrections
serve to raise questions about justice, the professions, and society and politics which
further study may more brightly elucidate.
14 Dwight Watson, Race and the Houston Police Department, 1930-1990: A Change Did Come (College
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